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IITELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



A SYSTEM 



IITELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY: 



BY 



REV. ASA MAHAN, 

PRESIDENT, AND PROFESSOR OF INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY, IN THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE. 



*' How charming is divine philosophy ! 
Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose, 
But musical as is Apollo's lute, 
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets, 
Where no crude surfeit reigns." 



Secontr SStrtttoiu 



NEW YORK 

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 
82 CLIFF STREET. 

18 4 7. 






Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by 

ASA MAHAN, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for 

the S-outhern District of the State of New York. 



DEDICATORY PREFACE. 



The following Treatise presents the sum of a course of 
Lectures, which, for six or eight years past, Ihave been in 
the habit of delivering to successive classes, on the subject 
of Intellectual Philosophy. One thing I may say in relation 
to this subject, without boasting. No class have yet passed 
through this course, without becoming deeply interested in 
the science of Mental Philosophy ; and, in their judgment, 
receiving great benefit from the truths developed, as well as 
from the method of development which was adopted. 
Hence the desire has been very generally expressed by those 
who have attended the course of instruction, as well as by 
others who have become acquainted with the general fea- 
tures of the system taught, to have it presented to the pub- 
lic in a form adapted to popular reading. In conformity to 
such suggestions, as well as to the permanent convictions of 
my own mind, the following Treatise has been prepared. 
In preparing it, it has been my aim to reject light from no 
source whatever from which it could be obtained, and at 
the same time to maintain the real prerogative of manly in- 
dependence of thought. The individuals to whom I feel 
most indebted as a philosopher, are Coleridge, Cousin, and 
Kant — three luminaries of the first order in the sphere of 



IV DEDICATORY PREFACE. 

philosophy. How far proper discriminations have been 
made in the study of their works, the reader will be able to 
judge. With these remarks, I would simply add, that 

to the beloved and honored pupils, who have hith- 
erto passed from under my instruction as a teacher of 
Mental Science, the following Treatise is now af- 
fectionately DEDICATED, WITH THE EXPRESSION OF THE 
FOND HOPE, THAT IN ALL FUTURE CLASSES, WHICH IT MAY 
BE MY PRIVILEGE TO INSTRUCT, I MAY, IN THE LANGUAGE 
OF ANOTHER, " FIND THE SAME LOVE OF PHILOSOPHY, AND 
THE SAME INDULGENCE TO THE PrOFESSOR." ♦ 



i 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. i-AGK 

INTRODUCTION. 

Classification of the Sciences — Object of Mental Philosophy — 
What is to he expected from such Investigations — Mental Phi- 
losophy, as a Science, possible — The Method in conformity to 
which Psychological Researches should be conducted — The 
above the only correct Psychological Method — Utility of this 
Science — State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of 
this Science. 13 



CHAPTER n. 

CLA.SSIFICA.TION OF MENTAL FHENOBIENA AND POWERS. 

Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified — 
Object of Mental Philosophy — Meaning of the words Mental 
Faculties. 23 

CHAPTER HI. 

PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE. 

Principle of Classification — Contingent and necessary Phenome- 
na of Thought defined. 

Ideas of Body aiid Space. 
Idea of Body contingent — Idea of Space necessary — Other cha- 
racteristics of these two Ideas — Idea of Body relative — Idea of 
Space absolute — Idea of Body implies that of Limitation — Idea 
of Space implies the absence of Limitation — Idea of Body, a sen- 
sible representation — Idea of Space a pure rational conception. 



nil CONTENTS. 

Ideas of Succession, and Time, or Duration. 
Idea of Succession contingent — The Idea of Time necessary—- 
Other Characteristics of these Ideas. 

Ideas of the Finite and of the Infinite. 
Remarks of Locke — Characteristics of these Ideas — Idea of Fi- 
nite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary and 
absolute. 

Ideas of Mental Phenomena, and of Personal Identity. 
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative — Idea of Per- 
sonal Identity necessary — Necessary ideas distinguished as con- 
ditional and unconditional. 

Ideas of Phenomena and Substance. 
Idea of substance explained — Idea of Phenomena contingent and 
relative — that of Substance necessary — Our Ideas of Substance 
not obscure, but clear and distinct. 

Ideas of Events and Cause. 
The idea of Events contingent and relative ; that of Cause ne- 
cessary — Theory of Dr. Brown and others — Observations on Mr. 
Dugald Stewart. 

Idea of Power. 
Conclusion of the present Analysis 



CHAPTER IV. 

APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

Logical and Chronological order of Ideas. 
Logical order — Chronological order. 

Pnmary Intellectual Facidiies presupposed by the preceding .Analysis. 
These Faculties why called Primary — Also called Intuitive Fa- 
culties — Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each other 
— Importance of the Truths above elucidated — Classification of 
Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant 



CHAPTER V. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness Defined — Self- Consciousness conditioned on Rea- 
son, but not a function of Reason — Natural, or spontaneous, and 
philosophical, or reflective Consciousness— Process of classifi- 
cation and Generalization in Reflection, illustrated — Functions 
of Consciousness — Necessity of relying implicitly upon the 
testimony of Consciousness — Consciousness, a distinct func- 
tion or faculty of the Intellect — Theory of Dr. Brown 49 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VI. 



To be distinguished from Sensation — Spontaneous and voluntary 
determination of Sense — Mental process in Perception — Organs 
of Sense, and the knowledge conveyed by each — Error of Dr. 
Brown — Objections of Perception — Common and Philosophic 
Doubts in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations 
of Sense and Consciousness — The Province of Philosophy — 
Comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Con- 
sciousness — Theory of External Perception — Theory Verified — 
Theories of External Perception formed by Philosophers — Rea- 
sons for these Theories — Objections to these Theories. 

Distinction of Qualities as Primary and Secondary • 



CHAPTER Vn. 

SECONDARY FACULTIES. 

Understanding — Notions Particular and General 

Elements of which Notions are constituted. 
Contingent Elements — Necessary Elements — Substance and 
Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions — Evolution of 
these Lavi^s not Arbitrary — Time and Space. 

Errors of Kant. 
1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Noumena to 
Time and Space — 2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to 
Phenomena— II. Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Dif- 
ference — III. The idea of a Whole, as including its Parts, or 
Parts in reference to the Whole. 

Kanfs Anatomy of Pure Reason. 
IV. The Category of Quantity — The Category of Quantity dis- 
tinct from that previously considered — V. Of Quality — VI. Of 
Relation— VII. Of Modality— VIII. The Idea of Law— Concep- 
tions as distinguished from Notions — A Fact often attending 
Perception — Mistake of Mr. Stewart — Notions and Conceptions 
characterized as complete or incomplete, true or false — Mistake 
of Coleridge in respect to the Understanding 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 

Abstraction— Abstract Notions, what, and how formed ? — General 
Notions, how formed. 



: CONTENTS. 

Classification. 
Forms of Classification— Classification, in what sense arbitrary 
— Genera and Species. 

Generalization. 
Rules in respect to Generalization — The Term General some- 
times used in a limited sense. 

Gemral Terms. 
Theory of the Realists — Theory of the Nominalists— Theory of 
the Conceptualists. 

Understanding and Judgment distinguished. 
Distinction between the Understanding and Judgment verified — 
Observations of Kant — Relations of the Understanding and 
Judgment 



CHAPTER IX. 

ASSOCIATION. 

Term defined — Term Association, why preferred— The Associat- 
ing Principle not without Law — Law of Association stated and 
defined — Existence of Law, w^hen established — The present Hy- 
pothesis, when established as the Law of Association — Apriori 
Argument — All the Phenomena referred to the commonly re- 
ceived Laws, can be explained on this Hypothesis — Phenomena 
exist which can be accounted for on this, and no other Hypothe- 
sis — Facts connected with particular Diseases — This Hypothe- 
sis established and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of As- 
sociation — Argument summarily stated — Explanatory Remarks 
— Reasons why different objects excite similar Feelings in our 
Minds — Application of the Principles above illustrated — Ground 
of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws of Associ- 
ation — Action of the associating Principle in different Individu- 
als — Influence of Habit — Standards of Taste and Fashion — Vi- 
cissitudes in respect to such Standards — Peculiarities of Genius 
associated with Judgment, or correct Taste — Influence of Writ- 
ers and Speakers of splendid Genius, but incorrect Taste — 
Danger of vicious Associations — Unrighteous Prejudices, how 
justified — Giving Individuals a bad Name, spreading false Re- 
ports, 8ec. — Influence of the associating Principle in perpetuat- 
ing existing mental Characteristics 98 



CHAPTER X. 

MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 

Terms defined — States of Mind entering into and connected with 
these Processes — The above statement verified — Principle on 
which Objects are remembered with Ease and Distinctness — 
Deep and distinct Impressions, on what conditioned — Diversity 



CONTENTS. 

of Powers of Memory, as developed in different Individuals — 
Philosophic Memory — Local Memory — Artificial Memory. 

Miscellaneous Topics. 
A ready and retentive Memory— The vast and diverse Power of 
Memory possessed by different Individuals — Improvement of 
Memory — Memory of the Aged — Duration of Memory 1 



CHAPTER XL 

IMAGINATION. 

Definitions of distinguished Philosophers — Objections to the above 
Definitions — Another definition proposed — Imagination and 
Fancy distinguished — Another Definition of the term Fancy. 

Imagination and Fancy Elucidated. 
Preliminary Remarks— Elucidation. 

Charactenstics of the Creations of the Imagination. 

1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one Whole — 

2. Blending the Diverse — 3. Blending Opposites — 4. Blending 
things in their Nature alike — 5. Combining Numbers into Unity, 
and dissolving and separating Unity into Number — 6. Adding 
to, or abstracting some Quality from, an Object— 7. Blending 
with external objects the Feelings which they excite in us — 
8. Abstracting certain Characteristics of Objects, and blending 
thena into Harmony with some leading Idea — 9. Throwing the 
fleeting Thoughts, Sentiments, and Feelings, of our past Exist- 
ence, into one beautiful Conception. 

Remarks on the preceding Analysis. 
Remark of Coleridge. 

Creations of the Imagination, why not always Fictions. 
Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry — Law of Taste 
relative to the Action of the Imagination. 

Imagination the organ of Ideals. 
Idea defined — Ideal defined—Ideals, Particular and General — 
Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and the 
Sublime — Ideals not fixed and changeless, like Ideas — Ideals the 
Foundation of Mental Progress — Ideals in the Divine and Hu- 
man Intelligence. 

Action of the Judgment relative to that of the Ima^nation. 
^ Taste defined — Productions of the Imagination when not regu- 
lated by correct Jud^ent or good Taste. 

Productions in which the action of the Fancy or Imagination is most con- 
spicuous. 

Combinations of Thought denominated Wit, as distinguished from those 
resulting from thepropei- action of the Imagination or Fancy. 
Bombast — Burlesque — Sarcasm. 



CONTENTS. 



Propriety of using the Imagination and Fancy in Works of Fiction. 
False Idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity with the 
popular Fictitious Writings of the Day — Imagination and Fan- 
cy — How improved 



CHAPTER XII. 



Reason defined — Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as distin- 
guished from the Understanding. 

Secondary Ideas of Reason — Idea of Right and Wrong. 
This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed — 
Idea of Right and Wrong necessary — Ideas dependent on that 
of Right and Wrong, &c. — Chronological Antecedent to the 
Idea of Right and Wrong, &c. 

Idea of Fitness. 
This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong, &c. 

Idea of the Useful^ or the Good. 
The Summum Bonum. 

Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong and of the Useful 
to each other. 
This purely a Psychological Question — Nature of Virtue — 
Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility — Relation of 
Willing to Happiness — Conclusion necessarily resulting from 
the Facts above stated — Argument Expanded — Additional Con- 
siderations — Argument stated in view of another Example — Re- 
sult of the Discussion thus far — Other important Considerations 
— The above A'-gument of universal Application — Obligation 
not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies of Right or 
Wrong Willing — Another General Consideration — Mutable 
Actions. 

Ideas of Liberty and Necessity. 
Ideas defined — These Ideas Universal and Necessary — Idea of 
Liberty realized only in the Action of the Will — Chronological 
Antecedents of these Ideas. 

Idea of the Beautiful and Sublime. 
Opinions of Philosophers — Considerations indicating the exist- 
ence in the Mind of Ideas of Reason, designated by the terms 
Beautiful and Sublime— Objection to the Universality of these 
Ideas — Chronological Antecedent of these Ideas — Illustration 
from Cousin — Explanatory Remarks. 

Idea of Harmony — RefleciUks. 
Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas — Poetry de- 
fined. 

Idea of Ti-uth. 
Idea defined — Chronological Antecedent of this Idea. 

Idea of Law. 
Citations from Coleridge— Coleridge's Definition of Law — 
Law, Subjective and Objective— Conclusion from the above — 



CONTENTS. XIU 

Chronological Antecedent to this Idea — Apparent Mistake in 
respect to Law — Theory and Law distinguished — Nature of 
Proof — Fundamental and superficial Thinkers. 

The Philosophic Idea. 
Chronological Antecedent of tliis Idea. 
First Truths^ or Necessary Pnnciples of Reason, as distinguished 
from Contingent Principles. 
Contingent and Necessary Principles defined and distinguished 
— First Truths defined — Kind of Proof of which Necessary 
Ideas or Principles admit — Statement illustrated by a Refer- 
ence to the Idea of God — Idea and Principle of Reason distin- 
guished—Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions. 

Idea of Science, Pure and Mixed. 
Idea of Science defined — Pure Sciences — Mixed Sciences. 

Function of Reason denominated Conscience. 
Conscience defined — General Remarks — Objection — Term 
Conscience as used in the Scriptures. 

General Remarks pertaining to Reason. 
Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties — Through 
Reason Man is a Religious Being — Reason common to all 
Men — Error of Coleridge — Paralogism of Cousin — Transcen- 
dentalism — Reason, in what sense Impersonal— Reason, in 
what sense identical in all Men 156 



CHAPTER XIIL 

RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS. 

Intellectual Faculties enumerated — Influence of the above Dis- 
tinctions — Errors of Kant — Classification of Mental Faculties. 

Remarks upon the relations of Intuitions to one another. 
Intuitions cannot be opposed to each other — DilFerent Intuition 
Faculties cannot contradict each other — The logical Conse- 
quents of no one Intuition can be in opposition to any primary 
Intuition, nor to the logical Consequents of the same — Error of 
Kant and Coleridge. 

Secondary Facidties. 
Understanding — The Judgment — The Associating Principle — 
Imagination 200 

CHAPTER XIV. 

SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTELLI- 
GENCE. 

General characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of our 
Knowledge of the same — Distinct Apprehension conditioned 
on Attention — Spontaneous DeveLopment of the Intelligence — 
Characteristics of this Spontaneity — Characteristics Illustrated. 



XIV CONTENTS. 

Additional Remarks and Illustrations. 
Categories of Spontaneous and Reflective Reason — Relation of 
Observation and Reflection to this original Spontaneity — Con- 
fidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason, how awakened — 
Use of the Common Demonstrations of the Divine Existence 
— Conclusions arrived at by a process of Reasoning, when false 
— Reasons of the Diversity and Difference of the Opinions of 
Men — Sources of Error. 210 

CHAPTER XV. 

OKIGIN OF IDEAS. 

The two Schools in Philosophy — Principles of Locke — Theory 
of Kant — Principles of Locke tested with reference to Neces- 
sary Ideas — Principles of Locke fail in respect to Understand- 
ing-conceptions — Error of Kant — Position of Kant true in 
respect to Understanding-conceptions and Affirmations of the 
Judgment. 

Tni£ Explanation. 
Intuitions — Notions — The Judgment — Associating Principle 
and the Imagination — Scientific Movement. 

Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated fron 

the Concrete and Particular. 

General Notions — Abstract Notions — Universal and Necessary 

Ideas — Error of Cousin 2U 



CHAPTER XVL 

LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 



Investigation and Reasoning distinguished — Substances, how 
known — Induction of Phenomena, for what purposes made — 
Induction pertaining to particular Substances — Induction for 
purposes of Classification into Genera and Species — Finding a 
General Fact, or Order of Sequence — The Probable and fin- 
probable — Order of Sequence — The Discovery of Universal 
Law. 

Testimony. 
Characteristics of the Statements made by a Witness — Cir- Jj 
cumstances which go to establish the Credibility of a Witness ■I 
— Corroborating Circumstances aside from the Character of ^' 
the Witness — Concurrent Testimony 228 

CHAPTER XVII. 

REASONING. 

The Syllogism the universal form of Reasoning — The above Prin- 
ciple verified — Forms in which the Major Premise appears — 



CONTENTS. XV 

Principles which lie at the . Basis of all Conclusions from a 
Process of Reasoning— Remarks upon these Principles — Re- 
marks on Aristotle's Dictum. 

Differoit kinds of Reasoning. 
Distinctions Elucidated — Distinction between Demonstrative 
and Probable Reasoning — Common Impression in respect to 
the Extent of Demonstrative Reasoning — Method of Proof- 
Real Proof found in no other Method — Sources of Fallacies in 
Reasoning. 

Conception of Logic. 
All Things occur according to Rules — Logic defined — Rela- 
tions of Logic to other Sciences 237 

CHAPTER XVITI. 

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 

The Bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Science, properly 
so called. 

Kanfs distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments. 
Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined and distinguish- 
ed — Errors of Kant in the Application of the above Principles. 
Progress of Transcendental Philosophy since the time of Kant. 
System of Kant — System of Fichte — System of Schelling — 
System of Hegel. 

Remarks upon the Systems above Presented. 
Difficulties in the System of Kant — Difficulties inherent in the 
Systems of Fichte and Schelling — Difficulties in the System of 
Hegel — Difficulties common to all the Systems. 

Modern Transcendentalism — Eclecticism of Cousin. 
System stated — Remarks upon this System. 

Common Sense. 
Common Sense defined — Common Sense a Standard of Truth 
— Philosophic Principles, why rejected by the Mass of Man- 
kind — Dictates of Common Sense, how known and distinguish- 
ed — Characteristics of Men distinguished for Common Sense. 

Characteristics of the German Mind. 
Characteristic stated — Ground of these Peculiarities 249 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INTELLIGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF 
THE BRUTE. 

Brute Instincts classified — Manifestations of Instinctive Intelli- 
gence — Principle on which the Argument is based — Points of 
Resemblance between the Man and the Brute — Hypotheses on 
which these common Facts may be explained — Points of Dis- 
similarity between Man and the Brute — Facts applied — Gene- 
ral Remarks. = 280 



XVl CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XX. 

MATTER AND SPIRIT. 

Principle on which the Argument is based — The Soul, how 
revealed to itself— Matter, how revealed— Our Knowledge of 
the Existence of Matter and Spirit equally certain— Principle 
on which the Argument rests re-stated — Qualities of these two 
Substances — The Argument— Common Objections 294 



CHAPTER XXI. 

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 

Preliminary Considerations — Principles on which the present 
Argument Rests— Direct Argument— Future Retributions 298 



CHAPTER XXII. 

THE IDEA OF GOD. 

Preliminary Considerations. 

God, the Unconditioned and Absolute Cause of all that Conditionally 

Exists. 
This Principle holds, whether the conditioned be conceived of 
as Finite or Infinite. 

Logical Consequents of the Principle above Elucidated. 
Eternity — Freedom as opposed to Necessity — Intelligence — J 
Spirituality— Moral Agency— The Exercise of Moral Govern- I 
ment, in Harmony with the Law of Justice and Goodness. " 

God, the Infinite and Perfect. 
This a First Truth of Reason — Does Creation indicate the 
Character of God as Infinite and Perfect ? — Reasons why these 
Elements have not yet been designated — Foundation of the 
Conviction that God is both Infinite and Perfect — Nature of the 
Arguments above adduced — Relation of the Idea of God above 
elucidated to all other Ideas of Him. 

The idea of a System of Theology. 
Theology defined — Postulate, Axioms, &c., in Theology — Eand 
of Proof pertaining to each particular Attribute — This science 
to be evolved in the light of the Works of God, Material and 
Mental, and of the Teachings of Inspiration— Theology, Natu- 
ral and Revealed — Difference between INIyster}' and Absurdity 
in Theology — Absurdity defined — Mystery defined — Mystery 
and Absurdity defined in another form — Fundamental Charac- 
teristics of Real Revelation from God — Revealed Theology 
defined — Defects of Method in the common Systems of Theo- 
logy — Use of the common Treatises on Natural Theology — 
Conclusion , 306 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER I. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Classificaticn of the Sciences. 

All substances may be ran2;ed together under two gen- 
eral divisions, Matter and Mind. This arrangement pre- 
sents a twofold division of the sciences, to wit. Physical and 
Mental ; a division not strictly universal, but sufficiently 
comprehensive for our present purpose. 

Object of Mental Philosophy. 
Mental Philosophy is the science of Mind, and of the 
human Mind in particular. Its object is a correct classifica- 
tion of the phenomena, for the purpose of a full and distinct 
development of the Powers, Susceptibilities, and Laws of the 
human Mind. This department of inquiry being completed, 
Mental Philosophy, as a science, then ascends to an investi- 
gation of the wide field of Moral Obligation, for the purpose 
of developing the extent^ limits^ and grounds of human re- 
sponsibility. 

What is to be expected from such Investigations. 

The field before us is of almost boundless extent. We 
are not, therefore, to expect that any one treatise will pre- 
sent all that may be known of the human Mind. All that I 
hope to accomplish, is to introduce the inquirer to the science, 



14 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and give to his inquiries in respect to it, a right direction. 
His own investigations will then lead him to exhaustless 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge. 

Mental Philosophy^ as a Science^ possible. 
Every substance in existence is known, and can be known 
by us, through and only through its respective phenomena. 
This, with us, is the changeless condition of knowledge in 
respect to all realities which lie around us in the universe. 
Every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so 
far only as we can know its phenomena. The question, 
then, whether Mental Philosophy is possible to us, depends 
wholly upon this, whether the Mind, in the action of its varied 
powers and susceptibilities, is so revealed to itself, that it 
can know its owm operations or phenomena ? To this ques- 
tion, but one answer can be given. We are so constituted, 
that we have a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior 
of our minds. This power, or law of our Mental Faculties, 
explain the fact in whatever manner we please, is denomi- 
nated Consciousness, which is a faithful witness of whatever 
passes within us. On the authority of Consciousness, all 
men do and must rely. Here Scepticism itself assumes the 
garb of positive faith : for in the language of Descartes, " let 
a man doubt everything else, he cannot doubt that he doubts ;" 
and " he cannot doubt that he doubts " for this reason, that 
he cannot but rely, in some form or other, upon the testimo- 
ny of his own Consciousness. 

Not only are all things which pass within us given as phe- 
nomena of Consciousness, but we have also the power of 
retaining these phenomena under the eye of the mind, until 
we have fully resolved them into their original elements, and 
marked their characteristics. This power or exercise of the 
mind is denominated reflection, and is conditioned on the 
Will. 

Mental Philosophy then becomes possible for the same 
reasons, and on the same conditions that physical science, or 
Natural Philosophy is possible. Facts equally undeniable, 
and equally distinct and palpable, are given as the foundation 
of both sciences. All that is required in either instance, is, 
that our researches be conducted upon right principles — that 
we introduce into our investigations nothing but actual facts, 
— that these facts be correctly arranged and classified, — and 
that none but legitimate conclusions be drawn from them. 



INTflODUCTlON, 15 



The Method in conformity to which Psychological Researches 
should he conducted. 
Having shown that Mental Philosophy, as a science, is 
possible, we will now contemplate the question in respect to 
the Method which should be adopted in conducting our in- 
vestigations. Every philosopher commences his inquiries 
in conformity to a certain ideal of which he has conceived, 
and which he has assumed as involving the most perfect 
method in conformity to which such investigations can be 
conducted. A remark of Cousin on this point demands spe- 
cial attention. " As is the method of a philosopher, so will 
be his system ; and the adoption of a method, decides the 
destiny" of a philosophy."" It becomes us, therefore, at the 
threshold of our inquiries, to stop, and with great care, de- 
termine the Method in conformity to which we are to inves- 
tigate the powers, susceptibilities, and laws of the mysterious 
substance before us. The following Principles I would pro- 
pose as involving and announcing the true Method to be 
adopted. 

1. We should present to our own minds, with great dis- 
tinctness, the question, what are the facts which lie at the 
basis of all our conclusions in respect to this science ; facts 
upon which all legitimate conclusions do and must rest ? 
They are, as all must adm.it, the facts which lie under the 
eye of Consciousness. But what are these facts ? In other 
words, what are the sole and exclusive objects of Conscious- 
ness ^ Not, surely, as Cousin observes, the " external world, 
or its Creator — not the substance, nature, essence, or Facul- 
ties of the soul itself." They are the soul in its manifesta- 
tions — in the exercise of its various Faculties. Upon these 
all our conclusions in regard to the nature of these Faculf-ies, 
as well as upon the nature of the soul itself, and of all other 
objects are based. As the sole basis of physical science, we 
have the phenomena of perception. As the basis of Psycho- 
logy, we have the phenomena of Consciousness, and these 
only. As we know the mind only through its phenomena, 
or manifestations, so all legitimate conclusions in respect to 
it must be revealed and affirmed by these manifestations. 
Hence I remark, 

2. That in pursuing our investigations according to the 
true Psychological Method, we shall commence with no 
questions in respect to the nature or essence of mind, whether 



16 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

it is material or immaterial, or in respect to its various pow- 
ers, or functions, nor in respect to the origin of mental phe- 
nomena. All such questions are to be adjourned until we 
have observed and marked the characteristics^ and classified 
the phenomena, or operations which now^ in our present 
state of mental development, lie under the eye of Conscious- 
ness. The question, in regard to the origin of menial phe- 
nomena, involves, as its foundation and starting point, a 
knowledge of such phenomena as they now exist. Other- 
wise we are inquiring after the origin of that of the nature 
of which we are profoundly ignorant. So also, if, before we 
have attained this knowledge, we study and attempt the 
resolution of questions pertaining to the nature or essence of 
the mind, or in respect to its Faculties, we violate the fun- 
damental law of all correct philosophizing, to wit : that sub- 
stances are known and are to be studied only through their 
phenomena. The true Psychological Method does not neg- 
lect any legitimate questions in respect to ontology, or the 
origin of mental phenomena. It simply adjourns these, till 
anoiher preliminary department of inquiry has been com- 
pleted. 

In pursuing our inquiries in respect to mental phenomena, 
and in respect to the characteristics of particular phenomena, 
two rules of fundamental importance present themselves, — 
to wit : Suppose or assume, as real, nothing which does not 
exist — and omit, or disregard, nothing which does exist. 

3. The phenomena which lie under the eye of Conscious- 
ness clearly indicate a diversity of mental powers, or func- 
tions. In conformity to the true Psychological Method, a 
fundamental aim of the Mental Philosopher will be, to adopt 
those principles of classification by which these different 
powers or functions shall be distinctly revealed to the Mind. 
Two self-evident principles will guide him in determining 
the different powers or functions of the Mind. Phenomena, 
in their fundamental characteristics alike, are to be attributed 
to one and the same Faculty. Phenomena, in their funda- 
mental characteristics unlike, suppose a diversity of powers 
or functions. Hence the vast importance of classification 
with exclusive reference to fundamental characteristics. 

4. Amid the endlessly diversified phenomena of Con- 
sciousness, there are, in the depths of the Mind, particular 
phenomena, which reveal the Laws which govern the action 
of the different meatal powers. One of the principal aims 



INTRODUCTION, 17 

of the Mental Philosopher, in conformity to a correct Psy- 
chological Method, will be, to fix upon, and develope those 
facts, or phenomena, by which the Laws of thought, feeling, 
and action, are revealed. No department of inquiry in the 
wide field of Mental science is of greater importance than 
this. 

5. Having by careful reflection, and in conformity to cor- 
rect principles, ascertained, classified, and arranged the phe- 
nomena of the Mind, as they now lie under the eye of Con- 
sciousness, a correct Psychological Method would then lead 
U£ to move the important questions pertaining to the origin 
of these phenomena, to Ontology, and to the nature, extent, 
limits, and grounds of Moral Obligation. This completes the 
circle of investigations in the w^ide domain of Mental Science. 
Much will be done for Philosophy, if this circle is completed 
according to the method above developed. 

The above the only correct Psychological Method. 

A moment's reflection will convince us, that this is the phi- 
losophical, and I may add, the only philosophical Method. 
The powers of nature, external and internal, are known to 
us only in their manifestations, or through their respective 
phenomena. These manifestations must, of course, be 
known, or we must remain in total ignorance of the powers 
themselves. 

This is the universal Method, the Method which lies at 
the basis of all real science pertaining to Matter or Mind. In 
pursuing our investigations in strict conformity to the princi- 
ples of this Method, we shall be conducted to no conjectural 
conclusions, but to certain knowledge ; provided we have 
m.arked with correctness existing phenomena, and have pro- 
ceeded logically from facts thus given, to our conclusions. It 
puts us, to say the least, upon the right road to knowledge. 
If we " fall out by the way," the fault will be our own, and 
not that of the Method adopted. 

If we arrive at correct conclusions, we shall, also, in the 
light of the Method pursued, understand and be able to assign 
the reasons for those conclusions, a most important attain- 
ment in the progress of mental development. If, on the 
other hand, we adopt any false conclusions, our Method it- 
self presents the best means for their correction. No indi- 
vidual will long remain in the embrace of any important 



18 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

error, who has adopted a correct method of investigation, 
and who rigidly adheres to the principles of that method. 

Utility of this Science* 

But little need be said to impress the inquirer with a con- 
viction of the importance of our present investigations. 

Mental Philosophy is the science of self-reflection. It 
teaches us to know ourselves, in our relations to God, and to 
the universe around us. 

The importance of this science may likewise be seen, in 
the light of its relations to all other departments of human 
investigation. " Whatever be the object of inquiry," says 
Cousin, " God or the world, beings the most near or remote, 
you neither know or can know them, but upon one condi- 
tion, namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in gen- 
eral ; and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of 
them except in proportion to your general faculty of know- 
ledge. Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or 
the lowest thing, your knowledge in the last result rests, 
both in respect to its extent and its legitimacy, upon the 
reach and validity of that faculty, by whatever name you 
call it, Spirit, Reason, Mind, Intelligence, Understanding." 
One of the first and great inquiries of man, then, is the na- 
ture, extent, and validity of this faculty. This is Intellectual 
Philosophy. This is Psychology, a science, which indeed 
is not the whole of Philosophy, but " must be allowed to be 
its foundation and starting point." 

By developing the laws of human belief, and by habituat- 
ing the mind to contemplate and investigate causes through 
their respective phenomena, this science also furnishes a 
light, to guide our investigations in every other science, and 
presents the strongest possible motives to lead us onward. 

Nor is its connection with morality and religion less im- 
portant and influential. Indeed, here lies its chief import- 
ance. The development of the laws of evidence, will place 
in a clear light, the ground of our assent to the Divine au- 
thority of Christianity, so far as external evidence is con- 
cerned. A development of the powers and susceptibilities 
of the mind itself, will lead us to a correct understanding of 
the bearing of the internal evidence of Christianity. A de- 
velopment of the grounds of moral oblio;ation will lead us to 
perceive distinctly, and to feel deeply, our obligation to obey 
the moral precepts of Christianity. Every truth, every 



INTRODUCTION. 19 

principle and precept of Christianity, supposes some one or 
more faculties or susceptibilities of the mind, to which they 
are addressed. A distinct knowledge of these faculties and 
susceptibilities, places those truths and principles in the 
clearest possible light before the mind. 

One other consideration will show clearly the important 
bearing which our present inquiries have upon religion. 
The study of Mind, according to the Method above announc- 
ed, implies, as its foundation and starting point, a careful in- 
vestigation of mental phenomena. Among these phenomena 
ideas occupy a very important place, and among the most 
fundamental and important of all our ideas are the concep- 
tions of the infinite and perfect, that is, of God, of eternity, 
of immortality, of moral obligation, and of future retribu- 
tions. In developing the characteristics, origin and grounds 
of these ideas, we are determining our convictions in regard 
to many of the most important and fundamental truths of re- 
ligion. We are moulding and forming convictions which 
will, and must determine the meaning, which we shall attach 
to the most important portions of the sacred volume itself. 

If we should appeal to facts, we should find the fullest 
verification of all that is said above. All the forms of cor- 
rupt Christianity which have appeared for the last eighteen 
centuries, all the false religions which have ever cursed the 
earth, all the forms of infidelity and scepticism, which the 
seathings of human depravity have, in any age, thrown upon 
the surface of society, have had their foundation in systems 
of false Philosophy. No maxim is more fully verified, by 
universal observation than this. As is a man's Philosophy 
so is his Theology. The changeless laws of our being ren- 
der us, in all depa-^tments of research and action, philosophic 
beings. In religion, we can no more be exempt from the 
influence of Philosophy, than in all other departments of in- 
vestigation. Suppose we professedly, as some have done, 
repudiate all Philosophy, and approach the Sacred Volume, 
to be taught of God, irrespective of any philosophic specula- 
tions. What is this but the enunciation of a peculiar sys- 
tem of Philosophy — a system which, after all, will deter- 
mine, in many essential respects, the meaning which we shall 
attach to the most important responses of the Sacred Ora- 
cles. God hath joined Philosophy and Religion together. 
We do violence to the nature which he has given us, when 
we attempt to put them asunder. False Philosophy is the 



20 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

mother of false religions. A correct Philosophy is the hand- 
maid of true Religion. 

In short, in every condition and relation in life, next to the 
wisdom, which, by direct inspiration, " cometh from above," 
is a correct and comprehensive knowledge of Mental Philo- 
sophy, important to man. To the citizen, this science is 
useful by giving him the reasons of the duties devolved upon 
him in all the relations of life. To the theologian, it will be of 
great use, by enabling him not only to understand correctly 
the truths and principles of Christianity, but also to present 
them in such a manner that he will " commend himself to 
every man's conscience in the sight of God." How true 
also is the sentiment advanced by the great philosopher of 
England, to wit, that no man is qualified to fill the sphere of 
an enlightened statesman, who has not thought much and 
profoundly upon the infinite, the just, the right, the true, and 
the good. 

State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this 
Science. 

It remains to speak upon one topic more, the spirit requi- 
site to a successful prosecution of this science. 

The first requisite that I mention is this, a deep convic- 
tion of the importance of the science. We pursue nothing 
with energy which, to our minds, does not possess an impor- 
tance demanding the exertion of our entire powers. If I 
could impress the inquirer with a due conviction of the im- 
portance of our ])resent investigations, and could excite in 
him a purpose of corresponding inflexibility to master the 
science, I should not have any unpleasant apprehensions in 
respect to the result. 

I mention, in connection with the above, another requisite, 
to wit, a love of the science for its own sake ; that is, for 
what presents itself to the mind, as intrinsic in the science 
itself, as well as an account of its relative value. That 
which strongly appeals, not only to our convictions of what 
is valuable, but to the sensibilities of our nature, we readily 
pursue with the most energy and untiring perseverance. 
But two things are requisite to excite in any mind this love 
for the science under consideration — a proper conviction of 
the importance of the science, and familiarity with its great 
truths and principles. We are naturally such philosophic 
beings, that almost nothing else delights us so much as phi- 



INTRODUCTION. 21 

losophic truths and principles, when we once become ac- 
quainted with them. 

Another essential requisite is the habit or spirit of self-rp.- 
Jiection. All legitimate conclusions pertaining to this science 
rest upon the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness. 
To know these facts, that eye must be fixed with long and 
intense gaze upon them, till their fundamental characteristics 
are distinctly revealed. Without the spirit of self-reflection 
the inquirer will make but poor progress in Mental Philo- 
sophy. With it, he will " go from strength to strength." 

The inquirer who would make progress in this science, 
must also be deeply imbued with a teachable spirit. This is 
the true and only philosophic spirit. Under its influence the 
mind "cries after knowledge, and lifts up its voice for under- 
standing " " It seeks for her as silver, and searches for her 
as for hid treasures." " Wisdom enters into the heart, and 
knowledge is pleasant to the soul." The love of truth, for 
her own sake, takes full possession of the mind. To " sit 
under her banners," and " dwell in the light of her counte- 
nance," all opinions, all systems and prepossessions, contrary 
to her teachings, are readily sacrificed. Facts are weighed 
with the utmost care for the exclusive purpose of knowing 
their characteristics; and all conclusions, however contrary to 
all preformed theories, are readily admitted, which sustains to 
such facts the relation of logical antecedents or consequents. 
In this state of mind, the student will not fail to " under- 
stand righteousness, and judgment, and equity ; yea, and 
every good path." 

I mention as another indisputable requisite, untiring indus' 
try and perseverance. " There is no roj^al road to know- 
ledge" of any kind ; much less to a knowledge of ourselves. 
Before we attain that high eminence from which the goodly 
mountains, waving forests, verdant hills, luxuriant valleys, 
and majestic rivers of this " land of promise," this " land 
flowing with milk and honey^" shall lie out with distinctness 
beneath the enraptured vision ; we shall find many a tire- 
some wilderness to pass, many a rugged steep to climb, and 
sometimes, perhaps, almost " through the palpable obscure,'' 
will we be compelled to " find out our uncouth way." But 
when that eminence has been attained, no one feels that he 
has " labored in vain, and spent his strength for nought." 
Every individual, who is not fully prepared for the toil of 
hard and tireless thinking, had better abandon this study be- 
2* 



22 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

fore he commences it. Otherwise, in addition to all the 
wretchedness of ignorance, he will be subject to the more 
depressing influence of conscious unworthiness of the pos- 
session of the treasure of knowledge. 

I will allude to but one requisite more — a deeply seri- 
ous stale of mind. In no other state are we prepared for 
deep communion with the mysteries, and for profound con- 
templations of the sublime and majestic creations of truth. 
To walk among her " cloud-capped towers, gorgeous pala- 
ces and solemn temples," and to worship at her shrine, there 
is no place for triflers here. A trifler neither knows him- 
self nor respects himself He is, therefore wholh' unpre- 
pared to inquire for, or appreciate when found, the most mo- 
mentous of all the revelations of truth, those respecting the 
nature, character and relations of himself. 

The individual who commences, and continues to prose- 
cute, his inquiries pertaining to this science, in the spirit 
above descrioed, will find in the end a full reward of his 
labors. The object of the author is not to think for the in- 
quirer, but to enable him to think for himself. 



CHAPTER II. 

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND 
POWERS. 



"All the facts," says Cousin, "which fall under the Con- 
sciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of 
the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental 
facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond 
doubt, are never in reality, solitary, and separate from each 
other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and 
which a careful analysis ought to distinguish without divid- 
ing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life ; these 
three facts are expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO 
THINK, TO ACT." Is this a full and correct classification 
of the phenomena of the human mind ? Are these distinc- 
tions real ? Are all mental phenomena included in these 
fundamental facts ? These questions I answer in the affir- 
mative for the following reasons : 

1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do 
not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental 
operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feel- 
ing, or choice, purpose, or determination .'' 

2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, 
not in degree but in kind. How entirely distinct, for example, 
is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, 
on the one hand, and mental determination, on the other. 
Feehngs, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an 
equal remove from thoughts and mental acts or determina- 
tions. So of the class last mentioned. Choice in every de- 
gree or form makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no ap- 
proach whatever to thoughts or feelings. 

3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the 
above expressions, as actually existing in human Conscious- 
ness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. When 



24 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, 
that I think so and so ; at another that I have particular 
feelings ; and at another still, that I have resolved, or deter- 
mined upon a particular course of conduct ; both alike readily 
apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to 
states of mind perfectly distinct. 

4. In all known languages there are terms employed to 
designate these three classes of phenomena ; terms, each of 
which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either 
of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to 
any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to 
think. We never use it to designate feelings, or mental de- 
terminations of an}^ kind. The terms sensation or emotion 
are never applied to any but the phenomena of feeling. In 
a similar manner we never apply the terms purpose^ willing, 
determining, &c., to the phenomena of thought or feeling, 
but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. 
The existence of such terms undeniably evince, that the dif- 
ferent classes of phenomena, under consideration, are recog- 
nized by universal Consciousness, not only as existing, but 
as entirely distinct from one another. 

5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument present- 
ed in the work, recently published, on the Will. " The 
clearness and particularity with which the universal Intelli- 
gence has marked the distinction under consideration, is 
strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying 
terms in common use, which are applied to each of these 
classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It 
is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously 
applied to all classes of phenomena. There are terms, how- 
ever, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we 
speak oi clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or deter- 
minations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, 
but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also 
speak of inflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feel- 
ings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, 
must the universal Consciousness have marked thouohts, feel- 
ings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distinct from 
one another — phenomena differing not in degree but in kind^^ 

Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified. 

The three fold classification of mental phenomena, above. 

established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of 



MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS. 25 

mental faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from 
one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we desig- 
nate by the terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or 
Sensitivity, and Will. To the Intellect we refer all the 
phenomena of thought^ of every kind, degree, and modifica- 
tion. To the Sensibility we refer all feelinc/s^ such as 
sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will 
we refer all mental determinations y such as volitions^ choices, 
purposes, &c. 

Object of Mental Philosophy. 
The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of 
the phenomena, characteristics, laws, and mutual relation- 
ships and dependencies of these different faculties. 

Meaning of the words Mental Faculties. 

W^hen I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would 
by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma, 
that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated 
from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of 
substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet 
this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and 
dentical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or opera- 
tions, entirely distinct from one another. This diversity of 
capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words 
Mental Faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, 
and willing, are entirely distinct from each other, so we 
speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, 
the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, as distinct faculties 
of the Mind. 

The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself, will, 
at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental 
Faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of 
the Intelligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind en- 
tirely distinct from those of the Sensibility and Will, without 
supposing that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we 
may speak of the different Powers, or Faculties of the 
Intelligence itself, without implying that that Faculty is com- 
posed of a diversity of parts. The term Faculty, whether 
applied to the whole Mind, or to any of the departments of 
the Mind, implies a diversity o^ functions of the same power, 
or substance, and not a diversity of substances, or parts. 



CHAPTER III. 

PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE. 

We are now prepared to enter directly upon the great 
inquiry to be pursued in this Treatise, — the Phenomena, 
Faculties, and Laws of the human Intelligence. As all 
that we know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other 
department of the Mind, is revealed to us through the phe- 
nomena which lie under the eye of Consciousness, the first 
inquiries which now present themselves are, .What are the 
phenomena of thought thus revealed ? What are their fun- 
damental characteristics ? In conformity to what principles 
shall they be classified and arranged % 

Principle of Classification. 
There is one principle, in conformity to which all intellect- 
ual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light 
of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena 
may be very distinctly presented. I refer to the modes in 
which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelli- 
gence. Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and 
separate, the one from the other. Every object of thought 
is conceived of as existing either contingently or of necessity, 
that is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the pos- 
sibility of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived 
of as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its 
non-existence. If we have any conceptions of an object at 
all, we must conceive of it as falling under one or the other 
of these relations. The principle of classification, therefore, 
is fundamental, and of universal application. 

Contingent and necessary Phenomena of Thought defined. 
Every thought, [conception, cognition, or idea, then, by 



IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE. 27 

whatever term we may choose to designate it, all the phe- 
nomena of the Intelligence, may be classed, as contingent, 
or necessary. A conception is contingent, when its object may 
be conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceiving 
of its non-existence. 

An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as 
existing with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence. 

All the phenomena of the InteUigence must, as shown 
above, fall under one or the other of these relations. It 
remains now, to illustrate the principle of classification here 
adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular 
phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining 
to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. In 
the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, 
other important characteristics, aside from those under con- 
sideration, will be developed, while these will be kept prom- 
inently in mind, as the grounds of classification. 



IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE. 

We will commence our analysis with the consideration of 
two prominent ideas, those of body and space. We are to 
contemplate them as they now lie in the Intelligence, in its 
present state of development. That these ideas are in all 
minds, which have attained to any considerable degree of de- 
velopment, there can be no doubt. The question is, what 
are their fundamental characteristics } 

Idea of Body contingent. 

We will begin with the idea of body. Take any one body 
we please, the book, for an example, which lies before us. 
While we conceive of this body, as existing, we can also, 
with perfect readiness, conceive its non-existence. We be- 
lieve, that the time was, when it had no existence, and that 
the time may come, when it will cease to exist. The pow- 
er which brought it into being, may also annihilate it. The 
same holds true of all bodies, of every kind. All objects 
around us, the world itself, and the entire universe we con- 
template as existing with the possibility of, at the same time, 
conceiving of their non-existence. They do exist. They 
may cease to be. They may be annihilated. There is no 



28 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

difficulty of conceiving of these propositions as true. Nor is 
there any perceived contradiction between them. The i'Jea 
of body then is continjent. We always conceive of the object 
of that idea as existing, with the possibility of, at the same 
time, conceiving of its non-existence. 

Idea of Space necessary. 
We now turn to a consideration of the idea of space. We 
can, as shown above, readily conceive of the annihilation of 
all bodies, of the universe itself. But when we have con- 
ceived of this, can we conceive that space, in which the uni- 
verse exists, may be annihilated ? We cannot. We conceive 
of space as a reality, as really existing. Can we conceive of 
it as not being } We cannot. No intelligent being can form 
such a conception. Of this every one is perfectly conscious. 
When we have conceived of the annihilation of this, and of 
all other bodies, of the entire universe itself, let any one at- 
tempt to conceive of the annihilation of space, in which we 
necessarily conceive of all these objects as existing, and he 
will find the formation of such a conception, an absolute im- 
possibility. The idea of space then is necessary. We con- 
ceive of the object of that idea as existing, with the impossi- 
bility of conceiving of its non-existence. 

Other characteristics of these two Ideas. 
It now remains to mark other characteristics of these im- 
portant ideas. The following may be presented as the most 
fundamental. 

Idea of Body relative. 
When we conceive of a body as existing, we necessarily 
conceive, as the condition of its existence, of the existence of 
something else, to wit, space in which body does and must 
exist. If body is, space must be, as the condition of its 
existence. The idea of body, therefore, is relative, that is, 
the existence of the object of that idea necessarily supposes, 
as the condition of its existence, the existence of some- 
thing else. 

Idea of Space absolute. 
When, on the other hand, we conceive of space, we con- 
ceive, as the condition of its existence, of no other reality. 
Space must be, whether anything else exists or not. The 



IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE. 29 

idea of space then is unconditioned, or absolute. The reahty 
of the object of that idea, supposes, as the condition of its 
existence, the existence of nothing else. 

Idea of Body implies that of Limitation. 
We always, also, conceive of body as limited. Under this 
condition, we not only conceive of all particular bodies, but 
of the universe itself. The idea of body then always implies 
that of limitation, in other words body is finite. 

Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation. 
Space, on the other hand, we always necessarily conceive 
of as without limits. Its idea implies the absence of all limita- 
tion. In other words, space is infinite. 

Idea of Body., a sensible representation. 
Once more, when we form a conception of some body, we 
can readily conceive of something else, by which the former 
can be represented. The human countenance, for example, 
can be represented on canvass. The idea of body then, is a 
sensible representation. 

Idea of Space a pure rational conception. 

When, on the other hand, we have formed the idea of 
space, we find, and can conceive of, no existence with which 
the former can be compared. It bears no resemblance what- 
ever to any other object which we know, or of which we 
can form any conception. The idea of space has no more 
resemblance to any other thought, or mental phenomena 
whatever. The idea of space is a pure rational conception. 

The following then may be stated, as the most important 
characteristics of these two ideas. 

1. The idea of body is contingent. That of s})ace is 
necessary. 

2. The idea of body is relative. That of space is uncon- 
ditioned and absolute. 

3. The idea of body implies that of limitation. Or, body is 
finite. The idea of space implies the absence of all limi- 
tation. In other words, space is infinite. 

4. The idea of body is a sensible representation. That of 
space is a pure rational conception. 



30 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION. 

These ideas are in all intelligent minds. No individual, 
whose Intelligence has been developed at all, will fail to 
understand you, when you speak of one event, as having 
happened ; of another, as having succeeded it, and of the fact 
that that succession took place in some definite period of 
time. We will now mark the characteristic of these ideas. 

Idea of Succession contingent. 
You can conceive of some one event as having happened, 
and of another as having succeeded it. In other words, you " 
have the idea of succession. Can you not conceive, that 
neither of these events occurred ? Every individual can 
readily form such a conception. The same holds true of all 
events, of all succession of every kind, and in all time. The 
idea of succession, like that of body, is contingent. 

The Idea of Time necessary. 
But when we have conceived of the total cessation of suc- 
cession, we find it absolutely impossible to conceive that 
there is no time, or duration, in which succession may take 
place. We can no more conceive of the annihilation of time, 
than we can of that of space. The idea of time, then, like 
that of space, is necessary. 

Other Characteristics of these Ideas. 

When we conceive of succession, we necessarily affirm, 
as the condition of its existence, the reality of something 
else, that is, of time, in which succession takes place. The 
idea of succession, like that of body, is relative. 

On the other hand, when we alfirm the reality of time, we 
suppose, as the condition of its existence, the existence of 
nothing else. Time is, and must be, whether anything else 
exists or not. The idea of time, then, is unconditioned and 
absolute. 

Once more ; whenever we can conceive of succession, we 
necessarily conceive of time before, and after it. The idea of 
succession, therefore, implies of that limitation, or succession 
is limited, finite. 

The idea of time, however, implies the absence of all limi- 
tation. Duration never began ; nor will it ever cease to be. 



IDEAS OP THE FINITE AND INFINITE. 31 

In other words, time is infinite. The following are the most 
important and fundamental characteristics of these two ideas. 

1 . The idea of succession is contingent. That of time is 
necessary. 

2. The idea of succession is conditioned, or relative. That 
of time is unconditioned and absolute. 

3. The idea of succession always implies that of limitation. 
Or succession is finite. The idea of time, on the other hand, 
implies that of the absence of all limitation. In other words, 
duration is infinite. 

IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE. 

Bod}' and space, succession and duration, are given to us, 
as we have seen, with the following characteristics : Body 
and succession are limitable ; time and space are illimita- 
ble. In other words, the former are finite, the latter infinite. 
" Now the ideas of the finite and the infinite," as remarked 
by Cousin, " may be detached from the ideas of body and 
succession, time and space, provided we keep in mind the 
subjects from which they are abstracted." 

These ideas then are in the mind. They are also distinct, 
the one from the other. Consequently the one cannot be 
derived from the other. The multiplication of the finite can- 
not give the infinite. Nor by dividing the infinite do we find 
the finite. Being correlative terms, the one necessarily sup- 
poses and suggests the other. The one cannot possibly exist 
in the mind without the other. Yet as above remarked, the 
one is perfectly distinct from the other. 

Nor is one of these ideas less distinct than the other. 
When I speak of the infinite, every one as readily and dis- 
tinctly apprehends my meaning, as when I speak of the 
finite. The following propositions, for example — body is 
limitable ; space is illimitable — are equally intelligible to all 
minds, the one as the other. 

There are other forms in which these ideas appear in the 
Mind, in all of which they sustain, to each other, the same 
relations, and possess the same characteristics. When the 
Mind conceives of power, wisdom or goodness, as imperfect, 
or limitable, or finite, it necessarily conceives of something 
which is and always was. 

If an individual still affirms that he has, in reality, no idea 
of the infinite, we have only to ask him, whether he under- 



32 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

stands the import of the words he employs, when he makes 
such an affirmation ? whether he is not conscious of speaking 
of something, which, in thought, he himself clearly distin- 
guishes from all that is limitabie, or limited ? These ques- 
tions, he will readily answer in the affirmative. In this 
answer he clearly contradicts the affirmation under considera- 
tion. For, if he really, as he affirms, has no idea of the infi- 
nite, he would not know the meaning of the terms he uses, 
nor could he in thought clearly distinguish the infinite, from 
all that is limitabie, or finite. 

If also we have no real or positive idea of the infinite, we 
can have none of time and space, for they are positive ideas, 
and their objects are given in the Intelligence, as positively 
or absolutely infinite. 

Kemarks of Locke. 

Four remarks of Lock, pertaining to the idea of the Infi- 
nite, demand a passing notice. 

His first remark is, that it is an "endlessly growing idea." 
On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite is always fixed. 
Being a simple idea, it must, when once generated in the 
mind, remain there, at all times, one and identical. It may 
become more and more vivid. In the respect under con- 
sideration, however, this idea undergoes no modification 
whatever. Whoever found, since the ideas of infinite space 
and duration were developed in his Mind, that these have 
undergone the least modification, as far as growth is con- 
cerned } 

Again : Locke maintains that the idea of the Infinite is 
obscure. Still it exists, and as a phenomenon of Conscious- 
ness, falls, most legitimately, under the cognizance of the 
philosopher. But in what sense is this idea obscure 1 To 
those faculties of the Intelligence which pertain to the finite, 
it must for ever remain obscure. To that faculty, however, 
which apprehends truths necessary and absolute, it is as plain 
as any other idea whatever. 

According to Locke, also, the idea of the infinite is merely 
a negative idea. "We have," he says, "no positive idea of 
Infinity." This is directly contradicted by the testimony of 
universal Consciousness. Who is not conscious that his 
ideas of God, of space, and time, all of which are given in 
the Intelligence as infinite, are just as positive as any of our 
conceptions whatever. We might also, with the same pro- 



PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 33 

priety, maintain that our conceptions of the finite are ne- 
gative, as that our ideas of the infinite are. Being correla- 
tive ideas, if one is assumed as positive, the other v^ill be 
relatively negative of course. In themselves, however, 
both are alike positive and equally so. 

Once more : " Number, says Locke, '^ affords the clearest 
idea of the infinite." This is to reduce the infinite to the 
finite ; for number, however large, is always limited — that 
is, finite. The multiplication of the finite may call into ex- 
ercise the faculty which apprehends the infinite, and thus 
render our ideas of the latter more distinct and vivid (as all 
acts of attention do) than it otherwise would be. In no 
other sense, however, can such repetitions give us the Infi- 
nite. 

Characteristics of these Ideas. 
Having established the fact, that the idea of the infinite, 
as well as the finite, is in the mind, it now remains to mark 
their respective characteristics. 

Idea of the Finite contingent and relative ; that of the Infinite 
necessary and absolute. 

Whatever substance we conceive of as finite, we cannot 
but regard as existing contingently. We cannot regard it, as 
in its own nature, a necessary existence. Hence, for all that 
we conceive of as finite, we naturally and necessarily inquire 
after a cause. We do not ask the question, had it a cause .'' 
but what caused it ^ An idea of the finite, therefore, is con- 
tingent, and consequently relative. 

On the other hand, whatever we regard as infinite we ne- 
cessarily apprehend as uncaused — that is, as existing by ne- 
cessity. When we trace back any chain of causes and 
effects, for the purpose of finding a first cause, at each suc- 
cessive link we always inquire for its antecedent, till we 
arrive at the Infinite. Here we pause ; here our inquiries 
cease ; here we recognize ourselves at once, as in the pre- 
sence of an existence which is not contingent, but necessary 
and absolute. The idea of the Infinite, therefore, is neces- 
sary and absolute. 

IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 

Every individual believes, that he is now the same being 



34 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. Numberless 
and ever varying phenomena are constantly passing under the 
eye of Consciousness. Many are recalled of which we 
were formerly conscious ; yet they are all referred to the 
same individual subject. Every phenomenon of thought, 
feeling, and willing, of which we are now conscious, which 
we recall as having, in some former period, been conscious 
of, or which we expect to put forth in some future time, is 
given in the Intelligence in this exclusive form — I think, I 
feel, I will ; I did think, I did feel, I did will, so and so. 
The same holds equally true of all similar phenomena which 
we contemplate, as about to occur in future time. What- 
ever the phenomena may be, the same identical I is given as 
its subject. This is what is meant by personal identity. It 
is the unity of our being, of the I or self, as opposed to the 
plurality and ever changing phenomena of Consciousness. 
Having shown that the idea of mental phenomena and of 
personal identity are in the Mind, we will consider their 
characteristics. 

Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative. 
You have a Consciousness of some thought, feeling, or act 
of Will. You remember similar phenomena of which you 
were formerly conscious. You conceive of them as now 
being, or as having been actual realities. Can you not con- 
ceive of them as not being, or as never having taken place } 
You can. Can j^ou conceive of such phenomena as exist- 
ing or having existed, without referring them to some subject ? 
In other words, can you conceive of some thought, feeling, 
or volition as now existing, or as having existed in former 
times, without referring it to some subject, some being which 
thinks, feels, or wills 1 You cannot. All the phenomena 
of Consciousness are contingent and relative. 

Idea of Personal Identity necessary. 
How is it with the idea of personal identity ? You are 
now conscious of some thought, or feeling, or act of Will. 
You recall others, of a similar nature, of which you have 
been formerly conscious. This you refer to one and the 
same subject, the I of Consciousness, as it is sometimes 
called. This reference you and all mankind alike must 
make. This reference mankind universally make in all the 
transactions of life. Under its influence we hold ourselves 



PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE. 35 

and others bound to fulfil contracts made years ago. Under 
its influence, the virtuous are commended and rewarded, and 
the vicious blamed and punished for actions long since per- 
formed. Under its influence we anticipate the retributions 
of eternal justice in a future state for the deeds done in the 
bod3^ Is it possible to avoid making this referenced It is 
not. You cannot possibly conceive of a thought, for ex- 
ample, without referring it to some subject which thinks. 
You cannot be conscious of any mental phenomenon, or 
recall any others of which you were formerly conscious, 
without referring them to one and the same subject, yourself. 
The idea of personal identity, then, is necessary. 

Necessary ideas distinguished as conditional and unconditional. 
Here an important distinction between necessary ideas de- 
mands special attention. When we contemplate the ideas of 
space and duration, for example, we find that the objects of 
these ideas must exist, whether anything else exists or not. 
Those ideas, therefore, are not only necessary, but uncon- 
ditioned and absolute. On the other hand, the ideas of per- 
sonal identity, and of substance and cause, which "we shall 
hereafter consider, are not, in this sense, necessary. They 
are only conditionally necessary. Phenomena being given, 
substance must be. An event being given, the supposition of 
a cause is necessary. Phenomena and events not being given, 
we do not afSrm the existence of substances or causes. The 
phenomena of Consciousness not being given, we do not 
afhrm the reality or identity of the self, the subject of these 
phenomena. Such ideas are conditionally necessary, and not 
like those of space and time, not only necessary, but uncon- 
ditioned and absolute. 

IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE. 

Idea of substance explained. 
If the observations which have been made upon the idea 
of personal identity, have been distinctly understood, the 
characteristics of the idea of substance will be readily appre- 
hended. All the phenomena of Consciousness and Memory 
are, as we hav^e seen, by a necessary law of our being, refer- 
red to one and the same subject- The phenomena are acci- 
dents, perpetually changing. The subject, however, remains 
the same. Now, in the language of Cousin, " Being, one 



36 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and identical, opposed to variable accidents, to transitory 
phenomena, is substance." But thus far we have only per- 
sonal substance. The same principle, however, applies 
equally to all external substances. Through the medium of 
our senses, such objects are given to us as being possessed of 
a great variety of qualities, and as existing in a great variety 
of states. The qualities and states, which are perpetually 
varying, we necessarily refer to one and the same subject, 
a subject which remains one and identical, amid the endless- 
ly diversified phenomena which it exhibits. This is sub- 
stance. 

Idea of Phenomena contingent and relative — that of Sub' 
stance necessary. 

Now as it is with our ideas of the phenomena of Con- 
sciousness and personal identity, so it is with our ideas of 
external phenomena and external substance. The former is 
contingent and relative ; the latter is necessary. When any 
phenomenon appears, we can readily conceive that it had not 
appeared. Its appearance also we can admit, only on the 
supposition of something else, to wit, substance, to which 
this appearance is necessarily referred. Our ideas of phe- 
nomena, therefore, are contingent and relative. 

On the other hand, the idea of substance, relatively to phe- 
nomena, is necessary. Phenomena being given, substance 
must be. It is impossible for us to conceive of the former 
without the latter. 

Our ideas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distinct. 

According to Locke, "we have no clear idea of substance 
in general." This idea also, he represents, as " of little use 
in philosophy." In reply, it may be said, that our idea of 
substance is just as clear and important, as those of time, 
space, and personal identity. Of this every one is conscious. 
The same function of the Intelligence which apprehends one 
of these ideas, apprehends them all. Take away the power 
to apprehend one, and the power to apprehend every other of 
these ideas is annihilated. Philosophy itself also becomes 
an impossibility. How could we reason philosophically about 
ourselves, in the absence of the idea of personal identity 1 
Equally impossible would it be, to reason about objects exter- 
nal to us, in the absence of the idea of substance. This and 
kindred ideas, instead of being " of little use in philosophy/' 



EVENTS AND CAUSES. 31* 

are, in reality, the foundation of all our explanations of phe- 
nomena, external and internal. 

We often hear individuals, in expatiating upon the great 
ignorance of man, affirming, that all we ''know of realities in 
and around us, is their phenomena. Of the substances them- 
selves, we know nothing." In repl}'' to such rhapsodies, it 
may be said, that our knowledge of every substance of every 
kind, is just as clear, distinct, and extensive, as our know- 
ledge of its phenomena. In phenomena, substances stand re- 
vealed, the substance being as its phenomena. In the phe- 
nomena of thought, for example, we know ourselves, as think- 
ing beings, or substances, our powers being as the thoughts 
w^hich they generate. Our knowledge of the powers of 
thought, is just as distinct as that of thought itself. The 
same holds true, in respect to all substances, material, and 
mental. 



IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE. 

The universe within and around us, presents the constant 
spectacle of endlessly diversified and ever changing phenome- 
na. Some of these are constantly conjoined, in the relation 
of ^^ immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence." 
The connection between others is only occasional. In refer- 
ence to events of the former class, the mind judges, that the 
relation between them is not only that of antecedence and 
consequence, but of cause and effect. In reference to every 
event, however, whether its antecedent is perceived or not, 
we judge that it had a cause. This judgment is universaly 
extending to all events, actual and conceivable. It is abso- 
lutely impossible for us to conceive of an event without a 
cause. Let any one make the effort to form such a concep- 
tion, and he will find that he has attempted an impossibihty. 

Here it should be noticed, that we do not affirm that 
every effect has a cause. That would be mere tautology. 
It would be equivalent to the affirmation, that whatever is 
produced by a cause, is produced by a cause. All this might 
be true, and the proposition, every event has a cause, be 
false, notwithstanding. 

The idea of Events contingent and relative ; that of Cause 
necessary. 
The relation between the idea of an event, and that of a 



38 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cause, may be readily pointed out. Whenever the mind 
witnesses, or is conscious of, the occurrence of an event, 
it apprehends that event as contingent and relative. It might 
or might not have happened. There is no impossibility in 
making these different suppositions. Tiie occurrence of an 
event also necessarily supposes something else, to wit, a 
cause. On the other hand, no event uncaused can possibly 
be conceived to have taken place. The idea of an event, 
then, is contingent and relative. The idea of cause is neces- 
sary, conditionally so, as shown above. 

Theory of Di\ Brown and others. 
The speculations of certain philosophers respecting the 
subject under consideration, here demand our attention. The 
relation of cause and effect, according to Dr. Brown and 
others, is nothing more than that of " immediate and inva- 
riable antecedence and consequence." A cause, says Dr. B., 
is nothing else than ^' an immediate and invariable antece- 
dent." According to this philosopher, in no instance what- 
ever is there any reason, in the nature of any particular 
cause, why "it should produce one event rather than another. 
Succession, mere antecedence and consequence immediate 
and invariable, without any reason in the nature of the ante- 
cedent and consequent why this order of succession should 
arise, rather than another, is all that exists in any instance. 
In regard to this theory, it is enough to say that no man does 
or can believe it. Let any man, for example, behold a piece 
of wood and a metallic substance put together into a heated 
furnace. The wood is immediately consumed, and the metal 
changed from a solid to a fluid state. Can he avoid the con- 
viction, that there is, in the nature of these two substances, 
a reason, why, that when acted upon by the same cause, one 
is consumed, and the other changed from a solid to a fluid 
state ? When the Almighty said, " Let there be light, and 
there was light," who dares believe that there was not, in the 
nature of that fiat, a reason, why, as its consequent, light, 
rather than any other substance, should appear.^* When two 
pounds weight are placed on one side of a balance, and five 
on the other, who does not believe, that aside from the par- 
ticular sequence which follows here, there is, in the circum- 
stances supposed, a reason why one particular sequence 
should follow, rather than any other } In the succession of 
day and night, also, we have an order of sequence imme- 



EVENTS AND CAUSES. 39 

diate and invariable. Is this equivalent to the declaration, 
that day causes night, or night causes ihe day ? It would be 
so, if the theory under consideration was true. For all the 
conditions of that theory are here fulfilled. We have an 
order of sequence immediate and invariable. 

As a further illustration, let us, for a mioment, consider the 
theory of " pre-established harmony" between the action of 
the Soul and Body, proclaimed by Leibnitz. According to 
this author, Matter and Mind do, and can exert no influence 
upon each other, whatever. I will, for example, a motion of 
my arm, or of any other part of the body, and the motion 
follows. Still my volitions have no influence in causing or 
controlling that motion. So in all other instances. God, 
foreseeing the states of our minds, has so constituted our 
bodies, that the action of the latter shall always be in perfect 
harmony w-ith that of the former, though wholly uninfluenced 
by it. In this theory, the relation of cause and effect, as 
announced by the theory of Dr. Brown, is perfectly fulfilled. 
Between the states of our minds, and the corresponding 
action of our bodies, we have an order of sequence imme- 
diate and invariable. But who does not regard the Liebnitz- 
ian theory as announcing a relation totally distinct and oppo- 
site to what is universally believed to exist between our 
minds and bodies } When we say, that the motion of the 
body is in immediate and perfect harmony with that of the 
mind, we say one thing. When we say, that the action of 
the mind causes that of the body, we introduce, in the judg- 
ment of all men, an entirely different idea. Sequence imme- 
diate and invariable is all that we perceive to exist between 
any antecedent and consequent ; but it is, by no means, all 
that we believe^ yea know to exist. 

Observations on Mr. Dug aid Stewart. 

The following remarks of Mr. Stewart also demand a 
passing observation : 

" It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among phi- 
losophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to 
perceive a necessary connection between two successive 
events, or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds 
from the other, as its cause. From experience, indeed, we 
learn, that there are many events, which are constantly con- 
joined, so that the one invariably follows the other : but it is 
possible, for anything we know to the contrary, that this 



40 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

connection, though a constant one, as far as our observation 
has reached, may not be a necessary connection ; nay, it is 
possible, that there may be no necessary connections among 
any of the phenomena we see ; and if there are any such 
connections existing, we may rest assured that we shall never 
be able to discover them." 

Again : 

^' When it is said, that every change in nature indicates 
the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something 
which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the 
change, and without which it could not have happened. This 
may be called the metaphysical meaning of the word ; and such 
causes may be called metaphysical or efficient causes. In natu- 
ral philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being 
the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are 
constantly conjoined, so that when we see the one, we may 
expect the other. These conjunctions we learn from expe- 
rience alone ; and, without an acquaintance with them, we 
could not accommodate our conduct to the established course 
of nature." 

These remarks certainly cannot hold in regard to the primary 
qualities of matter, as, for example, solidity considered as the 
antecedent, and resistance as the consequent. Is it possible to 
conceive of the existence of an object which is extended and 
solid, which is at the same time destitute of the power of 
resistance .'' 

Here I would drop the suggestion, whether it is possible 
to conceive of any substance as existing, which is destitute 
of power ; and whether our ideas of substance and of power 
are not, in fact, identical .? For my own part, I find it im- 
possible to conceive of substances which are not actual causes, 
or real powers. 

IDEA OF POWER. 

The idea of Power, is that of causation in its quiescent 
state, or as the permanent attribute of a subject irrespective 
of its action, at any particular moment. When particular 
effects are attributed to particular causes, while the nature of 
the substances containing such causes remain unchanged, the 
mind considers the power to repeat such effects under the 
same circumstances, as the permanent attributes of those sub- 
stances. This is the idea of power, as it exists in all minds. 



IDEA OF POWER. 41 

All substances, in their active state, are Causes — in their qui- 
escent state, are Powers. Powers are of two kinds, active 
and passive. The latter are commonly called susceptibilities. 
As the existence of powers and causes is indicated by their 
respective phenomena, so the nature of such powers and 
causes is indicated by the characteristics of their respective 
phenomena. 

The idea of Power, sustaining, as it does, the same relation 
to phenomena, that that of cause and substance do, is, of 
course, like those ideas, universal and necessary. 

Conclusion of the present Analysis. 
Here our analysis of intellectual phenomena will close, for 
the present. It might have been extended to almost any 
length. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the 
principle of classification adopted, and to show its universal 
applicability, as well as to lay the foundation for the important 
distinctions, &c., in respect to the intellectual powers, an 
elucidation of which will be commenced in the next Chapter. 



CHAPTER IV. 

APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS. 

In applying the results of the preceding analysis, one of the first 
questions which arises, respects the relations of intellectual 
phenomena, contingent and necessary to each other. With 
regard to this question, I would remark, that there are two, 
and only two important relations which such phenomena sus- 
tain to each other — the relation of logical and chronological 
antecedence and consequence. The latter relates to the order 
of acquisition, or to the question. Which, in the order of time, 
is first developed, in the Intelligence. The former relates to 
their order in a logical point of view, that is, to the question, 
Which sustains to the other, in the process of ratiocination, 
the relation of logical antecedent. 

Logical order. 

In regard to the order last mentioned, I would remark, 
that one idea is the logical antecedent of another, M'hen the 
latter necessarily supposes the former, that is, when the real- 
ity of the object of the latter can be admitted, only on the 
admission of that of the object of the former. The ideas of 
events and cause being given in the Intelligence, for example, 
we find that we can admit the reality of an event on one sup- 
position only, to wit, that of a cause which produc(*l the 
event. We say, therefore, that the idea of cause is the 
logical antecedent of that of events. 

Now, if we contemplate ideas in this view, it will.be per- 
ceived at once, that necessary ideas are, in all instances, the 
logical antecedents of contingent ones. What was shown 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS, 43 

above to be true of the ideas of event and cause, is self evi- 
dently true of the ideas of body and space, succession and 
time, the finite and the infinite, and phenomena external and 
internal, and substance and personal identity. Every con- 
tingent idea is relative, necessarily supposing, as its logical 
antecedent, some necessary idea. 

Chronoloyical order. 
Contingent ideas, on the other hand, are the chronological 
antecedents of necessary ideas, that is, in the order of actual 
development in the Intelligence, the former precedes the 
latter. Two considerations will render this proposition de- , 
monstrably evident. 

1. Necessary ideas are given in the Intelligence, only as 
the logical antecedents of contingent ones. Space, for exam- 
ple, is known to us, only as that in which bodies or substan- 
ces exist. In no other light can we possibly know or con- 
ceive of it. Now that which is and can be known to us, only 
as the place of some other thing, cannot have been known 
to us prior to that thing ; otherwise, the former might be 
known and conceived of, irrespective of the latter. The 
same holds true of the ideas of succession and time, phenome- 
na and substance, events and causes. The latter class of ideas 
can be conceived of, only as the logical antecedents of the for- 
mer. The former therefore must have originated in the In- 
telligence, prior to the latter. 

2. While necessary ideas can be defined, only as the logi- 
cal antecedents of contingent ones, the latter can be defined 
without any reference to the former — a fact which could not 
be true, if the latter were not the chronological antecedents 
of the former. Cause, for example, can be defined, only as 
that which produces events. An event, as any one can per- 
ceive by consulting his dictionary, can be, and is defined with- 
out any reference to the idea of cause. Contingent ideas 
therefore are the chronological antecedents of necessary 
ones. 

PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE 
PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

The preceding analysis has fully prepared us to proceed 
legitimately and safely to another very important inquiry — 
the Primary Intellectual Faculties pre-supposed in that analy- 
sis. As stated in the Introduction, the being and character- 



44 INTELLECTUAL FHILOSOFHY. 

istics of every power or substance in existence, are indicated 
to us by its respective phenomena. The perception of such 
phenomena, being itself a phenomenon of the mind which 
perceives, supposes, in the mind, corresponding powers of 
perception. When the Intelligence apprehends a fact, or 
truth of any kind, such act implies, in the Intelligence, cor- 
responding powers of apprehension. Now truths perceived 
by the Intelligence are, as we have seen, of two kinds, con- 
tingent and necessary. The perception of such truths indi- 
cates a corresponding distinction of intellectual functions, or 
powers. The faculty or faculties which perceive, and af- 
firm the reality of contingent phenomena, are clearly distin- 
guishable from that which aftirms the realit}^ of truths neces- 
sary and universal. 

But contingent phenomena perceived by the Intelligence, 
are distinguishable, with equal clearness, as objective and su6- 
jcctive^ that is, part pertain to the Mind itself, and part to ex- 
ternal material substances. These facts most obviously de- 
mand atwo-fold division of the Intellectual faculties which per- 
tain to contingent phenomena, as objective and subjective. 
The analysis completed in the last Chapter, presents to our 
contemplation three distinct faculties of the Intelligence : 

1. That which perceives the phenomena of the mind itself, 
the faculty which gives us subjective phenomena. This 
function of the Intelligence is denominated Consciousness. 

2. The faculty which perceives the phenomena of external 
material substances, or which gives us objective phenomena. 
This function of the Intelligence is denominated Sense. 

3. That faculty which apprehends truths necessary and 
universal. This intellectual function, or faculty, is denomi- 
nated Reason. 

These Faculties why called Primary. 
Consciousness, vSense, and Reason, are called the primary 
faculties of the Intelligence, for two considerations : 

1. Because, that with them, all our knowledge com- 
mences. 

2. All our complex cognitions are composed of elements 
given by these faculties. All the phenomena of the Intelli- 
gence are either simple or complex. All simple ideas are 
found to be the direct intuitions of one or of the other of these 
faculties. All complex ideas are found, on a careful analysis, 
to be composed of elements previously given by these facul- 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 45 

ties. The truth of this last remark will be fully confirmed in 
the progress of our subsequent investigations. 

Also called Intuitive Faculties. 
The faculties above named are also sometimes denominated 
Intuitive Faculties. The reason is, that each alike, pertains to 
its objects, by direct intuition. Consciousness, for example, 
by direct intuition, and not through any medium, apprehends 
the phenomena of the mind. The same is true of the faculty 
of Senye in respect to the phenomena of external material 
substances. The action of Reason is conditioned on the prior 
action of Sense and Consciousness. It is not through any 
medium, but by direct intuition, hovi-ever, that Reason af- 
firms truth as universal, necessary, and absolute. Like the 
former, therefore, it may, with equal propriety, be denominat- 
ed a faculty of intuition. These faculties, as we shall see 
hereafter, give us the elements of all our knowledge. 

Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each other. 
We are now prepared also for another very important in- 
quiry — the appropriate spheres of the primary faculties rela- 
tively to each other. This inquiry can now be met in very 
few words. Sense, and Consciousness, give us phenomena 
external and internal. Reason gives us the logical antece- 
dents of phenomena thus perceived and, affirmed. This is its 
appropriate and exclusive sphere relativel}^ to the other facul- 
ties. It cannot enter the domain of either Sense or Conscious- 
ness, and judge of the validity of its affirmations. The same 
holds true of each of these last mentioned faculties, relatively 
to the domain of the other, and that of Reason too. Each fac- 
ulty has its own exclusive sphere in which it is wholly inde- 
pendent of either or both of the others, and independent in this 
sense, that the validity of its affirmations cannot be tested at 
the bar of either of the others. Its response, when question- 
ed, in respect to what has affirmed is, " What I have written, 
I have written." When Sense, for example, has made an 
affirmation pertaining to the phenomena of an external mate- 
rial substance, all that Consciousness can do, pertaining to the 
subject, is, to give that affirmation as it is, together w^ith its 
characteristics. Of the validity of the affirmation, it can say 
nothing. Reason can give the logical antecedent of that af- 
firmation, and that is all. With its validity it has no more to 
do, than Consciousness has. The same will hereafter be 
3* 



46 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

shown to be true of Reason, in respect to every other func- 
tion of the Intelligence. 

Importance of the Truths above elucidated. 
If the truth of the conclusions above stated be admitted, it 
will ba found to be of fundamental importance in philosophy. 
They will put an end at once to the wild speculations of many 
philosophers of the Super-sensual school, both in this coun- 
try and in Europe. Here lies, for example, the great error 
of Kant, the father of modern Transcendentalism. He first 
gives us a most profound, and correct analysis of intellectual 
phenomena, together with a statement equally correct, of the 
faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena. He then sum- 
mons all the other faculties at the bar of Reason, there to 
test the validity of their affirmations. It is no matter of sur- 
prise at all, that the result of the trial should be thus an- 
nounced b)^ the philosopher himself who instituted it, a trial, 
the entire results of which, as we shall hereafter see, and a 
moment's reflection must convince us, must and can rest upon 
nothing else than groundless assumptions, and not at all upon 
the real affirmations of the Intelligence. " We have therefore 
intended to say," says Kant, in givins; the results of his phi- 
losophy, " that all our intuition is nothing but the representa- 
tion of phenomenon — that the things which we invisage [form 
conceptions and judgments of] are not that in themselves 
for which we take them ; neither are their relationships in 
themselves so constituted as they appear to us ; and that if 
we do away with our subject, or even only the subjective 
quality of the senses in general, every quality, all relation- 
ships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time 
themselves would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena 
in themselves, but only in us It remains utterly unknown to 
us what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, sep- 
arate from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know 
nothing but our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar 
to us, and which need not l3elong to every being, although to 
every man. With this we have only to do." The above 
extract contains the following strange paralogisms, contradic- 
tions, and absurdities. 

1. That our Intelligence /a^es, that is, affirms things not to 
be, what the same Intelligence takes, that is, affirms them to 
be. Kant first employs the Intelligence to find out what 
things are. He then employs the same Intelligence to de- 



APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 47 

monstrate, that these very things are not what the Intelli- 
gence had previously alfirmed them to be. As if a merchant 
should profess, that by his yard-stick, he had demonstrated, 
that he had a thousand yards of cloth, and then, that, by the 
same yard-stick, he had as fully demonstrated the fact, that 
he had no real cloth at all, and that neither the yard-stick nor 
the cloth were, in themselves, what the yard-stick had shown 
them to be. 

2. That, while our Intelligence represents nothing what- 
ever as it is in itself, this same Intelligence does correctly re- 
present " our manner of perceiving objects" — a most palpable 
contradiction, surely. For if our Intelligence does not repre- 
sent things as they are, it surely will not represent our " man- 
ner of perceiving" as it is. 

3. Kant affirms, that ail that we have to do with objects, 
is " according to our manner of perceiving them," that is, 
as they are given, in our Intelligence. He then teaches us, 
that these objects are not as our Intelligence affirms them to 
be. This, certainly, is doing with objects far otherwise than 
" according to our manner of perceiving them." 

Now all these absurdities' and contradictions which Kant 
gives as the results of his philosophy, and which constitute 
its distinguishing peculiarities, would have been prevented, 
together with the tide of scepticism, which, through that 
philosophy, has desolated so large a portion of Europe, had 
that great philosopher, after demonstrating the reality of Rea- 
son, as a faculty of the Intelligence, raised, and correctly an- 
swered, the inquiry pertaining to the true sphere of that 
faculty relatively to other functions of the Intelligence. Phi- 
losophers of the Super-sensual school have run wild with 
Reason, just as those of the Sensual school did with Sensa- 
tion and Reflection. 

The possession of Reason is the great distinguishing cha- 
racteristic of humanity, that characteristic which separates 
man at an infinite remove from the lower orders of creation 
around him, and places him among the great Intelligences of 
the universe. The full demonstration of Reason, as a func- 
tion of the Intelligence, has placed the philosopher whom 
Coleridge not unappropriately denominates the '' venerable 
sage of Koningsburg," among the brightest intellectual lumi- 
naries of earth. When the appropriate sphere of this divine 
faculty in man, relatively to the action of the other functions 
of the Intelligence, shall be fully settled, then philosophy, 



48 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

instead of being the sport of wild and blind assumptions, will 
stand unmoved upon the rock of eternal truth. This subject 
will be resumed again in a subsequent part of our investi- 
gations. 

Classification of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant. 

It was stated above, that Kant has given a most profound 
and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with 
a development equally correct of the intellectual faculties 
pre-supposed by those phenomena. I will close this chapter 
by giving a concise statement of the results of his analysis. 

Intellectual phenomena, according to this philosopher, are 
divided into two classes — those derived from experience^ and 
those not derived from experience — the empirical and ra- 
tional. 

The operations of our own minds, for example, together 
with the qualities of external material substances, are given 
us by the direct intuitions of Sense and Consciousness. Such 
intuitions, therefore, are exclusively empirical, being derived 
solely from experience. 

On the other hand, space is an object neither of Sense nor 
Consciousness. Its reality we know, and know absolutely; 
but not as an object of expeuience. The same is true of the 
ideas of Time, the Infinite, Substance, Cause and Effect, &c. 

Rational intuitions are by Kant denominated '' intuitions 
a priori.''^ Events^ for example, are objects of experience ; 
as such we know them. But the proposition, every event 
has a cause, w^e know a priori^ and not by experience. 

Intuitions d priori.^ have these characteristics, and bj^ these 
they are distinguished from empirical intuitions, viz. : univer- 
sality and necessity. Though we might know by experience, 
that such and such events have a particular cause, we cannot 
know from experience, that every event has a cause ■ much 
less, that every event must have a cause. Experience, if it 
could give us what isy could not give us the fact that what 
is J must be. 

The above classification, it will readily be perceived, is, in 
reality, identical with that elucidated in the preceding Chap- 
ter, and leads to precisely the same division of the Intellec- 
tual faculties, a division which Kant, in fact, presents, as the 
result of his investigations. The " a priori " phenomena of 
Kant are those there given as necessary, while his empirical 
intuitions are the contingent phenomena of Sense and Con- 
sciousness. 



CHAPTER ¥. 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 



Consciousness Defined. 

Of this function of the Intelligence various definitions have 
been given by different philosophers. The following is the 
definition given by Dr. Webster. " The knowledge of sen- 
sations and mental operations, or of what passes in our own 
mind ; the act of the mind which makes known an internal 
object." Cousin represents it as that function of the Intel- 
ligence which " gives us information of everything which 
takes place in the interior of our minds." " Perhaps the 
most correct description of the mind in Consciousness, i. e. 
of the conscious states of the mind," says the translator of 
Cousin's Psychology, " is the being aware of the phenomena 
of the mind — of that which is present to the mind ; and if 
self-consciousness be distinguished, not in genera., but as a 
special determination of Consciousness, it is the being aware 
of ourselves, as of the ??ie, in opposition to the not me^ or as 
the permanent subject ., distinct from the phenomena of the 
mind, and from all outward causes of them." In simple 
Consciousness, according to this author, we have a know- 
ledge, in conformity to the statement of Cousin, of whatever 
passes in the interior of our own minds, that is, of all our 
mental exercises. In self-Consciousness., which is only a 
special form or determination of the former, we know our- 
selves in those phenomena, and thus distinguish ourselves 
from all external causes of them. This, certainly, is a very 
distinct and correct exposition of the sulDJect. 

The definition of Professor Tappan, given in his work on 
the Will, though somewhat lengthy, demands special atten- 



60 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion, on account of the distinctness and correctness with 
which the subject is there presented. 

"" Consciousness," he says, " is the necessary knowledge 
which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it 
knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and pas- 
sions, it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercis- 
ing acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such 
acts. This is common, universal, and spontaneous Con- 
sciousness. 

'' This definition may appear to some an identical proposi- 
tion — the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows emo- 
tions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be 
implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels, 
and wills. Therefore, we would say further : 

" By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we 
mean the power and act of self-recognition : not, if you 
please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and vo- 
litions ; but the mind knowing itself in these." 

In the above definitions the subject is presented with such 
distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no partic- 
ular definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, 
we are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but 
we know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it. In 
every exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only 
know what these states are, but know ourselves in them, as 
exercising or pursuing them, and as the subjects of them. 
Hence all mental phenomena, as giv^en in Consciousness, are 
expressed in propositions like the following ; — I think, I feel, 
1 will ; — the mental phenomena being given, together with 
the self, the I, as the subject of them. 

In every act of Self-Consciousness, also, three terms are 
given ; — the particular phenomenon, the I, or self, as its sub- 
ject, and something not ourselves, as its object, or cause. In 
Consciousness, we find ourselves, and all external objects, 
as distinct from ourselves. 

A remark, which I deem of special importance to make 
here, is this. In Consciousness, we not only know mental 
phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such 
knowledge, we know also the fundamental and distinguish- 
ing characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely 
know, by Consciousness, mental phenomena, and not also 
their distinguishing characteristics, we could never classify 
and arrange such phenomena as the basis of important con- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 51 

elusions in the science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirma- 
tions we can make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of 
thinking, feeling, and willing, w^e must atfirm, on the exclu- 
sive authority of the characteristics of such phenomena, cha- 
racteristics perceived and affirmed by Consciousness. 

Self -Consciousness conditioned on Reason^ but not a function 
of Reason. 
The exercise o^ Self Consciousness, contemplated as a par- 
ticular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is 
conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason. It is by 
Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phe- 
nomenon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each 
particular phenomenon supposes a particular subject. But 
for Reason, therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be 
given in Consciousness, we could not know, that, for such 
phenomena, any subject whatever is supposed. Simple 
Consciousness gives us mental phenomena. Self-Conscious- 
ness, a particular form, or determination of the former, con- 
nects such phenomena with the subject, the reality of which 
Reason has affirmed, and connects them in the propositions, 
I think, I feel, I will, &c. While, therefore, Self-Conscious- 
ness is conditioned on the Reason, the former, as a function 
of the Intelligence, is clearly distinguishable from the latter. 
This is further evident from a single consideration. Reason 
is the organ of a priori, that is, universal and necessary truths, 
Thi« is its exclusive sphere. AH the affirmations of Con- 
sciousness, even in the form called Self-Consciousness, bear 
the characteristics of contingency. A sound philosophy, 
therefore, will not fail, as philosophers sometimes have done, 
to distinguish these different functions of the Intelligence 
from each other. 

J^ataraly or spontaneous, and philosophical, or reflective 
Consciousness. 
Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common 
to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelli- 
gence. In the language of Cousin, it is, *' in all men a na- 
tural process." Every individual is accustomed to use the 
propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. All persons are ac- 
customed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of par- 
ticular states, or exercises of mind. This shows, that they 
not only are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are 



62 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

aware of the function of the Intelligence exercised under 
such circumstances. All men, also, in the spontaneous de- 
velopments of Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves 
as subjects of mental phenomena, from all external causes, or 
objects of the same. They may not be able technically to 
express this distinction with the clearness and definiteness 
that a philosopher would. They may not be able to under- 
stand at first, the meaning of the terms he would employ to 
express that distinction. Still it is, to them, a no less pal- 
pable reality, than to him. 

Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be, " in all 
men, a natural process, some," in the language of the phi- 
losopher above named, " elevate this natural process to the 
degree of an art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of 
second Consciousness — a free re-production of the first ; and ' 
as Consciousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in 
them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge 
of everything which falls under the eye of Consciousness." 
Reflection, or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural 
Consciousness directed by the Will, in the act of careful 
attention to the phenomena of our own minds. As natural 
Consciousness is one of the characteristics which distin- 
guishes man from the brute, so philosophic Consciousness is 
the characteristic which distinguishes the mental philosopher 
from the rest of mankind. 

The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to 
two common forms of observation in respect to externat ma- 
terial substances. The phenomena of such substances all 
mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about. ]t 
is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes 
these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their funda- 
mental characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classifica- 
tion, generalization, &c. The same holds true in respect to 
the two forms of Consciousness under consideration. Men- 
ial phenomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a 
greater or less degree, are accustomed to reason about. The 
philosopher, however, by laborious efforts of self reflection, 
most critically attends to these phenomena, for the purpose 
of marking their characteristics, classifying and arranging 
them according to philosophic principles, and thus determin- 
ing the powers and laws of mental operations. In simple 
Consciousness, we have a knowledge of whatever passes in 
our minds. In reflection, we have the same phenomena 



CONSCIOUSNESS, 53 

classified and generalized, according to fundamental charac- 
teristics thus perceived and atfirmed. 

Frocess of classification and generalization in Reflection^ 
illustrated. 
I will now present a short illustration of this process, for 
the purpose of elucidating the proper method of questioning 
Consciousness, although in so doing I shall allude to a men- 
tal process of a secondary character, hereafter to be explain- 
ed. The mind perceives, we will suppose, some object, an 
external material substance, denominated body. With the 
perception there arises the conception of the object as exist- 
ing somewhere — in space. The proposition, this body exists 
somewhere, or in space, falls under the eye of Conscious- 
ness. It is taken up by reflection, and by the process of ab- 
straction, hereafter to be described, the two elements con- 
stituting the proposition are separated from each other. Thus 
the mind obtains two distinct ideas, that of body and space. 
These two ideas are now separately considered and marked 
with their respective characteristics of contingency and 
necessity. Again, some event is perceived. With this per- 
ception arises the conviction that it had a cause. The pro- 
position, this event had a cause, falls under the eye of Con- 
sciousness. It also is taken up by reflection, and by the 
process above described, two new ideas, that of event and 
causation, marked by their respective characteristics of con- 
tingency and necessity, are obtained. These two ideas now 
being in the mind, by the laws of association, the other two, 
above referred to, are suggested and ranged with them in two 
distinct classes, as contingent and necessary ideas. Here 
we have the process of classification. Now on a further 
examination of the particular ideas comprehended under 
either of the above classes, some new characteristic common 
to them all, may be discovered ; as, for example, all contin- 
gent ideas may be found also to have the characteristic of 
relative. This becomes a general fact, and we have it in the 
process of generalization. The Intelligence now takes up 
these phenomena, orio;inally given by Consciousness, and then 
analyzed, arranged, and generalized by reflection, and gives us 
the powers and susceptibilities of the Mind, as indicated by 
•these phenomena, &c. 



64 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPKYc 

Functions of Consciousness. 
Such are the nature and functions of Consciousness, toge- 
ther with the knowledge derived through it. 

1. In its original spontaneity, it gives us all the phenome- 
na of the mind. 

2. In connection with the Reason, it gives us ourselves as 
the subjects of these phenomena, and as distinguished from 
all existences around us, perceived or apprehended. 

3. In reflection it gives the same phenomena, analyzed, 
arranged, and generalized. 

4. From these data, the Intelligence gives us the nature, 
faculties, susceptibilities, and laws of mental operation, indi- 
cated by these phenomena. 

Necessity of relying implicitly upon the testimony of Con- 
sciousness. 
In the Introduction, a proof of the possibility of mental 
philosophy, as a science, was attempted. On this point I 
shall add nothing more here. I will make a few remarks 
upon the necessity of relying with implicit confidence upon 
the testimony of Consciousness, as the basis of all conclu- 
sions pertaining to the science of Mind. The great reason, 
as I suppose, why many individuals are prejudiced against 
mental philosophy, as a peculiarly difficult, obscure, and 
uncertain science, is a secret distrust of the validity of the 
facts which lie at the basis of the science ; in other words, 
in the credibility of the witness through whom the facts are 
obtained. In respect to physical science, no such distrust is 
felt. Mankind generally rest with implicit confidence in the 
validity of Sense, with regard to external, material substances. 
With equal assurance do they, consequently, rest on any con- 
clusions legitimately drawn from such phenomena respecting 
the nature and laws of the substances revealed in those phe- 
nomena. Now, why should we not repose the same faith in 
the validity of the testimony of .Consciousness, in respect to 
those phenomena which constitute the basis of an infinitely 
more important science, the knowledge of Mind, that we do 
in our senses in respect to external, material phenomena } 
Of these two sciences, that which is by far of the highest 
concernment to us, we should not suppose would rest upon 
the most uncertain basis. If we look also at the real facts 
of the case, can any one tell us, or even conceive of the 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 55 

reason, why we should rest with less assurance in the truth 
of that of which we are conscious, tlian in that which is per- 
ceived and atfirmsd by the external senses ? 

The visionary speculations, and dreamy theories of many 
of the most distinguished mental philosophers of ancient and 
modern times, has no doubt contributed (and rightly, too, if 
mad speculations are the legitimate results of the principles 
of the science), to the impression on the minds of many, that 
the Scotchman's definition of Metaphysics must be the true 
one, to wit : " Metaphysics is, when he that is listening dinna 
ken what he that is speaking means, and he that is speak- 
ing dinna ken what he means himself." It should be borne 
in mind, however, that up to the time of Bacon, a remark 
precisely similar would have been equally applicable to the 
speculations of natural philosophers ; and that while the 
principles of physical science have, since that period, been 
settled upon the right foundation, the true method in mental 
science is of comparatively recent development. I will here 
drop the suggestion, whether posterity will not regard itself 
as almost as much indebted to Victor Cousin for the annun- 
ciation of the true method in mental science, as to Bacon for 
announcing the same in respect to physical ? Mental phi- 
losophy, just emerging from the darkness of ages, seems now 
to have gained the high road to truth, with its laws of inves- 
tigation correctly settled. If we would make sure and 
rapid progress, two things are indispensable — 'that we enter 
upon our investigations with implicit confidence in the validity 
of the facts of Consciousness, as the basis of the science of 
mind — and that we adhere with equally assured confidence 
to all conclusions to which those facts legitimately conduct 
us. 

Consciousness, a distinct function or faculty of the Intellect. 
We are now prepared to answer the question, whether 
Consciousness is a distinct function, or faculty of the Intelli- 
gence ? All philosophers, when speaking of it, without 
reference to any pre-formed theory, agree in speaking of it, as 
a function as distinct and real as any other. Sense and Rea- 
son, for example. Yet, by some, the fact that it is such a 
faculty has been denied. Consciousness, says the transla- 
tor of Cousin's Psychology, " is not to be confounded either 
with the Sensibility (external nor internal) nor with the 
Understanding, nor with the Will ; neither is it a distinct and 



56 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

special faculty of the Mind ; nor is it the principle of any of 
the faculties ; nor is it, on the other hand, the product of 
them." It would be somewhat difficult, after so many nega- 
tions, to put anything very positive into a definition of the 
subject. Yet the learned author has himself given to this 
something a " local habitation and a name." "Conscious- 
ness," he say&t" is a witness of our thoughts and volitions." 
Now as this witness has a special function distinct from every 
other function of the Intelligence, ought we not to conclude 
that it is a special faculty of that Intelligence 1 

The act of knowing also implies the power of knowledge. 
A knowledge unlike all other knowledges, implies a special 
faculty of knowledge, a faculty distinct from every other. Is 
not the knowledge obtained b}'- Consciousness, thus distinct 
from all other knowledges ? Does it not, therefore, imply a 
special faculty distinct from every other function of the In- 
telligence .'' 

Consciousness also, must be a special faculty, or it must 
be a peculiar function of some other faculty, or of the whole 
together. From Sense and Reason, it is as clearly distin- 
guishable, as either of those is from the other. No one will 
pretend, that it is a special function of any of the secondary 
faculties hereafter to be named, nor of all the Intellectual 
faculties together. What shall we regard it then but a spe- 
cial function of the Intelligence ? 

One other consideration which I present, is, as it appears 
to me, quite decisive of the question under consideration. 
The exercise of Consciousness is dependent on the Will, in 
the same sense, that that of the other special functions of the 
Intelligence is. When, for example, an external object makes 
an impression upon one or more of the organs of Sense 
through this faculty, there is an instant and spontaneous ap- 
prehension of the ccmse of that, impression. Before that 
cause is distinctly perceived, however, the perceptive faculty 
must, by a voluntary act of attention, be directed particularly 
to the object. The specific control which the Will thus ex- 
ercises over this faculty, clearly indicates it, as a special 
function of the Intelligence. Now a relation precisely similar, 
as shown above, in respect to its spontaneous, and reflective 
determinations, does the Will exercise over Consciousness. 
We have the same evidence that it is a special faculty, or 
function of the Intellisjence, that we have that Sense is. 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 67 

Theory of Dr. Brown. 

I will close my remarks upon the subject of Conscious- 
ness, by a reference to the theory of Dr. Brown in respect 
to it. Consciousness, according to this philosopher, is sim- 
ply a general term expressive of all the phenomena or states 
of the mind. " Sensation," he says, for example, " is not an 
object of Consciousness differing from itself, but a particular 
sensation is the consciousness of the moment, as a particular 
hope, or fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, 
may be the actual consciousness of the next moment." 

A. single example will fully demonstrate the incorrectness 
of this theory. I affirm (what is actually true), to myself, or 
some other individual, that I am in pain. This affirmation 
implies three things — the existence of the feeling as a state 
of the Sensibility — an apprehension of pain in general, 
together with that of the particular feeling referred to — and 
a reference of that feeling to myself as the subject, this ap- 
prehension and reference being exclusively states of the Intelli- 
gence. Now this knowledge of the feeling under consider- 
ation, with its reference to myself as the subject, is an act of 
Consciousness ; an exercise of the Intelligence which accom- 
panies all mental states, and which differs as much from 
sensation, or any other state of the Sensibility, as thought 
differs from such states. Sensation then is an object of Con- 
sciousness differing from itself. The same holds true in re- 
spect to all mental exercises. The state itself is one thing. 
The knowledge of that state, and reference of it to ourselves 
is quite another. This last exercise of the Intelligence is 
Consciousness, an exercise as distinct from the state of which 
it takes cognizance, as that state is from the object which 
causes it. 



CHAPTER VL 



SENSEc 



Sense has been defined, as that faculty or function of the 
Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena, or 
qualities, of external, material substances. 

To he distinguished from Sensation, 
The exercise of this faculty should be carefully distin- 
guished from those states of the Sensibility which always 
accompany it, but which are, notwithstanding, none the less, 
for that reason, distinct from it, to wit, sensation. Sensation 
is the slate of the Sensibility ichich immediately succeeds any 
impression made upon our physical organization^ by some mate- 
rial substance. In the exercise of the faculty of Sense, the 
Intelligence apprehends the object, or the quality in the 
object, which caused the sensation. Sensation is exclusively 
a state of the Sensibility. Sense is no less exclusively a 
function of the Intelligence. Of these distinctions we should 
never lose sight, when reasoning upon this department of 
mental science. 

Spontaneous and voluntary determination of Sense. 
Sense, like Consciousness, is, in its primitive developments, 
a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence. Its action, in this 
state, is, in no sense, conditioned on the Will. Perception, 
in its distinct forms, is conditioned on attention, which is 
nothing but the perceptive faculty, directed by the Will ; and 
hence, for the want of a better term or phrase, called the 
Voluntary determination of the faculty. Attention, in the 
direction of Consciousness — that is, when directed to mental 



SENSE. 69 

phenomena — is called reflection. When in the direction of 
the faculty of external perception — that is, towards the phe- 
nomena of material substances — it is called ohserialion. 

The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the 
voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phe- 
nomena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of 
that faculty, may be readil}^ illustrated. A portion of a 
congregation, for example, who have been listening to a 
certain speaker, have fallen into a state of slumber. The 
speaker suddenly stops, and immediately all are aroused. 
Now, if the audience had not, in some form, heard the voice 
which broke upon their ears, why were they aroused ? Yet, 
if inquired of, in respect to what had been spoken to them, 
they would, for the obvious and exclusive reason, that they 
had not attended to it, be wholly unable to answer. How 
often do we hear the remark, I gained no distinct conception 
of that part of a discourse. My attention happened, at the 
time, to be directed to something else. 

The attention may, in some instances, be so tixed upon 
-some object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelli- 
gence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from 
what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction. 
A gentleman, for exam.ple, who was employed about the 
machinery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut off, 
by the sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that 
machinery which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. 
So intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with 
the prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, 
that he was not aware of the injury done to his own person, 
nor w^as he sensible of the least pain from it, till the accident 
was pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, 
however, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it be- ■ 
came intense. 

The basis of attention is the spontaneous action of the 
Sensibility and Intelligence — action which always occurs, 
when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and when the mind 
is not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense 
action upon some object, (as in the case above cited) in some 
specific direction. 

Mental process in Perception. 
The process of the mind, in the perception of external 
I objects, is doubtless originally something like this. Ad im- 



60 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

pression is made on the Sensibility, or a sensation is excited, 
by the action of some object on the physical organization. 
In Consciousness, the mind not only apprehends the impres- 
sion, but itself, as its subject, and not as its cause. For this 
reason, the mind is led to seek for the cause of the sensation 
out of itself. Hence the spontaneous apprehension of the 
object, and the direction of the organ of perception towards 
it. Thus it is, that we originally find ourselves and all 
things else, in Consciousness. If the phenomena of our 
minds were not originally given us, as objects of Conscious- 
ness, we could never know ourselves as the subjects of these 
phenomena. And if, when we know ourselves, as subjects 
of phenomena produced by external objects, we could not 
know that every phenomenon must have a cause, and that 
the cause of the particular phenomenon given, is not within 
ourselves, how could we be led to seek, and recognize that 
cause without ourselves ? 

Organs of Sense, and the knowledge conveyed by each. 
In regard to the particular organs of Sense, of which five 
are commonly reckoned, to wit, sight, hearing, taste, smell, 
and touch, organs through which a knowledge of the parti- 
cular qualities ot material substances are conveyed to the 
mind, but little need be said. One remark, however, may 
be deemed of some importance. It is this. Each organ 
pertains exclusively to the particular quality or qualities 
which are the objects of that particular organ. The peculiar 
qualities given by sight, for example, are given by no other 
sense. The relation of objects, such as distance, which is a 
mere relation, and not a quality at all, we learn, by experi- 
ence, to determine by various senses, as sight, touch, hearing, 
and smelling even in some instances. But the existence and 
qualities of such objects are given, as causes and objects of 
particular sensations and perceptions in us, by each of the 
senses alike, each sense, or each organ of the general faculty 
giving the quality, or qualities, which are the objects of that 
particular organ. 

Error of Dr. Brown. 
Here a very palpable error of Dr. Brown deserves a pas- 
sing observation. According to him, we derive a knowledge 
of external substances from one sense only, that of touch, or 
rather muscular action. " But for our previous belief of the 



SENSE. 61 

existence of a permanent and independent system of exter- 
nal things, acquired from other sources, we should have 
classed," he says, " the greater number of the feelino-s, 
which we now refer to Sense, among those w^hich arise spon- 
taneously in the Mind, without any cause external to the 
Mind itself." Thus, unless the muscular system had fortu- 
nately or unfortunately come in contact with some external 
or resisting cause, the Mind might have had a consciousness 
of the sensations of smell, taste, hearing, sight, and touch, 
without the idea of any cause w^iatever, without itself. Of 
one fact the Mind could not have been ignorant, to wit, that 
these phenomena must have been produced by some cause. 
Consciousness would have forbidden the supposition that the 
Mind itself was both the subject and cause of such phenom- 
ena. The only other supposition- possible is the certain 
knowledge of a cause external to the Mind — a cause, the 
nature of which corresponds with the character of the phe- 
nomena of which the Mind is conscious. Further, the sen- 
sation produced by resistance is first given in Consciousness, 
as a simple phenomenon of which the Mind know^s itself, not 
as the cause, but as the subject. If, while the Mind knows 
itself as the subject of that phenomenon, it could not know- 
that it is not both subject and cause, it would never seek for 
the cause of this or of any other phenomenon out of itself. 

Objects of Ferception. 
The objects of perception (external perception) are the 
qualities of material substances. The qualities perceived are 
resistance, extension, form, color, taste, smell, sound, &c. 
vSuch qualities are to us the index, and the only index we 
have, of their respective subjects. In the consciousness of 
thought, feeling, and mental determinations, we know our- 
selves as thinking, feeling, and acting beings. So in the ex- 
perience of sensations and perceptions produced in us by 
external material substances, w^e know^ them as the powers 
which produce these perceptions and sensations ; in other 
words, we know them as substances possessed of the quali- 
ties of resistance, extension, form, color, &c. 

Common and Philosophic Doubts in respect to the comparative 
validitij of the affirmations of Sense and Consciousness. 
While the mass of mankind appear to exercise more con- 
fidence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that 
4 



62 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of Consciousness, the case seems, in many instances, to be 
reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Con- 
sciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to 
subjective, while that of Sense is not, in their estimation, 
equally so in respect to objective phenomena. Novr the 
reason of the presence of these philosophic doubts, as Cole- 
ridge would call them, in the latter instance, and of their 
absence in the former, arises, as 1 suppose, from the fact that 
philosophers have attempted to explain the quo modo of 
external perception, and not that of internal. This is the 
very reason for the doubts under consideration, assigned by 
Coleridge himself. ^' As this," he says [to wit, the belief 
that there exist things without «s], " on the one hand, origi- ' 
nates neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet, on the other 
hand, remains proof against all attempts to remove it by 
grounds or arguments (r^atnra furca erpellas tamen usque rede- 
bit) ; on the one hand, lays claim to immediate certainty as a 
position at once indemonstrable and irresistible ; and yet, on 
the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially 
different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, 
leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part 
of our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that 
which is ex hypothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our 
being) ; the philsopher, therefore, compels himself to treat 
this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and 
connatural, but still a prejudice." Now w^hy does this phi- 
losopher compel himself to treat as a groundless prejudice 
and an untruth that w^hich himself acknowledges to be an 
innate, connatural belief, an irresistible affirmation of his 
own and of the universal Intelligence 1 Simply because he 
cannot explain the quo modo of external perception — cannot 
see how an object not ourselves, and wholly unlike ourselves, 
as matter is universally conceived to be, should be to us an 
object of knowledge. If that is a reason why we should 
compel ourselves to treat as false what we know to be true, 
it should certainly induce us to treat his theory as equally 
false. For how can we explain the manner in which that 
w hich is intrinsic and a part of ourselves, should be present- 
ed to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly extrinsic and foreign, 
and even opposed to ourselves — how it can present that 
which is exclusively subjective, as wholly objective — that 
which is purely spiritual, as wholly material — that, in short, 
which is " without form and void," as possessed of a definite 



SENSE« 63 

form ? The quo modo of knowledge, according to this last 
theory, would be found quite as difficult of explanation as in 
conformity to any other whatever. 

Let us now suppose that philosophers should undertake to 
explain the quo modo of knowledge by Consciousness. How, 
for example, can I perceive and attend to an object external 
to myself, and yet have, at the same time, a consciousness 
equally distinct of the act of perception itself } Suppose 
they should attempt to explain such mysterious acts of the 
Intelligence as these, and at the same time compel them- 
selves to treat «as a prejudice all mental affirmations, the 
mode of origination of which they cannot explain, would not 
their philosophic doubts be quite as strong in respect to the 
validity of Consciousness, as with regard to that of any other 
function of the Intelligence } 

The Frovince of Philosophy. 
Philosophy, it should be borne in mind, has to do with 
facts as they are, with the nature of the powers revealed in 
those facts, and with the laws in conformity to which those 
powers act. With the mode of their action further than 
this, it has nothing to do. In the fall of heavy bodies to the 
earth, for example, we learn that attraction is a property of 
all material substances. We then set ourselves to determine 
the law v/hich controls the action of this property. Here 
we are within the legitimate domain of philosophy. But 
suppose we attempt to explain the mode in which the attrac- 
tive power acts. " Such knowledge is too wonderful for us. 
It is high, we cannot attain unto it," Philosophy, well 
satisfied with her own legitimate and wide domain, resigns 
such things to the Eternal One, who created all the powers 
of the universe, and consequently understands the mode of 
their action. All that philosophy" can say in regard to the 
mode of action of any power is, that such is its nature. 

Comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Con- 
sciousness. 
We are now prepared to contemplate the comparative va- 
lidity of the affirmations of these two functions of the Intel- 
ligence, Sense and Consciousness. I will suppose that I 
have a perception of some external object, as possessed of 
the qualities of extension, form, and color. In Consciousness 
I recognize the existence of this perception as a phenomenon 



64 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of my own mind. Which of these affirmations are, in real- 
ity, the most valid, and which would a wise and sound phi- 
losophy impel me to esteem and treat as such — the affirma- 
tion of Sense, in respect to the qualities of the external 
object, or of Consciousness, in regard to the existence and 
character of the affirmation of the former faculty, as a 
phenomenon of the Mind itself? Neither, surely. Each 
faculty pertains alike to its object, by direct and immediate 
intuition. The affirmation of each is alike positive and abso- 
lute in respect to its object. The action of one is, in reality, 
no more a mystery than that of the other. The quo modo 
of the action of each is alike inexplicable, and no more 
inexplicable than the mode of action of every other power 
in existence. It is a sage remark of Dr. Brown, when speak- 
ing of the mode in which causes produce their respective 
effects, that " everything is mysterious, or nothing is." When 
philosophy leads us to doubt the real affirmations of any 
faculty of the Intelligence, then philosophy itself becomes 
impossible, and the attempt to realize it, the perfection of 
absurdity. 

Theory of External Perception. 

The way is now prepared for an enunciation of the theory 
of external perception, taught in this Treatise. Knowledge im- 
plies two things ; an object to be known, and a subject capa- 
ble of knowing. Between the nature of the subject and ob- 
ject there must be such a mutual correlation, that, -when 
certain conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises, as a neces- 
sary result of this correlation. Between matter and mind 
this correlation exists. The latter knows the former, be- 
cause the one is a faculty, and the other an object of know- 
ledge. Mind perceives the qualities of matter, because the 
former has the power of perception, and the latter is an object 
of perception. 

Mind also exists in a tri-unity, consisting, as we have seen, 
of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will.* To each of these de- 
partments of our nature, the external world is correlated. 
Certain conditions being fulfilled, particular qualities of ma- 
terial substances become to the Intelligence, direct objects of 
knowledge. Other conditions being fulfilled, they affect our 
Sensibility, producing in us certain sensations either plea- 
surable, painful, or indifferent. Our Will then acts upon 
these substances, controlling their movements, and modify- 



SENSE. 65 

ing their states, while they, in turn, re-act upon the Will, 
modifying and limiting its control. In the first instance, 
knowledge is direct and immediate. In the second, through 
a consciousness of sensations, we learn the correlation be- 
tween those objects and our sensibility. In the last, through 
a consciousness of the nisuses of our Will, and an experience 
of their results, we learn the correlation between these sub- 
stances and our voluntary powers. In all instances, how- 
ever, whether our knowledge is direct or indirect, it is alike 
real and absolute. In respect to the manner in which, when 
certain conditions are fulfilled, we know these objects, the 
only answer that philosophy gives or demands, is this : Such 
is the correlation between the nature of the knowing faculty 
and that of the objects of knowledge. 

Theory Verified. 
It is a sufficient verification of the theory above announced, 
that it is a statement of the case, as it presents itself to the 
universal Intelligence — that it is encumbered with no difficul- 
ties which are not involved in every theory of a different 
kind which has hitherto been presented, and is entirely free 
from those difficulties which are perfectly fatal to those theo- 
ries. Every individual believes, that he knows the external 
world as correlated to the threefold departments of our na- 
ture under consideration, and in accordance with the princi- 
ples above stated. Every theory also must rest, in the last 
analysis, in respect to the mode of knowledge, upon this one 
principle. The mind knows, because it is a faculty of knowledge. 
The difficulties which all theories, contradictory to that 
above announced, involve, are these : either they do not 
present the facts or conditions of knowledge, or the manner 
of knowing, as they are given in the universal Intelligence. 

Theories of External Perception formed by Philosophers. 

Theories differing from that above announced, formed by 
philosophers, to explain the manner in which Mind perceives 
external objects, divide themselves into two classes : — those 
which admit that our knowledge of such objects is real, 
and those which maintain that that knowledge is not real ; 
that all we can know of such objects is our own manner of 
conceiving of them. 

The former theories all agree in this, that we do not know 
external objects directly, but through certain images exist- 



66 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing between the objects and the faculty of knowledge. " To 
all of them," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " 1 apprehend the 
two following remarks will be found applicable : First, that 
in the formation of them, their authors have been influenced 
by some general maxims of philosophizing, borrowed from 
physics ; and, secondly, that they have been influenced by 
an indistinct, but deep-rooted conviction of the immateriality 
of the soul ; which, although not precise enough to point out 
to them the absurdity of attempting to illustrate its opera- 
tions by the analogy of matter, was yet sufficiently strong to in- 
duce them to keep the absurdity of their theories as far as pos- 
sible out of view, by allusions to those physical facts, in which 
the distinctive properties of matter are the least grossly and 
palpably exposed to our observation. To the former of these 
circumstances is to be ascribed the general principle upon 
which all the known theories of perception proceed : that in 
order to explain the intercourse between the mind and dis- 
tant objects, it is necessary to suppose the existence of some- 
thing intermediate, by which its perceptions are produced j 
to the latter, the various metaphorical expressions of ideas, 
species^ formSy shadows, phantasms, images; which, while 
they amused the fancy with some remote analogies to the 
objects of our senses, did not directly revolt our reason. " Very 
little, in addition to the observations above cited, need be 
said upon these theories. They all agree in leaving totally 
unexplained the very difficulties which they profess to ex- 
plain, to wit, How can the mind perceive an object out of itself, 
and at a distance from itself 1 The image between the mind 
and the object, is as really distinct from the mind, and as really 
removed from it, though at a less distance, as the object itself. 
Perception of the intermediate. image is just as difficult of 
explanation, and as truly needs another intermediate image, 
as perception of the object. 

Of the theories last named, some affirm that there are no 
objects external to the mind ; that what we have postulated 
as the qualities of objects external to us, are nothing but our 
own mental states, states of which we are conscious. This 
is the theory of Coleridge, and of modern Transcendentalists. 
Others maintain the reality of mind, on the one hand, and of 
something not mind on the other. They deny, however, 
that the latter can be to the former, in any sense, an object 
of knowledge. When this unknown something, having 
neither extension nor form, and existing neither in time nor 



SENSE. 67 

space, (inasmuch as these are not realities in themselves, 
but only modes in us of conceiving of things as external to 
us,) when, I say, this unknown and nameless something, in 
some unknown and nameless manner, affects the unknown 
something called mind — the latter, by virtue of laws innate in 
itself, postulates to itself its own sensations as the quaUties 
of substances distinct from itself. Thus the great universe, 
in which we contemplate ourselves as existing, together with 
time and space, in which we contemplate ourselves and the 
universe as having being, is nothing in itself but a fiction 
of our own Intelligence. This is the theory of Kant, Elated 
without caricature. Both the kinds of theories under con- 
sideration agree in this, that what our Intelligence postulates 
as the quahties of external substances, are, in reality, 
nothing but mental states, seen by the eye of Conscious- 
ness. External perception i^ nothing but the eye of Con- 
sciousness directed to an affection wholly subjective, which 
the Intelligence postulates as the quality of something object- 
ive and external to the mind. In Consciousness, mental af- 
fections of different kinds are given as subjective and object- 
ive : that is, some are given as phenomena of the mind itself, 
and others as those of objects external to the mind. Hence, 
according to philosophers maintaining these theories, Con- 
sciousness has two distinct functions, the external and the 
internal. When taking cognizance of some affection w^hich 
the Intelligence has postulated as a subjective phenomenon, 
this is Consciousness in the exercise of its interior function. 
When taking cognizance of some affection which the Intelli- 
gence postulates as a phenomenon of an object external to 
the mind, this is Consciousness in the exercise of its exterior 
function. Sense, according to these theories, is not a faculty of 
knowledge at all ; but only a receptivity of affections or im- 
pressions, postulated by the Intell'lgence as the qualities of ob- 
jects external to the mind. Thus that vrhich we have been 
accustomed to regard as a real world external to the mind, 
and altogether unlike ourselves, has no existence out of our- 
selves. Neither the universe, nor its author have any ex- 
istence in itself. They are mere ideals of our own creating ; 
ideals grand and perfect, and which we are therefore bound 
to regard and revere, not as realities in themselves, but as 
grand conceptions — sublime creations of our own Intelligen- 
ces, creations which are true, as Coleridge remarks, simply 
and exclusively, "because we have conceived them." 



68 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Beasons for these Theories. 
Among the reasons given for these theories, the most im- 
portant, and all that 1 now need to notice, are * the follow- 
ing : 

1. They explain the possibility of knowledge. Of all 
things real to us, as objects of knowledge, we have a direct 
and immediate Consciousness. All objects of knowledge, 
therefore, are brought within the sphere of direct mental 
vision. The possibility of perception is thus fully demon- 
strated. 

2. These theories render the reality and certainty of know- 
ledge self-evident. If nothing exists in the object, but what 
our Intelligence has put there, our knowledge of the object 
must be real, certain, and absolute. If, for example, nothing 
exists in a contribution box but what 1 have put there, and I 
know what I have put into it, then my knowledge of what 
the box contains is real and absolute. So when I contem- 
plate an object which my Intelligence has postulated as ex- 
ternal to myself, if that object is in reality nothing but a pure 
creation of my Intelligence, and contains nothing but what 
the same Intelligence has put into it, how demonstrably mani- 
fest it is, that my knowledge of the object is real and ab- 
solute. 

Objections to these Theories. 

But while these theories apparently, at first thought, com- 
mend themselves to our minds, as explaining things which 
would otherwise be w^iolly inexplicable to us, they are at 
once^ in our Intelligence, met with difficulties perfectly in- 
surmountable. 

1. They leave totally unexplained the same mj'stery hang- 
ing over the subject which they profess to explain, that hiing 
over it before, to wit, the possibility of knowledge. The 
distance between the subject and object of knowledge is, to 
be sure, greatly abridged ; inasmuch as all things are brought 
under the immediate vision of Consciousness itself. A the- 
ory, however, w-hich is valid as an explication of the possi- 
sibilify of knowledge, must explain the possibility, not of 
one, but of all kinds of knowledge. JNow the theories under 
consideration, explain, in a certain foim, the possibility of 
what is called external perception. But thej^ leave wholly 
unexplained the possibility of knowledge of another kind, the 



SENSE. 69 

possibility of which needs to be explained, just as much as 
that of the former, to wit, the possibility of knowledge hy 
Consciousness. Suppose an explication of the possibility of 
a knowledge of our own mental states be demanded, what 
answer can be given, but that which is rejected as valid, in 
regard to the possibility of external perception — to wit, that 
Consciousness, relatively to mental states, is a, faculty, and the 
states themselves are objects of perception, or knowledge ? 
Now this explication, the only one possible, in the case under 
consideration, and indeed in any case whatever, is equally 
valid, as an explanation of the possibility of external percep- 
tion. We have only to postulate the Intelligence as ?i facul- 
ty, and external substances as objects of perception, and the 
possibility of such knowledge is just as manifest as know- 
ledge by Consciousness, or through any other function of the 
Intelhgence. 

2. These theories leave another mystery, still more inex- 
plicable, hanging over the question in respect to the possibil- 
ily of knowledge, to wit, how can the Intelligence postulate 
a purely mental affection as exclusively the quality of an ex- 
ternal object ? In other words, how can the Intelligence 
give a phenomenon as pertaining, an object wholly distinct 
from and independent of the precipient subject, w^hich, after 
all, is nothing but a phenomenon of that subject ? Above 
all, how can the Intelligence first give an affection purely 
subjective, as a quality exclusively objective, and afterwards 
give the same quality as exclusively subjective, and that with- 
out the possibility, as Colerigde acknowledges, of considering 
it, as anything but objective ? All these contradictions take 
place in the interior of our Intelligence, in respect to external 
perception, according to the theories under consideration — 
contradictions perfectly equivalent to the declaration, that the 
same thing, at the same time, is, and is not. Should it be 
said, that this process is possible to the Intelligence, because, 
that such is its nature, the same explanation renders equally 
explicable, the possibility of external perception as main- 
tained in this Treatise, a fact denied exclusively on the ground 
of its inexplicability. 

3. The explication which these theories give of the fact of 
perception, is, in reality, the destruction of the fact, and not 
its explication at all. In the Intelligence, there appears a 
perception of an external object. Philosophy is called upon 
for an explanation of the fact. The fact to be explained is 

4* 



70 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

that of the perception of such objects. As such exclusively, 
it is to be explained, and not as something different from a 
real perception of something external. This is what philo- 
sophy is bound to do, if she speaks at all. Now what is the 
explication given by the theories under consideration ? The 
perception of an object external to the mind, is explained by 
a profound demonstration, that no such object, nor percep- 
tion of such object, exists in the Intelligence, and that such 
perception is an inexplicable impossibility. Now this is not 
the explanation of a fact, but its destruction, the most unphi- 
losophical procedure — a procedure very much like the 
Frenchman's definition of the flea, to wit, an animal upon 
which, if you put your finger, he is not under it. 

4. These theories involve an explication equally sophis- 
tical and unphilosophical of the question, in respect to the 
certainty and reality of knowledge. An apprehension of an 
object exists in the Intelligence. Philosophy is called upon 
to answer the question, whether this apprehension is valid, 
in respect to the object ? If it is so, our knowledge is real, 
certain. What answer do these theories give to this ques- 
tion ? This. Our knowledge is certain and absolute, for 
the obvious reason, that the object has no existence at all ; 
that the perception itself is the only thing real, and as it 
contains nothing but what the Intelligence has put into it, 
therefore our knowledge is real and absolute. What a 
strange answer this to the question, the only question sub- 
mitted to philosophy, to wit, the validity of the perception 
relatively to its object. 

5. These theories annihilate wholly all distinctions be- 
tween truth and error, all criteria of truth whatever. The 
reality, the certainty of knowledge, according to these theo- 
ries, consists in this — that as our conceptions are the only 
realities existing, and as these contain nothing but what the 
Intelligence puts into them, therefore our knowledge is real, 
is absolute. Now, this condition of certainty holds, in 
respect to one conception, just as well as another ; and if 
this is the condition of certainty, the wildest vagaries of the 
maniac are just as true as the sublimest demonstrations of 
Newton. 

6. Finally, all such theories give a totally false explica- 
tion of the real procedure of the Intelligence in respect to 
knowledge of every kind. Let any one attempt to apply 
such theories, as elucidating the process of his own mind in 



SENSE. 71 

its perceptions and knowledges, and the effect cannot be better 
expressed, than in the following extract of a letter written 
to Coleridge by a friend, explaining to the philosopher the 
effect of a careful study of his theory of the Imagination : 

" As to myself, and stating, in the first place, the effect on 
my understanding^ your opinions and method of argument 
were not only so new to me, but so directly the reverse of 
all I had ever been accustomed to consider as truth, that, 
even if I had comprehend.ed your premises sufficiently to 
have admitted them, and had seen the necessity of your 
conclusions, I should still have been in that state of mind, 
which, in your note, p. 251, you have so ingeniously 
evolved, as the antithesis to that in which a man is when he 
makes a hull. In your own words, I should have felt as if 
I had been standing on my head. 

*' The effect on my feelings^ on the other hand, I cannot 
better represent, than by supposing myself to have known 
only our light, airy, modern chapels of ease, and then, for 
the first time, to have been placed, and left alone, in one of 
our largest Gothic cathedrals, in a gusty moonlight night of 
autumn. ' Now in glimmer, now in gloom ; ' often in pal- 
pable darkness, not without a chilling sensation of terror ; 
then suddenly emerging into broad, yet visionary light, with 
colored shadows of fantastic shapes, yet all decked with holy 
insignia and holy symbols ; and, ever and anon, coming out 
full upon pictures, and stone-work images, and great men, 
with whose names I was familiar, but which looked upon 
me with countenances, and an expression, the most dissimilar 
to all I had been in the habit of connecting with those names. 
Those whom I had been taught to venerate as almost super- 
human in magnitude of intellect, I found perched in little 
fret-work niches, as grotesque dwarfs ; while the grotesques, 
in my hitherto belief, stood guarding the high altar with all 
the characters of apotheosis. In short, what I had supposed 
substances, were thinned away into shadows, while, every- 
where, shadows were deepened into substances : 

' If substance may be call'd what shadow seem'd, 
For each seem'd either ! ' " 

Now, a theory which gives such an explanation of the 
process of the human Intelligence as this, does not give a 
true exposition of that process. There is surely no pre- 
sumption in such an affirmation as this. 



72 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In the remarks above made upon the theories under con- 
sideration, I have anticipated some things which properly 
belong to a later department of mental science ; no more, 
however, than was necessary to a distinct presentation of our 
present subject of investigation. 

DISTINCTION OF QUALITIES AS PRIMARY AND SECONDARY. 

A few remarks upon the distinction commonly made with 
regard to the qualities of material substances, will close this 
Chapter. These qualities are distinguished as primary and 
secondary. The former are such as are essential to the sub- 
stance as material, such, for example, as solidity and exten- 
sion. The latter are not essential to the existence of the 
substance as matter, such, for example, as color, tempera- 
ture, taste, and smell. Our knowledge of the former is di- 
rect ; of the latter, it is only indirect and relative. As pro- 
perties of external things w^e know such things, says Mr. 
Stewart, only " as the unknown cause of a known sensa- 
tion." On these distinctions, I would simply present the 
following suggestions : 

1. I would raise a query, w'hether color is properly ranked 
as a secondary qualitj^ ? Can we conceive of a material 
substance which is, to any being, an object of vision (and 
every such substance may be to some being, such an object), 
and is yet destitute of color ? For myseli, I find it impos- 
sible to form such a conception of such a substance. 

The principal argument which I present in favor of this 
position, how^ever, is the fact, that all men believe it, even 
philosophers, in the very act of an attempted demonstration 
of the opposite opinion. " We know^ well," says Dr. Brown 
(a strange assertion, that we know well, what he goes on to 
show we cannot believe even while attempting to prove it), 
" when we open our eyes, that whatever affects our eyes is 
•within the small compass of their orbit ; and yet we cannot 
look for a single moment, without spreading what we thus 
visually feel over whole miles of landscape. Still, I must 
repeat, not the slightest doubt is philosophicalhj entertained 
by those, who, when they open their eyes, yield like the 
vulgar to the temporary illusion — that the colors, thus sup- 
posed to be spread over the external objects, or rather the 
rays of light that come from them, are merely the unknown 
causes of certain sensations in ourselves. When ques- 
tioned on the subject of vision, we state this opinion with 



SENSE, 73 

confidence, and even with astonishment, that our opinion 
on the subject, in the present age of philosophy, should 
be doubted by him who has taken the superfluous trouble of 
putting such a question. At the very moment, probably, at 
which we give our answer, we have our eyes fixed on him 
to whom we address it. His complexion, his dress, are re- 
garded by us as external colors, and we are practically, at 
the very moment, therefore, beljnng the very opinion which 
we profess, and in speculation truly profess, to hold." 

For myself, my opinions must undergo an essential modi- 
fication before I shall hold a dogmas, philosophically, which I 
cannot but disbelieve, even in the act of attempting to de- 
monstrate its truth. A philosopher once asked a friend, 
why the atmosphere above us appears blue ? The friend 
attempted to account for the fact, by reference to the laws 
of reflection of light. The philosopher replied, that he had 
a much more simple, and to himself a much more satisfactory 
answer : " The sky appears blue, because it is blue." The 
answer indicated an insight into the depths of philosophic 
wisdom. It is the very answer which true philosophy gives 
to all similar questions. 

2. Our vision of objects is direct and immediate^ and not 
indirect and inediate. The presence of light, the image on 
the retina, the consequent effect upon the Sensibihty, through 
the optic nerve, are conditions of vision, but no part of vision 
itself. When these conditions are fulfilled, we see, not 
what is within the small compass of the orbs of vision, but 
the objects themselves towards which those orbs are turned. 
I hold the truth of this theory, for the reason that it an- 
nounces, as the real and necessary belief of the race, what phi- 
losophy is bound to do, the real belief of philosophers, when 
in the very act of attempted demonstrations of the opposite 
theory. Let any man attempt to write a demonstration of 
the theory, that we never, in reality, see objects without us, 
and in the act of writing that demonstration, he will believe 
that he has a direct vision of the paper on which he is writ- 
ing out an attempted demonstration of the position, that he 
has no such vision. Now, a theory which I cannot believe, 
even when attempting to demonstrate its truth, I shall never 
consent to receive as philosophically true. Philosophy will 
announce much fewer errors than it now does, when it will 
cease to enunciate as philosophically true, what all men, and 
philosophers with them, know to be intellectually false. 



74 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

3. Nor is it true, as some suppose, that primary qualities 
exist in the objects themselves, while the secondary qualities 
exist only in the Sensibility which experiences them. There 
is nothing in the external object, it is said, like the sensation 
of color, taste, or smell. Nor is there anything in the object 
like the sensation of resistance. As causes of specific sensa- 
tions, secondary qualities sustain precisely the same relation 
to their appropriate effects that primary qualities do. The 
only ground for the distinction under consideration, is this : 
we cannot conceive of a material substance which is not solid 
and extended ; but we may conceive of one which is destitute 
of taste, smell, &c. 

Secondary qualities are also just as essential to the pecu- 
liar nature of the substances in which they inhere, as the pri- 
mary ones. We cannot take away a primary quality, with- 
out so changing the nature of its subject, that it will no lon- 
ger be material. Nor can we take away a secondary qual- 
ity (the quality in sugar, for example, which produces in us 
the sensation of sweetness), without changing its nature, as 
that particular thing. 

Nor is our knowledge of the nature of substances less real 
and positive, through the secondary, than through the primary 
qualities of matter. My knowledge of the real nature of 
sugar, for example, through the sensation of sweetness, is 
just as real as is my knowledge of any other substance, 
through the perception of form, or the sensation of resistance. 
All that I know, in either instance, is the real correlation be- 
tween the nature of Mind and Matter, through perceptions 
and sensations. 



CHAPTER VII. 



SECONDARY FACULTIES. 



Understanding. 

' Through the faculty of Sense, and a consciousness of sen- 
sations, we have, as we have seen, intuitions of the qualities 
of external] material substances ; phenomena, such as are ex- 
pressed by the terms extension, form, resistance, color, taste, 
smell, and sound. By Consciousness, we have similar intui- 
tions of the operations of our own minds, such as thinking, 
feeling, and willing. Through Reason, on condition of the 
perceptions of Sense and Consciousness, we have the intui- 
tions of time, space, personal identity, substance, and cause. 
These intuitions being given, another and secondary intellec- 
tual process occurs, a process, in which these intuitions, 
necessary and contingent, are united into notions of particu- 
lar things. Thus, our notion of body, for example, is com- 
plex, and when analysed into its distinct elements, is found 
to be constituted exclusively of intuitions given by the facul- 
ties above referred to. We conceive of it as a substance, 
in which the qualities above named inhere, a substance 
existing in time and space, and sustaining certain relations to 
other substances, of which we have notions similarly 
compounded. The same holds true of our notions of all sub- 
stances whatever. They are all complex, and constituted 
exclusively of intuitions given by the primary faculties. 

A notion, then, is a complex intellectual phenomenon, com- 
posed of intuitions. The faculties, or functions of the Intel- 
ligence, which give us the latter, we have already consider- 
ed. What shall we call that which gives us the former ? 
In other words what shall we call the notion-forming power 
of the mind .'* In conformity to a usage which has, since 
the time of Coleridge, extensively obtained, we denominate 



76 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

this faculty of the Intelligence, the Understanding. In strict 
conformity to this specific application, will the term Under- 
standing, when special notice to the contrary is not given, be 
employed throughout this Treatise. It will be employed, 
not as Locke uses it, as designating the general Intelligence, 
but to designate a special function of that InteUigence, a func- 
tion in which intuitions contingent and necessary, given by 
the primary faculties, are combined into notions or conceptions 
of particnhr objects, or classes of objects. 

Notions Particular and General. 

Notions are of tw^o kinds, particular and general. Partic- 
ular notions are such as^we form of individuals, and designate 
by terms which are applicable to such individuals only — such 
as John, Samuel. General notions appertain to classes of 
individuals, and are designated by terms of corresponding ap- 
pHcation, such as man, mountain. The formation of the no- 
tions last mentioned, will be considered in a subsequent 
Chapter. 

ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED. 

The elements of which all notions are constituted, are, as 
we have seen, of two kinds — contingent and necessary. A 
proper philosophical analysis of notions would lead us to con- 
template them in the light of these two distinct classes of 
elements. 

Contingent Elements. 
The contingent elements entering into every notion are all 
expressed by the general term phenomenon. Now, pheno- 
mena present themselves under the following entirely distinct 
relations. 

1. That of inherence., or that which inheres in particular 
substances, irrespective of other substances. Thus white- 
ness, for example, inheres in snow, sweetness in sugar, and 
form belongs to all bodies. This class of phenomena we de- 
signate by the term quality. 

2. That which results from the action and reaction of one 
substance upon another, or the phenomena of depe7idence. 
Thus, fluidity in metals results from the action of heat upon 
metallic substances. All such phenomena we designate by 
the term effect. 



ELEMENTS OF NOTIONS. 77 

3. That relation of phenomena which results from the ex- 
ternal connection of substances with one another, or the phe- 
nomena of coherence. Thus individuals sustain to each other 
the relations of employer and agent, physician and patient, 
teacher and pupil, &c. 

4. The fourth class of phenomena may be denominated 
accidental. Thus the fact that an individual now existing, is 
born of a woman, constitutes an essential element of our con- 
ception of him as a man. But the fact that he was born in 
Paris instead of London, in France instead of America, is 
what is called an accidental element of our conception of 
him, because, such an element is not essential to our con- 
ception of him as a man. 

5. The relation of phenomena pertaining to place. Thus, 
when any phenomena appears, we ask, where is it? If one 
individual, for example, who is ignorant of the facts, should 
hear others speaking of the Astor House, he would at once 
ask after its location. The particular place where the house 
is located, is a contingent element of our conception of it. 
The same holds true of all other substances. 

6. Phenomena present themselves under one other relation 
still, that of antecedence., and succession. When any event is 
announced to us as having occurred, we ask the question, 
when did it occur } The answer to this question, that is, the 
particular time of the event, enters as a contingent element 
into our conceptions of it. 

As far as my present investigations extend, the above pre- 
sent a complete enumeration of the contingent elements of 
all our notions. Whenever we contemplate an object, we 
always think of it in relation to what is intrinsic in the object, 
irrespective of other objects — to what we have witnessed in 
regard to the effects resulting from the agtion of other powers 
upon it, or from its action upon them — to its external rela- 
tions to other objects — to accidental circumstances connected 
with it — to the place where it is located, or its phenomena 
have appeared, — and the time of such occurrences. I have 
hesitated considerably in respect to the question whether 
the last two classes should not be ranged under the fourth, 
and classed as accidents. To me, however, they appear 
sufficiently distinct to justify the arrangement above made. 

Necessary Elements. 
Of the necessary elements which enter into, and determine 



78 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the characteristics of all our notions, a complete enumeration, 
in the present state of mental science, is hardly to be ex- 
pected. We may hope, however, to make an approach 
somewhat near to that result. 

Substance and Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions, 

Oae fact, pertaining to this department of our inquiries is 
quite evident. It is this : The fundamental elements which 
enter into all our notions, and which, as laws of thought, de- 
termine the character of such phenomena, are two, substance 
and cause. If we make inquiries respecting any object for 
the purpose of perfecting our notions or conceptions of it, it 
is as substance or cause, that such object is contemplated. 
All our inquiries are but different forms in which these two 
ideas evolve themselves in the Intelligence. 

Evolution of these Laws not Arbitrary. 
A careful analysis will also convince us, that the forms in 
which these two laws of thought evolve themselves, are by 
no means arbitrary. On the other hand, their principles of 
evolution are perfectly fixed. Whenever we would make 
inquiries respecting substances or causes, for the purpose of 
perfecting our notions of them, we, on reflection, find that cer- 
tain specific inquiries we do and must put, and that none 
others we can make. In the light of the answers obtained 
to such inquiries, are all our notions of substance and cause 
determined. An elucidation of these laws of thought, and 
as a consequence, an evolution of the direction of the Under- 
standing in all legitimate inquiries after right notions of 
substances, constitutes one of the great problems in philoso- 
phy. A davelopement of these laws, in other words, of the 
Categories of the Understanding, will now be attempted. 
Whether that development shall be complete or incomplete, 
the result will determine. 

Time and Space. 

I begin with the categories of time and space. These are 
entirely distinct from each other. As the same remarks, 
however, are equally applicable to each, I shall consider j 
them together. 

Whenever any substances or phenomena are thought of, I 
two inquiries arise in respect to them. When and where do, 
or did they exist or occur } When we think of the world, 



- ERRORS OF KANT. 79 

for example, we naturally raise the inquiries, When was it 
created? how long has it stood ? what place does it occupy 
in the universe ? So also when we think of any occurrence 
in, or on the earth, we raise inquiries precisely similar, to 
wit, When and where did they occur ? The same holds true 
in respect to all objects of the Understanding. All substan- 
ces, all causes, all phenomena are thought of in relation to 
time and space. The ideas of time and space, as laws of 
thought, enter into all our notions, or Understanding-concep- 
tions. 

ERRORS OF KANT. 

1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Noumena to 
Time and Space. 
Kant makes a distinction obviously correct, between the 
impressions which objects make upon us, and the causes of 
these impressions, or the objects themselves. The former 
he denominates phenomena. The latter, that is, what he 
regards as the unknown objects which produce impressions 
in us, he calls noumena. Now phenomena, he says, we 
necessarily conceive of, as in time and space. Noumena, on 
the other hand, have no such relation, indeed, no relation 
whatever, to either time or space. Here a great mistake of 
this profound analyzer of the human mind presents itself. 
Reason affirms absolutely, that noumena have as real a re- 
lation to time and space as phenomena do. Whatever is to 
us an object of thought, whether it be an object, as it exists 
in itself, or whether it be a phenomenon of such object, we 
do, and must, put the questions. When ? — how long ? — and 
where ? — in respect to it. Noumena, as well as phenomena, 
do and must have their locations in time and space. In the 
language of Dr. Murdoch, we may triumphantly ask, " How 
can physical effects be limited to time and space, and not 
also the physical causes v/hich produce them ? Can a mate- 
rial thing operate or produce effects, where it is not present to 
produce them .'' Or can Reason any more conceive, a prio- 
ri^ of a necessity for phenomena to exist only in time and 
space, than for noumena to exist in the same manner } If 
then. Reason decides a priori., oy intuitively, that phenomena 
must so exist, does she not equally decide a priori., or intui- 
tively, that noumena must so exist .?" The overlooking of 
this obvious and undeniable fact, led this great philosopher to 



80 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

accord to time and space a necessary reality, as laws of sen- 
sible intuition, that is, of external perception, and to deny ail 
reality of them, as realities in themselves. 

2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to Phenomena. 

Another error of this philosopher consists in representing 
the ideas of time and space as laws of sensible intuition, 
that is, of external perception, and not as categories of the 
Understanding. They are, Kant maintains, the '■^ forms of 
the phenomena of external Sense, or the aspects in which 
those phenomena present themselves to our Senses." They 
not only determine the forms of phenomena, but alone 
render perception possible to us. Now a moment's reflec- 
tion will convince us that these ideas have no relation 
whatever to perception, external or internal, but exist in us 
exclusively as laws of the Understanding, or notion-forming 
power. 

In the first place, these ideas, instead of existing in the 
mind prior to, and thus determining the fonn of phenomena, 
are chronologically, as we have seen, developed in the Intel- 
ligence subsequent to phenomena, external and internal. 
We must first perceive extension, for example, and thus 
form a notion of something extended, before we can conceive . 
of space in which such objects exist. It is not, therefore, as 
this philosopher maintains, through the idea of space that 
objects present themselves to us, in perception, as extended. 
On the other hand, without the perception of extension, the 
idea of space, as the place of the object perceived, would not 
be developed at all. The same illustration holds equally in 
regard to time. This idea does not first exist in the mind, 
and then determine our perception of events, as simultaneous 
or successive. The prior perception of succession, on the 
other hand, developes the idea. Perception, in all forms and 
degrees, exists wholly independent of the ideas of time and 
space. The mistake of Kant, in this case, consists in putting 
the antecedent for the consequent. 

Equally manifest is it, on the other hand, that these ideas 
do not give form to perception, but, as laws of thought, 
determine the characteristics of perceptions or notions. 
When we perceive or think of phenomena, and of substances 
also, then, as the ideas of time and space are developed, 
we put the inquiries, Where .-^ when? how long? &c., in 
respect to them. We do not perceive y but conceive or think 



ERRORS OF KANT. 81 

of objects, as in time and space. The ideas of time and 
space are, therefore, categories, not of Sense, but of the 
Understanding. 

II. — Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Differejice, 
An essential element of our ideas of substance, is that of 
identity and diversity. As the relation between substances 
and their phenomena is that of necessity, a necessary law of 
conceptions, or of notions, is that substances are as their 
phenomena. Hence the two great necessary laws which 
determine our notions of substances, to wit, similar pheno- 
mena, suppose similar substances ; dissimilar phenomena sup- 
pose dissimilar substances. Under the categories of Identity 
and Diversity, Resemblance and Difference, all classification, 
as we shall see, in a subsequent chapter, proceeds. The 
conception of the likeness or unlikeness of an object to some- 
thing else, enters, as an essential element, into all our no- 
tions of it. Perhaps some might be inclined to place the 
above ideas under a category hereafter to be considered — that 
of Relation. The}^ are no less distinct from it, however, 
than either of those next to be mentioned. 

III. — The idea of a Whole, as including its Parts, or Parts 
in reference to the Whole. 
Every notion pertains to its object as a whole, including 
parts, or as a part relatively to a whole. This is a univer- 
sal and necessary law of all Understanding-conceptions, or 
notions. Thus, when v/e conceive of the Mind, we neces- 
sarily conceive of it as a whole, including the Intelligence, 
Sensibility, and Will ; or we think of some department of 
mental operation relatively to the whole Mind. If we would 
form a notion of any material substance, any body, the same 
holds true in a more specific and special sense. Body, as 
given in all Understanding-conceptions, or notions, is a 
whole, a compound, constituted of simple parts. 

kant's antinomy of pure reason. 

According to this philosopher, all transcendental ideas, 
that is, all the necessary elements of our notions of substan- 
ces around us, involve palpable contradictions. Two distinct 
and opposite propositions are susceptible of equal and abso- 
lute demonstration from these ideas. For example, the two 



82 .INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

following propositions, which are perfectly contradictory to 
each other, are equally susceptible of demonstration. 

1. *' Every compound substance in the world consists of 
simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing but the 
simple, or that which is compounded of it." 

2. " No compound thing in the world consists of simple 
parts, and there exists not anywhere therein anything simple." 

The amount of the proof of the first, which he denomi- 
nates the Thesis, is this : If the compound is not made up of 
simple parts, then, if all composition were done away in 
thought, no compound part could remain ; and as there is, in 
that case, none simple, nothing would remain, and, conse- 
quently, no compound would be given. 

His proof of the second, denominated Anti-Thesis, is, that 
the simple, whatever it may be, must occupy space, and 
therefore be made up of parts existing externally to each 
other, and consequently compounded. The conception of 
the simple, which is not a compound of something which is 
itself compounded, is a contradiction, and of course an im- 
possible conception. No simple, therefore, does or can exist. 
From the contradictions necessarily involved in the Thesis 
and Anti-Thesis above given, each of which, from the nature 
of Understanding-conceptions, he affirms, is susceptible of 
equal and absolute demonstration, he infers, as demonstrably 
evident, the non-reality of all material existences, such as 
we conceive of them ; inasmuch as the supposition of their 
real existence involves contradictions perfectly synonymous 
with the affirmation, that the same thing, at the same time, 
may be and not be. In reply, I remark, 

1. That the proposition, that that which is compounded 
must be made up of simple parts, is an intuition of Reason, 
and therefore incapable of demonstration, in the same sense 
that all other intuitions are. We may show, as in the Thesis 
above given, that the opposite proposition involves a contra- 
diction, and that is all. 

2. The conception of the simple is a pure idea of Reason, 
and not an Understanding-conception at all. The compound 
only is an object of perception, and consequently of Under- 
standing-conceptions. All bodies, therefore, as the Under- 
derstanding forms notions of them, must be compounded. 
Not so with the simple, as given by the Reason. 

3. In his Anti-Thesis, Kant assumes the idea of the sim- 
ple as an Understanding-conception, which, of course, 



ERRORS OF RANT. 83 

involves the idea of composition, and hence his boasted de- 
monstration is nothing but a singular paralogism. If we 
assume that the idea of the simple is a notion, that is, that it 
is complex and not simple, then we have the contradictions 
presented by Kant in his Thesis and Anti-Thesis. Take 
away this assumption, and the contradictions wholly disap- 
pear. I believe that it can be shown that all the antinomies 
of pure Reason, as given by this philosopher, involve paralo- 
gisms similar to the one under consideration. 

IV. — The Category of Quantity. 
Whenever we contemplate a notion which lies under any 
term whatever, we find that it always does and must refer to 
some one object, to a number or multitude of objects, or to 
a total race or class of objects. For example, the term man 
may be used to designate some one individual, or a plurality 
of -men, or the total race of men. This is what is meant 
by the logical quantity of a notion or conception, and 
presents us with the category of Quantity — with its sub- 
catagories. Unity, Plurality, and Totality. Under the first, 
we have the notion of an individual. Under the second, that 
of a number of individuals. Under the last, we have a 
multitude of individuals classed together as a total race, on 
the ground of common qualities. Whenever we inquire 
after the extent or logical quantity of any term, or of that 
of the notion which lies under that term, we ask in which of 
the senses above named is it to be taken } 

The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously 

considered. 
At first thought, the category of Quantity maybe regarded 
as identical with that previously considered. The ideas of 
whole and of parts, however, are correlative ideas. It is not 
so with those of unity and totality. A class supposes indi- 
viduals ; but the individual does not necessarily suppose a 
class. Totality, as distinguished from individuality, is dis- 
tinct from a whole as distinguished from parts. 

v.— 0/ Quality. 
To complete and perfect our notions of substances, a fun- 
damental inquiry arises, to wit, what is this substance } 
When we would answer the question pertaining to the nature 
of the object, but one thing is considered — the qualities of 



84 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the object. As it is a necessary intuition of Reason, that 
substance supposes quality, and that substances are as their 
qualities, hence arises the category of Quality. 

In all distinct notions of an object, certain qualities are 
positively affirmed, others denied, and others atfirmed in a 
limited degree, of the object. Thus, in our notions of an in- 
dividual, for example, distinguished intellectual powers may 
be affirmed, prudence denied, and courage affirmed in a limit- 
ed degree. This principle is observed when we would 
describe an object to others, for the purpose of conveying 
distinct conceptions of it to their minds. We designate the 
positive qualities which appear in it. We deny other quali- 
ties of it, which might appear, but do not. We then desig- 
nate others which might appear in all its parts, or in a certain 
degree of perfection, but which appear only in a limited 
degree. Thus the category of Quality presents itself in 
three forms, or sub-categories, those of Affirmation, Negation, 
and Limitation. When an object has been placed in the 
light of all these, then our notions of its nature are full and 
distinct. 

VI.— 0/ Relation. 

Another form in which objects are given to us in notions? 
or Understanding-conceptions, is their relations to other ob- 
jects. According to Kant, the category of Relation also 
developes itself in three forms. When two objects are 
brought together for the purpose of comparing them with 
each other, we consider the question, what qualities inhere 
in one which do not in the other ? Here we have the first 
sub-category of Relation, that of Inherence. Each sub- 
stance is thus contemplated in its relations to its distinctive 
attributes or qualities. 

Objects also are contemplated relatively to their powers 
of affecting other objects and determining their states, or 
their susceptibilities ot being affected by such objects. The 
metals, for example, are conceived of, as susceptible of fusion 
from heat, and caloric as possessed of the power of pro- 
ducing such effects in metals. In the one case, we give our 
notions of the powers of substances, and in the other of their 
susceptibilities. Two substances also may be compared rela- 
tively to their powers and susceptibilities. Thus we have 
the relation, or sub-category of causality and dependence. 

A third relation is that of reciprocity, denominated by 



UNDERSTANDING. 8^5 

Kant the sub-category of Community. When objects, for 
example, mutually attract or repel each other, this relation- 
ship differs entirely from that of cause and effect. All objects 
in the universe around are, in some form or other, thus cor- 
related to each other. The relation of employer and agent 
falls under the principle under consideration. 

Such is the category of Relation. When we have con- 
templated objects till we know them, in the light of their 
comparative qualities, or attributes — in reference to their 
powers of affecting other objects, or of being affected by 
them— and as they mutually and reciprocally affect each 
other, then our notions are complete, as far as the idea of 
relation is concerned. 

Y\l.—Of Modality. 
Every Understanding-conception respects its object, as a 
possible or impossible — a real or unreal existence — and as 
existing of necessity or contingently. These ideas enter, as 
necessary elements, into all our notions, and constitute what 
is denominated the modality of Understanding-conceptions. 
Suppose I convey the conception I have of some object, to 
any individual. He will naturally and necessarily inquire, 
Can such a thing be } Is it a reality } Does it exist of 
necessity, or contingently } 

Ylll.—The Idea of Law. 

When we have formed our notions of objects, in the light 
of the preceding principles, another inquiry of great impor- 
tance arises, to wit, according to what lav»', or laws, do those 
powers act } The forms in which the nomological idea, as 
it is denominated by Prof. Tappan, developes itself are vari- 
ous, according to the nature of the objects to which it per- 
tains, and the point of view in which the object is contemplated. 
Still, as a necessary element, it enters into, and determines 
the character of, all our notions of substances within and 
around us. When we come to speak of the Reason again, 
this idea, together with the conditions of its development, 
and the varied forms in which it appears will be the object 
of special remark. I deemed it important to simply refer to 
it here, on account of its omnipresent influence, in determin- 
ing the character of all our Understanding-conceptions. 

Such are the elements which enter into all our notions, or 
Understanding-conceptions. That the above analysis pre- 
5 



S6 INTELLECTUAL PHrLOSOPHY.- 

sent us with real elements of such phenomena, there can be 
no doubt. But whether that analysis is complete, will be 
ascertained in the more .perfect developments of mental 
science. 

Conceptions as distinguished from Notions. 
Conception, as commonly defined by philosophers, is a 
past perception recalled in Memory or Recollection. It 
is rather, as it appears to me, the recalling of the notion 
formed of the object when perceived. Perceptions may be 
renewed but not recalled. The conceptions of individuals 
will vary, as the notions which they formed of objects when 
perceived. The terms notion and conception are often used 
as synonymous. 

A Fact often attending Perception. 
It is a fact with which all are familiar, that when we 
unexpectedly meet an object before unknown to us, but 
which, in certain particulars, resembles one well known, we 
seem for a time to see the latter with perfect distinctness. 
The reason of this phenomenon I suppose to be this. Under 
such circumstances, the notion we have of the known object 
is recalled with such vividness, that it almost exclusively 
occupies the attention of the mind. 

Mistake of Mr. Stewart. 
According to this philosopher, in all conceptions, the 
absent object is, in the first instance, always believed to 
be present, as an object of direct perception. Universal con- 
sciousness affirms the error of such a dogma. The mistake 
of Mr. S. arose, as I suppose, from his definition of concep- 
tion, that is, that it is a past perception recalled. If this 
were true, I do not see but we must, not only at first, but at 
all times, regard the object of our conception, as directly- 
present. 

Notions and Conceptions characterized as complete or incom- 
plete., true or false. 
In the former part of this Chapter, we have contem- 
plated the elements, contingent and necessary, which enter 
into all Understanding-conceptions. It now remains to 
consider these phenomena in their relation to their objects. 
All Understanding-conceptions pertain to their objects, in 



UNDERSTANDING. 87 

two important relations, as complete or incomplete^ or as true 
ox false. 

Such conception is complete, when it represents all the 
elements really existing in the object. It is incomplete, 
when it fails to do this. Absolute completeness character- 
izes probably none of our conception's. 

An Understanding-conception is true, when it represents 
completely or incompletely, and attributes to the object, the 
real elements of the object, and nothing else. It is false, 
when it attributes to the object unreal elements, or denies of 
it what is real. 

Two facts are obviously true from the above definitions. 
1. A conception may be incomplete ; and yet true, it being 
true when it attributes to the object nothing but what is 
real. Or a notion might be complete, and yet, in a certain 
sense, false ; as it might attribute to the object all that is real, 
and something not real. 2. Conceptions may be wholly true, 
or wholly false ; or partly true, and partly false. That is, 
they may attribute to their objects nothing but what is real, 
or nothing that is real ; or they may attribute to them some 
things real, and some not real. Unmingled error seldom 
characterizes any of our conceptions. 

Mistake of Coleiidge in respect to the Understanding. 

Coleridge defines the Understanding, as the " faculty of 
judging according to Sense," a definition which he copied 
from Kant and other German philosophers. According to 
such philosophers, the Understanding pertains only to exter- 
nal material substances. It has nothing to do with the sub- 
jective, with Mind. 

Now this is a great error in philosophy. As a matter of 
fact, we form notions and conceptions of Mind as really as 
we do of anything not ourselves. Notions subjective as 
really exist, in Consciousness, as those which are objective. 
Nor can any reasons be assigned, why we should attribute 
the formation of the latter to one faculty of the Intelligence, 
and that of the former to another. The appropriate sphere of 
the Understanding is evidently limited only by the Finite. 
Reason alone pertains to the Infinite, the Absolute, and the 
Universal. All other realities fall within the range of the 
Understanding. 



CHAPTER VIIL 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 



Abstraction. 

All our notions, or Understanding-conceptions, are, as we 
have seen, complex, constituted of elements furnished by 
the primary faculties. Sense, Consciousness, and Reason. 
To make an abstraction of a notion is, in thought, on the 
ground of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to sepa- 
rate these elements from one another, giving special atten- 
tion to some one, or more, or each of them in particular. 
Into our conceptions of body, for example, the elements of 
form, solidity, color, &c., enter. Now in the light of the 
ideas of resemblance and difference, the Intelligence perceives 
at once, that the element of solidity differs from that 
of form, and that of color from either of the others. In 
thought, therefore, either of these elements may be so sepa- 
rated from all of the rest, that it shall be the object of special 
observation. Thus our conceptions of each element of the 
object, and consequently our notions of the entire object, may 
become more or less distinct and complete. 

Abstract Notions^ whaty and how formed? 
When the Intelligence, in the sense above explained, 
makes abstraction of a particular element of an object or 
conception, it may, ever after, conceive and speak of that el- 
ement without reference to the particular object from which 
it was abstracted. Then we have what is denominated an 
abstract notion, such as is designated by the terms redness, 
sweetness, hardness, &c. 

General Notions, how formed. 
^ Originally all Understanding-conceptions are particular. 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. bV 

From these, all notions, abstract and general, are formed. 
How is the general evolved from the particular ? Let us 
suppose that, in conformity to the process above described, 
the Intellect has formed notions of tv^o particular objects, 
mountains, for example. These two notions lie together un- 
der the eye of Consciousness. In the light of the idea of 
resemblance and difference, the mind at once perceives that 
there are certain elements common to the two. Abstraction is 
made of these elements, and a third notion is formed, em- 
bracing them alone. Here is the first appearance of a gen- 
eral notion. When a third mountain is perceived, and a no- 
tion formed of that, the general notion undergoes a new 
modification, and now embraces those elements only com- 
mon to the three. Thus the process of abstraction goes on, 
till the general notion pertains to those elements only com- 
mon to all mountains. This same process takes place in all 
instances in which general notions are evolved from particu- 
lar ones. 

CLASSIFICATION. 

The process of classification can now be readily explained. 
We will refer back to the case when two particular notions 
were in the mind, and the general was evolved from them. 
As soon as the notion last named appears, the two particu- 
lars are subsumed or classed under it. In the same manner 
every particular previously perceived is arranged under the 
general, in all the successive modifications which it subse- 
quently undergoes. 

Forms of Classification. 
There are three distinct points of view from which objects 
are classified. 

1. In view of general resemblances, they are classed, on 
the ground of common qualities, under general notions, such 
as man, animals, &c. 

2. In view of some one quality without reference to re- 
semblance in any other particular, they are classed under no- 
tions purely abstract, such as redness, whiteness, &c. We 
often class objects together, as white^ hard, sweet, &c., with- 
out reference to their relations, in any other particulars. 

3. Objects are classed together, in view of their corre- 
spondence to pure rational conceptions, such as a circle, 
square, right and wrong, &c. 



90 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Classification J in what sense arbitrary. 

It will readily be seen that classification from one point of 
view, will run directly across and back of that which is 
formed from another. How distinct and opposite, for exam- 
ple, will classification be which is founded in view of some 
one abstract quality, such as redness, from that which is bas- 
ed upon general resemblance, and formed under a general 
conception. Equally distinct and unlike either of the others 
will be the arrangement of objects, which are classed togeth- 
er under some pure rational conception. 

For these reasons classification has, by many been regard- 
ed as perfectly arbitrary. It is true, that we are at liberty to 
adopt either of the principles of classification above described 
we please. In this respect, the process is perfectly arbitra- 
ry. If we classify at all, however, we must adopt one or 
the other of the forms under consideration, no other forms 
being conceivable. When we have selected our principle 
also, the subsequent arrangement of objects in conformity to 
it is necessary. In very important respects, therefore, clas- 
sification has its laws, which are by no means arbitrary. 

Genera and Species. 
In the process of classification, objects are ranged together 
as genera and species. Thus we have the genus tree, and 
the different classes, or species of fruit-bearing and forest 
trees, ranged under it. A species also is often itself a genus 
relatively to particular and distinct classes belonging to that 
species. If fruit-bearing be assumed as the genus, then we 
have the apple, plum, peach, cherry trees, &c., ranged as 
species under this generic term. The illustration might be 
extended indefinitely, from the highest to the lowest forms of 
genus and species. Our present concern is with the princi- 
ple on which objects are thus classed. It is that to which 
we have frequently referred in this Chapter, the idea oi resem- 
blance and difference. The genus is formed on the percep- 
tion of remote resemblances. Species under the genus are 
formed on the perception of important differences ; while ob- 
jects are classed under the species, on the perception of re- 
semblances more near and special. Thus the genus tree is 
formed on the perception of qualities common to all trees. 
The species fruit-bearing and forest trees, are separated from 
each other, on the perception of important differences, each 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT, 91 

species being formed on the ground of resemblances more 
near and particular than those designated by the general term 
tree. 

In illustration of the process in which classes, as genus 
and species, are formed, we v/ill take the case of the child. 
A certain object stands near the paternal m.ansion, which he 
has learned to designate by the term tree. By and by he 
sees another object resembling this in all important particu- 
lars. Here, he says, is another tree. In his mind they 
are distinguished as greater and less, and in respect of loca- 
tion. Here is the obscure development of the ideas of 
genus and species. At length, however, he perceives a tree 
differing in very important particulars from either of the oth- 
ers. He now asks the question, what kind of tree is this } 
The answer is, we will suppose, a maple tree. Then the 
inquiry arises, what tree is that which stands near the house } 
He is told that it is an elm tree. He has now the idea of 
the genus tree, formed on the perception of common quali- 
ties, and of two species, separated from each other on the 
perception of important differences. All trees subsequently 
perceived, presenting similar resemblances and differences, 
will be separated and arranged accordingly. As other trees, 
differing from either of these, are perceived, they will be sep- 
arated and classed in a similar manner. Throughout the 
whole process, one idea guides the mind, that of resem- 
blance and difference. 

GENERALIZATION. 

But few words are requisite in the explanation of the men- 
tal process called Generalization, A general fact is a quality 
common to every individual of a given class. It may be pe- 
culiar to that class ; or, while it belongs to each individual of 
the class, it may appertain to individuals of other classes. 

Rules in respect to Generalizaiion, 

1. No fact must be assumed as general, which does not 
belong to each individual of the class to which it is referred. 

2. No general fact must be assumed as peculiar to one 
class, which, though strictly general in respect to that class,- 
nevertheless appertains to individuals of other classes. 

3. No fact must be assumed as general without a sufficient 
induction of particulars, to remove all doubt in respect to 
the question whether it is, or is not, a general fact, 



92 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The Term General sometimes used in a limited sense. 
In common usage, a fact is called general, when it belongs 
to a majority of the individuals of a certain class. In such a 
case, its existence in connection with an individual of the 
class is only probable. Great injury is often done to indivi- 
duals in the application of facts of this kind. 

GENERAL TERMS. 

In the progressive developments of mental science, the 
question has long been agitated among philosophers, wheth- 
er when we use general terms, such as man, animal, there are 
ideas in the mind, and objects in the universe around us, cor- 
responding to these terms, or whether they are mere terms, 
without corresponding ideas and objects. In respect to such 
terms, three distinct theories have been formed by as many 
different sects of philosophers. 

Theory of the Realists. 
The first was maintained by a particular class of the school- 
men, and deduced from certain princij)les, real or supposed, 
maintained by Aristotle. The theory was this : There ex- 
ists in nature, not only individual substances, but certain es- 
sences^ corresponding with the general ideas which exist in 
the mind. When, for example, we use the term man, it 
was maintained that there exists in the world around us a 
certain essence, which is found in no individual of the spe- 
cies, and which exists in connection with no individual, but 
which corre.'^ponds with the idea in the mind, which idea is 
designated by the above term. So of every other general 
term. The sect of philosophers maintaining this theory w^as 
called Realists. Their dogmas have been long since ex- 
ploded. 

Theory of the Nominalists. 
Another theory directly opposed to the above, was main- 
tained by a sect of philosophers w'hich arose in the eleventh 
century. " According to those philosophers," says Mr. Stew- 
art, " there are no existences in nature, corresponding to gen- 
ral terms ; and the objects of our attention, in all speculations, 
are not ideas, but words." This sect was called the Nomi- 
nalists. As there are no existences in nature, according to 
this sect, corresponding with general terms, all our specula- 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 93 

tions and reasonings, but for our knowledge of such terms, 
must be confined to individuals. The following from Mr. Stew- 
art, who was an avowed Nominalist, will illustrate the mean- 
ing of the above remarks, as well as show their correctness. 
" It has been already shown, that without the use of signs, all 
our knowledge must be necessarily limited to individuals ; 
and that we should be perfectly incapable, both of classifica- 
tion, and general reasoning." If the author means that with- 
out the use of signs, we should be unable to communicate 
our thoughts to each other, what he says is a mere truism, 
which is no less applicable to individuals. But if he means, 
as he evidently does, that without the use of signs, we could 
not reason upon general subjects, I reply, 

1. That the existence of the names themselves implies the 
previous process of reasoning and classification, to which he 
supposes these terms give birth. A class must first be form- 
ed, and a judgment aflSrmed, before any particular term can 
be chosen to designate them. Now as the process of clas- 
sification gives existence to general terms, which processes 
must always be anterior to the terms themselves, the mind 
must possess the power of classification and general reasoning, 
in the absence of such terms. The mistake of the author 
consists in changing the order of sequence, putting the effect 
for the cause. 

2. Individuals have been known who have lost entirely 
all recollection of general terms, and who have yet retained 
the power of classification and reasoning upon general sub- 
jects unimpaired. 

3. If our reasonings upon general subjects respect not 
ideas, nor things, but words merely, then all general conclu- 
sions must be absolutely useless in all the concerns of real life. 
In such circumstances, we have to do with realities exclu- 
sively, and shall find no place for conclusions in respect to 
abstractions, or rather in respect to the relations of abstrac- 
tions which have no existence in nature. 

4. The fact, that general terms are always defined by a re- 
ference to individuals, shows clearly, that there are, in such 
individuals, realities corresponding to the terms employed. 

Theory of the Conceptualisis. 
We come now to notice the doctrine of the sect denomi- 
nated Conceptualists, or Notionalists. According to the 
doctrine of this sect, a general term, when considered objec- 



94 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY 

twely^ denotes those qualities which exist alike in all indi- 
viduals of a given class — when considered subjectively^ it 
designates the conception of these qualities in the mind. In- 
stead of there being no existences in nature, according to the 
doctrine of the Nominalists, corresponding to general terms, 
they maintain, that there is in every individual of a given 
class, that which corresponds with those terms. The doc- 
trine of this sect, as will be seen, is equally removed from 
that of the Realists and Nominalists both. That the doc- 
trine of this sect is correct, and the only correct view of the 
subject, is evinced, because : 

1. When the mind affirms of any particular object, as soon 
as perceived, that it is a man, a horse, an animal, such 
affirmation supposes the existence in the mind of a certain 
notion, or conception of a given class of objects, and the per- 
ception of the agreement of the given object, with that 
conception. It can be accounted for upon no other suppo- 
sition. 

2. Every person, when he appeals to his own Conscious- 
ness, knows, that when using general terms, he is designat- 
ing conceptions really existing in his own mind, conceptions 
pertaining to real qualities of classes of objects existing 
around him. 

3. General terms are always defined by a reference to the 
qualities existing in individuals of a given class, and no 
definition is allowed to be correct, which does not designate 
the qualities common to the whole class to which it is applied. 

4. General conclusions, when correct, must be applicable 
to all the individuals of the particular class to which they 
are applied. This shows that such conclusions are based 
upon the conception of the common qualities of each indi- 
vidual of the class. 

UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED. 

Having explained the process of abstraction and classifi- 
cation, it now remains to compare this process with the 
action of the Understanding. A moment's reflection will 
convince us, that this process, and that of forming notions, 
are entirely distinct from each other, and must be referred 
to functions of the Intelligence equally distinct. To form a 
notion of A and B, and to affirm that they agree or disagree, 
are intellectual operations, entirely distinct from each other. 
The former process is called conception ; the latter is called 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 95 

judgment. So also when the Understanding combines the 
elements given by the primary faculties into notions, particular 
and general, that is one thing. When the Intelligence 
classes an individual under a general notion, in the affirmation, 
this is a man, an animaal, &c. — that is quite another thing, an 
intellectual process entirely distinct from the formation of 
notions. In this last process we conceive, that is, combine 
intuitions. In the former, we judge. 

As the function of the Intelligence by which we form 
notions is called the Understanding, so that by which we 
judge, that is, abstract, classify, and generalize, is denomi- 
nated the Judgment. 

Distinction between the Understanding and Judgment verified. 

A single additional consideration will fully verify the dis- 
tinction above made between the Understanding and Judg- 
ment. We often meet with individuals in whom the Under- 
standing is strongly developed, and embraces a wide range of 
objects. Yet the same individuals may be almost totally 
wanting in respect to the faculty of Judgment. They con- 
ceive distinctly and vividly of objects presented, yet make no 
important discriminations between them. They will read a 
book, for example, and give a full and distinct account of 
what it contains, and yet appear to be none the wiser for 
what they know. They, as is commonly said of them, 
appear to know everything, and yet can make little use of 
their knowledge. They form notions of objects just 
as they present themselves, without making important dis- 
criminations between them. This is owing to the fact that 
the Understanding, which simply knows objects as they 
appear, is exercised, while the Judgment, which separates 
things that differ, and ranges together those that agree, and 
then abstracts, classifies, and generalizes our conceptions, or 
rather the objects of thought, is wanting or inactive. 

On the other handwe meet with individuals who, with a very 
limited acquaintance with particular objects, yet possess a 
great amount of what is called practical wisdom. Their 
information is limited, yet what they know is analyzed, 
classified, and generalized. In other words, in such individ- 
uals the faculty of Judgment is fully developed. 

Such considerations clearly show that the function of the 
Intelligence denominated Understanding is one thing, while 
that of the Judgment is quite another. With the fads upon 



96 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



wl^ich the distinction under consideration is based, all men 
are familiar. They recognize readily the distinction between 
information and knowledge, between conceiving of objects, 
and in this sense knowing them, and making important 
discriminations between them. In short, the basis for the 
distinction between the Understanding and Judgment is laid 
in facts recognized by all men. 

Observations of Kant. 

The remarks of Kant upon the subject under considera- 
tion are so much to the point, that I will present one or two 
quotations from, his Critick on the faculty of Judgment. 
" If the Understanding," he says, " in general be explained 
as the faculty of rules, the faculty of Judgment is that of 
subsuming under rules ; that is to say, of distinguishing 
whether something does or does not stand under a given 
rule." Again : " The faculty of Judgment is a particular 
talent, which is not to be taught, but only exercised ; and 
this, consequently, is the specialty of the so-called mother- 
wit, the want of which no schooling can supply ; for although 
this may offer to, and, as it were, graft upon a limited Un- 
derstanding, rules in abundance borrowed from another 
mind, still the faculty of availing himself correctly of these 
must belong to the hearer himself: and no rule which we 
could prescribe to him with this intention is, under the de- 
ficiency of such a natural gift, secure from misuse. A phy- 
sician, therefore, a judge, or politician, may have many ex- 
cellent pathological, judicial, or political jules in his head, 
to such a degree that he himself may become therein a pro- 
found teacher, and yet in the application of them will easily 
make a mistake, either because he is deficient in natural 
Judgment (although not in Understanding), and certainly 
can see the general in abstractor but cannot distinguish 
whether a case in concreta^ fall under it, or from this cause, 
that he has not sufficiently been trained by examples and 
real business to this judgment." 

Two characteristics, entirely distinct and opposite, of dif- 
ferent individuals of distinguished minds, may very properly 
be alluded to here, as illustrating and confirming the distinc- 
tion between the Understanding and Judgment above made. 
We often meet with individuals, public speakers, for example, 
distinguished for strong and vivid conceptions of whatever 
subject their minds are occupied with. Yet one of their 



FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. 97 

discourses shadowing forth some bold and grand conception, 
will contain elements manifestly contradictor}^ to those con- 
tained in a prior discourse of a similar character. Yet the 
speaker himself appears wholly insensible of such contra- 
diction. He contradicts himself, without at all being sensible 
of the fact. A bold and strong conception with such a mind 
is, of course, true, together with all the elements embraced 
in it. 

The productions of other minds are distinguished not only 
for logical and scientific arrangement, but for the consistency 
and harmony of the elements introduced into one discourse 
with those introduced into others. Such individuals seldom, 
to use a phrase commonly applied in such cases, cross their 
own tracks, and if they do this at any time, they will per- 
ceive it quite as soon as others. 

How shall we account for such diversities .'' The answer 
is, that in the first instance, the Understanding, and fre- 
quently the Imagination, are strongly developed, while there 
is a deficiency of Judgment. In the latter cases, there is a 
strong development of the faculty last named. ISow, phe- 
nomena so diverse and opposite necessarily suppose facul- 
ties fundamentally distinct from each other. 

Relations of the Understanding and Judgment. 

Having shown the distinction between these faculties, it 
now remains, in the conclusion of the present Chapter, to show 
the relations between them. The Judgment pre-supposes 
the Understanding. The former can analyze, abstract, 
classify, and generahze only what is furnished by the latter. 
Understanding might exist without Judgment ; but the latter 
cannot exist, or rather cannot act, without the former. 

The Understanding also not only precedes, but succeeds 
the action of the Judgment. When the Judgment has ab- 
stracted, analyzed, classified, and generalized objects of the 
Understanding, the latter faculty then combines into its 
conceptions of such objects all the discriminations of the 
former faculty pertaining to them. When, for example, we 
have passed a judgment upon any individual, affirming that 
he belongs to a particular class, that judgment, ever after, 
enters as an essential element into our conceptions of him. 
This is universally true of all judgments and notions. 



CHAPTER IX. 



ASSOCIATION. 



Term defined. 
*' That one thought is often suggested to the mind by 
another, and that the sight of one external object often re- 
calls former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are 
facts," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " which are perfectly fa- 
miliar, even to those who are least disposed to speculate 
concerning the principles of our nature." This is what is 
meant by the term Association. It is that principle of our 
minds by which past thoughts and states are recalled, and 
revived, through the influence of present perceptions, 
thoughts and feelings. This law of the human mind was de- 
nominated by the old philosophers, " Association of ideas." 
By Dr. Brown it was denominated '' Suggestion." By 
others, it is designated by the simple term, Association. 

Term Association^ why preferred. 
I prefer the latter term to either of the former, because it 
alone expresses all the phenomena which require conside- 
ration, when treating of the subject before us. We find by 
experience, that not only thoughts and events are associated, 
but thoughts, events, and feelings also. The term Asso- 
ciation of ideas, can be proparly applied to ideas only. The 
same is true of Suggestion. An idea or event cannot pro- 
perly be said to suggest feelings. Thoughts and events may 
be said to revive feelings ; and feelings may be said to 
suggest thoughts and events. Association is the term, and 
the only term, which can properly be applied to all these 
different classes of phenomena. 

The Associating Principle not without law. 
Although the Mind is so constituted, that certain states 



ASSOCIATION, 99 

follow certain other states, these phenomena, as philosophers 
have long since observed, not only do not follow each other 
at random, but are known to follow some one or more fixed 
law or laws. To ascertain and illustrate the operation of 
these laws, has been considered one of the great problems 
in Intellectual Philosophy ; and has accordingly occupied a 
conspicuous place in almost every treatise upon the science. 
Mr. Hume, 1 believe, was the first philosopher who attempt- 
ed to settle definitely the number of these laws. According 
to this philosopher, they are all reduced to three : Resem- 
blance, Cause and Effect, and Contiguity in time and place. 
Others have since added that of Contrast. 

Law of Association stated and defined. 
Dr. Brown is the first, and the only philosopher that I 
have met with, who has suggested the inquiry, whether all 
the laws of Association may not be reduced to one common 
principle, or law. The question, however, he barely sug- 
gests, without attempting to illustrate, or confirm it, I will 
give the passage to which I refer, as it will afford an oppor- 
tunity to develop the principle which I shall endeavor to 
illustrate, and establish, as the great and only law of Asso- 
ciation : " All Suggestions," [Associations,] " as I conceive, 
may, if our analysis be sufficiently minute, be found to de- 
pend on prior co-existence, or at least on such immediate 
proximity as is itself, very probably, a modification of co- 
existence. For this very nice reduction, however, we must 
take in the influence of the emotions, and other feelings, 
that are different from ideas ; as 'when one object suggests 
an analogous object, by the influence of an emotion or sen- 
timent, which each may have separately produced before, 
and which is therefore common to both." The author ap- 
pears, as you will readily perceive, to use the term co-exist- 
ence, in two senses, to wit : when two ideas have-existed in 
the mind, or two objects have been perceived by it at the 
same time, — and when they have existed in connection with 
similar states of mind, which states are consequently com- 
mon to them both. Now, the proposition which I shall en- 
deavor to illustrate and establish, is this, that all the pheno- 
mena of Association may be reduced to this last-mentioned 
principle^ co-existence with the same, or similar feelings^ or 
states of mind. If any perception, or thought, induces 
feelings similar to those which have co-existed with other 



100 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

thoughts, or perceptions, these last will be suggested in con- 
sequence of such association. This is the exclusive and 
universal law of Association. 

Existence of Law] when established. 
Law, as we have seen, is an idea of Reason. Like all 
such ideas, it sustains to phenomena the relation of logical 
antecedent. The phenomena being given, the law is neces- 
sarily affirmed, as the condition of their explanation. Each 
particular law also sustains this same relation to the particu- 
lar facts explained by it. In the light of such law, it will 
be seen, that all such facts can be accounted for, on the 
supposition of its existence and operation, and that they can 
be accounted for on no other supposition conceivable by us. 
It thus bears the characteristic of all other ideas of Reason, 
to wit, universality and necessity. 

The present Hypothesis^ when established as the Law of Asso- 
ciation. 

To establish the hypothesis under consideration, as the law 
of Association, two conditions must be fulfilled : 

It must be shown, in the first place, that all phenomena 
referred to the commonly admitted laws, can be accounted 
for on this hypothesis. 

It must be shown with equal clearness, in the second 
place, that there are facts of Association which cannot be ac- 
counted for by these laws, but which admit of a ready ex- 
planation on this hypothesis, and upon none other conceiva- 
ble by us. These positions being established, the Judgment 
affirms the hypothesis, as the exclusive and universal law of 
Association. 

We are now prepared to take up the question, whether 
there are many, or but one law of Association, and whether 
the hypothesis under consideration is that law ^ 

A priori Argument. 
It will be admitted, on a moment's reflection, that there is 
a very strong a priori probability in favor of the supposition, 
that the facts of Association are controlled by one law, instead 
of many. The opposite position supposes a departure, in 
this single instance, from what we find true of all other 
classes of facts which lie within and around us in the uni- 



ASSOCIATION. 101 

verse. The phenomena of attraction, in the material uni- 
verse, for example, are many, and endlessly diversified. Yet 
they are all controlled by one law. Why should we suppose 
the phenomena of Association to be an exception ? Should 
we not expect, in the ultimate analysis of facts, to find unity 
amidst diversity here, as well as everywhere else .'' This 
argument is adduced as of weight, simply in favor of the 
supposition of one instead of many laws, and not at all in fa- 
vor of any one hypothesis, in distinction from another. Any 
one principle, which would lay claim to the prerogative of 
universal law, must fulfill the conditions above presented. 
We are now prepared for a direct investigation of the ques- 
tion, whether the hypothesis under consideration fulfills these 
conditions. 

All the Phenomena referred to the coimnonhj received Laws, 
can be explained on this Hypothesis. 
That many of the phenomena of Association can he ac- 
counted for, in consistency with the commonly admitted laws, 
will be denied by no person of reflection. That objects which 
resemble each other, that those which have been perceived at 
the same time or place, that sustain to each other the rela- 
tion of contrast, or cause and effect, do mutually suggest 
each other, is undeniable. But do such phenomena necessa- 
rily suppose the existence of a plurality of laws ? May 
they not all be referred to one, and that the one under con- 
sideration } Those of resemblance, obviously may. The 
same is true of those which sustain to each other the rela- 
tions of contiguity of time and place, and of cause and effect. 
For they undeniably have existed with the same feeling or 
states of mmd. The only phenomena which present the 
appearance of difficulty, are those of Contrast. That a giant 
and a dwarf resemble each other in but few particulars, and 
that they stand in striking contrast to each other, is readily 
admitted ; but that, as objects of perception, or recollection, 
they may have co-existed with the same feelings, or states of 
mind, and as causes also of the same, I as fully believe, as I 
do that the conception of a hero and a lion have co-existed 
in a similar manner. A giant and a dwarf are strongly con- 
trasted, but each, as striking departures, though in different 
directions, from the common stature, may have co-existed 
with similar feelings of wonder or surprise^ and as common 



103 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

causes of the same ; and this may be the only reason why 
one suggests the other. In conversing upon this subject on 
a particular occasion, an individual present remarked, that he 
recollected having, at a particular time, seen a dwarf. A 
giant, which he had previously seen, was not suggested at 
all, but another dwarf whom he had before met with. I 
at once asked the speaker, if the giant referred to was not a 
familiar acquaintance of his. He replied that he was. This 
fact readily accounted for the phenomena of Association, 
presented by him. Familiarity had destroyed the feeling of 
strangeness, which had formerly co-existed with the precep- 
tion or recollection of the giant. The same feeling, how- 
eve, co-existing with the perception of the two dwarfs, the 
perception of one would of course sugo;est the other. In 
the same manner, all the phenomena of Contrast may be re- 
duced to the hypothesis before us. 

Phenomena exist which can he accounted for on this^ and on 
no other Hypothesis. 

1. Those falling under the relation of Analogy. — But how 
can we account for those associations which fall under 
the relation of analogy .'' A hero and a lion sustain no 
relation of external resemblance, by which one would sug- 
gest the other. Equally removed are they from the relations 
of contiguity, cause and effect, or contrast. But as causes of 
similar feelings, or states of mind, the conceptions of them 
have co-existed in the mind, in connection with such states ; 
and this, I believe, is the only reason that can be assigned, 
why the contemplation of one suggests the other. 

Milton's account of the fight of Abdiel and Satan, may 
present a striking illustration of the principle under consider- 
ation : 

" So saying, a noble stroke he lifted high, 
Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell 
On the proud crest of Satan, that no sight, 
Nor motion of swift thought, less could his shield, 
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge 
He back recoiled ; the tenth on bended knee 
His massy spear upstay'd ; as if on earth 
Winds under ground, or waters forcing way, 
Sidelong had push'd a mountain from his seat, 
Half sunk with all his pines," 



ASSOCIATION. 108 

Now, why did the conception of Satan, thus smitten down, 
suggest to the mind of Milton that of a mountain pushed 
from his seat ? The only answer that can be given is, that 
the contemplation of each induces similar feeling or states of 
mind. So of all the phenomena of association, falling under 
the relation of analogy. Suppose, further, that an individual 
relates to a number of men some incident of a sublime, beau- 
tiful, heroic, horrid, or ludicrous character. How happens 
it that each hearer instantly recollects almost every incident 
of a similar character, which he has ever met with ? These 
incidents resemble each other in one particular only, and sus- 
tain no other relation to each other than this : they have, as 
objects of perception or contemplation, existed in the mind as 
causes of similar feelings to those awakened by the incident 
under consideration. The hypothesis before us is the only 
one conceivable, which accounts for such phenomena. 

2. Phenomena of Dreaming. — The phenomena of dreaming 
can readily be accounted for on this hypothesis, and, as 1 
conceive, upon no other. In consequence of peculiar atti- 
tudes of the body, or states of the physical or mental system, 
certain feelings are awakened in the mind. Those objects 
of thought or perception, which have formerly co-existed 
with similar feelings, are consequently suggested ; and these 
are judged to be the causes of existing feelings. A sick man, 
for example, with a bottle of hot water at his feet, dreamed 
that he was walking upon the crater of ^Etna, and that this 
was the cause of the burning sensation which he felt. He 
had formerly felt similar sensations when walking upon the 
crater of Vesuvius, and had just been reading of a traveller's 
walking upon the crater of JEtna. These facts fully account 
for his dream. In a similar manner, all the phenomena of 
dreaming may be accounted for. But can they be account- 
ed for by the common laws of Association ? I answer, no. 

3. Phenomena of Somnambuhsm. — -Some of the phenomena 
of somnambulism here deserve an attentive consideration. 
It is well known that somnambulists frequently pass from a 
state of wakefulness to that of sleep, and vice versa, very 
suddenly; and that in each change, there is an entire obli- 
vion of what passed in the preceding state ; while the train 
of thought, or the emplo3''ment left, when passing from the 
present state, is, on returning to that state, instantly resumed, 
at the very point where it was left. Sentences left half fin- 



104 . INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ished, when passing out of one state, are completed as soon 
as the individual enters upon the same state again. How- 
manifest, from such phenomena, is the fact, that the universal 
law of suggestion is based upon similarity of states or feelings. 

Facts connected with particular Diseases. 

There are many facts connected with particular diseases, 
which more fully confirm and illustrate the principle which 
I am endeavoring to establish. Take, as a specimen, the 
two following cases stated by Dr. Abercrombie, in his In- 
tellectual Philosophy. I give them in the words of the 
author. 

" Another very remarkable modification of this affection is 
referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by Major Elliot, 
professor of Mathematics in the United States' Military 
Academy at West Point. The patient was a young lady of 
cultivated mind, and the affection began with an attack of 
somnolency, which was protracted several hours beyond the 
usual time. When she came out of it, she was found to 
have lost ever}^ kind of acquired knowledge. She immedi- 
ately began to apply herself to the first elements of educa- 
tion, and was making considerable progress, when, after 
several months, she was seized with a second fit of somno- 
lency. She was now at once restored to all the knowledge 
which she possessed before the first attack, but without the 
least recollection of anything that had taken place during 
the interval. After another interval she had a third attack 
of somnolency, which left her in the same state as after the 
first. In this manner she suffered these alternate conditions 
for a period of four years, with the very remarkable circum- 
stance that during the one state she retained all her original 
knowledge ; but during the other, that only which she had 
acquired since the first attack. During the healthy interval, 
for example, she was remarkable for the beauty of her pen- 
manship, but during the paroxysm wrote a poor, awkward 
hand. Persons introduced to her during the paroxysm she 
recognized only in a subsequent paroxysm, but not in the 
interval ; and persons whom she had seen for the first time 
during the healthy interval, she did not recognize during the 
attack." 

" Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable to sudden 
attacks of delirium, which, after continuing: for various 



ASSOCIATION. . 105 

periods, went off suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly- 
rational. The attack was often so sudden that it commenced 
while she was engaged in interesting conversation, and on 
such occasions it happened, that on her recovery from the 
state of delirium she instantly recurred to the conversation 
she had been engaged in at the time of the attack, though 
she had never referred to it during the continuance of the 
affection. To such a degree was this carried, that she 
would even complete an unfinished sentence. During the 
subsequent paroxysm, again', she would pursue the train of 
ideas which had occupied her mind in the former. Mr. 
Combe also mentions a porter, who in a state of intoxication 
left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober could not 
recollect what he had done with it. But the next time he 
got drunk, he recollected where he left it, and went and 
recovered it." 

Here are manifest and striking facts of Association. On 
the commonly received laws of the associating principle, they 
cannot be explained at all. On the hypothesis under con- 
sideration, however, they admit of a most ready explanation. 
How can they be explained on any other hypothesis ? 

I will adduce another fact taken from the same author. 

" A case has been related to me of a boy, who at the age of 
four received a fracture of the skull, for which he underwent 
the operation of trepan. He was at the time in a state of 
perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection 
either of the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, 
during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a correct 
description of the operation, and the persons who were pre- 
sent at it, v/ith their dress, and other minute particulars. He 
had never been observed to allude to it before, and no means 
were known by which he could have acquired the circum- 
stances which he mentioned." 

But one explanation can be given of such a remarkable 
fact. During the interval between the surgical operation 
and the sickness referred to, the feelings existing in connec- 
tion with operation had never been revived, and from the 
peculiarity of the feelings could not have been. During this 
sickness, in consequence of the action of the fever upon 
the brain and skull, these feelings were revived. The 
consequence was, that the circumstances attending their 
existence were recalled. No other hypothesis can explain 
such facts. 



106 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

This Hypothesis established and illustrated^ by reflecting upon 
the facts of Association. 
Every true explanation of the facts of Consciousness, will, 
as soon as it is understood, be confirmed in the conviction of 
every one who understands it, as he subsequently reflects on 
what passes in the interior of his own mind. This is, in a 
special manner true of the hypothesis under consideration. 
Every person who understands it, subsequently finds its 
truth confirmed and illustrated by his own reflections upon 
the facts of Association, as they fall under the eye of his Con- 
sciousness. 

Argument summarily stated. 

The argument in support of the principle of Association 
under consideration may be summarily stated, in the follow- 
ing propositions. 

1. It is known to exist as a law of Association, in certain 
cases — in all instances of Association founded on the rela- 
tions of analogy. No other reason can be assigned why the 
conception of a hero, for example, suggests that of the lion, 
but the fact that they have each co-existed with similar 
feehngs, and as causes of such feelings. 

2. All the phenomena, explicableby the commonly received 
laws of Association, admit of an equally ready and consistent 
explanation, upon the hypothesis before us. 

3. All other phenomena, which cannot be explained by 
the commonly received laws, admit al^o of a ready explana- 
tion, when referred to the above hypothesis. 

4. No other hypothesis yet known, explains all the 
phenomena of Association. 

We are at liberty then to assum.e, that the hypothesis with 
which we started, ceases to be a hypothesis. It may be 
regarded as the law of Association. 

Explanatory Remarks. 

To understand fully the operation of the associating prin- 
ciple, two circumstances pertaining to it demand special 
attention. 

The first is the fact, that when a deep impression has 
been made upon the mind by any thought or perception, the 



ASSOCIATION. i07 

feeling excited may not only be revived by some subsequent 
thought or perception, but those feelings may afterwards 
recur spontaneously^ without any other apparent cause, than 
the well-known mental tendency to return to states in 
which our minds have previously existed. When we have 
listened to an enchanting musical performance, for example, 
who has not months subsequent to the event, felt, in the 
depths of the inner being, the spontaneous movements of the 
cords of melody, which were so powerfully swept on the 
occasion referred to, and which, at once, bring the whole past 
scene into distinct remembrance ? The law of Association 
is this. When any feeling w^hich has co-existed with any 
past intellectual state is revived, whether that revival is 
spontaneous, or is occasioned by some present thought or 
perception, that state will recur again, as a consequence of 
the revival of this feeling. 

The second remark is this. The feeling which has co- 
existed with any former intellectual state, need not be 
wholly, but only partially revived, in order to occasion the 
recurrence of that state. Let some present occurrence, pro- 
duce feelings of joy, wonder, surprise, or regret, for example. 
Should any subsequent event excite these feelings in only 
a very slight degree, the former occurrence would thereby, 
be suggested. This is a universal characteristic of the action 
of the principle of Association. 

Reasons why different Objects excite similar Feelincfs in our 
Minds. 

The law of associations has been stated and illustrated. 
We are now prepared for another important inquiry, to wit. 
On lohat principle is it that different objects^ or rather thoughts 
and perceptions J excite similar feelings in our minds, and thus 
mutually suggest each other? The following may be speci- 
fied as the most important reasons why different objects ex- 
cite such feelings. 

1. In consequence oi natural resemblance between the objects 
themselves. That objects naturally alike should excite sim- 
ilar feelings, is a necessary consequence of personal identity. 
Such objects do not suggest one another, because they are 
alike, but because, that being alike, they excite similar feel- 
ings. The principle of association in such instances, is the 
same as in all others. 



108 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

2. Objects excite similar feelings, and thus mutually sug- 
gest each other, in consequence of similarity of relations to 
the original principles of our nature. Sweetness, beauty, and 
harmony, as mere objects of sense, are totally unlike. But 
they may and do sustain such a relation to the original prin- 
ciples of our nature, as to induce similar states of mind. 
Consequently, the perception of one may suggest that of the 
other. Thus the origin of figurative language, such as sweet 
or beautiful sounds, admits of a ready explanation. Also 
the sublime comparisons of poetry and oratory, founded up- 
on the relations of analogy. An Indian orator, speaking of 
theAmerican revolution, said, "That it was like the whirl- 
wind, which tears up the trees, and tosses to and fro the 
leaves, till we cannot tell from whence they come, or whith- 
er they will fall. At length the Great Spirit spoke to the 
whirlwind, and it was still." Says another, whose age num- 
bered more than one hundred years : "I am the aged 
hemlock. The winds of an hundred winters have whistled 
through my branches, and I am dead at the top." " And I 
heard," says the sacred writer, " as it were the voice of a 
great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the 
voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluiah ; for the Lord 
God omnipotent reigneth." Milton, speaking of the break- 
ing up of the counsel of Pandemonium, says : 

" Their rising all at once, was at the sound 
Of thunder heard remote." 

An aged soldier, in one of the tragedies, says of himself: 

" For I have fought when few alive remained, 
And none unscathed ; when but few remained. 
Thus marred and mangled — as belike you've seen 
O' summer's night, around the evening lamp. 
Some scorched moths, wingless, and half consumed, 
Just feebly crawling o'er their heaps of dead." 

How different, as mere objects of sense, are all the things 
compared together in the above quotations. But sustaining 
a common relation to the original laws of the mind, they in- 
duce similar feelings or states of mind. Consequently, the 
apprehension of one, suggests that of the other. 

3. Objects co-exist with, and excite similar feelings, in 
consequence of a perceived relation between the objects them- 
selves ; such, for example, as the relations of cause and ef- 



ASSOCIATION. 109 

feet — parent and child, &c. Why it is that the feelings ex- 
cited by one of these objects are transferred to the other as 
soon as the relation between them is perceived, we cannot 
tell. All that we can say is, that such is the constitution of 
our minds, that when two objects are known to sustain such 
relations to each other, they will, in all ordinary circumstan- 
ces, excite similar feelings, and the idea of one will, conse- 
quently, suggest that of the other. 

4. Objects co-exist with similar feelings in consequence of 
mere accidental association. Whenever the mind has been 
brought, from any cause whatever, into any particular state, 
the accidental perception of any object, or suggestion of any 
thought, however foreign to the cause of the present state, 
will so modify that state, that the new object will ever after 
sustain an entirely new relation to the Sensibility of our na- 
ture. To the present state of the mind, thus modified, it sus- 
tains the relation of a cause. Consequently, its subsequent 
presence as an object of perception, or of conception, will 
excite, in a greater or less degree, that state, and will of 
course recall the objects which formerly co-existed with the 
same state. Thus the same object may, at different periods 
of our lives, be associated with entirely different, and even 
opposite states of mind, and states of mind totally different 
from what they are naturally adapted to produce. Thus of 
course they may, and will recall entirely different objects to 
our remembrance. In many instances, we find it wholly 
impossible to account for the change which has taken place 
in the effect of particular objects upon our Sensibility, and 
consequently upon our train of associations ; so gradual, and 
accidental, has been the transfer of the object from one state 
of feeling to another. 

Application of the Principles above illustrated. 
The law of Association which has been confirmed and illus- 
trated, has many and very important applications. To a few 
of these, special attention is invited, as we conclude the pre- 
sent Chapter. 

Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws 
of Association. 
We are now prepared to state distinctly the ground of the 
mistake of philosophers, pertaining to the laws of Associa- 
tion. Because objects sustaining certain relations to each 
6 



110 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

other, do mutually suggest one another, they have fastened 
upon these relations, as the laws of Association. In this man- 
ner, they have overlooked the fact, that objects suggest each 
other, only on the ground of a common impression made by 
each upon the mind, and that the relations existing between 
them present the reason why they make a common impres- 
sion, instead of revealing laws of the associating principle. 
Philosophers have noticed the fact, that some objects are as- 
sociated on the exclusive ground of a common impression. 
Yet they have singularly overlooked the universal law of 
Association revealed in that fact. " Things," says Mr. 
Stewart, " which have no known relation to each other, are 
often associated, in consequence of their producing similar 
effects on the mind. Some of the finest poetical allusions are 
founded on this principle ; and, accordingly, if the reader is 
not possessed of sensibility congenial to that of the poet, he 
will be apt to overlook their meaning, or censure them as 
absurd." Now, had the question suggested itself to this phi- 
losopher. Is not this the condition and ground of all Associa- 
tion of every kind, and do not objects sustaining to each other 
the relations of resemblance, contiguity in time and place, 
contrast, cause and effect, and analogy, mutually suggest each 
other, because, that being thus related, they produce a com- 
mon impression ? he would have perceived, at once, that his 
mind had dropped down upon the universal law of Associa- 
tion. 

Action of the associating Principle in different Individuals. 

We are all familiar with the fact, that the action of the 
associating principle is very different in different individuals. 
This is evidently owing to two circumstances — natural tem- 
perament, and the diverse pursuits of individuals — one there- 
by being more deeply interested in, and consequently more 
deeply impressed with different objects, and with different 
elements of the same object, than another. Let any number 
of individuals of diverse temperaments, for example, contem- 
plate the same painting, each will be most forcibly impressed 
with those features of it particularly correlated to his own 
peculiarities of natural temperament. Hence the corres- 
ponding diversity of the action of the associating principle, 
in such a case. So with a gentleman on a tour of observa- 
tion, a merchant engaged in the purchase and sale of grain, 
and a farmer seeking a location for his family, in looking over 



ASSOCIATION. 1 1 1 

the same plantation. Each will contemplate it in the light 
of the leading idea in his own mind. A corresponding diver- 
sity will of course exist in the impressions received, and in 
the consequent action of the associating principle. 

Influence of Habit. 

That actions and trains of thought, to which we have been 
long familiar, are performed and carried on by us with a 
degree of ease and exactness perfectly unaccountable to a 
new beginner, is obvious to every one. In respect to the 
ease and exactness with which trains of physical actions to 
which we have become habituated are repeated, two reasons 
may be assigned. 

The first is, a certain conformation of the physical organ- 
ization, so that, as soon as the train is commenced, the action 
of the muscles in obedience to the will is spontaneous and 
necessary in a given order of action. 

The second is, the fact that all the actions under consid- 
eration have become indissolubly associated with the same 
state of mind. Of course, as soon as that state is reproduced, 
those actions are spontaneously suggested in their proper 
order. 

The same remarks are equally applicable to trains of 
thought to which we have become habituated. When the 
mind has often existed in a certain state, there is, as shown 
above, a strong tendency, spontaneously, or on the slightest 
impression, to recur to that state again. The train of 
thought having become associated with this state is, of 
course, pursued with precision and facility. 

Standards of Taste and Fashion. 
" A mode of dress," says Dugald Stewart, " which at first 
appears awkward, acquires in a few weeks or months, the 
appearance of elegance. By being accustomed to see it worn 
by others whom we consider as models of taste, it becomes 
associated with the agreeable impressions which we receive 
from the ease, and grace, and refinement of their manners," 
Thus the pronunciation common to the higher classes in 
Edinburg, while it remained the capital of Scotland, and 
which was then regarded as the standard of purity in diction, 
has now become barbarous, in consequence of the removal of 
the capital to London. 



112 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Vicissitudes in respect to such Standards. 
Every one is familiar with the perpetual vicissitudes in 
dress, and everything, the chief recommendation of which 
is fashion. The remarks of Mr. Stewart on this point also, 
are so much to the purpose, and so well expressed, that I 
will venture another citation from him. " It is evident that, 
as far as the agreeable effect of ornament arises from associ- 
ation, the effect will continue oply while it is confined to the 
higher orders. When it is adopted by the multitude, it not 
only ceases to be associated with ideas of taste and refine- 
ment, but it is associated with ideas of affectation, absurd 
imitation, and vulgarity. It is accordingly laid aside by the 
higher orders, who studiously avoid every circumstance in 
external appearance, which is debased by low and common 
use ; and they are led to exercise their invention in the 
introduction of some new peculiarities, which first become 
fashionable, then common, and last of all are abandoned as 
vulgar." There is one circumstance which Mr. Stewart has 
not mentioned, which has perhaps quite as much influence 
in inducing these vicissitudes ■ as that presented above. 
" The higher classes" are pleased with revolutions in society 
which are visibly produced by themselves, and which do not 
diminish, but increase and render manifest, to themselves 
and the world, their own controlling influence. In the per- 
petual vicissitudes of costume, proceeding from and controlled 
by themselves, they are continually manifested to them- 
selves as the "glass of fashion, and the mould of form." 
Thus a continued gratification of the love of power is enjoyed, 
a motive not the most commendable to be sure, but yet quite 
as real as that above presented. 

Peculiarities of Genius associated with Judgment., or correct 
Taste. 
We are now able to state distinctly the peculiarities of 
true genius, when associated with good Judgment. It con- 
sists in distinguishing those things which please simply 
in consequence of accidental associations, like those above 
referred to, from those which are correlated to the original 
and changeless principles of our nature, and in thus shadow- 
ing forth the real and permanent forms of beauty, sublimity, 
and fitness. Those forms of thought which stand correlated 
to the current opinions of the day, may have a wide-spread 



ASSOCIATION. 113. 

ephemeral popularity, after which they sink to a silent or 
dishonored grave, and a long oblivion. The productions of 
true genius, associated with good taste, on the other hand, 
will please as long as human nature remains what it is. 

Influence of Writers and Speakers of splendid Genius^ hut 
incorrect Taste. 
It is well known, that very strong conceptive and imagina- 
tive faculties (the peculiarities of true genius), sometimes 
exist in the absence of a well-balanced Judgment, and con- 
sequent good taste. The productions of such individuals 
will be characterized by surpassing excellences, and glaring 
defects. Yet the mass of their admirers will, in time, be- 
come as well-pleased with the latter as with the former; 
and the defects will be more frequently copied by imitators, 
perhaps, than the excellencies. The reason is this. The 
defects come to be associated with the feelings of interest 
and delight which the excellencies excite. The former are 
thus embalmed and consecrated by the latter. Every indi- 
vidual who would preserve his taste unvitiated, should be, 
in a special sense, on his guard under such circumstances. 

Danger of vicious Associations. 
Great genius and great vices, polished manners and cor- 
rupt morals, and productions the most finished in respect to 
style and imagery, and the most foul in respect to sentiment, 
are not unfrequently associated among men. The imminent 
peril of intercommunion with such minds and with such pro- 
ductions, is manifest, in the light of the law of Association 
above illustrated. The feelings of sublimity, beauty, and de- 
light awakened by the contemplation of great minds, polish- 
ed manners, and the perfections of style and imagery, at first 
weaken, and finally entirely supplant the feelings of disgust, 
abhorrence, and repellency, which the contemplation of vice, 
and corrupt principle, in their unassociated grossness, excites. 
The final result is, the acquirement of polished manners and 
style, with the loss of virtue and virtuous principles. That 
" which cannot be gotten for gold," and for "which silver 
cannot be weighed as the price thereof," in comparison with 
which " no mention shall be made of coral or of pearls, and 
the price of which is above rubies," has been excbanged for 
that which might have been attained in much higher per- 
fection without this irreparable loss ; but which may exist in 



114 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

connection with the foulest morals, and an equal preemi- 
nence in guilt. 

Unrighteous Prejudices^ how justified. 
Every individual is familiar with the fact, that persons and 
classes of men, placed in circumstances degrading in public 
estimation, often become the victims of cruel and unright- 
eous prejudice. Some circumstance, aside from condition, is 
fastened upon as the cause of this feeling, which is thus jus- 
tified, on the assumption that it is natural, and therefore 
necessary, designed and sanctioned by Providence. Feelings 
connected with individuals by accidental association, are 
assumed as resulting from the original constitution of our 
nature, and are justified on that assumption. 

Giving Individuals a had Name^ spreading false Reports^ <^c. 
It is very frequently asserted as a proverb, that the evils 
resulting from giving persons a bad name, and spreading false 
reports respecting them, will ere long correct, and more than 
correct themselves, in consequence of a re-action of public 
feeling, as the truth comes to be known. This would be 
true, were men disposed to render impartial justice in all 
instances. But this is far from being the case. Pre-eminent 
virtues and endowments, together with a commanding influ- 
ence, may often, under such circumstances, occasion a re- 
action of public feeling which will perfectly overwhelm the 
authors of the mischief. The standing of the mass of man- 
kind, however, is not such as to occasion such reaction, even 
when the wrong done comes to be known. Hence it often 
happens that the feelings first awakened come to be perma- 
nently, to a greater or less degree, associated with them in 
the public mind. If this is not so, no thanks are due to 
those who first set the ball rolling. 

Influence of the associating Principle in perpetuating existing 
mental Characteristics. 
" To the pure," says the Sacred Writer, " all things are 
pure ; but to the corrupt and unbelieving, there is nothing 
pure." In other words, a mind truly pure comes to be so 
correllated to objects in respect to not only the action of the 
voluntary power, but also in respect ta the Sensibility and 
Intelligence, that all things awaken thoughts and feelings 
tending to perpetuate and increase that purity. The same is 



ASSOCIATION. 115 

tme with the vicious. Every object of thought and percep- 
tion is brought into such a relation to their Minds, as to gen- 
erate thoughts and feehngs which tend only to develop and 
confirm existing tendencies to corruption. This law of self- 
perpetuation which virtue and vice respectively possess, is 
found in the associating principle. In a Mind which has 
long been the cage of impure thoughts and feelings, those 
feelings at last come to be associated with all objects of 
thought, and thus the entire current of thought and feeling 
is turned into an impure channel. 

There are no limits to the application of the associating 
principle, as above illustrated. Its importance in mental 
science will be appreciated as it is understood in its endless- 
ly diversified applications. 



CHAPTER X. 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 



Terms defined. 

Memory and Recollection are treated by philosophers only 
as important departments of the principle of Association. 
This, as we shall see, is demanded by sound philosophical 
analysis. The two terms above named are often used inter- 
changeably, and never distinguished but by the following 
circumstances. In the process denominated Memory, no- 
tions, or conceptions of facts and events, are spontaneously 
recalled to the Mind. In that called Recollection, these 
Intellectual states are recalled by an effort of Will. 

States of Mind entering into and connected with these Pro- 
cesses. 
There are three distinct mental operations connected wdth 
each of these processes of Mind. 

1 . Some feeling or state of Mind which has formerly co- 
existed with the perception or apprehension of the object 
recalled — a feeling or state spontaneously recurring, or reviv- 
ed by some object of present thought, perception, or sensa- 
tion. 

2. A simple apprehension of the object or event itself — 
an apprehension attended with no belief or judgment what- 
ever pertaining to the object. 

3. A recurrence, in thought, of the circumstances of time 
and place connected with the perception or apprehension of 
the object. 

The above statement verified. 
That objects of Memory and Recollection are not recalled 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 117 

directly and immediately, but are suggested, in the manner 
above described, is obvious from two considerations. 

1. From universal Consciousness. Those who are least 
accustomed to analyze the operations of their own minds, as 
well as philosophers, have noticed this fact. Hence the 
common affirmations : " This reminds me of," or " This sug- 
gests to my mind such and such occurrences," clearly 
showing, not merely that such events are suggested, but that 
the subjects of them are conscious of it. 

2. When we wish to recollect any events, or in the com- 
mon phrase, to recall them, we do not attempt to do this 
directly, but by directing the attention to various objects, at 
present before the Mind, that they may suggest those which 
we wish to recall. Memory and Recollection are, in this 
respect, subject to precisely the same law, and the law which 
governs each is the same which governs the entire pheno- 
mena of Association. The above remark is so obviously true, 
that philosophers, as stated above, almost universally treat 
of these subjects in the same connection. Memory being 
considered only as one department of Association. 

Principle on which Objects are remembered with Ease and 
Distinctness. 
Taking this position for granted, or as having been already 
proved, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that the 
ease and distinctness with which any objects or events will be 
recalled to the Mind, will always be proportioned to the 
depth and intensity of the impressions formerly received 
from them, and with the number' of objects and events with 
which such impressions have heretofore co-existed, or may 
hereafter co-exist. This conclusion we also find to be con- 
firmed by universal experience. When you hear the decla- 
ration, " Such and such events I shall never forget," suppose 
you ask the reason for such an affirmation. The answer will 
invariably be, " It made such a deep impression upon my 
Mind." On the other hand, if a person is asked for the 
reason why he recalls with such difficulty any particular 
event, he will uniformly answer, " It made such a feeble im- 
pression upon my Mind." Assuming that the state of the 
Sensibility is the regulating principle of suggestion, the fact 
is self-evident, that the ease with which any particular event 
will be recalled, depends not only upon the depth and inten- 
sity of the impression which it formerly made, but upon the. 
6* 



118 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

number of objects or events with which such impression 
may li'ave co-existed, and shall hereafter co-exist. 

Deep and distinct Impressions^ on what conditioned. 

One inquiry, of no small importance in mental science, 
here claims our attention, to wit, the circumstances under 
which impressions received from objects of thought or per- 
ception are rendered deep and distinct. Among these I no- 
tice the three following, as the most important : 

1. Attention. In former Chapters it has been shown that 
attention is the condition of distinct perception, both in re- 
spect to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness. In 
walking, for example, we do not remember the particular 
acts of volition, which directed each particular step. Yet 
we know that we must have been conscious of such acts. 
The eye runs carelessly over a particular landscape, and 
nothing but the most general outline is remembered, while 
we know that each particular part must have been seen by 
us. For the want of attention, however, these objects were 
not distinctl}'' perceived. Of course no distinct and vivid 
impression was made upon the Mind, and consequently they 
are not remembered. The manner in which attention influ- 
ences Memory is two-fold. It not only impresses deeply 
and distinctly on the Mind particular scenes, each taken as a 
whole, but all the parts of such scenes. Hence the whole 
of such scenes will be recalled by the perception or sugges- 
tion of any particular part, which may be met with in other 
scenes. That Memory, however, does not depend primarily 
upon attention, but on the impression made by objects of 
attention, is evident from the fact, that the ease with which 
any particular event is recalled, is not proportioned to the 
degree of attention devoted to it, but to the vividness of the 
impression received from it. 

2. The impression made upon the mind by a particular 
event, and consequently the ease with which it will be 
remembered, depends upon the circumstances in which the 
event occurred — circumstances external to the Mind ; such 
for example, as its occurrence at a time and place unexpect- 
ed, in connection with other events deeply interesting to 
us, &c. 

3. The impression which events make on the Mind, 
depends upon the state of the Mind itself^ when they occur. 
Offices of kindness, when we little need them, make a com- 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 119 

paratively slight impression upon the Mind. They are 
accordingly forgotten with comparative ease. But the stran- 
ger who watched over us when we were sick, in a strange 
land, we never forget, for the obvious reason that such occur- 
rences are deeply impressed upon the Mind. Who is not 
aware that the impression made upon the Mind in reading a 
book, listening to a discourse, or witnessing any scene, and 
consequently the ease and distinctness with which they are 
recalled, depends greatly upon the state of Mind at the time ? 

Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in different 
Individuals. 
Assuming the principle, that those things of which we 
have formed distinct conceptions, and which have deeply 
moved and affected our Sensibility, will be easily and dis- 
tinctly remembered, the diverse kinds of Memory, as they 
appear in different individuals, may be readily explained. 

Philosophic Memory. 
The philosopher is, above all things, interested in univer- 
sal truths and general principles, and in facts which illustrate 
such truths and principles. With names, and minor circum- 
stances of time and place, he has little or no interest. These, 
of course, he seldom recalls ; while general principles and 
facts connected with, and illustrative of general principles, 
he never forgets. Here we have the peculiarities of what 
may be called Philosophical Memory. 

Local Memory. 
With general principles, however, the mass of men are 
very little interested. Events, as mere events, with all their 
circumstances of time, place, &c., are the things which 
chiefly interest them. In such cases, general principles, if 
understood at all, will readily pass from the Mind, while 
facts and events, with all their adventitious circumstances, 
will leave their permanent impress upon it. Here we have 
the characteristics of what is called Local Memory. 

Artificial Memory, 

The third and only other kind of Memory which it is 

necessary to notice, is called Artificial Memory, a method of 

connecting things easily remembered with those which are 

recalled with greater difficulty, that the latter may be recalled 



120 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHr. 

by means of the former. The manner in which the princi- 
ple of suggestion operates in this instance, may be readily 
explained. The two objects are brought into the relation of 
co-existence with one and the same state of Mind ; and the 
familiar object, by exciting that state, recalls the one less 
familiar. The inexpediency of resorting to such associa- 
tions, excepting upon trivial subjects, is so obvious as not to 
need any particular remarks. 

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 

A few topics of a somewhat miscellaneous character, con- 
nected with our present inquiries will close this Chapter. 

A ready and retentive Memory. 
The distinction between what is called a ready, and a re- 
tentive Memory, next demands attention. A philosophical 
Memory is known to be the most retentive and least ready. 
General principles are regarded by the philosopher, as above 
all price. These of course he never forgets. For the same 
reason, facts and events, connected with, and illustrg^tive of 
general principles leave an impress equally permanent upon 
his mind. The Memory of such a person however, will not, 
in ordinary circumstances, be ready, for the obvious reason, 
that when he wishes to recall any particular fact, he finds it 
necessary first to recall the general principle with which it 
was associated. For the same reason, Local Memory will 
be more ready, but less retentive. The qualities in objects 
with which such persons are interested, exist alike in such 
an infinite variety of objects, that when this quality is met 
with, a great multitude of similar objects will be at once sug- 
gested. They will generally be those how^ever, which have 
been most recently seen. Persons possessing Local Memory 
merely, will excel in common conversation, and in what may 
be called loose and rambling composition. Philosophical 
Memory, displays itself in the laboratory, the hall of science, 
on the bench, in the lecture room, and pulpit. 

The vast and diverse Power of Memory possessed by different 

Individuals. 

The degree in which this faculty is developed in different 

individuals, may now be readily accounted for. It is owing, 

as I suppose, to two circumstances — natural diversities in 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 121 

which the power is possessed by different individuals, and an 
accidental direction of the power. Themistocles knew 
every citzen of Athens by name. Cyrus and Hannibal had 
each a similar knowledge of every soldier in his respective 
army. Their original endowments made them capable of 
such acquisitions. They made such acquisitions, because 
they considered them necessary to the end they designed to 
accomplish. 

Improvement of Memory. 

But for the faculty under consideration, the past would 
~be to us, as if it had not been. No advantages could be de- 
rived from experience of our own or that of others. Exist- 
ence, at each successive moment, must be commenced anew. 
The same errors and follies, which formerly occurred, must be 
repeated, without the possibility of improvement. Through 
this facuhy, the past furnishes the chart and compass for the 
future. The progress of improvement is onward, with per- 
petually accumulating force. The question, therefore. How 
can this faculty be improved .? presents itself, as of special 
importance. The following suggestions may not be out of 
place on this point : 

1. The first thing to be kept distinctly in Mind, in all plans 
for the permanent improvement of Memory, is the principle 
on which its ready and retentive action depends, to wit, deep 
and distinct impression. All our plans for the accomplish- 
ment of the object under consideration, should be formed 
with direct reference to this one principle. 

2. As impressions depend very much upon distinctness of 
conception, in all efforts, to improve this faculty, we should 
habituate ourselves to form distinct conceptions of objects 
especially of those which we wish to recollect. In this, 
manner the impression will not only be deep and permanent, 
but the notion associated with it being distinct, will, when 
recalled, possess a corresponding distinctness. 

3. In thought, the object should be located, in distinct 
relation to the circumstances of time and place with which it 
is associated. In this manner the impression and conception 
both will not only be rendered deep and distinct, but each 
circumstance referred to, as it recurs in connection with 
other thoughts and perceptions will, by exciting the feelings 
under consideration, recall the object associated with it> 



122 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. Knowledge, in order to be retained permanently, must 
be systematized and reduced to general permanent principles. 
Otherwise, it will be exclusively subject to the law of local 
Association which is so temporary in respect to retention. 

4. To converse with others, and write down our thoughts 
which we wish to retain, contributes to permanency and dis- 
tinctness of recollection. Knowledge, by this means, is 
rendered distinct, the corresponding impression deep and 
permanent, and the whole subject of thought most likely to 
be systematically arranged. All these circumstances tend to 
render Memory distinct and permanent. 

5. Memory also, to be improved, must be trusted, but at 
the same time, not overburdened, as is the case when every- 
thing is communicated to it, without the aid of a judicious 
diary of important thoughts and occurrences. That faculty 
which is not exercised will not be developed and improved. 
Memory is nofc^exempt from this law. At the same time, to 
overburden a faculty is a sure way to palsy its energies. 
Nothing but Reflection and Judgment, properly exercised, 
can fix upon the line where memory should and should not 
be trusted, without the aid of written records of our thoughts, 
and thus secure a proper development of this faculty. 

Memory of the Aged. 

One of the first indications of the approaching feebleness 
of age, is the failure, in a greater or less degree, of the power 
of Memory. A characteristic precisely the opposite is also 
sometimes presented in the experience of aged persons — a 
a wonderful revival of the Memory of the occurrences of 
early life. A lady of my acquaintance, for example, aged 
about ninety years, had occasion to amuse some of her great- 
grandchildren one day. She thought she would, as a means 
to this end, relate to them the substance of a story, related 
in verse, which she had read, when quite young. She had 
never committed it to memory, and doubtless had thought 
little of it for more than, half a century. As she commenced 
the story, the entire poem came fresh to her recollection. 
She could repeat it all, word for word. These two facts in 
the experience of the aged, the failure, on the one hand, and 
the wonderful revival of this power, on the other, need to 
be accounted for. 

In respect to the first class of phenomena, two reasons 
may be assigned for their existence. 



MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. 123 

1. The failure of the faculty of perception and attention. 
As a consequence, distinct notions are not formed of objects 
of present thought and perception. Nor do they affect the 
Mind as they formerly did. For these reasons, the peculiar 
feelings which have co-existed with former thoughts and per- 
ceptions, and would, if revived, suggest them, are not revived. 

2. In the failing of the perceptive faculty, there is a cor- 
responding change in the correlation of the Sensibility to 
objects of thought and perception. Hence the same feelings 
precisely are not no^ excited by objects of thought and per- 
ception, as formerly, and consequently former intellectual 
states are not reproduced. 

In respect to the second class, I would remark, that every 
one is aware, that amid the hurrying scenes of ordinary life, 
such crowds of associations rush upon the mind, at one and 
the same time, that no one entire scene of the past, is 
often distinctly recalled. On the other hand, when we 
are in a state of temporary isolation from the varying tide of 
events which is floating by and around us, then is the time 
when our recollections of the past become full and distinct. 
Now the aged are in a state of isolation of a more perma- 
nent character. Hence when a past scene is recalled, the 
Mind is in a state of comparative freedom from all diverting 
and distracting associations. Consequently the scene, in its 
entireness, is brought into full and distinct remembrance. 

Duration of Memory. 

If the law of Association illustrated in the preceding Chap- 
ter be admitted as true, it will follow, as a matter of course, 
that Memory is absolutely indestructible. Thought can never 
perish. If the impression with which any thought has co- 
existed, should, at any period, however remote, be in any 
form revived, the thought itself may be recalled. If any 
element of a given impression be reproduced, no reason can 
be assigned, why a thought which co-existed with it, myriads 
of ages ago, should not thereby be recalled, as well as the 
one which co-existed with it but yesterday. 

Numberless facts also, which lie around us in society, fully 
confirm the principle under consideration as a law of Memory. 
The case of the aged lady referred to above, presents a fact 
of the kind. The most striking one that now recurs to my 
recollection is given by Coleridge. It is the case of a Ger- 
man girl who had always labored as a domestic. While 



124 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Coleridge was on a visit to Germany, and in the vicinity of 
her residence, she sickened, and if I mistake not, died. 
During her sickness, she began to utter sentences in lan- 
guages unknown to all her attendants. Learned men, from a 
neighboring University, were called in. It was then found 
that she was reciting, with perfect correctness, entire passages 
from the Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Syriac Scriptures, and 
also from the writings of the ancient Fathers. The occur- 
rence was, by many, regarded as miraculous. A young phy- 
sician in attendance, however, determine to trace out her 
past history, for the purpose of finding a clue to the mystery. 
He found at last, that when quite small, the young woman 
had lived in the family of an aged clergyman of great learn- 
ing, who was in the daily habit of reading aloud in his study 
from the writings above referred to. As the child was at 
work in a room contiguous, she was accustomed to stop, 
from time to time, and listen to those strange sounds, the 
meaning of not one of which did she understand. There 
was the clue to the mystery. Those sounds were imperish- 
ably impressed upon the Memory. Hence their repetition, 
under the circumstances named. Cases of a similar nature 
might, to any extent, be adduced. They point with solemn 
interest, to the nature of the immortal powers within, as well 
as to facts of portentous moment in the future development 
of those powers. 



CHAPTER XI, 



IMAGINATION. 



There is hardly any department of the present Treatise, in 
respect to which I feel a greater solicitude, than that upon 
which we are now to enter. I freely acknowledge, that I 
have not been satisfied with the views given upon the subject 
by authors held in general repute. It is by no means cer- 
tain, however, that, when we have discovered real or appa- 
rent defects in the productions of others, we can produce 
anything more perfect ourselves. It not unfrequently hap- 
pens, also, that the supposed defects lie in our own ideal, and 
not in that in which we suppose ourselves to have found 
them. All are aware that there is such a function of the In- 
telligence as the Imagination. When we meet with any of 
its real creations also, all recognize them as such. But then, 
when the questions are asked. What is this power ? What are 
its functions ? or. What are the laws of its action ?■ a true an- 
swer does not so readily occur, as, at first thought, might be 
anticipated. 

Defininitlons of distinguished Philosophers. 

In further rem.arking upon the subject, I will first present 
some of the definitions of this faculty, given by distinguished 
philosophers. I begin with the definition of Dr. Brown : — 
" We not only perceive objects," he observes, " and concieve 
and remember them as they were, but we have the power of 
combining them with various new assemblages — of forming, 
at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a sin- 
gle universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with 
every succession of our thoughts." 

" What is Imagination," says Mr. Payne, " but Memory 
presenting the objects of pure perceptions (in a manner 



126 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

afterwards to be explained) in groups, or combinations which 
do not exist in nature ? " 

" In the exercise of the Imagination," says Abercrombie, 
*' we take the component parts of real scenes, events, or 
characters, and combine them anew, by a process of the 
mind itself, so as to form compounds, which have no exist- 
ence in nature." 

" But we have the power of modifying our conceptions," 
says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " by combining the parts of dif- 
ferent ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own 
creation. I shall employ the word Imagination, to express 
this power." 

" Imagination," says Professor Upham, " is a complex 
exercise of the mind, by means of which various conceptions 
are combined together, so as to form new wholes." 

It will be perceived at once, that, according to most of 
these definitions, the Imagination has a primary, if not an 
almost exclusive, reference to the objects of sense ; and ac- 
cording to all, its creations are fictions^ which have no cor- 
responding realities in nature. They are composed of ele- 
ments of perceptions of real scenes ; but yet these elements 
are so combined, that the creations, in all instances, have 
nothing corresponding to them in the universe within or 
around us. 

Objections to the above Definitions. 

If these definitions be admitted as correct, and.as present- 
ing the entire and appropriate sphere of the Imagination, we 
must find some other faculty to which to attribute a large 
portion of the best poetry in existence. I will present a few 
familiar quotations, as examples. 

Take, in the first instance, Wordsworth's description of 
the White Doe of Rylstone : 

" White she is as the lily of June, 
And beauteous as the silver moon 
When out of sight the clouds are driven, 
And she is left alone in heaven ; 
Or like a ship, some gentle day, 
In sunshine sailing far away — 
A glittering ship that hath the plain 
Of ocean for its wide domain." 

Nothing is here presented but what really exists in nature. 
Yet nothing but a creative Imagination, of a very high order, 
could have shadowed forth such a beautiful conception. 



IMAGINATION. 127 

Take, as another example, the 19th Psalm, as given in our 
Bibles, or as thrown into verse in our common hymn books : 

" The heavens declare thy glory, Lord, 
In every star thy vv^isdom shines." 

" Thy noblest wonders here we view, 
In souls renew'd, and sins forgiven." &c. 

Who will pretend that we have not here the creations of 
the Imagination, in its purest, highest flights ? Yet in the 
first instance there are no new combinations of sensible ob- 
jects presented, but a simple statement of facts in regard to 
objects perfectly familiar. In the second instance, no visible 
object is referred to, but simple facts in regard to spiritual 
objects. Again : 

"Along the banks where Babel's current flows, 
Our captive bands in deep despondence strayed, 
While Zion's fall in sad renaembrance rose, 
Her friends, her children, mingled with the dead. 

" The tuneless harp, that once with joy we strung, 
When praise employed, and mirth inspired the lay, 
In mournful silence on the willows hung. 

And growing grief prolonged the tedious day." 

No one, surely, will pretend that here is a combination of 
objects of perception, which had no existence in nature. 

Take the following lines from a poem, designed to present 
the scene which transpired in the wilderness where Elijah 
lodged, after he fled from the wrath of Jezebel : 

"Amidst the wilderness, alone, 

The sad, foe-hunted prophet lay ; 
And darkened shadows round him thrown, 
Shut out the cheerful light of day. 

" The winds were laden with his sighs, 
As resting 'neath a lonely tree, 
His spirit, torn with agonies. 

In prayer was struggling to be free." 

I make but one other selection, taken from Wordsworth's 
Boy of Winander Mere : 

"Who 
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls. 
That they might answer him. And they would shout 
^- Across the watery vale, and shout again 



128 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

With long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud, 

Redoubled and redoubled, concourse wild, 

Of mirth, and jocund din. And when it chanced 

That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill, 

Then sometimes in that silence, while he hung 

Listening, a gentle shock of wild surprise 

Has carried far into his heart, the voice 

Of mountain torrents ; or the visible scene 

Would enter, unawares, into his mind. 

With all its solemn imagery, its rocks, 

Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received 

Into the bosom of the steady lake." 

Surely, in none of these instances, have the poets given 
to " airy nothing a local habitation and a name." Yet no 
one fails to notice in all of them the appropriate results of the 
Imagination. 

Another Definition proposed. 
It now remains to attempt, at least, an enunciation of the 
true conception of the Imagination. An object may some- 
times be best explained by comparing it with another of 
whicli we have distinct apprehensions. Of the Understand- 
ing we have such apprehensions. The fundamental ele- 
ments of all its conceptions are, as we have seen, substance 
and quality, cause and effect. It combines the elements 
given by the primary faculties as given, without modifying 
them at all. It is the faculty, in short, which takes cogni- 
zance of realities as they are. JN^ow we have in our minds 
other ideas than those of substance and quality, cause and 
effect ; such, for example, as the ideas of the beautiful, the 
grand, and the sublime. These ideas last named, do not re- 
spect objects as they really exist (for they may, or may not, 
exist in harmony with such ideas), but as arranged and com- 
bined in a given manner. We have in our minds, therefore, 
two entirely distinct classes of conceptions — those which 
respect objects just as they exist in the universe of matter 
and mind, within and around us, and those in which the ele- 
ments of such objects are in thought combined, in harmony, 
more or less perfect, with fundamental ideas in the mind it- 
self; as those of the beautiful, grand, sublime, &c., which 
do not respect objects as they are, but certain arrangements 
of such objects. The function of the Intelligence which 
gives us the former class of conceptions, we have denomi- 
nated the Understanding. That which gives us the latter, 
that which " hovering o'er" all the elements of thought 



IMAGINATION. 129 

appearing upon the field of Consciousness, combines them 
into conceptions, more or less perfectly conformed to funda- 
mental ideas, like those referred to above, is the Imagination. 
By Coleridge it is called the " Esemplastic, or into-one-form- 
ing power." It re-combines the elements of thought into 
conceptions which pertain not to mere existences^ but ideas 
of the beautiful, the perfect, the sublime, &c., in the mind 
itself. A conception of the Understanding is perfect, when 
it represents its object as it is, w^hatever the object may be. 
A conception of the Imagination is perfect, when it sha- 
dows forth forms of beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., which 
correspond with the idea in the mind. Understanding-con- 
ceptions are compared with the object. The only standard 
with which the creations of the Imagination are compared, 
is the idea. 

Imagination and Fancy distinguished. 
Mr. Dugald Stewart is the first philosopher that I have 
met with, who makes a distinction between the Imagination 
and Fancy. I will give the remarks to which I refer, as it 
will prepare the way for the distinction which I wish to make. 
" It is the power of Fancy," he observes, " which supplies 
the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analo- 
gies which are the foundation of his allusions. But it is the 
power of the Imagination, that creates the complex scenes 
he describes, and the fictitious characters which he deline- 
ates." According to the distinction here made, it was the 
Imagination of Milton, which created the whole scene and 
the particular characters presented in ^ Paradise Lost.' His 
Fancy, on the other hand, furnished the figurative language, 
analogies, and illustrations with which it is adorned. The 
Fancy, as thus described, is, as it will readily be perceived, 
nothing but a particular department of the operation of the 
principle of Association. It collects the materials from which 
the Imagination creates its scenes and characters, and then 
furnishes the attendant embellishments. In conformity to 
this view of the subject, Fancy is defined by Coleridge, as 
the " aggregative and associative power." Thus defined, 
while the Imagination is that function of the Intelligence 
which is correlated to ideas of the beautiful, the grand, the 
sublime, &c., the Fancy is that function of the associative 
principle, which is correlated to the same ideas. 



130 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Another Definition of the term Fancy. 
There is another use of the term Fancy, called " arbitrary 
Imagination," or Imagination not governed by the pure ideas 
of truth and beauty." In this use of the faculty of Imagina- 
tion, instead of the beautiful being shadowed forth, grotesque 
images are produced with intentional violation of all laws of 
esthetics. In the present Treatise, the term Fancy will be 
used in conformity to the definition first given. 

IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED. 

Preliminary Remarks. 
I will here introduce two remarks, which it may be impor- 
tant to keep in mind, in order to a full appreciation of what 
is to follow, and will then proceed to the illustration and elu- 
cidation of the subject before us : 

1. The imagination pre-supposes the Fancy, as the ag- 
gregative power ; while the latter does not pre-suppose the 
former. 

2. Upon these distinctions are founded the epithets com- 
monly applied to each, the Fancy being, in different indivi- 
duals, denominated rich, luxuriant, or the opposite ; the Im- 
agination being denominated sublime, beautiful, or the oppo- 
site, according to the nature and character of its creations. 

Elucidation. 
We now proceed to a further elucidation of the nature of 
the Imagination, as distinguished from the Fancy, and of the 
characteristics of each. We will commence as the basis of 
our illustrations, with a work familiar to all, and for that 
reason the more to our purpose, to wit, ' Paradise Lost.* 
Before Milton existed, the various parts of the entire scene 
presented in this work, had been for ages before the minds 
of millions. Every one that had read his Bible was perfectly 
familiar with the revolt of Satan and his legions — the war in 
heaven — the creation of man, and his fall, through the wiles 
of Satan — the Eden of man's first abode, and his subsequent 
expulsion, &c. These scenes, by the aggregative powers of 
the Fancy, had often been brought together in the same 
mind at the same moment. But here they remained in 
scattered fragments, " without form and void," as far as unity 



IMAGINATION. 131 

and identity are concerned, till a new creative power in the 
mind of Milton, " moving upon the face of the waters," 
brought all the disordered and scattered elements into one 
harmonious whole. Now what is this power which gave 
unity to all these endlessly diversified scenes ? It is the 
Imagination. The Fancy first aggregates the materials — the 
elements. The Imagination then calls into being the " new 
heavens and the new earth," formed into a harmonious unity 
out of the elements thus brought together. The same re- 
marks apply to all the individuals, &c., real or imaginary, 
presented to our contemplation in the above poem. For the 
further illustration of these remarks I will now present a few 
extracts from the poem itself : 

" He scarced had ceas'd when the superior fiend 
Was moving towards the shore ; his pond'rous shield, 
Ethereal temper, massy, large, and round, 
Behind him cast ; the broad circumference 
Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb 
Through optic glass the Tuscan artist views, 
At evening, from the top of Fesole, 
Or in Valdamo, to descry new lands, 
Rivers or mountains in her spotty globe," 

The character and scene here presented, were created by 
the Imagination. The comparison of the shield to the moon, 
was the suggestion of the Fancy. Again : 

" Which when Beelzebub perceived, than whom 
Satan except, none higher sat, with grave 
Aspect he rose, and in his rising seemed 
A pillar of state ; deep on his front engraven, 
Deliberation sat, and public care; 
And princely counsel in his face yet shone, 
Majestic though in ruin : sage he stood 
With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear 
The weight of mightiest monarchies ; his look 
Drew audience and attention, still as night. 
Or summer's noon-tide air, while thus he spake." 

The operation distinct and separate of the two faculties 
under consideration, is too obvious here to need any remarks. 
To the same purpose I make one more quotation : 

" He, above the rest 
In shape and gesture proudly eminent. 
Stood like a tow'r ; his form had yet not lost 
All its original brightness, nor appear'd 
Less than archangel ruin'd, and th' excess 
Of glory obscur'd : as when the sun new lisen 
Looks through the horizontal misty air 
Shorn of his beams 5 or from behind the moon. 



132 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds 
On half the nations, and with fear of change 
Perplexes monarchs." 

Here you perceive the propriety of the epithets, rich, and 
luxuriant, beautiful, and sublime, as applied to the Imagi- 
nation and Fancy. — An Imagination, the creations of which 
are beautiful, grand, or sublime, is characterized accordingly. 
As the Fancy adorns such creations with analogies varied, 
rnultiplied, and appropriate, it is denominated rich, luxu- 
riant, &c. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION. 

The Imagination is exclusively a secondary faculty. It 
operates only upon elements which the other faculties fur- 
nish. As the laws which control the Imagination are the 
ideas of unity, beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., it is by 
blending, in a peculiar manner, the elements of thought and 
feeling which lie under the eye of Consciousness, that this 
faculty shadows forth those forms which correspond to these 
ideas. My present object is to mark some of the principles 
in conformity to which a creative Imagination blends, uni- 
fies, and shadows forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and 
sublimity. 

1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one Whole, 
The first that I mention is that already noticed in the case 
of ' Paradise Lost ;' that in which the elements of different, 
and widely diversified scenes, are combined into one harmo- 
nious whole — into one beautiful, grand, or sublime concep- 
tion. The character of the conception will depend upon two 
circumstances — the elements introduced into it — and the man- 
ner in which they are blended. To move upon the elements of 
thought, and blend them into form, in harmony with some one 
conception, is the principal law which controls the Imagina- 
tion, in shadowing forth the beautiful, the grand, and the 
sublime. Nothing, almost, has greater influence in awaken- 
ing in us the sense of the beautiful, the grand, or the sub- 
lime, than thus to contemplate parts of widely diversified 
scenes, which, in our thoughts, have lain in scattered frag- 
ments, all harmoniously blended into one grand conception. 
Thought is beautiful, and that which is brought into harmo- 
ny with thought, has great power in awakening in us the 



IMAGINATION. 133 

sense of the same. To blend into one that which in thought 
has before been disconnected, and thus to unify our concep- 
tions, stir in us the sense of the perfect, the true, the beautiful, 
the grand, and the sublime, is the peculiar function of the 
Imagination 

2. Blending the Diverse. 
The poet had heard, with feelings of awe and rapture, from 
the neighboring hills and mountains, the reverberations of the 
trumpet's notes, as they were sounded forth from some high 
cliff, on the mountain side. Amid similar scenes he had lis- 
tened to similar sounds from the waterfall. His Imagina- 
tion blends the two, and thus shadows forth the conception 
of the beautiful. 

" The cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep." 

The Fancy, or associative faculty, may connect, but not blend. 
This is the peculiar function of the Imagination. Under the 
influence of the former faculty, the poet would have said, 

" The cataracts sound like trumpets from the steep." 

" The sunshine is a glorious birth." 

To blend the conception of the production of light, with that 
of a birth, reveals the plastic power of the Imagination. 

" But now, when every sharp-edged blast 
Is quiet in its sheath.'" 

It requires some reflection, to appreciate the beauty of di- 
verse thoughts here blended. Yet reflection will draw it 
forth. We have all conceived of the ' sharp-edged sword,' 
ceasing from the work of death, and lying quiet in its sheath. 
We have also heard the chill wind of winter spoken of as 
having a keen edge. As the poet walks forth amid the bland 
and mellow air of May, when the keen edge of winter has 
passed entirely from the atmosphere, his plastic Imagination 
unites the two conceptions above referred to into one. Hence 
the beautiful thought, " every sharp-edged blast is quiet in 
its sheath." 

I might multiply examples of the kind under consideration 
to any extent. But these are sufficient to illustrate the prin* 
ciple. 

3. Blending Opposites. 
Another principle in conformity to which the Imagination 



134 IKTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

shadows forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublinnity, 
is by blending things opposite to each other, such as the ani- 
mate ani n nimate, material and mental, the rational and ir- 
rational. 1 will give a few examples, the most of which will 
illustrate the principle under consideration with such obvious- 
ness as to render any particular remarks upon them unne- 
cessary. 

" 'Twas niglit : the sultry atmosphere 
Half palpable with darkness seemed, 

Save when the lightnings, quick and clear, 
Across wide heaven in grandeur gleamed, 

Rousing along the fields of air, 

The growling thunders from their lair." 

Every one is aroused to a deep sense of the grand and 
sublime on reading such a stanza. Two circumstances im- 
part special grandeur and sublimity to. the thought here 
presented — separating and presenting as opposites, things 
sustaining the relation to each other of cause and effect, as 
the lightning and the thunder — and blendmg opposites, the 
animate and inanimate, and thus representing the thunders 
as growling monsters in their lair, roused to rage and fury 
by the lightnings gleaming in grandeur across the fields of 
air. 

I cite another passage from the same author — a poet yet 
unknown to fame. The language quoted, the poet has put 
into the mouth of an ancient Roman chieftain slave, dying 
in his humble shed, amid his comrades whom he was about 
to lead forth in a struggle for liberty, and who were as- 
sembled 

" To hear his last and solemn charge, 
Ere Death should set his soul at large. 

Half-raising up his giant form, 

With awful lustre in his eye, 
He spake, 

' Ye spirits of the storm. 

Careering chainless, through the sky, 
Your thunder-trumpet peals for me 
A glad and glorious jubilee. 
Like you, unmock'd by man's control, 
When on the clouds your chariots roll, 
My free and disembodied soul 
Soon makes the Elysian fields, long sought. 
The play-ground of its deathless thought' " &c. 

I shall not spoil the passage, by particular comments. 



IMAGINATION. 135 

Every one will perceive, that it is combining things op- 
posite, things in themselves grand and sublime, that imparts 
peculiar grandeur to this grand conception! 

In similar strains the same writer represents the impri- 
soned eagle, as longing to 

" Rise through tempest-shrouded air, 

All thick and dark, with wild winds swelling, 
To brave the lightning's lurid glare, 
And talk with thunders in their dwelling. ^^ 

Here the rational, in its sublimest forms, is first blended 
with the irrational, and then with the inanimate ; and then 
one of these beings is represented, as longing to rise amid 
scenes of fearful grandeur and sublimity, to converse with 
the other in his awful dwelling-place. Thus a creative 
Imagination evolves the forms of grandeur and sublimity. 

It is the peculiar manner in which opposites are blended, 
that imparts such peculiar beauty to that most beautiful of 
almost all compositions, the 19th Psalm. The imagination 
of the poet represents the entire material universe, especially 
the luminaries of heaven, as all held in a blissful and devout 
contemplation and study of the perfection and glory of the 
Creator — all learning, and each imparting to the other a 
knowledge of the Infinite and Perfect. Day speaks to day, 
and night to night, of some new-discovered excellence re- 
vealed in the manifold works of God. 

" Hark ! his hands the lyre explore. 
Bright-eyed Fancy hovering o'er. 
Scatters from her pictured urn, 
Thoughts that breathe, and words that burn." 

Fancy, as a bright-eyed, embodied spirit, hovering over, 
breathing thoughts, and burning words — opposites, in them- 
selves beautiful, so beautifully blended, are what impart 
such surpassing beauty to this beautiful thought. 

" But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God, who is our home." 

By blending things so opposite as spirits and trailing 
clouds, does the poet impart an ineffable beauty to the idea 
of the soul coming from the hands of its Maker. 

4. Blending Things in their Nature alike. 
Sometimes the Imagination evolves the beautiful, by 



136 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

blending thino;s in their nature identical. I will give a single 
example of tliis kind, tiie subjective influence of maternal 
affection, as the poet has presented it : 

" Her love to me, in strong control, 
Form'd of her life the dearest part; 
It seem'd a soul within her soul, 
The very pulse within her heartP 

No comments are requisite here, in pointing out the 
blending, plastic influence of the Imagination, in thus evolv- 
ing the forms of the beautiful. 

5. Combining Numbers into Unity ^ and dissolving and sepa- 
rating Unity into Number. 
Perhaps in no way does the Imagination more frequently 
body forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 
than by " consolidating numbers into unity, and dissolving 
and separating unity into number." 

" How beautiful are thy tents, O Jacob, 
And thy dwelling-places, O Israel, 
As rivers spread themselves abroad, 
As gardens by the river side. 

He coucheth and lieth down as a lion, 
As a young lion, who shall rouse him up. 
Blessed is he that blesseth thee. 
And cursed is he that curseth thee." 

The main force and beauty of this passage consists in the 
manner in which a vast number of people are presented as 
one venerable personage. Every one is so familiar with 
examples of this kind, that I need not multiply them. 

I will give a single example or two of the opposite kind, 
that of dissolving and separating unity into number : 

" And too oft 
Even wise men leave their better sense at home, 
To chide and wonder at them when return'd." 

No individual can fail to recognize the beauty of the 
thought here expressed. Yet it mainly consists in dissolving 
the unity of the Mind itself. 

" Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phautasma, or a hideous dream : 



IMAGINATION. 137 

The genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council : and the state of man, 
Like a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection." 

6. Adding /o, or abstracting some Quality from , an Object. 
When a property is added to an object which it does not 

possess, the object then, as Mr. Wordsworth observes, 
" re-acts upon the mind which has performed the process, 
like a new existence." This is one of the waj^s in which 
the Imagination delights us with the conception of the beau- 
tiful. For example : 

" Cuckoo ! shall I call thee hird, 
Or but a wandering voice ?" 

The cuckoo, though almost continually heard through the 
season of spring, is herself almost always invisible. This 
fact imparts a surpassing beauty to the conception evolved, 
in abstracting from her the idea of substantial existence, and 
representing her as a " wandering voice." 

Examples of the former kind — that of blending with ob- 
jects qualities which do not belong to them— have been given 
under the preceding topics. 1 will not forbear, however, the 
presentation of a single additional instance : 

" Sweet day ! so cool, so calm, so bright, 

The bridal of the earth and sky : 

The dew shall weep thy fall to-night. 

For thou must die." 

The beauty of this inconceivably beautiful thought, con- 
sists in representing the dew-drop, which in itself is the pure 
result of phj'^sical causes, as a tear which Nature sheds over 
the fall of a bright and gladsome day. Adding this new 
quality to the dew-drop, makes it act upon us as a new 
existence. 

7. Blending with external Objects the Feelings ichich they 

excite in us. 
The Imagination often imparts a surpassing beauty to 
what is in itself beautiful, by blending with the object the 
feelings which the contemplation of it excites in our minds : 

" O then what soul was his, when on the tops 
Of the high mountains he beheld the sun 
Rise up, and bathe the world in light ! He look'd — 



138 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Ocean and Earth, the solid frame of Earth, 

And Ocean's liquid mass, beneath him lay 

In gladness and deep joy. The clouds were touch'd, 

And in their silent faces he did read 

Unalterable love." 

" The moon doth with delight 
Look round her when the heavens are bare." 

No particular remarks, after stating the principle, are re- 
quisite, to show how that principle is illustrated by such 
creations. 



8. Abstracting certain Characteristics of Objects, and blending 
them into Harmony with some leading Idea. 

The same object, in respect to different features of it, may 
be contemplated relatively to different ideas, in the mind. 
In the light of how many leading ideas, for example, may 
the bright worlds that hang around us, in the immensity of 
space, be contemplated. Now, the Imagination often 
evolves the forms of the beautiful, the grand, and the sub- 
Hme, by throwing these objects before the mind, in harmony 
with one or more of these leading ideas. Take, as an ex- 
ample, the following stanzas from a poem entitled " A Psalm 
of Night :" 

" Fades from the West the farewell light, 

Flung backward by the setting sun, 
And silence deepens as the Night 

Steals with its solemn shadows on ! 
Gathers the soft, refreshing dew 

On spiring grass and flowret stems — 
And lo! the everlasting blue 

Is radiant with a thousand gems ! 

Not only doth the voiceful Day 

Thy loving kindness, Lord ! proclaim — 
But Night, with its sublime array 

Of worlds, doth magnify Thy name ! 
Yea — while adoring seraphim 

Before Thee bend the willing knee, 
From every star a choral hymn 

Goes up unceasingly to Thee ! 

Day unto Day doth utter speech. 

And Night to Night thy voice makes known ; 

Through all the earth where Thought may reach 
Is heard the glad and solemn tone — 



IMAGINATION. 139 

And worlds, beyond the farthest star 
Whose light hath reached a human eye, 

Catch the high anthem from afar, 
That rolls along Immensity !" 

Every one who contemplates the thought here embodied, 
aside from the sentiment of devotion awakened in his mind, 
will have a sense of the beauty, majesty, and sublimity of 
the works of Divinity, unfelt before. In the stanza, also, 

" And beauteous as the silver moon, 
When out of sight the clouds are driven, 
As she is left alone in heaven," 

that beautiful orb is thrown before the mind in the ligbt of 
one idea only, that of the beautiful. To blend thus into one 
conception, the elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 
existing in objects which may be contemplated in the light 
of other ideas, is one of the peculiar functions of the Ima- 
gination. In the light of the conceptions which it shadows 
forth, objects the most familiar put on new forms, and stand 
before the mind in an array in which we never contemplated 
them before. New fountains of thought and feeling are thus 
awakened in the depths of our own minds. 

9. Throwing the fleeting Thoughts^ Sentiments, and Feelings, 
of our past Existence, i?ito one beautifal Conception. 

I mention but one other form in which the Imagination 
delights us with the forms of the beautiful, the perfect, and 
the true, &c. It is by throwing into distinct and hallowed 
embodiment, those d-^ep thoughts and sentiments which have 
had a fleeting existence in our experience, but which, above 
all things, we desire never to forget. Who does not feel like 
dropping a tear of gratitude for that divine gift which ena- 
bled the poet thus beautifully to embalm, for eternal remem- 
brance, what we have all experienced, but might otherwise 
forget ? 

" The tear, whose source I could not guess, 
The deep sigh, that seem'd fatherless, 
Were mine in early days." 

Every one feels himself richer, when he has found such a 
thought as this. Of the same character is the following : 

" To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." 



140 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

"Every one, also, who is familiar with Death as the " sha- 
dow of the rock Kternily," finds his own hallowed experi- 
ences embalmed in lines like the following : 

" The clouds that gather round the setting sun, 
Do take a sober coloring fronn an eye 
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality." 

I forbear further citations. To embalm in beautiful forms 
the hallowed experiences of the race, is one of the high 
prerogatives which he enjoys who has been favored by his 
Maker with the hio;her functions of the Imaoination. 



REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS. 

It is not professed that the preceding analysis has present- 
ed all the forms in conformity to which the Imagination 
moulds its creations. All that was designed, is to give a 
sufficient number of particular forms, to aid the student in 
his inquiries into the operations of this mysterious power. 

Another remark is this. The examples presented iwillus- 
tration of one particular form, often contain elements equally 
illustrative of other forms. This was unavoidable. It was 
enough for my purpose to present, in each example, the ele- 
ment illustrative of the principle to which it was referred. 

Remark of Coleridge. 
Coleridge has somewhere made a remark, which I regard 
as of great importance in guiding the judgment in detecting 
the peculiar operations of the Imagination, and separating 
them from the operations of other intellectual faculties. 
The amount of his remark is this. It is not every part of 
what is called a production of the Imagination, that is to be 
attributed to that faculty. Much often is mere narration, and 
much the mere filling out of the grand outline of the con- 
ception which the Imagination has combined, and which as 
properly belongs to the Understanding and Judgment, as the 
filling up of the outlines of any other discourse of which 
the Intelligence has conceived. With a great portion of 
the filling up of Paradise Lost, for example, Imagination had 
no more to do than with that of filling up the grand outline 
of a sermon, or oration. In the sublime conception itself, 
and in the mysterious blending of the elements of thought 
often met with, in throwing that conception into form, here 



IMAGINATION. 141 

we find the workings of this creative, plastic faculty. To 
evolve principles which would enable the student, under 
such circumstances, to discern the operations of this faculty, 
has, as before said, been the main object of the preceding 
analysis. 

CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION, WHY NOT ALWAYS FICTIONS. 

In the preceding part of this Chapter, it has been shown, 
that the creations of the Imagination are not always, as it 
has been often stated by philosophers, " new wholes which 
do not exist in nature." It becomes an important inquiry, 
when and why is not this statement true ? It will be evi- 
dent, at first thought, that when the elements of thought 
which enter into particular conceptions, are wholly re-com- 
bined, the new wholes, thus produced, must exist purely in 
thought, without any corresponding existence. On the other 
hand, when the elements of beauty, o-randeur, and sublimity 
exist in objects in connection with other and different ele- 
ments, elements also related to other and different ideas, and 
when the Imagination, as in the Psalm of INight, above 
cited, blends these elements first named into some one beau- 
tiful, grand, or sublime conception, every element in the 
conception may be in strict correlation to realities. Take as 
a further illustration, a single stanza from a familiar hymn : 

" His word of grace is sure and strong, 
As that which built the skies: , 

The voice that rolls the stars along 
Speaks all the promises.''^ 

Every element in this beautiful thought is strictly con- 
formed to realities, as they are. Yet in the blending of 
these elements, particularly in the last two lines, we dis- 
tinctly mark the plastic power of the Imagination, in its 
sublimest and most beautiful form. 

The same is equally true, where, as shown above, the 
same power embalms, in similar conceptions, the hallowed 
sentiments and experiences of the past and present. Who 
that ever saw the tear of gratitude lying in the eye of afflic- 
tion — a thing far more beautiful than the dew-drop, when it 
holds in its embrace the image of the morning sun — a tear 
started by some gift that eased, for a time, the pressure of 
woe, and then turned away with a sorrowful heart, that such 
7* 



142 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

worth should be crushed beneath such a weight, does not 
recognize the truth^ as well as beauty, of the thought 
contained in the following stanza, especially in the two last 
lines ? 

" I have heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds 

With coldness still returning : 

Alas ! the gratitude of men 

Has oftener left me mourning." 

In another sense, all the proper creations of the Imagina- 
tion are true. They are true to thought. In the depths of 
our inner being, there lie thoughts too deep for any words 
which we can command. Nothing but an overshadowing 
Imagination can call them forth, and give them an external 
embodiment. Whether the forms in which they are em- 
bodied are correlated to substantial realities or not, they are 
true to thought, the most important of all realities. We 
feel grateful, therefore, when we find thoughts which we 
had vainly endeavored to express, moulded into form, and 
thus assuming " a local habitation and a name." 

I mention one other, and a very important sense, in which 
the creations of the Imagination are true. They sustain, in 
many instances, relations to realities analogous somewhat to 
that sustained by general notions. In a very important sense, 
these last have no realities in nature corresponding to them ; 
that is, there is no one object, that in all respects corresponds 
to a general notion, that is, that contains the elements itrepre- 
sents, and nothing more nor less. The elements belonging to 
it, however,- are found in each particular ranged under it. Let 
us now, in the light of this illustration, contemplate the forms 
of the beautiful, for example, shadowed forth by the Imagi- 
nation. We may not be able, in all instances, to find any 
one particular object which contains, and nothing more nor 
less, the elements which enter into this form. Yet, when- 
ever we meet with an object containing the elements of 
beauty, we find that element represented in the forms of the 
beautiful bodied forth by the Imagination. In these forms, 
we do not find any one particular shadowed forth, but each 
particular blended in the universal. In the most perfect 
forms of statuary, for example, we do not find any one human 
form, in distinction from all others, represented, but we find 
whatever is beautiful in every form there embodied. As the 
Understanding represents the particular in the general, so the 



IMAGINATION. 143 

Imagination represents all particulars relating to the beauti- 
ful, &c., in the universal. 

Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry. 
Most of the examples introduced into this Chapter are 
poetical. From this I would not have it supposed, that, in 
my judgment, the Imagination is confined to this species of 
composition. We meet with its finest creations, on the other 
hand, in painting, in statuary, in prose, and in every kind of 
discourse in which the elements of thought can be blended in 
mrmony with pure ideas. It admits, at least, of a doubt, 
whether the Imagination of Milton ranged with a more dis- 
cursive energy in his highest prose compositions, or in his 
Paradise Lost. 

Law of Taste relative to the Action of the Imagination, 
It is, as we have seen, the peculiar province of the Imagi- 
nation to dissolve, recombine, and blend the elements of 
thought. Its procedure in all these respects, however, is 
not arbitrary. Every thought cannot be blended with every 
other, without violating the laws of good taste. Here, then, 
an important question presents itself, to wit : What is the law 
which guides the Imagination, in blending the elements of 
thought i I will present my own ideas on this subject, by 
an example taken from the book of Job : 

" Hast thou given the horse his strength ? 
Hast thou clothed his neck with thunder .?" 

The propriety of blending of the two conceptions, that of the 
mane of the war-horse and of thunder, has been questioned by 
some, on account of the total dissimilarity of the objects of those 
conceptions. It is readily admitted, that no two objects are 
in themselves more dissimilar. Yet it is confidently main- 
tained, that there never was a figure of speech more appro- 
priate. The reason is obvious, and every one feels it, though 
he may not have an analytical consciousness of it. When 
two objects are, as objects of sense, totally dissimilar, the 
conception of each may excite precisely similar feelings. 
Hence the propriety and force of the figure employed by the 
sacred writer, in blending the two conceptions into one. 
This I conceive to be the universal law of good taste, relative 
to the action of the plastic power of the Imagination. 
Whenever two conceptions sustain a similar relation to any one 



144 . INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

common feeling or sentiment^ they maij he blended into one. 
The more diverse the objects of those conceptions, the more 
striking the figure, under such circumstances. I will give one 
other example : 

" The twilight hours Hke birds flew by, 
■ As lightly and as free ; 
Ten thousand stars were in the sky, 

Ten thousand in the sea; 
For every wave with dimpled cheek 

That leaped upon the av; 
Had caught a star in its embrace iB 

^nd held it trembling there^ 

Who is insensible to the exquisite beauty of the thought 
here ? Yet the wave of the sea or lake, reflecting the stars 
of night, no more, as an object of sense, resembles the dimpled 
cheek of beauty, or the mother catching up her babe and 
holding it in her embrace, than the mane of the war-horse 
resembles thunder. Why, then, are we struck with such 
delight at the blending of conceptions, the objects of which 
are, in themselves, so unlike } The answer is, These con- 
ceptions are mutually correlated to the same or similar 
feelings. When such conceptions are thus blended into a 
beautiful emotion common to both, there is shadowed forth 
the perfection of beauty. For this reason our hearts leap 
up, when we meet with such thoughts as the following, 
taken from the same effusion as that above cited : 

" I have heard the laughing wind behind, 
When playing with my hair — 
The breezy fingers of the wind, 
How cool and moist they were !" 



IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OF IDEALS. 

Another important function of the Imagination now claims 
our attention, its functions as the organ of Ideals. In illus- 
trating this function, the first thing to be accomplished is to 
distinguish between Ideals and Ideas. 

Idea defined. 
An Idea, properly defined, is a conception of Reason. As 
such it has the characteristics of universality and necessity, 
and is consequently, incapable of change, or modification. 



IMAGINATION. 145 

Thus when certain conditions are fulfilled, Reason evolves 
the idea of time, space, substance and cause, which we have 
already considered, together with such as the beautiful, the 
right, the true, and the good, &c., hereafter to be con- 
sidered. 

Ideal defined. 
An Ideal is a form of thought intermediate between an 
idea, and the conceptions or notions which the Intelligence 
generates of particular objects, and presents archetypes in 
conformity to which the elements of such conceptions maj" be 
blended in harmony with ideas. In the raind of Milton, for 
example, the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the 
sublime, &c., existed, as pure conceptions of Reason. When 
the varied conceptions, the elements of which are blended 
together in Paradise Lost, lay under the eye of his Conscious- 
ness, his Intelligence, brooding over those elements, at last 
blended them together into that grand conception, of w^iich 
the poem itself is the external embodiment. This conception 
was the Ideal after which the poem was formed, to realize his 
ideas of the grand, the beautiful, and the sublime. 

Ideals^ Particular and General. 
Ideals, like notions, are particular and general. Thus, in 
the mind of Milton, there existed a general ideal of what a 
poem should be, in order to realize, in greater or less perfec- 
tion, the pure ideas of Reason. At the same time, there 
existed a particular Ideal of the manner in which the ele- 
ments entering into that poem should be blended, in order in 
that particular production, to realize those ideas. 

Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful^ the Grand, and 
the Sublime. 
Ideals are not confined to any one class of ideas. Every 
individual, in all departments of human action, has an Ideal 
of the form to which the objects of his action should be 
brought into conformity, and in the light of w^hich he judges 
of all productions which meet his eye. Ideas of fitness, of 
the true, the perfect, and the good, are archetypes of Ideals, 
as w^ell as that of the beautiful. 

Ideals not fixed and changeless like Ideas. 
Ideals, as compared with ideas, may be perfect or imper- 



146 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

feet. They are consequently capable of continued modifica- 
tions. We often hear it said of individuals, that their Ideals 
are imperfect or wrong. As intermediate archetypes between 
conceptions of particular objects, and pure ideas of Reason, 
Ideals may, in the future progress of the Intelligence, undergo 
endless modifications, always advancing towards the perfect 
and absolute, without reaching it. 

Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress. 

As intermediate archetypes between particular conceptions, 
and universal and necessary ideas. Ideals constitute the 
foundation of endless progression in the development of the 
mental powers. .Every new elevation which the Intelligence 
gains, presents new conceptions of particular objects, and 
consequently new elements of thought. Every new element 
of thought involves a new Ideal, more nearly approaching 
the perfect and the absolute, and thus lays the foundation for 
fresh activity, and further progress in the march of mind. 
Sometimes also Ideals degenerate, and thus the foundation is 
laid for the backward movements of society. 

It is hardly necessary to add that the Imagination is the 
exclusive organ of Ideals. To form such conceptions is not 
a function of Reason, nor of the Understanding or Judgment. 
It remains, then, as the exclusive function of the Imagina- 
tion. 

Ideals in the Divine and Human Intelligence. 
In the Divine mind, the action of the Imagination is always 
in perfect and absolute correspondence to the Reason. As a 
consequence, there is a similar correspondence between the 
Divine Ideal and idea. All of God's " works, therefore, are 
perfect." Not so with the finite. Man may eternally 
progress towards the infinite and perfect, but can never 
reach it. 

ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE 
IMAGINATION. 

Taste defined. 
Taste is that function of the Judgment by which the charac- 
teristics of productions, especially in belles-lettres and the fine 
arts, are determined in the light of Ideals and ideas of beauty, 
order, congruity, proportion, symmetry, fitness, and whatever 



IMAGINATION. 147 

constitutes excellence in such productions. The Judgment 
may be exercised upon Ideals relatively to ideas, and upon 
particular productions relatively to both. Thus Milton, 
when he apprehended the conception realized in Paradise 
Lost, might, and doubtless did, often compare that conception 
with his own idea, to determine the fact whether the former 
made a near approach to the latter. In filling out the con- 
ception, he would continually compare the external embodi- 
ment with the internal Ideal. In all such operations, he was 
exercising those functions of the faculty of Judgment denomi- 
nated Taste. The existence of good taste depends upon the 
existence in the Intelligence of correct Ideals, together with a 
well balanced, and well exercised Judgment pertaining to the 
ideas of beauty, fitness, &c. If a man's Ideal is false, his 
Taste is of course vitiated. If his Ideal were ever so correct, 
and he was not possessed of a well balanced, and well exer- 
cised Judgment, pertaining to such productions, he would 
also lack the characteristics of good Taste. 

Productions of the Imagination ivhen not regulated by correct 
Judgment or good Taste. 

In some individuals in whom the Imagination exists and 
operates with a high degree of energy, its action is not guided 
and chastened by good Taste, or a well regulated Judgment. 
In such cases we find the most perfect forms of beauty and 
sublimity shadowed forth in connection with the grossest 
deformities. The subject also will, in most instances, be 
wholly unable to distinguish the one from the other. In 
listening to such men, we, at one moment, are perfectly 
electrified with the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity 
which are shadowed forth to our ecstatic vision ; but the next, 
perhaps, we are equally shocked and disgusted with images 
worse than grotesque, and forms of speech in strange viola- 
tion of all the laws of good Taste. Under such circum- 
stances we have special need of two things. Patience and 
good Judgment. The former will enable us to endure the 
evil for the sake of the good : the latter to separate the one 
from the other, that we do not receive the good and the bad, 
as is too often the case, as alike good, nor reject both as 
alike bad. 

The most perfect of all human productions are the results 
of genius associated with good Judgment. Of these the pro- 
ductions of Milton may be referred to as striking examples. 



148 IJSTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Grandeur and sublimity are the permanent characteristics of 
his genius. And how seldom are his sublime conceptions 
marred with violations of good Taste. 

PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE FANCY OR 
IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS. 

The productions of different authors, we read with almost 
equal interest, but for entirely different and opposite reasons. 
1 now refer to two classes of productions only, in one of 
which the operation of the Fancy is most prominentj and in 
the other, that of the Imagination. In productions of the 
former class, there will be an exuberance of metaphor, and 
beautifully appropriate comparisons and illustrations, and 
these will be the main source of the interest felt. In contem- 
plating the productions of a creative Imagination, on the 
other hand, the grand conception will be the chief, and in 
some instances, the exclusive source of interest. 

COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTIN- 
GUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER ACTION 
OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY. 

By the Imagination different conceptions are blended on 
the ground of co-existence with similar feelings. The feel- 
ing into which they are blended will be the leading one with 
which each is associated. By the Fancy different concep- 
tions are associated on precisely the same principle. Now 
Wit consists in blending and associating conceptions on the 
ground of remote and generally mere accidental elements, 
found in them in common. Such combinations and associa- 
tions therefore surprise and amuse us. When the Irishman, 
for example, replied to the question, what he would take to 
go, on a cold winter's night, a certain distance, in a state of 
nudity, " That he thought he should take a very bad cold," 
all recognize the reply as an example of genuine Wit. On 
an analysis we find that two thoughts are blen'ded here, on 
the ground merely of an accidental element common to both. 
The term take is permanently associated with the phrase 
taking cold, and has a mere accidental association with the 
question proposed, since some other term (as what will you 
ask :) would have answered just as well. The blending of 
the two thoughts, in consequence of such an accidental 



IMAGINATION. 149 

elpiTient, is what surprises and amuses us, and constitutes the 
real wit involved in the reply. 

A clergyman once delivered a discourse on the divine 
works. In the progress of his remarks, he said that every- 
thing God had ma 'e was perfect in its kind. As the speaker 
descended from the pulpit, he was accosted at the door by 
an ill-formed hunchback of a man, who, looking him in the 
face, with a kind of malicious grin, asked the question, 
" What, sir, do you think of my form } Do you think that 
to be perfect ? " Yes," replied the speaker, " you are a 
perfect hunchback." Here is genuine Wit. It consists, as 
every one will perceive, in assuming the idea of a hunch- 
back as a conception of the perfect, and then classing the 
individual present under it as an embodied realization of 
that idea. 

A combination, in its nature, not unlike the above, was 
made by a celebrated convict at Botany Bay, in respect to 
himself and associates : 

" True patriots we, 
For, be it understood, 
We left our country 
For our country's good." 

Wit may not inappropriately be denominated shallow 
sense, being, in most instances, the antithesis of a blunder, 
or a blunder from design. As two Irishmen were walking 
together, for examiple, the one after the other, the individual 
foremost took hold of the limb of a tree, which extended 
across the path (the end being broken off), and holding it in 
his hand as he passed along, as far as his strength would 
allow, suddenly let it fly back. His companion behind re- 
ceiving the blow in the forehead, was thereby thrown from a 
perpendiular to a horizontal position. On recovering his 
standing, however, as he was rubbing his eyes, he very 
gravely remarked to his associate, " In faith, it is well you 
held the limb back as long as you did. Had you not done 
so, it would probably have killed me." Here was a blun- 
der. Now suppose that a bystander had witnessed the 
occurrence, and had made ^i remark precisely similar in 
respect to it. This would have been genuine Wit. I would 
here drop the suggestion, whether the most of what is 
denominated Irish wit, is not, after all, amusing blunders ? 



150 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Bombast. 

In the appropriate exercise of the Imagination, the elements 
of some important and deeply interesting subject lie out with 
distinctness under the eye of the mind. The Imagination, 
brooding over these elements, combines and blends them 
together into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, 
according to the leading idea in the light of which they are 
viewed. Now, when the Intelligence, in any department of 
the empire of thought energizes upon some subject of deep 
and glowing interest, it will never throw upon its conceptions 
the attire of bombast. It may shadow forth figures homely, 
and in opposition to the laws of good Taste. There will be 
no forms of expression, however, swollen or bombastic. But 
this presents the inquiry. What is bombast ? There are 
three forms which this style of writing and speaking assumes. 

The first is that in which an individual, without any object 
of thought before him, attempts to form and shadow forth 
some vast and sublime conception. Thus the subject attempts 
to grasp and express " some boundless thing," by a simple 
eflfort of self-inflation. If anything is generated under such 
circumstances, it will, of course, be windy, and inflated with 
" great swelling words of vanity." 

" O," said a miscalled clergyman, as he rose to address a 
congregation amidst the solemnities of the Sabbath, " O that 
this very refined, polite, intelligent, and virtuous audience 
would soar — and soar — and soar with me — to some un- 
known — planet." He arose, of course, without thought, ex- 
cepting the conception that he must say something very fine. 
In his efforts at self-inflation, the idea o^ soaring would most 
naturally suggest itself, and with that, the rhapsody that fol- 
lowed. 

The second form is, when an individual endeavors to 
impart to a thought of trifling importance in itself, a very 
great interest, by arraying it in the attire of objects of great 
beauty, grandeur, or sublimity. We are all necessitated, 
from time to time, to speak of subjects of little or no great 
importance. We ought, in such circumstances, to show our 
good sense, by letting such thoughts pass from us " with the 
naked nature, and living grace," if they have any, which nat- 
urally belongs to them. But no. Some individuals can never 
speak upon any subject, without showing their want of sense, 
by throwing around it a drapery which subjects really beau- 



IMAGINATION. 161 

tiful and sublime would be ashamed to wear. I will give a 
specimen from memory. I will attribute it to no individual, 
because I do not know that any individual ever said it. I 
give it as what a son of Erin is reported to have said — an in- 
dividual who wished to express the simple conception, that 
he might have stayed in his native country, but chose to em- 
igrate to this, and came accordingly ; a conception, surely, 
which it required but few and very simple words to express. 
To him, however, it was a conception of vast interest. His 
Fancy was accordingly sent abroad for figures with which to 
adorn it, and thus the conception appears : 

" Silent in some hermit's grot and lulled to rest on mossy 
carpets, he might have spent his truant hours. But as he 
sped his trackless footsteps through the labyrinthian wastes 
of Fancy's rich, enchanted landscape, a voice re-echoed from 
the vaulted palace of the skies, and in sounds seraphic dwelt, 
and hung upon his ear. Obedient to the heavenly call, he 
bade adieu to fair Hibernia's hills, and with his staff, like 
Bunyan's Pilgrim, he followed the guiding star, till it shot 
its sparkling beams, and mingled with its mate around Colum- 
bia's banner." 

The third form in which the vice we are considering ap- 
pears, is when an individual has a very meagre, feeble, and 
faint conception of a subject of great interest in itself, and 
when he attempts to inflate his conceptions to the vastness 
of his subject, by swelling words and pompous imagery and 
illustrations. How often is a great subject marred and de- 
faced, by being daubed over with the " gloss and fustian" of 
minds who never had an adequate conception of it. 

" Poets and painters alike unskilled to trace 
The naked nature, and the living grace, 
With gloss and fustian cover every part. 
And hide with ornament their want of art." 

I will not forbear doing myself the pleasure, nor the reader 
the profit, of the following quotation from the " British Spy," 
as it presents one of the sources of bombast in public speaking 
— the conception, that in some part of a discourse an indivi- 
dual must be pathetic : 

'^ This leads me to remark a defect which I have noticed 
more than once in this country. Following up too closely 
the cold conceit of the Roman division of an oration, the 
speakers set aside a particular part of their discourse, usually 
the peroration, in which, they take it into their heads that 



152 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

they will be pathetic. Accordingly, when they reach this 
part, whether it be prompted by the feelings or not, a mighty 
bustle commences The speaker pricks up his ears, erects 
his chest, tosses his arms with hysterical vehemence, and 
says everything which he supposes ought to affect his hear^ 
ers ; but it is all in vain : for it is obvious that every thing he 
says is prompted by the head ; and, however it may display 
his ingenuity and fertility, however it may appeal to the ad- 
miration of his hearers, it will never strike deeper. The 
Aea775of the audience will refuse all commerce, except with 
the heart of the speaker ; nor, in this commerce, is it possi- 
ble, by any disguise, however artful, to impose false ware 
on them. However the speaker may labor to seem to feel, 
hovv'ever near he may approach the appearance of the reality, 
the heart nevertheless possesses a keen unerring sense, 
which never fails in detecting the imposture. It would 
seem as if the heart of man stamps a secret mark on all its 
effusions, which alone can give them currency, and which no 
ingenuity, however adroit, can successfully counterfeit.'"* 

Burlesque. 
Burlesque sustains the same relation to bombast, that wit 
does to a blunder. Each copies its antithesis from design. 
The proper, and only proper object of burlesque, is bombast, 
and faults of a kindred character. To attempt to burlesque 
that which is in itself deserving of veneration, is to render 
one's self most criminal. 



* When T listen to such an attempt at the pathetic as the above, I 
am reminded of a fact which an individual used to tell the students, 
when I was in college; — an individual who was accustomed to visit 
us statedly two or three times a year, and whose visits were not the 
most welcome to those of us who never were able to pay our bills, and 
others especially who had had money enough, and could not give a good 
account of the manner in which they got rid of it. This individual, 
notwithstanding his unwelcome errands, was accustomed to render 
himself very agreeable, by amusing anecdotes, which he would relate 
for the benefit of the students. Among these he was accustomed to 
relate the following, which he himself had heard : After the death of 
Washington, a Dutch orator in one of the village-^ on the Mohawk was 
appointed to deliver an oration on the character of that great man. 
The people assembled, and were entertained for about an hour and a 
half, with a most bathotic eulogy of the hero. At last the speaker 
came to a sudden and solemn pause. " Boys !" he exlaimed, " be very 
still now derein de gallery; — now Ibe'shcometode patetic. — Vash- 
ington died vidout a grunt, or a groan, or a grumble." 



IMAGINATION. 153 

In genuine burlesque, the original will be copied to a cer- 
tain extent, but yet with such variations as to leave no doubt 
of the design of the speaker or writer. One of the finest 
specimens of genuine burlesque, that I recollect to have met 
with, was given some years since in a foreign review of 
the works of an Irish orator of some celebrity, especially 
for what the reviewer termed bombast. He accordingly pre- 
sents a speech professedly after the style of the orator, 
a speech designed to show the great advantages which 
the poor man has over the rich, in respect to happiness. I 
quote a single paragraph from the speech, as it occurs in 
memory : 

" Happiness, Mr. Speaker, is like a crow seated upon the 
top of a mountain, which the hunter vainly endeavors to re- 
proach. The hunter looks at the crow, Mr. Speaker, and the 
crow looks at him. But if he should attempt to reproach 
him, he banishes away, like the schismatic tints of the rain- 
bow, which it was the sublime, and astonishing genius of 
Newton that developed and deplored." 

Sarcasm. 
Analogous to burlesque is sarcasm. Its appropriate sphere 
is to burlesque false claims to merit — claims which may not be 
assumed in a bombastic style. It attributes to the individual 
his claims, but does it in such a manner, that the irony shall 
be visible. " No doubt ye are the people, and wisdom 
will die with you." 

PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS OF 
FICTION. 

I close this protracted chapter with two or three sugges- 
tions of a general nature. 

The first is, the propriety of employing the Imagination 
and Fancy in the production of fictitious composition. Of 
the propriety of employing such a noble faculty in bringing 
out such productions, some persons, whose opinions are de- 
serving of respect, iiave serious doubts. To me it appears 
that such doubts have been occasioned exclusively by an 
abuse of what is in itself proper. Suppose I am contemplat- 
ing a statue. It presents all the forms almost of grace and 
beauty that appear in all beautiful human forms. I ask the 
question, What individual does this statue represent .'' The 



154 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

answer is, that it reprefents no one human form, but the 
statuary's own Ideal of beauty and grace, as it may be embo- 
died in a human form. Am 1 offended at the fact contained 
in the reply ? By no means. Why may not an individual 
as properly embody, in external form, an Ideal in his own 
mind, as copy an object less beautiful without ? The Ideal 
within is just as much a reality, as the object without, and 
may as properly be represented with the chisel, the brush, or 
the pen. To shadow forth conceptions more perfect than the 
real around, is to lay a foundation for human improvement. 
But let us suppose, that an individual, gifted with the power 
of thus blessing his race, employs that power, not in shadow- 
ing forth the forms of truth, beauty and perfection, but in 
throwing such attractions over vice and error, as tend to 
draw the young, the thoughtless, and the ignorant from the 
paths of truth, purity, and peace ; — such individuals deserve 
the deepest reprobation of the universe, as having abused and 
perverted one of the highest gifts with which any intelligent 
being has ever been entrusted. The individual also who will 
familiarize himself with the productions of such authors, sub- 
jects himself to an influence of all others, best adapted to 
sap the foundations of moral character, The maxim of an- 
cient wisdom, " The companions of fools shall be destroyed," 
is no more true, than the maxim, that the reader of impure 
books will himself become impure. 

False Idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity with the 
popular Fictitious Writings of the Day. 
A very common impression exists that familiarity with 
fictitious writings, especially with the popular fictions of the 
day, tends to improve the Imagination, and that because they 
are fictitious. Now this is a grand mistake. It by no means 
follows, that because a work is fiction, and not sober history, 
the perusal of it tends to improve the Imagination. It may tend, 
on the other hand, to no other end, than to vitiate the Fan- 
cy, by generating impure associations. For myself, I am per- 
suaded, that the study of such works as Prescott's ' Conquest 
of Mexico,' and ^ Alison's History of Modern Europe,' tends 
incomparably more to develop the Imagination than the pe- 
rusal of the great mass of fictitious works that are floating 
upon the surface of society. The question whether the pe- 
rusal of a work tends to improve the Imagination, depends, 
not upon the fact whether it is fiction, but upon the manner 



IMAGINATION. 155 

in which the elements of thought are therein blended. With- 
out departing at all from the path of truth in the narration of 
facts, the Imagination of the historian may be almost contin- 
ually energizing, in blending into the forms of beaaty, gran- 
ceur, and sublimity, the elements of thought which the nar- 
rative presents. In contemplating history, as its glowing 
facts are set forth in such forms, the Imagination may receive 
its most rapid development. The remark of Coleridge, 
that but a small part of even the best poems that we meet 
with, presents the appropriate creations of the Imagination, is 
pre-eminently true of fictitious writings. The question, then, 
whether the perusal of a particular work of fiction tends to 
improve the Imagination, depends not upon the fact that it 
is fiction, but upon the manner in which the elements of 
thought are therein blended. 

Imagination and Fancy — How improved. 

Every power is developed in one way only — in being exer- 
cised upon its appropriate objects. Each of the functions of 
the Intelligence under consideration, has its appropriate 
sphere. To develop the power, we must find its legiti- 
mate sphere, and in that sphere exercise it upon its appro- 
priate objects. The Fancy is improved, by developing in 
the mind the sense of the beautiful, the true, the perfect, and 
the sublime, by furnishing the Intelligence with distinct 
apprehensions of the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublim- 
ity which the universe of matter and mind, nature and art 
presents. 

The Imagination will be improved by familiarizing the 
mind with the true functions of the power itself, with the 
laws which regulate its action, in blending into form the ele- 
ments of thought, and with its actual creations, as given in 
the works of minds most highly gifted with this function of 
the Intelligence. 



CHAPTER XI. 



REASON, 



The preceding Chapters have occupied more than the en- 
tire ground which is traversed in the common systems of Phi- 
losophy, so far as an analysis of the Intellectual Powers is 
concerned. Such an analysis, however, leaves untouched 
many of the more important phenomena of the human 
Mind. Consciousness and Sense, which lie at the founda- 
tion of all the faculties which have been the subject of the 
preceding analysis, can never give us infinite, eternal, abso- 
lute, universal, and necessary truths, nor can they account 
for the existence of the ideas of such truths in the Mind. 
Such phenomena demand the admission of another power, 
not supposed in the existence of conceptions of contingent 
and relative phenomena. These last might exist in a Mind 
totally destitute of a knowledge of universal and necessary- 
truths. 

Reason defined. ' 

That faculty which apprehends truths, infinite, eternal, 
absolute, universal, and necessary, is the Reason. It bears 
precisely the same relation to such truths, that Conscious- 
ness and Sense do to contingent phenomena. Like those 
faculties, all its affirmations are direct and intuitive. 

Coleridge'^s Characteristics of Reason as distinguished from 
the Understanding. 
Coleridge has taken great pains to establish and elucidate 
the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding. 
Before proceeding to a further analysis of the phenomena 
and functions of the former faculty, I will present some of 
the characteristics of these faculties — characteristics which 



REASON. 157 

he has given to distinguish the one from the other. In giv- 
ing their characteristics, I shall use the term Understanding 
in the sense in which Coleridge himself appears to use it, as 
including the Judgm.ent as well as the notion-forming power. 
I desire this fact to be kept distinctly in mind. In all other • 
parts of this Treatise I use the Understanding and Judgment 
in strict accordance with the definitions given in preceding 
Chapters. Here I use the term Understanding in accommo 
dation to the usage of the author whose distinctions I shall 
endeavor to elucidate. What then are the great distinctions 
between the Reason and Understanding, as laid down by this 
philosopher ? 

1. '' The Understanding, in all its judgments, refers to 
some other faculty as its ultimate authority." " The Rea- 
son in all its decisions appeals to itself." Take as an illus- 
tration of the above distinction the following propositions : 
" This is a book." " Space is, or exists." The first pro- 
position supposes three things in the Mind — the conception 
designated b}^ the term book — 'the perception of the particu- 
lar object, a judgment that the object corresponds to the 
conception, and a consequent subsumption of the object 
under the conception. Now this judgment is an affirmation 
of the Understanding. Is it self-atlirmed, or is it based upon 
the authority of some other faculty ? Ask the speaker, how 
he knows that this is a book ? He refers at once to Sense 
(" I see it "), and to a notion of a class derived from previ- 
ous perceptions. The same may be shown to be true of 
every other affirmation of the Understanding, or generalizing 
power. 

Let us now look at the second proposition — Space is. On 
what authority is this affirmation made ? Upon no other 
authority than that of the faculty which apprehends the idea. 
So of the proposition, " Every event has a cause." All men 
know it to be true. In all minds, however, the faculty 
which affirms it is the sole ground or reason of the affirma- 
tion. The same principle holds in respect to all the judg- 
ments of the pure Reason. 

2. " The judgments of the Understanding admit of degrees. 
Those of the Reason preclude all degrees." In reference to 
some particular object of the perception, for example, under 
certain circumstances, we conjecture that it is a man ; under 
others, we believe it to be a man ; under others, we are sure 
that it is ; and under others still, we know it to be a man, 
8 



158 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

&c. But who merely conjectures or believes that every 
event has a cause ? We know it absolutely. In respect to 
this subject, the affirmation of the child and of the man, of the 
philosopher and of the peasant, are equally positive, and 
equally preclude all degrees. 

3. The laws which govern the Understanding in all its 
judgments are imposed upon it by the Reason ; while the 
Reason and its own laws are identical, or rather, the laws of 
the Reason are self-imposed. I feej, for example, a painful 
sensation. Instantly 1 apply my Understanding to deter- 
mine the particular cause. By what law is my Understand- 
ing governed, under such circumstances .'' By an idea or 
law, certainly, which exists, not in the Understanding itself, 
to wit, the affirmation of the pure Reason, that every event 
must have a cause. The same is true in regard to all other 
inquiries and affirmations of the Understanding, in regard to 
material substances. It obeys laws prescribed by another 
faculty. The Reason, however, obeys no laws but those 
which are self-imposed. When the Reason affirms absolute- 
ly that every event must have a cause — that succession sup- 
poses time — and that body supposes space, what law pre- 
scribed by another faculty or faculties does the Reason obey 
in such affirmations ? IN' one, surely. 

4. All the judgments of the Understanding are contingent. 
All the affirmations of the Reason are universal and neces- 
sary. I have before me, 1 will suppose, a right-angled 
triangle. I wish to know what relation exists between the 
square of the hypothenuse and the sum of the squares of the 
two sides. I first determine this question by actual measure- 
ment, and find that they are equal. I have now before me a 
particular fact. Why it is so, I know not, or whether this 
fact holds true in regard to other triangles, I know not. I 
repeat the experiment upon similar triangles of various sizes, 
and find that they all give me precisely the same result. I 
very soon begin to conjecture that this fact holds true of all 
similar triangles. Repeated experiments ripen this conjec- 
ture into such a conviction as to preclude all doubt. Still 
there is no certain knowledge. ISor does there appear any 
necessity, from the nature of the subjects of these experi- 
ments, that the conclusions should not be different from what 
they are. Now let a person, in whose mind the principles of 
Geometry are developed, construct a figure and demonstrate 
the fact under consideration, in respect to that one particular 



REASON. 159 

triangle. What is the conclusion deduced from this demon- 
stration ? Not only that this fact holds in regard to this 
particular triangle, but that it does and must hold true in 
regard to all other similar triangles. In the former instance, 
we obtained a particular, contingent truth, as conceived by 
the Mind. In the latter we obtained a truth, universal and 
necessary. 

5. The '' Understanding is discursive." " The Reason is 
fixed." The judgments of the Understanding admit of de- 
grees, and are perpetually passing and repassing from mere 
conjecture to positive affirmation ; from doubt and disbelief 
to positive faith, and the opposite. The decisions of the 
Reason, however, have ever been characterized by the total 
absence of all degrees. They are, and always have been, 
positive, absolute affirmations. 

6. The Understanding, considered as using the faculties of 
Sense, Consciousness, and Reason, is the faculty of observa- 
tion and reflection. " Reason is the faculty of contempla- 
tion." The Understanding, through Sense and Conscious- 
ness, observes and reflects upon the phenomena given by 
these faculties, for the purpose of forming notions, and for 
purposes of classification and generalization. The Reason, 
on the other hand, being the direct aspect and inward behold- 
ing of truth, and the truths which it thus, by direct intuition, 
apprehends, being the same " yesterday, to-day, and for- 
ever," cannot properly be said to observe and reflect, but 
rather to contemplate. There it remains fixed — awed, and 
held by the direct contemplation of the infinite^the neces- 
sary, and the universal. 

8. The Understanding is the faculty of believing. The 
Reason is the faculty of knowing. Those who have never 
been in London or Paris, believe, with greater or less degrees 
of confidence, according to their knowledge of the facts, that 
there are<»such cities in existence. Yet they cannot, with 
strict propriety, be said to know these facts. But every 
person, in whose mind Reason exists at all, knows absolutely 
that space is — that every event must have a cause, &c. 

The above distinctions, most of which are specifically 
stated, though none of them are illustrated, by Coleridge, not 
only distinguish the Understanding and Judgment from the 
Reason, but tend to elucidate the functions of each. I will 
now proceed directly to a further elucidation of the functions 
of Reason. 



160 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHr. 



SECONDARY IDEAS OF REASON. 



In former Chapters it has been shown, that Reason sustains 
this relation to the faculties of Sense and Consciousness : It 
gives the logical antecedents of phenomena affirmed by these 
faculties. Thus, on the perception of phenomena, we have 
the ideas of time, space, substance, personal identity, and 
cause. 

Now Reason sustains a relation to the Understanding pre- 
cisely similar to that which it sustains to Sense and Con- 
sciousness. It gives the logical antecedents of notions and 
conceptions^ as well as of primary intuitions. Th^ idea of 
right and wrong, of obligation, is not the logical antecedent 
of mere phenomena given by Sense and Consciousness. Be- 
fore obligation can be conceived of or affirmed, the notion or 
conception, not of mere phenomena, but of an agent pos- 
sessed of certain powers, and sustaining certain relations to 
other agents, must be developed in the Intelligence. The 
idea of obligation, then, is not the logical antecedent of phe- 
nomena affirmed by Sense and Consciousness, but of notions 
given by the Understanding. These considerations fully 
estabhsh the propriety of the distinction between ideas of 
Reason as primary and secondary. The former are the logi- 
cal antecedents of phenomena given by the primary contin- 
gent faculties. The latter sustain the same relation to 
those of the secondary faculties. The distinction here made 
seems hitherto, as far as my knowledge extends, to have 
escaped thediotice of the analyzers of the human Intelligence. 
Its reality and importance to a correct understanding of the 
operations of the human Mind will appear manifest as we 
proceed with our analysis of the secondary ideas of Reason. 
An exposition of all the ideas comprehended under this 
class will not be attempted. All that will be attempted will 
be the induction and elucidation of a sufficient wumber of 
particulars to serve as lights to the philosophic inquirer, in 
his researches in the domain of mental science. 

IDEA OF RIGHT AND M'RONG. 

Of the Secondary ideas of Reason, that which claims the 
first, and more special attention, is the one mentioned above, 
that of right or wrong, together with those dependent upon 
it, or necessarily connected with it. 



161 



This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed. 
It is an undeniable fact, that in the presence of certain 
actions, the human mind characterizes them as good or bad, 
right or wrong ; that the mind affirms to itself, that one class 
of the actions ought, and the other ought not to be per- 
formed ; that when we have performed certain actions, we 
deserve reward, and that when we have performed others, 
we deserve punishment ; and that w^hen this takes place, 
there is moral order, and when it does not, there is moral 
disorder. Such judgments are passed alike by all mankind, 
the old and the young, the learned and the ignorant, the 
savage and the civilized. Should it be said, that mankind 
differ in different circumstances in their judgment of the 
moral qualities of actions ; I reply : 

1. This objection itself implies the universality of moral 
distinctions. As men may differ in referring particular effects 
to particular causes, while all agree in the judgment, that 
every event must have a cause, so it is with moral distinc- 
tions. Men may not always attribute the same moral quah- 
ties to the same actions ; yet they universally agree in this, 
that our actions are either right or wrong. 

2. But when we refer to intentions, in which alone the 
moral quality of actions consists, we find a more extensive 
agreement among men than is generally supposed. A man 
wills the good of an individual possessed of moral excellence. 
Where is the intelligent being in existence who does or can 
regard such an act as any other than virtuous } Who is 
not aware, that men always justify wrong actions, if at all, 
by a reference to their intentions, showing by such reference, 
that in their judgment of the great law of love, all agree. 

3. Vicious actions are seldom regarded as virtuous. Men 
may persuade themselves that it is not wrong to perform such 
actions, but never that they are hound to do them, or deserve 
a reward for having done them. 

4. When an intention morally right is submitted to the 
contemplation of mankind, all agree in admitting it as virtu- 
ous and meritorious. Thus the sacred writer speaks of 
himself and associates, as through a " manifestation of the 
truth, commending themselves to every man's conscience." 
This could not have been the case, had not the consciences 
of all men been in fixed correlation to the moral law. The 
idea of right and wrong, then, is universal. 



162 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Idea of Right and Wrong necessary. 
It is also necessary. When the Intelligence affirms an 
action or intention to be right or wrong, it is impossible even 
to conceive of it, as possessed of the opposite character. We 
can no more form such a conception, than we can conceive 
of the annihilation of space. It has the same claim to the 
characteristics of universalit}' and necessity, that any other 
idea has. 

Ideas dependent on that of Right and Wrong. 
A moment's reflection will convince us, that the idea of 
right and wrong is the foundation of that of obligation ; and this 
again, of that of merit or demerit \ and this last of that of reward 
and punishment. When men would justify the bestowment of 
reward, or the infliction of punishment, they always refer to the 
merit or demerit of the individual. This judgment is sustained 
by a reference to the obligation of the same individual, and 
his obligations are shown by a reference to the idea of right 
and wrong. Such facts clearly indicate the relation of these 
ideas, the one to the other. 

Chronological Antecedent to the Idea of Right and Wrong, S^c. 
It has already been rem.arked, that the ideas under consid- 
eration are the logical antecedents, not of the phenomena of 
the primary contingent faculties, but of Understanding-con- 
ceptions. Before we can conceive of ourselves as subjects 
of moral obligation, we must be conscious of the possession of 
certain powers, and of existence in certain relations to other 
beings. This knowledge is the chronological antecedent of 
the ideas of right and wrong, while these ideas sustain to 
the facts of Consciousness the relation of logical antecedents. 
The question now is. What are the elements of moral agency, 
necessarily pre-supposed, as the condition of the existence of 
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, &c., in our minds } 
They are the following. 

1. Power to know ourselves together with our relations. 

2. The actual perception of such relations. 

3. Power to act, or to refuse to act, in harmony with 
these relations. 

That the ideas of right and wrong sustain to i\xc\ concep- 
tions the relation of logical antecedent, is evident from the 
following considerations : 



REASON. 163 

1. When we conceive of a being possessed of these powers, 
and existing in such relations, we necessarily atfirm obliga- 
tions of him. An intelligent being is revealed to me, as 
possessed of capacity for virtue or vice, together with sus- 
ceptibilities for happiness or misery. I have a consciousness 
of the power to will his virtue and happiness, or his vice and 
misery. I instantly affirm myself under obligation to will 
the former instead of the latter. No other conceptions are 
necessary to the existence of this affirmation. These facts 
also being postulated, obligation must be affirmed. We can 
no more conceive it right to will the evil instead of the good, 
or, that we are not under obligation to will the latter, than 
we can conceive of the annihilation of space. 

2. If any of these elements are not postulated, obligation 
can not be conceived of, nor affirmed. If we deny of a crea- 
ture intelligence to perceive his relations to other beings, we 
cannot conceive of him as under obligation to them. What- ' 
ever degree of intelligence be attributed to him, this involves, 
in our apprehensions, no obligation to one act of Will instead 
of another, in the absence of all power to put forth the re- 
quired, instead of the prohibited act. Suppose a creature 
has any degree of intelligence whatever. This creates no 
obligation to locomotion, in the absence of corresponding 
power. Suppose the mind located in a body totally destitute 
of the power of locomotion. Would the existence of intelli- 
gence create obligation to locomotion ? Certainly not Such 
would be the response of universal Mind. Now the power 
to will is just as distinct from the Intelligence, as that of 
locomotion is. Hence, inteUigence, of whatever kind or de- 
gree, can no more create obligation to one than the other, in 
the absence of corresponding power. To the conception of 
an agent, then, possessed of intelligence to know his relations, 
and power to act, or refuse to act, in harmony with those 
relations, the ideas of right and wrons;, of obligation, &c., 
sustain the relation of logical antecedents. 

IDEA OF FITNESS. 

Ever}'' person who has attentively noticed the operations 
of his own mind, must have observed, that under certain 
circumstances, certain actions, or certain states of mind, ap- 
peared to him fit and proper. When asked to give a reason 
for such judgments, no other account can be given, than a 



164 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

simple reference to the nature of the thing itself, and to the 
circumstances supposed. For illustration, take the following 
passage of Scripture : " It was meet that we should make 
merry and be glad ; for this thy brother was dead, and is 
alive again ; and was lost, and is found." Suppose that 
father to have been required to give a reason for the judg- 
ment, that under the circumstances supposed, joy and merri- 
ment were fit or proper. What answer could he have given.? 
No other answer than for the judgment, that no phenomena 
exist without a cause. In both instances, the mind knows 
absolutely that its judgments are, and must be true. No 
other reason for their truth, however, can be given, than 
this : The circumstances being given, they are self-affirmed. 

This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong ^ ^c. 

Now the idea of fitness, when applied to moral relations^ 
is identical with that of right and wrong. It is the founda- 
tion of the idea of merit and demerit ; and consequently of 
that of reward and punishment. 

It is also identical with the idea of moral order. When 
it is asked, Why is that state in which virtue is rewarded and 
vice punished, regarded as a state of moral order .'' no 
other reason can be assigned than this : Such a state is fit 
and proper. 

IDEA OF THE USEFUL, OR THE GOOD. 

Whenever we conceive of a creature capable of pleasure 
or pain, happiness or misery, we necessarily conceive of a 
state in which all the capacities of such a creature for plea- 
sure and happiness are perfectly filled. This state we de- 
signate by the term good^ a term sometimes used in another 
sense, as synonymous with that of right. Whatever tends 
to fill out the measure of pleasure and happiness, we desig- 
nate by the general term, useful. 

The ideas of the useful and the good, above defined, give 
birth to all the varied forms of human industry, such as 
agriculture, the mechanic arts, commerce, &c. All are 
moving on to the realization of one great leading idea, the 
filling up of the capacities of man for pleasure and happiness. 

The Summum Bonum. 
There is one idea of Reason, expressed by the words, the 



REASON. 165 

great good, the €wmnum honiim^ and the to iial6v^ about which 
philosphers have long disputed, and in respect to which, they 
have been about equally divided in opinion. The question 
may be thus put : When we think of ourselves, or of the 
universe at large, what is that state to which our nature is 
correlated, or preferable to any other, actual or conceivable ? 

Some have placed the great good in happiness merely. 
To this position, however, we find that our nature is not 
exclusively correlated. If happiness were the only thing to 
which our nature is correlated, as in itself most to be de- 
sired ; if happiness exists, we should be totally indifferent in 
respect to the means, or conditions of its existence. We 
are not pleased, but pained at the thought, for example, that 
perfect happiness should be associated with great wicked- 
ness. 

Others, in departing from this idea, have placed the great 
good, in virtue. To this position, also, we find that our nature 
is not correlated. If virtue is the only thing that the Mind 
regards as good, it would be indifferent in respect to the 
condition in which it should exist ; whether, for example, 
the virtuous agent were happy or miserable. We are 
pained, on the other hand, at the thought, that virtuous 
beings should not be happy. Happiness our Intelligence 
affirms to be the right of the pure and the virtuous. 

The true solution is, no doubt, to be found in the blending 
of the two above given, or, as Cousin expresses it, " In the 
connection and harmony of virtue and happiness, as merited 
by it." If we conceive of a state of perfect virtue, asso- 
ciated with perfect happiness, this conception contains a 
realization of our idea of the summum bonum. Every depart- 
ment of our nature is correlated to that idea. We can con- 
ceive of no state so much to be desired as this. Nor can 
we perceive any element in this state to w^hich the laws of 
our being do not fully respond. 

RELATIONS OF THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG AND OF THE 
USEFUL TO EACH OTHER. 

We have seen above, that the ideas of right and wrong 
are the foundation of obligation, and this of merit and de- 
merit, &c. The question has long been agitated among 
philosophers, whether there is any idea that sustains a 
similar relation to that of right and wrong, and of obliga- 



166 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion. By some it is maintained, that this is not an ultimate 
idea of Reason, but that it has its foundation in another, to 
wit, that of the useful. This question I regard as of such 
fundamental importance in mental and moral philosophy 
both, that I shall enter into a discussion somewhat protracted 
of it. The question, then, is, What is the foundation of 
moral obligation ? Is utility this ground ? 

This purely a Psychological Question. 

The object of mental philosophy, it should be borne in 
mind, is to explain human nature. When the Intelligence, 
for example, makes particular affirmations, the object of this 
science is, to ascertain the reasons in view of which such 
affirmations are made. 

It is admitted by all, that in the presence of certain actions, 
the Mind does, as a matter of fact, affirm its obligation to 
perform them. The question, and the only question, for the 
philosopher to solve here is. What is the element or ele- 
ments, in view of which this affirmation is made ? The 
Utilitarian affirms that the perceived utility of the action, or 
its perceived tendenc}'^ to promote happiness, is the only 
element in the action, and the only circumstance connected 
with it, in view of which obligation to perform it is, or can 
be affirmed. In view of nothing else, if this theory is true, 
can such affirmation be made. Now, as every one will per- 
ceive at once, the question whether this theory is true, is 
exclusively a psychological question. It can be truly an- 
swered, only by an appeal to Consciousness. 

The theory under consideration is also given as a uni- 
versal theory. If obligation is, in any instance, affirmed in 
view of any other consideration, this theory falls to the 
ground. 

Further, if the Utilitarian, as is sometimes done, assumes 
the position that perceived tendency is not the sole reason, 
why obligation is, in all instances affirmed, while it is in fact 
the only element which gives existence to obligation, his 
theory, instead of explaining the human Intelligence, con- 
victs it of fundamental error, inasmuch as it asserts, that 
the Intelligence affirms obligation in view of considerations, 
which do not give existence to obligation. Having thus 
convicted the Intelligence of fundamental error, how is he 
afterwards, through the same Intelligence, to find out the 
truth } Now at this point, we join issue with the Utilita- 



REASON. 167 

r*an. We assert, that his theory does not correctly explain 
the human Intelligence, re atively to the question under con- 
sideration, and is therefore wrong. To show this we will 
inquire, 

Nature of Virtue. 
In the first place, What is virtue ? I answer, virtue is not 
a phenomenon of the Intelligence or Sensibility, but of the 
Will. As a phenomenon of Will, it must consist in right will- 
ing. This is a definition sufficiently explicit for the present 
argument. Should any one feel disposed to question the 
statement, that virtue consists exclusively in right willing, he 
will not deny, that it is in part, at least, found here. This is 
all that is requisite to the present argument. The question 
then to be settled is this. Is obligation to will in a given di- 
rection alvmys affirmed^ and affirmed exclusively, in view of the 
perceived tendency of thus willing 7 

Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility. 
While virtue is, in this discussion, postulated as a phenom- 
enon of the Will, happiness, on the other hand, is a phenom- 
enon, neither of the Intelligence, nor Will, but of the Sensi- 
bility exclusively. This no one will deny. 

Relation of Willing to Happiness. 
Now the tendency of willing of every kind, to promote - 
happiness, or its opposite, depends entirely upon the cor- 
relation between the nature of the Will and Sensibility. To 
understand, in this respect, the nature of willing, that is, its 
tendency to promote happiness, or its opposite, this correla- 
tion must be known. How can such knowledge be obtain- 
ed ? By experience only. This is self-evident. Prior to 
experience, I know not even that I have a Sensibility. 
Much less, if possible, can I know, prior to experience, the 
adaptation of any cause whatever, as for example, willing in 
one direction or another, in view of affirmed obligation, to 
^produce in the Sensibility, happiness or misery. 

Conclusion necessarily resulting from the Facts above stated. 
Now as I can know from experience only, the tendency 
of willing, in one way or the other, in view of affirmed 
obligation, to promote happiness or misery, it is demonstra- 
bly evident, that obligation must, in all instances, be in the 



168 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

first case affirmed, in total ignorance of such tendency. It 
must be affirmed, in view of other considerations exclusively. 
Perceived tendency, or utility, therefore, is not the exclusive 
reason in view of which obligation is affirmed. It is not the 
element which enters at all into original and primary affirma- 
tions of this nature. Utility, then, is not the exclusive 
ground of right. 

Argument Expanded. 
The above argument is as susceptible of absolute demon- 
stration, as any proposition in mathematics. To show this, 
let A represent a moral action, B its results, the results which 
A tends to produce. As A is the cause of B, the relation of A 
as cause to B as effect, must be learned exclusively from ex- 
perience. For the same reason, A must be, in the mind, the 
chronological antecedent of B. Now as A is willing in 
view of affirmed obligation, it implies two things, obligation 
affirmed, and action or willing, in view of it. Let C then 
represent the former, that is, obligation affirmed, and D the 
latter, or willing in view of such affirmation. Now C must 
have been in the mind prior to D, because D is action or 
willing in view of C. But B is known subsequently to the 
existence of D, the former being an effect of the latter, an 
effect learned by experience alone. Now as D is known 
prior to B, much more must C have been known and affirm- 
ed prior to all knowledge of B. Because C is affirmed prior 
to the existence even of D, which is the chronological ante- 
cedent of B. Obligation, therefore, is in all instances, first 
affirmed in view of totally different considerations than the 
perceived tendency of action in view of such affirmation, and 
the theory of the Utilitarian falls to the ground. 

Additional Considerations, 
The nature of willing may be contemplated and know^n 
in another and different point of light still, not in relation to 
the phenomena of the Sensibility, but of the Intelligence. A 
mountain, we will suppose, is before the mind. Prior to» 
experience, we cannot know, but that such is the correlation 
between our Wills and the mountain, that willing its removal 
to a certain place will cause its removal. In total ignorance 
of this relation, we may conceive of the removal of the 
mountain, and know w hat would be the effects of such an 
event, and understand perfectly what it is to will it. Our 



REASON. 169 

knowledge of the Dature of willing in this respect, cannot be 
increased or diminished, by our knowledge of the tendency 
of willing in the other respect above mentioned. Now 
the question arises, whether, in total ignorance of the 
tendency of Willing to produce this result, the Intelligence 
may not affirm, and affirm absolutely, that it is proper or 
improper, right or wrong, for us to will the removal of 
the mountain ? Suppose we know, that the removal of 
the mountain would occasion the death of a thousand 
individuals ; but we do not know at all, whether our 
willing it has any tendency to produce the result. Would 
not the Intelligence under such circumstances affirm absolute- 
ly our obligation not to will the removal of the mountain .? 
Who does not know, that it would make this affirmation ? 
Obligation to right willing is therefore affirmed, in view of 
considerations entirely distinct and separate from the per- 
ceived tendencies of thus willing to promote happiness. 

Argument stated in View of another Example. 

God, we w'ill suppose, is present to the contemplation of 
a rational being as capable of an infinite ai^iount of happiness 
or misery. Before we can know whether willing God's hap- 
piness or misery has any tendency to produce the one or 
the other, we must understand the correlation between the 
nature of our Will and the divine Sensibility. In total ab- 
sence of this knowledge, however, we can understand per- 
fectly the nature of willing in another respect, that is, what 
it is, to will the infinite happiness, instead of misery of God. 
Now in total ignorance of the tendency of w^illing, to pro- 
duce the result, and in view exclusively of its nature, in the 
other respect named, may not the Intelligence affirm absolute- 
ly the obligation of the creature referred to, to will the infinite 
happiness, instead of the infinite misery of God } If so (and 
who will deny, that the Intelligence would, under the cir- 
cumstances supposed, make the affirmation under considera- 
tion), we have demonstrative evidence, that utility, or the 
perceived tendency of right willing, is not the reason in view 
of which obligation thus to will, is affirmed. - 

To bring this question to a final issue, let us suppose the 
being of God present, in the sense above explained, to the 
contemplation of one of his rational offspring, and that no 
other creature but this exists. In view of the divine capaci- 
ties, this creature affirms absolutely his obligation to will 



170 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

God's infinite happiness, instead of his misery. In view of 
God's infinite excellence he affirms his obligation to love him. 
Now the question is, in view of the nature of willing. In 
which of the senses above named has this affirmation been 
made ? In answering this question I remark, that the happi- 
ness of God may be assumed as an infinite quantity, incapable 
of any increase or diminution from any finite cause ; or it 
may be assumed as a finite quantity, capable of increase or 
diminution from such a cause. Or (the only remaining sup- 
position conceivable) the mind may be in doubt which of the 
above positions is true. Of these positions, the first, as I 
sup{)ose, is the general impression of the race, and it certainly 
accords with the Bible. 

Now, in whichsoever of these states the mind is, it affirms 
with equal absoluteness its obligation to will the infinite 
happiness, instead of misery, of God. When it holds that 
the happiness of God cannot be increased or diminished by 
any act of any finite will, still it affirms its obligation to will 
the infinite happiness of God, instead of his infinite misery. 
Now an affirmation made in the absence of a certain element 
cannot be based upon that element. 

Further, the thing which this creature affirms himself 
bound to will, under the circumstances supposed, is the 
infinite happiness of God. Now it is demonstrably evident, 
that our willing cannot have any tendency to produce this 
result, a cause in its nature finite, having no tendency to 
produce an effi^ct that is infinite. The utmost that can be 
said of the tendency of willing is, that it is adapted to effect 
the happiness of God in a finite degree. Now is it in view 
of such a result that we affirm our obligation to will a result 
that is infinite ? Willing an infinite good derives, in our 
judgment, all its obligation from the perceived tendency of 
such willing to produce a finite good. Such is the doctrine 
of Utility. 

Result of the Discussion thus far. 

The result of the discussion thus far, is this. The per- 
ceived adaptation of willing the infinite happiness of God to 
promote that end, cannot be the reason of the affirmation that 
we are bound to will his infinite happiness, 

1. Because this affirmation is, as a matter of fact, made 
with the most perfect absoluteness, in the full belief that such 
willing has no tendency to effect his happiness at all. 



REASON. 171 

2. Because that this affirmation is made with equal abso- 
luteness, while the mind is in perfect suspense in respect to 
the fact whether our willing has any tendency to affect at all 
the happiness of God. 

3. Suppose we adopt the conclusion that our willing has 
such tendency, this conclusion w^e can adopt only as the 
result of a process of reasoning. Before we have arrived at 
this result, the above affirmation was made wdth perfect 
absoluteness, and could not, therefore, have been based upon 
such conclusion. 

4. When this conclusion is arrived at, the absoluteness of 
the affirmation under consideration is neither increased nor 
diminished. 

5. To suppose that the obligation to will the infinite happi- 
ness of God is based upon the perceived tendency of thus 
willing to affect his happiness in a finite degree, is to abandon 
entirely the position that intentions^ or what a man wills, 
determines moral character. 

Other important Considerations. 
Other considerations, bearing upon this point, now demand 
our consideration. 

1. No one is conscious of a reference at all to the tendency 
of our willing to affect the happiness of God, as the ground 
of the affirmation that we ought to will it. 

2. When this tendency is pointed out and proved to exist, 
no one recognizes it as the reason of the affirmation under 
consideration. 

3. No one who attempts to assign to others the reason 
why they are bound to love God, or to will his happiness, 
ever assis^ns this as the reason. Assuming the position, on 
the other hand, that we affirm ourselves bound to love God, 
or to will his happiness, for the sole and exclusive reason 
that the character of God is intrinsically excellent, and that 
his happiness is a thing in itself of infinite value ; this 
assumption I affirm to be correct. 

1. Because universal Consciousness affirms its truth. 

2. When this fact is pointed out, universal Reason responds 
to it, as the real 2;round of the affirmation under consideration, 
and as an all-sufficient ground. 

3. This fact is invariably referred to, w-hen we attempt to 
convince others of their obligation to love God, or to will his 
happiness, and of their guilt in not doing it. 



172 liNTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. Upon this ground Utilitarians, as well as others, found 
their affirmations of obligation to will what is right, whenever 
their theory is not distinctly before their minds. 

5. The more perfectly the mind is abstracted from all 
considerations but the simple relation of willing to what is 
intrinsic in the object presented, the more distinct and vivid 
will be the affirmations of Reason in respect to the moral 
character of our determinations. Of this every one is con- 
scious. 

The above Argument of universal Application. 
The argument thus far has been based mainly upon one 
example, willing the happiness instead of the misery of God. 
It will readily be perceived, however, that this example is of 
universal application in respect to all duties which, as creatures, 
we owe to God. If obligation to will God's happiness is not 
based upon perceived tendencies of willing it, to produce that 
result, no more surely can obligation to love him, submit to 
his authority, or be grateful for his mercies, be based upon 
perceived tendencies of yielding to such claims to produce 
the same result. 

Obligation not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies of 
Bight or Wrong Willing. 
Suppose the Utilitarian shifts his ground, and assumes the 
position that we affirm our obligation to will the happiness of 
God, or to love him, in view of the perceived tendencies of 
such willing to advance our own or the happiness of others. 
I reply, 

1. That, as shown above, obligation must have been per- 
ceived, affirmed, and complied with, or transgressed, prior to 
the perception of any such tendencies. Such perceptions, 
therefore, cannot have been the basis of such affirmations. 

2. The testimony of universal Consciousness is opposed to 
this supposition. When we affirm our obligation to love God, 
for example, nothing is further from our views than the 
thought, that this affirmation is based upon the perceived 
tendencies to make us happy. 

3. No person ever assigns this as the reason why we are 
bound to will the happiness of God. 

Another General Consideration. 
I have one consideration further, of a general nature, in 



REASON. 173 

favor of the position which I am endeavoring to establish. It 
is this. The more perfectly a man is emancipated from the 
belief of the doctrine of utility, the more perfectly he is 
" rooted and grounded" in the belief of the opposite doctrine, 
the more sacred in his estimation does right, does duty 
appear. As proof of this assertion I appe«,l to the conscious- 
ness of those who have had experience of the influence of 
this belief upon their m.inds. That error should have such 
an influence is the strongest anomaly in the history of human 
nature. " That which maketh manifest is light," and nothing, 
surely, but light can sanctify duty in our estimation. 

Once more, according to the showing of Utilitarians 
themselves, the tendency ^ v/illing, as, for example, the 
happiness of God, is a'con Juration, in view of which, it is 
impossible for us to will. Now that fact in view of which it 
is impossible for me to act, is a fact in view of which I cannot 
affirm my obligation to act. On the other system, the very 
consideration, in view of which we affirm our obligation to 
will what is right, is the very consideration in view of which 
alone, as all admit, right willing is possible. 

Mutable Actions. 
rS.The way is now prepared to consider a class of actions 
denominated Mutable. Here, at first thought, it would ap- 
pear that utiHty must be the ground of right. For example, 
the parent says to his child, " You must not strike your 
brother or sister ;" and the reason assigned for this prohibi- 
tion is, "because it will hurt." Now this prohibited act 
is composed of two elements. 1. The physical part, or the 
motion of the hand. 2. The volition or act of the Will, as 
willing such motion. The real meaning of the prohibition 
is, " You shall not will this motion of your hand." The rea- 
son of the prohibition, and consequently the ground of obliga- 
tion to comply, is the perceived connection between the 
motion and the well-being of the person exposed to its effects. 
Now here also it is demonstrably evident that utility is not 
the ground of the right. For the obligation to avoid willing 
arises from the perceived connection between the motion 
under consideration and its effects, and not from the per- 
ceived connection between willing and the motion itself. 
Because, when we suppose all such connection between will- 
ing and the motion destroyed, the obligation of the subject to 
to avoid wiUing such motion remains equally sacred. The 



174 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

connection between willing and its effects is accidental. The 
character of willing, however, remains the same, whether 
this connection exists or not. This principle is of universal 
application. Whenever we are bound lo will any end, we 
'affirm ourselves under obligation to will every means which 
we judge adapted to secure that end. In neither instance is 
our obligation to will affirmed in view of the perceived con- 
nection between our willing and the object willed ; but on 
account of what is intrinsic in the object itself 

1 here close this protracted discussion of the relations 
between the ideas of obligation, and of the useful. It is not 
intended to be denied that perceived tendency is a ground 
of obligation, but that it is the (^elusive ground. Less than 
I have said upon this subject||P could not have said, and 
satisfied my own mind. We will now proceed to the analysis 
of other ideas of Reason. 

IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 

Ideas defned. 
These ideas, like those of right and wrong, are opposites. 
The elements entering into one, are excluded from the other. 
The question is, What are the characteristics which separate 
and distinguish one of these ideas from the other.'' In an- 
swer, I would remark, that they represent two entirely dis- 
tinct and opposite relations, which may be supposed to ex- 
ist between an antecedent and its consequent. The first is 
this : The antecedent being given^ but one consequent is possible^ 
and that must arise. This relation we designate by the term 
necessity. The second relation is. The antecedent being given^ 
either of two or more consequents are possible., and consequent ij^ 
when any one does arise., either of the others mic^ht arise in its 
stead. 

These Ideas Universal and Necessary. 
These ideas have the characteristics of absolute universal- 
ity and necessity. Every antecedent and consequent, actual 
and conceivable, must fall under one or other of the relations 
which they represent. These ideas have nothing to do with 
the nature of antecedents and consequents. They simply 
and exclusively represent the relations existing between 
them. As representing such relations, they must bear the 
fundamental characteristics of all other ideas of Reason, inas 



REASON. 175 

much as no other relation, differing in kind from either of 
these, and not included in one or the other of them, is even 
conceiv^able. 

Idea of Liberty realized only in the Action of the Will, 
The relation between all antecedents and consequents, with 
the exception of motives and acts of Will, are conceived by 
the Intelligence as necessary. If the idea of Liberty is not 
realized in the action of the Will, it exists in the Intelligence 
without an object, or any element in any object correspond- 
ing to it, in the universe. 

Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas. 
No idea of Reason does or can exist in the Mind, without 
the appearance of some phenomena, through which it is 
revealed. The existence of the idea of Liberty can be ac- 
counted for only on the supposition of the appearance in Con- 
sciousness of the element of Liberty in the action of the Will. 
In all other phenomena of which the Mind is conscious, the 
element of necessity appears. The appearance of these phe- 
nomena, then, are the chronological antecedents of the ideas 
of Liberty and Necessity. 

IDEA OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 

Opinions of Philocophers. 
All men agree in pronouncing some objects beautiful, and 
some sublime, and others the opposite. By many philoso- 
phers, the beautiful and sublime are contemplated as simple 
emotions. vSome suppose, that all objects are to the Mind 
originally alike in this respect, that they are unadapted 
to awaken any such emotions in the Mind, and that these 
feelings come to be connected with particular objects by ac- 
cidental association. Pleasing emotions are from some (fause 
awakened in the mind. While in this state, we perceive, we 
will suppose, a rose. These emotions are thus associated with 
that object, so that when it is perceived again, they re-appear. 
Hence, not because the rose is in itself more beautiful than 
any other object, but on account of the feelino;s thus associat- 
ed with it, it is ever after regarded as beautiful. Now to 
this theory there exists this insuperable objection. Acciden- 
tal association can never account for the absolute universality 
of judgment which exists among mankind, in respect to par- 



176 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ticular objects. Why, for example, do all the world agree in 
in pronouncing the rose and lily more beautiful than the 
poppy or sun-flower ? Accidents never produce perfect uni- 
formity. 

Others suppose, that there are in the mind ideas of Reason 
represented by the terms beautiful and sublime, and that ob- 
jects are referred to one or the other, as they present corres- 
ponding characteristics. I will now present certain consider- 
ations designed to show, that this last is the true concep- 
tion. 

Considerations indicating the existence in the Mind of Ideas 
of Jteason, designated by the terms Beautiful and Sublime. 

One fact which has a very important bearing upon this 
question, strikes the mind at first view. It is this : No hu- 
man form or countenance is regarded by any person as per- 
fect. How can this fact be accounted for, except on the sup- 
position, that every such judgment is based upon a compari- 
son of the external object, with an idea more perfect, exist- 
ing in the mind itself ? 

Again, the ancient sculptors and painters, when they at- 
tempted to give to the world, what all men would alike re- 
gard as the forms of perfect beauty, copied after no one liv- 
ing model ; but took from all the forms of beauty in the 
world around them, those parts which were most beautiful, 
and from these combined new forms more beautiful than any 
realities actually existing. Does not this show, that they 
were endeavoring to realize, not the forms of beauty actually 
existing in the universe around them, but an idea in their 
own minds more perfect than these forms ? 

With this supposition also, and with this only, consists the 
fact, that the* pleasure derived from the contemplation of 
certain forms of beauty is permanent, and becomes more in- 
tense^^the more intimate and protracted our acquaintance with 
them ; while the pleasure derived from the contemplation 
of other forms ceases on a protracted and intimate acquaint- 
ance. The reason of this obviously is, that the first-mention- 
ed forms correspond very nearly, in all their parts, to the 
ideal in the mind. An intimate acquaintance with the others, 
however, gives us a knowledge of their defects, and in time 
destroys the pleasure which we felt when those defects were 
not perceived. 

I will present one other consideration bearing upon the 



REASON. 177 

subject, which I regard as perfectly decisive. The particu- 
lar elements which mark objects as beautiful or sublime, do 
in fact correspond with fundamental ideas. In respect to the 
sublime, all agree in fixing upon the Infinite as the chief 
source of emotions of sublimity. In finite objects one ele- 
ment only is correlated to these emotions, that of vastness. 

The characteristics of the beautiful are determinate form, 
regularity, uniformity, and variety. A waving, instead of a 
crooked line, a line realizing the ideas of uniformity and va- 
riety, has universally been fixed upon, as the line of beauty 
and grace. Now that which proceeds according to funda- 
mental ideas, must be itself the rejfresentative of such ideas. 

Objection to the Universality of these Ideas. 
An objection to the principle above elucidated, to wit, 
the different standards of beauty adopted by different nations, 
and by the same nations, at different periods, has sometimes 
been adduced. In reply, the following considerations are 
presented as deserving special attention : 

1. It may be questioned whether the savage when he 
paints and and tattoes his form, and the civilized person when 
he adorns his with the ornaments of civilized society, are 
endeavoring to realize the same idea. The one may be 
aiming to realize the idea of the beautiful, and the other 
(the savage), that of the terrible. The same holds true of 
architecture. The prominent idea in the Grecian style is the 
beautiful. That in the Gothic is the grand, the solemn, the 
sublime. The former and the latter then, had not different 
standards of beauty. They were aiming to realize different 
ideas. 

2. While the idea may exist alike in all minds, the ideal, 
that is, Xhefonn in which the idea shall be embodied, may exist 
in different minds, and among mankind at different periods, in 
different development. Consequently the forms in which 
they will embody the idea will be various. 

3. In contemplating particular forms of beauty, in which 
many defects of course exist along with the beautiful, these 
may be mistaken for the particular features which are the 
source of the pleasurable emotions felt under these circum- 
stances. These defects then v/ill be copied instead of the 
actual beauties. 

4. But in the midst of all this apparent variety, there is a 
more general agreement than is commonly supposed ; an 



178 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

agreement that is fundamental to the inquiry before us. In- 
troduce men of all ages, and of every nation into the same 
family, and ask them which of the children in that particular 
family is the most beautiful, and you will find but little di- 
versity in their judgments, and no diversity which is not 
perfectly consistent with the supposition of a common ideal 
in their minds, while the striking coincidence in their judg- 
ments can be explained on no other supposition. 

5. There are actual forms of beauty, in respect to which 
all men do agree. The most perfect specimens of ancient 
sculpture and painting may be adduced as an illustration. 
Also forms of beauty in the w^orld around us ; as the rose 
and the lily. Such circumstances we should find it difficult 
to explain on any other supposition than the one before us. 

Chronological Antecedent of these Ideas. 
The condition of the development of the idea of beauty and 
of sublimity in the mind, is the perception of the elements of 
the beautiful and sublime in some external object. In the di- 
vine mind, these ideas, among others, existed eternally as the 
prototypes after which creation w^as formed and moulded. The 
human Intelligence is so constituted, that in the presence of 
objects, in the conformation of which the divine idea is more 
or less nearly realized, the same idea is awakened in the mind 
of man. This idea then becomes the standard by w hich the 
external object is characterized as beautiful, grand, or 
subhme. 

Illustration from Covsin. 
Cousin thus beautifully explains the origin of the idea of 
beauty in the mind : " The idea of the beautiful is equally 
inherent in the mind of man, as that of the just and the good. 
Interrogate yourselves, when a vast and tranquil sea, when 
mountains of harmonious proportions, when the manly or 
graceful forms of men or women, are present to your view, or 
some trait of heroic devotion, to your recollection. Once 
impressed with the idea of the beautiful, man seizes, disen- 
gages, extends, develops and purifies it in his thought, and by 
the assistance of this idea, which external objects have sug- 
gested to him, he re-examines these same objects, and finds 
them, inferior to the idea which they themselves have sug- 
gested." 



179 



Explanatory Remarks. 
The remarks above made have directly respected the 
beautiful and sublime, as they are embodied in external form. 
By this I would not be understood as implying that nothing 
else is beautiful or sublime, or that this is their chief source. 
There are beauty and sublimity in thought, and if possible, 
higher still in action. 

IDEA OF HARMONY. 

The remarks and illustrations above presented, pertaining 
to the ideas of the beautiful and subhme, are equally applica- 
ble to that of harmony. The ear tryeth sounds, as the eye 
doth form and color. In harmony words and sounds are ar- 
ranged according to fundamental ideas, just as other elements 
are in the beautiful and sublime. That this is the true ex- 
plication of the subject will appear, I think, from the follow- 
ing considerations : 

1. When highly excited by musical performances, those 
who attentively watch the operations of their own minds, 
cannot fail to notice, that under such circumstances they uni- 
formly conceive of the same pieces as performed infinitely 
better ; and that it is this conception which constitutes the 
main source of delight. 

2. Persons in whose minds the principle of harmony is 
most fully developed, enjoy an exquisite piece of music quite 
as highly, when reading it alone, in the absence of all musical 
sounds, as when hearing it performed by the best trained 
choir, clearly showing that the idea in the mind far surpasses 
realities without. 

3. Skilful performers on the organ or piano, who have lost 
the faculty of hearing, enjoy these instruments no less than 
before. 1 recollect to have read of a celebrated musician in 
Germany, who in his old age lost his hearing entirely. Yet, 
as his fingers would run over the kpys of his piano, the 
instrument used being (a fact unknown to him) totally desti- 
tute of power to produce any sound whatever, he would rise 
in his feelings to perfect ecstasy of delight. In his own mind 
there was harmony deep and profound. It w^as harmony in 
idea. 

4. The principles of harmony are all found to be reducible 
to mathematical formulas. These principles are not deduced, 



180 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in the first instance, from observation, irrespective of funda- 
mental ideas. Such ideas must first be developed, before the 
principles of harmony can be understood. 

REFLECTIONS. 

Two reflections suggest themselves from the above analysis. 

Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas. 
The first is, that a profound knowledge of mind clearly 
shows that our nature is constituted according to absolute 
principles of pure science, or of fundamental ideas of Reason. 
Nothing, at first thought, would appear to be at a further 
remove from the principles of pure science, especially of the 
pure mathematics, than the laws of harmony. Yet, when 
we have developed the laws of proportion in the pure mathe- 
matics, we find that we have developed those principles 
without the knowledge of which the laws of harmony could 
not be understood. The same results are equally applicable 
to external existences. In the study of pure science we 
have not departed from nature. We are only in the depths 
of our own Reason, developing the forms and laws to which 
nature, material and mental, is conformed. We are only 
developing those forms and principles which enable us to 
understand the universe as it is. The more deep and pro- 
found our descent into the depths of pure science, the more 
profound and perfect is our knowledge of nature. What do 
such facts indicate in respect to the character of the Author 
of our being ? He must be a pure Intelligence, in whose mind 
absolute science pre-existed as the forms and laws after which 
all things, visible and invisible, are constituted. Hence, when 
the principles of the same science are developed in our own 
minds, we are then able to comprehend our own nature, and 
the constitution of things around us. Because we are from 
our nature scientific beings, for this reason alone it is that we 
can understand the works of God. Thus it is that 

" Trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God who is our home." 

How little is the student accustomed to reflect that in the 
study of the laws and principles of the triangle, the square, 
the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and hyperbola, together 
with the science of number and proportion, he is developing 



REASON. 181 

Ija liis own mind, those forms and principles by which alone 
the wonders of astronomy, and the laws of attraction which 
bind the universe of m.atter in harmony together, &c., can 
be understood and explained by him. In our descent into 
the deep profound of the pure and abstract sciences, we find 
ourselves, whenever we come to recognize our position in 
the deep profound of nature, and of the infinite Intelligence 
of Nature's God, 

Foetrij defined. 
We are now prepared for a definition of poetry, properly 
so called. A mere rythmical jingle of words at the end of 
lines of a given length, does not constitute poetry, according 
to the true signification of the term. Nor have I been satis- 
fied with the popular definitions of the subject which I have 
met with. I will present, as an example, that given by 
Coleridge ; *' A poem is that species of composition which 
is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immedi- 
ate object pleasure, not truth ; and from all other species 
(having this object in common with it) it is discriminated by 
proposing to itself such delight from the whole as is compati- 
ble with a distinct gratification from each component part." 
The great objection to this definition is, that many prose, as 
well as poetical compositions, would fall under it. I will 
BOW propose another and a different definition. Poetry, or 
more properly, perhaps, a poem, is the creations of the Ima- 
gination embodied in language arranged in conformity to the 
idea of harmony. I leave the definition to speak for itself. 

IDEA OF TRUTH. 

Idea defined. 
Another fundamental idea of Reason — an idea which con- 
trols the Intelligence in all its movements — is the idea of 
truth. The term Truth may be contemplated objectively and 
subjectively. Objectively, it comprehends and expresses all 
realities, whatever they may be. Subjectively, it designates 
an intellectual conception in harmony with the object of the 
conception. 

Chronological Antecedent of this Idea. 
The chronological antecedent of this idea, or the condition 
of its development by the Reason, is the perception of phe- 



182 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY." 

nomena, and the consequent development of the idea of sub- 
stance. Then the great question, " What is truth ?" becomes 
the leading idea in the Intelligence. 

IDEA OF LAW. 

Citations from Coleridge. 

I shall introduce what I have to say upon this subject by 
a few passages from the writings of Coleridge : 

" What is it which first strikes us, and strikes us at once, 
in a man of education, and which, among educated men, so 
instantly distinguishes the man of superior mind, that (as was 
observed with eminent propriety of the late Edmund Burke) 
' we cannot stand under the same archway during a shower 
of rain without finding him out V Not the weight or novelty 
of his remarks ; not any unusual interest of facts communi- 
cated by him ; for we may suppose both the one and the 
other precluded by the shortness of our intercourse, and the 
triviality of the subjects. The difference will be impressed 
and felt, though the conversation should be confined to the 
state of the weather or the pavement. Still less will it arise 
from any pecuharity in his wards and phrases." * * * 
" There remains but one other point of distinction possible ; 
and this must be, and in fact is, the true cause of the impres- 
sion made on us. It is the unpremeditated, and evidently 
habitual arrangement of his w^ords, grounded on the habit of 
foreseeing, in each integral part, or (more plainly) in every 
sentence, the whole that he then intends to communicate. 
However irregular and desultory his talk, there is method in 
the fragments. 

" Listen, on the other hand, to an ignorant man, though 
perhaps shrewd and able in his particular calling, whether he 
be describing or relating. We immediately perceive that 
his Memory alone is called into action ; and that the objects 
and events recur in the narration in the same order, and with 
the same accompaniments, however accidental or imperti- 
nent, as they had first occurred to the narrator." In other 
words, there is here an almost entire absence of method, or 
law. Again : 

" Method becomes natural to the Mind which has been 
accustomed to contemplate not things only, or for their own 
sake alone, but likewise and chiefly the relations of things, 
either their relations to each other, or to the observer, or to 



REASON. 183 

the state and apprehension of the hearers. To enumerate 
and analyze these relations, with the conditions under which 
alone they are discoverable, is to teach the science of 
Method." He then, in a subsequent essay, observe-s that 
there are two kinds of relation in which objects of Mind 
may be contemplated, to wit, that of Law and that of 
Theory. The nature of these two relations will be illustrat- 
ed and distinguished as we proceed. 

CoIendge''s Definition of Law. 

" The first is that of Law, which, in its absolute perfec- 
tion, is conceivable only of the Supreme Being, whose crea- 
tive idea not onl}^ appoints to each thing its position., but in 
that position, and in consequence of that position, gives it 
its qualities, yea, it gives its very existence, as that particular 
thing. Yet in whatever science the relation of the })arts to 
each other and to the whole, is predetermined by a truth 
originating in the Mind., and not abstracted or generalized 
from observation of the parts, there we affirm the presence 
of a law.) if we are speaking of the physical sciences, as of 
Astronomy, for instance ; or the presence of fundamental 
ideas., if our discourse be upon those sciences, the truths of 
which, as truths absolute, not merely may have an inde- 
pendent origin in the Mind, but continue to exist in and for 
the Mind alone. Such, for instance, is Geometry," &c. 

To set the above definition in a clear and distinct light, take 
the following illustration. Let us suppose a body of men, 
say one hundred thousand in number, assembled together, 
all perfectly armed and equipped with all the implements of 
war, but without officers, without discipline, without order. 
Here is a congregated mass of powers, but the absence of 
law. In oth-r words, these powers act in conformity with 
no rule. What is the condition of this army ? It is power- 
less, except for self-destruction, and that in exact proportion 
to its numbers. Contemplate now this army, officered, dis- 
ciplined, and all brought into perfect order under some ex- 
perienced commander. You have the same powers as for- 
merly, but now acting in conformity wnth certain rules or 
laws. The army now becomes powerful, not for self-de- 
struction, but for attack and defence. But what is the law 
which these powers obey, or in conformity with which they 
act .'' It is an idea in the mind of the commander. It is 
this idea which gives to each part of this army its particular 



184 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its 
qualities, its very existence, as that particular part. The 
army receives its existence and qualities as that particular 
army from the law or idea which it obeys, or in conformity 
with which it acts. The same remarks apply to the dis- 
course of the educated and uneducated, as referred to above. 

Ypu will now readily apprehend the meaning of the re- 
mark of Coleridge : " Law in its absolute perfection is con- 
ceivable only of the Supreme Being, whose creative idea 
not only appoints to each thing its position^ but in that posi- 
tion, and in consequence of that position, gives it its quali- 
ties, yea, it gives its a ery existence, as ihat particular 
thing." The meaning, as far certainly as it is correct, is this : 
An idea in the mind of God appoints to every power in 
nature its particular position, and in consequence of that 
position, gives it its qualities, its very existence, as that par- 
ticular thing. 

In illustration, I would remark, that if we conceive of the 
powers of nature, as existing each one by itself alone, or as 
existing in different relations to each other from that which 
they now sustain, none of the. peculiar qualities which they 
now exhibit would appear. All the phenomena of vegeta- 
tion, for example, result from the peculiar arrangement ot the 
powers of the material creation relatively to each other. 
Change this arrangement, and nothing but barrenness and 
universal desolation would appear. Each particular parti- 
cle, therefore, receives its qualities, yea, its very existence, 
as the particular thing manifested to us, in consequence of 
its position relatively to surrounding particles. Everything 
we behold or contemplate is to us what it is, in consequence 
of its existence, position, and consequent action in harmony 
with an idea in the infinite Intelligence. . 

Law^ subjective and objective. 
Law, then, may be contemplated in two points of light, 
subjective and objective. In the first sense, it is an idea, in 
which powers are contemplated as arranged relatively to each 
other, so that their mutual action and redaction shall produce 
results in correspondence to a certain end conceived of, and 
chosen by the mind. In the second sense, it is the exist- 
ence, arrangement, and consequent action of these powers, 
in harmony with that idea. 



185 



Conclusion from the above. 
We come to this conclusion : that whenever powers act 
in conformity with law, they are acting in obedience to some 
idea existing in some intelligent mind. To illustrate this, 
let us suppose an army of one hundred thousand men all 
dressed and equipped alike, arranged in a given order, and 
all performing perfectly harmonious motions and evolutions. 
You here perceive the presence and all-pervading influence 
of law. Is it possible to conceive all this, and not suppose 
this law to be some idea in some intelligent mind — a mind 
that comprehends all the parts, and assigns to each part its 
position, &c..? If this could not be supposed of intelligent 
powers, much less could we suppose a similar action of ne- 
cessary and unintelligent ones. The grand problem, then, the 
solution of which is the final object and distinctive character 
of philosophy, when once solved, leads the mind to the di- 
rect apprehension and contemplation of the Infinite, of God, 
whose creative idea is the law of all existences. The pro- 
blem referred to is this : " For all that exists conditionally 
(i. e. the existence of which is inconceivable except under 
the condition of its dependency on some other as its ante- 
cedent) to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, 
and thereby to reduce the aggregate of human knowledge 
to a system." Now, this ground can be found in nothing 
but in the mind of God. 

Chronological Antecedent to this Idea. 
As Mind wakes into conscious existence, and contem- 
plates the action of the powers of nature within and around 
it, it at once perceives all things existing and acting as a 
means to an end. Everywhere diversity blended with har- 
mony, presents itself. Now, this presentation of the powers 
of nature is the chronological antecedent of the idea of 
Law in the Reason. Hence the great inquiry ever after 
imposed upon the InteUigence, to wit : What are the laws in 
conformity to which they act ? In this inquiry, the Intelli- 
gence begins to " feel after " the Infinite, and it never rests 
until it finds itself in the presence of" that creative idea, which 
appoints to each thing its position.^ and in consequence of that 
position, gives it its qualities, yea, its very existence as that 
particular thing." 



186 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Apparent Mistake in respect to Law. 
Philosophers, as well as others, often appear at least to 
speak on this subject, as if, in their judgment, the powers of 
nature, with their present arrangement, on the one hand, 
existed, and Law on the other, as a separate something con- 
trolling their action. Coleridge maintains, that law (and by 
law, he means thought), is the only reality. Now, it should 
be borne in mind, that when we depart from ideas, nothing 
relative to the powers of nature exists, but the powers ar- 
ranged in such a manner, that their mutual action and re- 
action shall produce results in harmony with such ideas. 
Look, as an illustration, at the steamboat. There is not 
here powers arranged in a given order, and then a something 
else, which controls their action. All the results we witness 
arise from the nature, and the peculiar arrangement of the 
powers here combined. So in all other instances. 

Theory and Law distinguished. 

The term theory is used in two senses somewhat different. 
The first meaning may be illustrated by a reference to what 
is denominated the Theory and Practice of Medicine. The 
end for which medicinal substances are used in cases of dis- 
ease is the controlling of the disease, and its consequent re- 
moval. Now, when a certain disease appears, a particular 
course is adopted. The results are marked down. That 
course which, in given circumstances, is attended with the 
most favorable results, is set down as the course to be pur- 
sued in the treatment of this disease. The course becomes 
a Theory, to which m.edical practice is conformed. Accord- 
ing to this usage, the term Theory supposes certain powers 
arranged under some one point of view, and certain prin- 
ciples of action adopted for the purpose of controlling these 
powers. 

According to another usage, Theory means a certain hypo- 
thesis which has been adopted for the explanation of a given 
class of facts ; an hypothesis, in conformity to which, it is 
supposed, the facts maybe explained. In respect to a given 
class of facts, it frequently happens that all admit of an 
equally ready explanation, on either of two or more distinct 
and opposite hypotheses, and hence a corresponding number 
of Theories are adopted for their explanation. Thus we 
have two distinct and opposite Theories of electricity, all the 



REASON. IS7 

facts presented being equally explicable in conformity to 
each. 

Now Law, as distinguished from Theory, is an hypothesis 
which sustains to a given number of facts the relation of a logi- 
cal antecedent. The facts being given, the hypothesis must 
be assumed as the ground of their explanation. The facts 
must not only be explicable by the hypothesis, but affirmed 
by it, in such a form as to contradict every other hypo- 
thesis which can be adduced for their explanation. This 
condition we find realized in the facts adduced by Newton, 
in demonstration of the law of attraction. 

Nature of Proof . 
One thought suggested by the preceding analysis demands 
special attention — the nature of proof No proposition is, 
properly speaking, proven, till facts or arguments are adduced, 
which not only .affirm its truth, but contradict every opposite 
proposition. How often is this fundamental law of evidence 
overlooked and disregarded in almost every department of 
human investigation. In Theology, for example, how often 
is an hypothesis denominated a doctrine, which merely con- 
sists with a given class of passages of Holy Writ, assumed 
as absolutely affirmed by these passages, when, in reality, 
they equally consist with the contradictory hypothesis. Let 
it ever be borne in mind, that no passage or passages of Scrip- 
ture prove any one doctrine which do not contradict every 
opposite doctrine. No facts affirm any one hypothesis which 
do not equally contradict every contradictory hypothesis. 

Fundamental and superficial Thinkers, 
Another suggestion which presents itself is this— the dif- 
ference between superficial and fundamental thinkers. The 
former dwell only upon the surface of subjects, and having 
there found certain hypotheses which consist with mere ex- 
terior facts, they gravely conclude that they " have heard 
the conclusion of the whole matter." They have discover- 
ed all that can be known, and " wisdom will die with them." 
The latter class, on the other hand, retire into the interior of 
subjects, and taking their position upon some great central 
facts, announce the existence and operations of universal 
laws, sustaining to exterior facts the relation of logical ante- 
cedents, and explaining them all. The reason why the po- 
sitions assumed by such men are uniformly so impregnable 



188 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHi". 

is, that the error of every hypothesis, in opposition to that 
which they have assumed, as well as the truth of their own, 
becomes visible at once, in the light of the great central facts 
on which they have taken their stand, 

THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEA. 

The philosophic idea realized, or objectively considered, 
is the reduction of phenomena to fundamental ideas, the re- 
duction of the sum of human knowledge to' a system, the 
finding, amid the infinity of facts which are floating in the 
universe around us, some great central fundamental facts or 
laws, which are affirmed by all others, and explain them 
all. 

This idea subjectively considered is a conception lying 
down in the depths of the Reason, that all substances exist 
and act in harmony with such ideas. Hence the questions 
perpetually imposed upon the Understanding and Judgment, 
in all departments of human research ; to wit, what are the 
laws which explain the facts here presented .'' Science is 
everywhere now on the high road tending to the realiza- 
tion of this great idea. Happy the eyes that shall see it rea- 
lized. 

Chronological Antecedents of this Idea. 

The chronological antecedents of this idea are the same 
as those which sustain a similar relation to that of law. In- 
deed this idea is but one form in which the idea of law man- 
ifests itself. 

Other ideas of Reason will be considered, when we speak 
of matter and spirit, the soul, God, &c. 

FIRST TRUTHS, OR NECESSARY PRINCIPLES OF REASON, AS 
DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTINGENT PRINCIPLES. 

Contingent and necessary Principles defined and distinguished. 

^' Contingent principles," in the language of Cousin, " are 
those which force belief, though without implying any con- 
tradiction in the denial of them, and which are not therefore 
necessary, but irresistible, natural beliefs, actual, primitive, 
and instinctive, such as the belief in the stability of the laws 
of nature, the perception of extension," &;c. 

A necessary truth or principle, on the other hand, is one 



REASON. 189 

which not only forces assent, but which is always attended 
with absolute conviction of its necessity, of the total impossi- 
bility of supposing the contrary ; such as the proposition, 
Every event must have a cause. The above distinction per- 
fectly corresponds with those made by Dr. Reid. " Truths," 
he observes, " which fall within the compass of human 
knowledge, whether they be self-evident, or deduced from 
those that are self-evident, may be reduced to two classes. 
They are either necessary or immutable truths, whose contra- 
ry is impossible ; or they are contingent and mutable, depend- 
ing upon some effect of Will or power, which had a begin- 
ning, and may have an end." 

That a cone is a third part of a cylinder of the same base, 
and the same altitude, is a necessary truth. It depends not 
upon the- will or powpr of any being. It is immutably true, 
and the contrary impossible. That the sun is the centre, 
about which the earth, and the other planets of our system, 
perform their revolutions, is a truth, but it is not a necessary 
truth. It depends upon the power and will of God. 

First Truths defined. 
First truths are those principles, whether contingent or 
necessary, which lie at the foundation of all science, of all 
reasoning. ^' They admit," says Dr. Reid, " of no other 
proof than the following : 1. All men do admit them, as a 
matter of fact, in all their reasoning. 2. All men, even 
those who deny their validity, act upon them. 3. If denied, 
the validity of all reasoning fails." 

Kind of Proof of which necessary Ideas or Principles admit. 
The above remarks of Dr. Reid are strictly applicable to 
contingent principles. Necessary ideas and principles, on the 
other hand, admit of a kind of proof, that, as far as my know- 
ledge extends, has escaped the notice of philosophers. All 
such ideas and principles sustain, as we have seen, to con- 
tingent phenomena and principles, the relation of logical an- 
tecedents, while the former sustain to the latter, the relation 
of chronological antecedents. Now, in addition to the kind 
of proof, adduced by Dr. Reid, necessary ideas and princi- 
ples admit of this also : We can designate the phenomena 
or principles to which they sustain the relation of logical 
antecedents. Thus we may prove the reality of time, by 
referring to successiouj of the reality of which every one is 
9* 



190 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

conscious. This is, in fact, the highest kind of proof of 
which any principle is susceptible. 

Statement illustrated by a Reference to the Idea of God. 

The idea of God is a first truth of Reason. In reference 
to the proof of the Divine existence, two errors, as it ap- 
pears to me, have been committed by philosophers and theo- 
logians. Some have affirmed, that this truth is wholly in- 
susceptible of any proof of any kind. Others have supposed 
that it admits of logical demonstration from given premises. 
jVow the truth pertaining to the subject lies between the two 
errors above named. The Divine existence admits of the 
same proof that other necessary ideas of Reason do ; that is, 
we may find the contingent phenomena or principles to which 
this great truth sustains the relation of logical antecedent. 
This, in common with the kind of proof common to all 
first truths, is the only kind of which it is susceptible ; 
and when philosophical and theological research takes this 
direction, we shall find the highest kind of demonstration of 
the Divine existence. But this subject will claim attention 
in a subsequent part of this Treatise. 

Idea and Frinciple of Reason distinguished. 

An idea of Reason is the pure conception of an object of 
Reason, irrespective of any other object ; as the idea of 
space, time, substance, cause, &c. 

A principle of R^son is the conception of the necessary 
relation of such objects to some other reality, as the princi- 
ples, Body supposes space, succession supposes time, phe- 
nomena suppose substances, and events causes. Here the 
relation existing between contingent and necessary ideas is 
affirmed. This is what is meant by a principle of Reason. 

Axioms^ Postulates.) and Definitions. 
An axiom is a first principle of Reason. Axioms which 
are employed in particular sciences do not belong to those 
sciences exclusively. On the other hand, they pertain to all 
sciences, and are only in the form in which they are pre- 
sented adapted to the particular science to be treated of. 
The axioms in Geometry, for example, The whole is greater 
than any of its parts, things equal to the same thing are equal 
to one another, &c., are not peculiar to Geometry, but are 
common to all sciences. The last named is the same thought 



REASON. 191 

expressed in a somewhat different form, as the axiom in 
logic, to wit. Where two terms agree with one and the same 
thing, they agree with one another. 

Postulates are assumed axiomatic principles of Reason, 
which pertain exclusively to the particular sciences to be 
treated of The postulate in Geometry, for exam.ple, that a 
straight line may be drawn between any two points in space, 
belongs exclusively to this and other cognate sciences. 

Definitions, scientifically considered, give the objects^ and 
the qualities of the objects to be investigated in the light of 
given axioms, and postulates. The conception, for example, 
of a straight line, a triangle, square, &c., of which the science 
of Geometry treats, are given by definition. 

These principles are applicable to all sciences whatever. 



IDEA OF SCIENCE, PURE AND MIXED. 

Idea of Science defined. 

The idea of Science, which of course is a pure conception 
of Reason, is knowledge reduced to fundamental ideas and 
principles ; or the properties and relations of objects.) systemati- 
cally evolved in the light of such ideas and principles. Thus 
in Geometry, we have the properties and relations of particu- 
lar objects systematically evolved in the light of axioms and 
postulates, which are, in reality, fundamental ideas of Rea- 
son. Whenever this end is accomplished, in reference to 
any phenomena, or objects, then we have the scientific idea 
realized. 

Pure Sciences. 
When the axioms, postulates, and definitions are all alike 
pure conceptions of Reason, and when the Judgment evolves 
the properties and relations of the objects of such definitions 
in the light of such axioms and postulates, then we have 
what are denominated pure sciences. Such is Geometry, 
and the mathematics generally. 

Mixed Sciences. 

When the axioms and postulates are ideas or principles of 

Reason, and when the definitions pertain to phenomena or 

objects contingent and relative, as in natural philosophy, and 

w^hen the Judgment evolves the relations and properties of 



192 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

such objects in the light of such ideas and postulates, then 
we have mixed sciences. 



FUNCTION OF REASON DENOMINATED CONSCIENCE. 

Conscience defined. 

Conscience is that function of Reason which pertains to 
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, of merit and de- 
merit, &c. It is a testifying function of Reason, pertaining 
to the relation which ought to exist between the action of 
the Will and the idea of right and wrong. 

General Remarks. 

1 . Conscience always commands us in the name of God. 
Her mandates are regarded as the voice of God speaking 
within us, and when disregarded, we always hold ourselves 
amenable to the Divine tribunal. Conscience in the heathen 
is not only a law, but a law of God ; and so it is regarded 
by them. 

2. As Conscience is the voice of God within us, it follows 
that it can* never, in its appropriate exercise, put right for 
wrong, and the opposite. In other words, no man acts con- 
scientiously when doino; wrong, nor in opposition to Con- 
science, when doing right. " Conscience," as Coleridge re- 
marks, " in the absence of direct inspiration, bears the same 
relation to the will of God, that a good chronometer does to 
the position of the sun in a cloudy day." 

Objection. 
In opposition to the principle above stated, it is very com- 
mon to refer to the contradictory standards of moral obliga- 
tion adopted by different nations, communities, and individu- 
als. The following considerations are deserving of special 
attention in reply to this objection : 

1. To suppose that the heathen, for example, in all their 
rites and ceremonies, are endeavoring to realize the idea of 
right, is as absurd, as to suppose that the savage is endeavor- 
ing to realize the idea of the beautiful, when he is tattooing 
his body. 

2. The Bible affirms that the heathen are actuated by 
fear and not by Conscience : " And deliver them who through 
fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage " 



REASON. 193 

3. The judgment that a thing is not wrong, is often mis- 
taken for the testimony of Conscience to its Tightness. 

4. When a reference is made to the intention, the only 
appropriate object of Conscience, we find a more universal 
agreement among men than is generally supposed, an agree- 
ment of such a nature as to demand the truth of the above 
proposition, while every shade of difference may be explain- 
ed in perfect consistency with it. 

Term Conscience as used hi the Scriptures. 
A good conscience, as the words are there used, is the 
testimony of the mind to the agreement of the Will, or moral 
action, with the moral law. An evil conscience is the oppo- 
site, the testimony of the mind to the fact of the disagree- 
ment of the action of the Will with that law. 

GENERAL REMARKS PERTAINliSTG TO REASON. 

Tlelation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties. 
The relation of Reason to other functions of the Intelligence 
may now be readily pointed out. Of the phenomena, or 
truths affirmed by those faculties, Reason gives the logical 
antecedents. This is its exclusive function. The Judgment, 
in all its operations, is exclusively analytic. It simply 
evolves what is embraced in the affirmations of the other 
faculties. Reason is synthethic. It always adds to the 
affirmation of the other faculties something not embraced in 
the affirmation. The element added, however, always sus- 
tains to that to which it is added a fixed relation, that of 
logical antecedent. Thus when Sense or Conscience affirms 
phenomena, Reason adds to the affirmation an element not 
embraced in it, that of Substance, an element, however, 
sustaining to the affirmation a fixed relation, that of logical 
antecedent. 

Through Reason Man is a religious Being. 
As possessed of Reason alone is man a religious being. 
Through this aw^ful power he attains to a knowledge of the 
soul, of moral obligations and retributions, of immortality, of 
God, and enters into inter-communion with the Infinite and 
Eternal One. 

Reason common to all Men. 
Reason also exists in all men, and equally in all who pes- 



194 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sess it at all. This is evident from the fact that if an indi- 
vidual knows a truth of Reason at all, he does and must 
know it absolutely. There are no degrees in such knowledge. 
The difference, and only difference, between men lies in their 
perceptive and reflective faculties. Newton differed from 
other men not because he knew any more absolutely than 
they that events suppose a cause, that things equal to the 
same things are equal to one another, &c., but because he 
possessed powers of perception and reflection which enabled 
him to see (what they could not discover) the qualities 
involved in such truths. 

Error of Coleridge. 
Reason is not, as Coleridge maintains, an " organ identical 
with its appropriate objects." " Thus God, the soul, eternal 
truth," he adds, " are not the objects of the Reason, but they 
are the Reason itself." Space and duration he would admit 
are the objects of the Reason, but are they Reason itself.^ 
If God and the soul are the Reason, then they are identical, 
and Pantheism is eternal truth. Philosophers, as well as 
others, are accustomed to take many things for granted which 
need to be proved. We must, if we are not willing to be 
greatly misled, be careful what assumptions we permit them 
to make. Otherwise we may find ourselves under the direc- 
tion of principles which may lead us we know not whither. 

Paralogism of Cousin. 

In order to do justice to this great philosopher, I must 
make quite a lengthy quotation from him, on the important 
point next to be considered. The extract is taken from his 
remarks on enthusiasm, and commences with a quotation 
from Locke. 

" ' Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and 
needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest 
of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all 
those maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every 
man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be 
true as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding. 
In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use 
of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are 
known by a superior and higher degree of evidence ; and 
such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think 
that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect 



SEASON. 195 

shall have in a future state, of thousands of things, which 
now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our 
short-sighted Reason having got some glimpse of, we, in the 
dark, grope after.' I accept this statement, let it be consis- 
tent or not with the general system of Locke. 1 hold like- 
wise that the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive 
knowledge. This knowledge, in many cases, for example, 
in regard to time^ space, personal identity, the infinite, all 
substantial existences, as also, the good and the beautiful, 
has, you know, this peculiarity, that it is not grounded upon 
the Senses nor upon the Consciousness, but upon the Reason, 
which, without the intervention of any reasoning, attains its 
objects and conceives them with certainty. Now, it is an 
attribute inherent in the Reason to believe in itself: and from 
hence comes faith. If, then, Intuitive Reason is above 
Inductive and Demonstrative Reason, the faith of Reason in 
itself in intuition, is purer and more elevated tban in induc- 
tion and demonstration. Recollect, likewise, that the truths 
intuitively discovered by Reason are not arbitrary, but neces- 
sary ; that they are not relative, but absolute. The authority 
of Reason is absolute : it is then a characteristic of the faith 
attached to Reason, like Reason absolute. These are the 
admirable characteristics of Reason, and of the faith of Rea- 
son in itself. 

" This is not all. When we come to interrogate Reason 
about itself, to inquire into its own principle, and the source 
of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are 
forced to recognize that this Reason is not ours, not consti- 
tuted by us. It is not in our power ; it is not in the power 
of our Will to cause the Reason to give us such or such a 
truth, or not to give us them. Independent of our will. 
Reason intervenes, and, when certain conditions are fulfilled, 
gives us, I might say imposes upon us, these truths. The 
Reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not in our- 
selves, and in no way can it be confounded with our person- 
ality. Reason is impersonal. Whence, then, comes this 
wonderful guest within us, and what is the principle of this 
Reason which enlightens us, without belonging to us .' This 
principle is God, the first and the last of everything. Now, 
when the faith of Reason in itself is attached to its principle, 
when it knows that it comes from God, it increases not 
merely in degree, but in nature, by as much, so to say, as 
the eternal substance is superior to the finite substance in 



196 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHy. 

which it makes its appearance. Thus comes a redoubled 
faith in the truths revealed by the Supreme Reason in the 
shadows of time, and in the limitations of our weakness. 

" See, then_, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its 
principle. Now this mode or state of Reason which hears 
itself, and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with 
the particular and extraordinary characteristics connected 
with it, is what is called Enthusiasm. The word sufficiently 
explains the thing: Enthusiasm [0eo? ev rifiivj is the spirit 
of God within us ; it is immediate intuition, opposed to in- 
duction and demonstration ; it is the primitive spontaneity 
opposed to the ulterior development of reflection ; it is the 
apperception of the highest truths by Reason in its greatest 
independence both of the senses and of our personality. En- 
thusiasm in its highest degree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs 
only to particular individuals, and to them only in particular 
circumstances ; but in its lowest degree, Enthusiasm is as 
much a fact as any thing else, a fact sufficiently common, 
pertaining not to any particular theory, or individual, or 
epoch, but to human nature, in all men, in all conditions, and 
almost at every hour. It is Enthusiasm which produces 
spontaneous convictions and resolutions, in little as in great, 
in the hero, and in the feeblest woman. Enthusiasm is the 
poetic spirit in everything ; and the poetic spirit, thanks to 
God, does not belong exclusively to poets. It has been given 
to all men in some degree, more or less pure, more or less 
elevated 5 it appears above all, in particular men, and in 
particular moments of the life of such men, who are the 
poets by eminence. It is Enthusiasm, likewise, which 
produces religions, for every religion supposes two things : 

1. That the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths; 

2. That it proclaims them in the name of God himself who 
reveals them to it." 

It requires a great philosopher to conceive of a great absurd- 
ity, and to give a professed demonstration of that absurdity 
by a great paralogism. In all these respects, I give it as my 
sober judgment, that the above passage is almost unequalled 
among the absurdities and paralogisms of modern times. 
What are the conclusions to which we are conducted in this 
strange rhapsody.? They are the following : 1. Reason is 
in us, but belongs not to us. It constitutes no part of our 
personality. It is not a faculty of the soul, like the Under- 
standing and Judgment, but is a light in the soul. 2. Reason 



REASON. 197 

is God, " the spirit of God within us." 3. In its own eyes 
Reason is God, " is divine in its principle." 

What are the arguments by which these dogmas are affirm- 
ed to be proven ? The following : 

1. Knowledge by Reason is " intuitive knowledge." 
" Without the intervention of any reasoning, it attains its ob- 
jects and conceives them with certainty." This peculiarity, 
I remark. Reason possesses only in common with Sense and 
Consciousness, with this advantage on their part, that intui- 
tions through these faculties are prior, in the order of time, 
to any through Reason. If for such a consideration Reason 
is to be deified, and deemed no part of ourselves, much more 
should Sense and Consciousness. 

2. " Truths intuitively discovered by Reason, are not arbi- 
trary, but necessary ; they are not relative, but absolute." 
Now what a leap in logic is that, to go from such a 
premise to the conclusion, that therefore Reason is God, 
" the spirit of God in us," and no part of ourselves. Cousin 
himself, in another place, has fully demonstrated the fallacy 
of his own conclusions here. He has laid it down as a fun- 
damental principle in mental philosophy, that the fact of 
knowledge of any kind in man, implies in him corresponding 
powers of knowledge. He himself affirms, that we do know 
by direct intuition, truths, absolute, universal, and necessary. 
The knowledge of such truths belongs to us, just as much as 
knowledge of any other kind, and implies in us correspond- 
ing powers. If we had not the power to know such truths, 
the knowledge of them would, never belong to us as phe- 
nomena of our Intelligence. Now the faculty by which, 
when certain conditions are fulfilled, we know such truths, 
is Reason, a faculty which belongs as much to us as any 
other functions of our Intelligence, and is no more imper- 
sonal than any of them. 

4. His fourth and last argument is this, " Reason is not 
constituted by us. It is not in our power ; it is not in the 
power of our Will to cause Reason to give us such or such 
a truth, or not to give us them," &c. In view of such a 
consideration, hear the philosopher exclaim, " See, then. 
Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its principle." The 
man that, in such a premise, can see any such conclusion, 
must throw away his Reason, and see without his eyes. 
Reason, instead of deifying itself, and then falling upon its 
knees to worship its own image, exclaims. 



198 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY 

" for my single self, 
I had as lief not be, as live to be in awe 
Of such a thing as I myself" 

No, Reason is too noble, too truthful a faculty to perform 
such an act of self-apotheosis. Reason stands in -awe of 
nothing but the Infinite, which it apprehends, without ever 
confounding itself with that which it knows, adores, and 
worships. 

He also whom Reason reveals, has said, " Thou shalt 
have no other gods before me." The man who deifies Rea- 
son, and gets upon his knees before that, is, in " Reason's 
eye," as w^ell as in the light of inspiration, a heathen, as 
much as the man who worships devils. 

In the paragraph above cited, Cousin himself furnishes us 
wnth a full demonstration of the fallacy ©f all his reasonings 
here. Reason, he says, " when certain conditions are ful- 
filled^ gives us — I may sa}^, imposes upon us — those truths." 
Now if Reason was really divine, God in us, knowledge 
through Reason would be unconditioned, as it is in God. 
Must the Divine Intelligence, as is true with ours, first per- 
ceive phenomena, before the Divine Reason can apprehend 
the idea of substance, space, time, &c. i Certainly not. We 
have Reason just as we have Free Will, because " we are 
made in the image of God." Yet Reason in us is not God, 
any more than Free Will is. Reason, too, has a sphere in 
the human Intelligence — a sphere which marks it as a func- 
tion of that Intelligence, just as much as any other faculty, 
and as impersonal in no other sense than all other intellec- 
tual functions are. 

Transcendentalism . 
Every one is surprised that, because, when certain intel- 
lectual faculties have given, by direct intuition, phenomena, 
another faculty should then give us the logical antecedents 
of such phenomena, philosophers should hence conclude, that 
this last faculty is God — is no part of our Intelligence, but 
the "spirit of God in us." Yet upon just such paralogisms 
is the entire fabric of German Transcendental Pantheism 
founded. When philosophers discover any power in nature 
before unrecognized, they are very apt to worship it as a 
God. Kant developed Reason as a function of the Intelli- 
gence — a function which philosophers had before failed to 
recognize. Germany at once raised the cry, " The gods 



REASON. 199 

have come down to us." " Great is Reason." " God in 
us." There is no God but Reason, and Reason is everything. 
Everything, therefore, is God. Sorry am I to record the 
fact, that the great high priest of philosopiiy in France 
" has brought oxen and garlands " to do sacrifice to this new 
divinity. 

Reason^ in what sense impersonal. 
From what has been said above, one thing is perfectly evi- 
dent, to wit, in Reason we are impersonal in the same and 
in no other sense, than we are in the exercise of all other 
intellectual faculties. What Cousin has said in respect to 
the action of Reason being independent of our Wills, is 
equally applicable to every intellectual faculty. " It is not 
in the power of our Will," he sa3's, " to cause Reason to 
give us such or such a truth, or not to give us them." Nor 
is it in the power of our Will to cause Sense or Conscious- 
ness to give us such or such phenomena, or the Understand- 
ing or Judgment to give such or such notions or affirmations, 
or not to give them, when certain conditions are fulfilled. In 
one department of the Intelligence, we are impersonal in the 
same sense, and for the same reason, that we are in another. 

Reason^ in what sense identical in all Men. 
From the fact that, in all men. Reason gives precisely the 
same truths, it has been inferred that Reason does not exist 
subjectively in us, as other intellectual faculties do. It is like 
the atmosphere, it is said, which is in the lungs of all, but 
subjective to none. So Reason is a light in all, but a func- 
tion of the Intelligence of none. Now it by no means follows 
from the fact, that the same phenomena appear in all men, that, 
therefore, the power to perceive such truth, is subjective in 
none. The same phenomena appear in all, because the power 
to which they are to be referred is in all of precisely the same 
nature. Reason in all men is alike, in the same sense that 
powers which produce precisely similar phenomena are in 
their nature one. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS. 

The last Chapter completes our analysis of the Intellectual 
powers. This analysis has led to the following classification 
of the powers, or functions of the InteUigence, distinguished 
as primary and secondary : 

Intellectual Faculties enumerated. 

The former include Consciousness, the faculty which gives 
us a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our own 
minds, or subjective phenomena — Sense, the faculty which 
gives the qualities of external, material substances, or ob- 
jective phenomena — and Reason, the faculty which appre- 
hends and affirms the reality of necessary, universal, spiritu- 
al, infinite, and eternal truths. 

The secondary faculties comprehend the Understanding, 
the conceptive or notion-forming power — rthe Judgment, the 
classifying, generalizing, and realizing power — the associ- 
ating principle, with its varied functions, as simple association 
or suggestion, Memory, Recollection, and Fancy — and the 
Imagination, or esemplastic power. 

All these faculties we have found distinctly marked, and 
separated, the one from the other, by fundamental phenom- 
ena. Into these, we have found, that all the phenomena of 
human Intelligence may be resolved. These, then, we con- 
clude to be the faculties of the human Intelligence. 

Feeling a deep solicitude that the grounds of the above 
distinctions may be understood and appreciated, I have de- 
termined upon a cursory review of the various topics dis- 
cussed in the preceding analysis. For particular reasons, I 
shall base this recapitulation upon the principle of classifica- 
tion of mental phenomena adopted by Kant in his Critick of 



RECAPITULATION* 201 

Pure Reason — -a principle, as we have seen, leading to the 
same classification of the intellectual powers, and to the 
advanced student, on some accounts, preferable to the one 
adopted in the preceding analysis. 

" That all our cognition," he says, " begins with experi- 
ence, there is not any doubt ; for how otherwise should the 
faculty of cognition be awakened into exercise, if this did 
not occur through objects which affect our senses, and partly 
of themselves produce representations, and partly bring our 
Understanding-capacity into action, to compare these, to 
connect, or to separate them, and in this way to work up the 
rude matter of sensible impressions into a cognition of 
objects, which is termed experience ? In respect of time, 
therefore, no cognition can precede in us experience, and 
with this all commences. 

" But although all our cognition begins with experience, 
still on that account, all does not precisely spring up out of 
experience. For it may easily happen that even our empi- 
rical cognition m.ay be a compound of that which we have 
received through our impressions, and of that which our pro- 
per Cognition-taculty (merely called into action by sensible 
impressions) supplies from itself, which addition we cannot 
distinguish from the former original matter, until long exer- 
cise has made us attentive to it, and skilful in the separation 
thereof." 

All cognitions, or intellectual phenomena, are therefore 
divided by Kant into two classes — those derived from expe- 
rience, and those not thus derived. The former he demon- 
strates empirical, the latter a priori cognitions. Cognitions 
a priori all have these fundamental characteristics, and by 
these they are distinguished from the empirical of every 
kind, to wit, universality and necessity. The proposition, for 
example. An event supposes a cause, is not only true of every 
event of which we have had experience, but we know 
absolutely that it must be true of all events actual and con- 
ceivable. These characteristics can never pertain to phe- 
nomena which have their source in experience, which is al- 
ways limited, and in no instance can afSrm anything more 
than that a thing really is, without ever affirming that it 
must be. 

Influence of the above Distinctions. 
The student who has followed this philosopher thus far, 



202 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

and has understood the ground of his classification, will 
never after, whatever his philosophic destiny may be, range 
himself as a disciple of Locke, maintaining and believing 
that all our knowledge comes from experience. He may 
fall into vagaries incomparably more wild and extravagant 
than ever appeared among the disciples of the sensual school. 
Yet between him and Empiricism " there is a great gulf 
fixed," and he will never pass over it to the school from 
which he has been separated. His destiny lies in another 
direction. Having discovered in the depths of his Intelli- 
gence, cognitions bearing the characteristics of absolute uni- 
versality and necessity, he never will, and never can, adopt 
the principle, that all our knowledge comes from sensation 
and reflection. 

Errors of Kant. 
While we admit the reality and validity of cognitions a 
priori^ as distinct from the empirical, it becomes a matter of 
fundamental importance in philosophy to settle definitely the 
relations between these two classes of phenomena thus dis- 
tinguished. This point has been settled in the preceding 
analysis. Cognitions a priori universally sustain this relation 
to the empirical, that of logical antecedents, while the former 
are the chronological antecedents of the latter. ISow these 
relations Kant overlooks entirely. Here lies his first error. 
On the other hand, he assumes, without argument or any 
attempt at proof, that there are cognitions a priori — cogni- 
tions more important than all others — which not only do not 
spring out of experience, but which transcend all experience, 
and extend the compass of our judgm.ents wholly beyond 
its limits. " And exactly," he adds, " in these last cogni- 
tions, which transcend the sensible world, where experience 
can afford neither guide nor correction, lie the investigations 
of Reason, which we, as far as regards their importance, 
hold to be highly preferable, and in their object, far more 
elevated, than all the Understanding can teach in the field of 
phenomena, even wiih the danger of erring, rather than that 
we should give up such important investigations from any 
ground of doubtfulness, or disregard, or indifi^erence. These 
unavoidable problems of pure Reason itself, are God, Liberty ^ 
and Lnmortality .'''' The principle announced in this passage 
is this. That the cognition-faculty, once roused into action by 
experience, evolves through its own laws, and wholly irre- 



RECAPITULATION. 203 

spective and independent of what is given in experience, the 
conceptions above named — conceptions which sustain the 
relation of logical antecedents to no empirical cognitions 
whatever, and that the chief investigations of Reason per- 
tain to these conceptions. Here lies the great error of this 
philosopher. From this single assumption flow out the most 
important peculiarities of his philosophy, together with all 
the wild vagaries of Transcendentalism. If these ideas are 
in the mind as logical antecedents of no empirical intuitions 
whatever, they are there as splendid conceptions to be sure, 
but with no claims whatever to objective validity' — with no 
evidence that any corresponding realities exist. Yet as laws 
of thought, they determine our Understanding-conceptions 
pertaining to ourselves, the external universe, and the origin 
of each. Such notions, therefore, as far as they depend upon 
and receive their character from these ideas, have no claim 
to objective validity. They are realities to us, simply and 
exclusively because our Intelligence, by virtue of its own 
inherent laws, has made them, relatively to ourselves, what 
they appear to be. Further, if these ideas of Reason exist 
in the Mind thus independent of experience, and at the same 
time exist there as regulative principles of experience-con- 
ceptions, should we not suppose, and does it not follow as a 
logical consequent, that all other a priori ideas have the same 
characteristics, and sustain the same relation to experience — 
such ideas, for example, as those of time, space, cause, and 
substance ? 

These last ideas have the same characteristics of univer- 
sality and necessity as those of God, Libert}^, and Immor- 
tality ; and, as laws of thought, sustain precisely the same 
relations to all Understanding-conceptions. All a priori 
ideas, therefore, exist in the Intelligence without any claim 
to objective validity. As those ideas, also, as laws of 
thought, determine the character of all Understanding-con- 
ceptions, these last are alike destitute of any claim to objec- 
tive validity. Neither ourselves, nor the external world, nor 
that which our Intelligence gives us, as the cause of each, 
" are what we take them to be." They are all mere fictions 
of our Intelligence. Such Kant himself denominates them. 
Since this philosopher passed off the stage, his successors, 
such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, have been laboring to 
build up the fabric of human knowledge upon tbe assumption 
above named, ail agreeing in laying the foundation of their 



204 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

glorious temple upon " airy nothing," upon the wise assump- 
tion, that the very temple they were building with so much 
toil and trouble was not " what they took it to be." Such, 
however, is the logical consequence of the assumption on 
which all their conclusions rest. 

On the other hand, if we conceive the entire action of 
Reason to be in fixed correlation, in the first instance, to the 
intuitions of Sense and Consciousness, and in the second to 
Understanding-conceptions, giving the logical antecedents of 
such intuitions and conceptions, if we suppose that such 
intuitions and conceptions, in the order of actual develop- 
ment, precede the ideas to which they are respectively 
correlated, and are consequently unmodified by them, then 
we have an entirely different system of knowledge. On this 
topic I shall have occasion to speak again hereafter. 

Classification of Mental Faculties. 
While the great principle which peculiarizes the system of 
Kant, and determines its destiny, is found to be a baseless 
assumption, his classification of the Intellectual faculties 
clearly designate him' as one of the greatest analyzers of the 
human mind that has yet appeared. We w^ill now proceed 
to a consideration of this subject. Knowledge, with us, 
commences not with judgments^ but intuitions. This is 
evident from the fact that all judgments are composed of 
intuitions. Intuitions are of two classes, empirical, and a 
priori. The former also are subdivided as subjective and 
objective. This classification of intuitions gives us a three- 
fold division of the primary faculties, or functions of the 
Intelligence, to wit, Sense, which gives us the qualities of 
external material substances — Consciousness, which gives us 
the qualities of the mind, or subjective phenomena — and 
Reason, which gives us intuitions « jonoW. This classifica- 
tion is sustained by phenomena fundamentally distinct from 
one another. 

REMARKS UPON THE RELATIONS OF INTUITIONS TO ONE ANOTHER. 

Before leaving the present subject it may be important to 
make a few remarks upon the relations of intuitions to one 
another, together with that of the faculties of intuition. 

Intuitions cannot be opposed to each other. 
My first remark is, that intuitions can never be in con- 



RECAPITULATION. 205 

tradiction to each other. The intuitions of Consciousness, 
for example, can never be in contradiction to those of Sense, 
inasmuch as the exchisive office of the former, under such 
circumstances, is to give to the mind itself, what the latter 
faculty has affirmed of its object. For similar reasons intui- 
tions a priori can never contradict the empirical of either 
class, because a loo-ical antecedent can never, from the 
nature of the case, be contradictory to that to M'hich it 
sustains such a relation. How can the idea of time be in 
opposition to that of succession, or that of space to that of 
body, or the idea of phenomena be opposed to that of sub- 
stance or cause } Nor can an a priori or empirical intuition 
be in opposition to another of the same class. The idea of 
substance, for example, cannot be in opposition to that of 
space, time, or cause ; nor can the phenomena of extension 
be opposed to those of resistance or color. The same holds 
true in all other instances. 

Different Intuition Faculties cannot contradict each other. 

From the above principles the conclusion is irresistible, 
that the affirmations of no one faculty of intuition can be 
opposed to the other intuitions of the same faculty ; nor can 
the intuitions of one faculty be opposed to the intuitions of 
another. For the same reasons it might be shown that, the 
affirmations of the primary and secondary faculties cannot be 
opposed to each other. These conclusions are so self-evident, 
that no remarks in confirmation are deemed requisite. 

The logical Consequents of no one Intuition can be in Opposition 
to any primary Intuition^ nor to the logical Consequents of 
the same. 

Another conclusion is equall}^ self-evident, to w^it, That the 
logical consequents of no one intuition can be in opposition to 
any primary intuition, or to the logical consequents of the 
same. As the ideas of time, space, substance, cause, and of 
the infinite cannot be in contradiction to one another, nor to 
the intuitions of phenomena, so the logical consequents of 
any one of these ideas cannot be in contradiction to any other 
of these intuitions, or to the logical consequents of the same. 
If the ideas of substance and space, for example, are not 
contradictory to each other, how can the logical consequents 
of one contradict the other idea, or its logical consequents .-* 
So in all other instances. 
10 



206 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Error of Kant and Coleridge. 
We are now fully prepared to appreciate the theory of 
Kant, Coleridge, and the Transcendental school, generally, 
pertaining to the external world, or as Coleridge expresses 
it pertaining to the " presumption that there exist things with- 
out us.'''' All these philosophers acknowledge, in the first 
instance, that through the faculty of Sense we have intuitions 
of the qualities of external material substances, and that by 
means of such intuitions together with the ideas of sub- 
stance, cause, space, time, &c.,the Intelligence gives us the 
external universe as a real existence. They then profess to 
find other intuitions of Reason, from which the necessary 
conclusion is, that " the things which we envisage are not that 
in themselves for which we take them." In other words, the 
logical consequents of one class of intuitions given by the 
Intelligence, are in opposition to other intuitions of the same 
Intelligence, and to the logical consequents of the same. Thus 
one series of intuitions devours others, together with all their 
consequents. The procedure of the Intelligence, according 
to this theory, very much resembles that of the serpent in 
the fable, who seizing his tail in his mouth finally succeeded 
in burying his entire body so completely in his own stomach, 
that it became wholly invisible. From the Intelligence in 
the first instance, proceed intuitions empirical and a priori^ 
from which most logically result the apprehension, and 
knowledge of a vast and glorious universe of real existences. 
From the profound depths of the same Intelligence, then, 
there proceed other intuitions through which the entire and 
before conceived substantial system of knowledge 

" Is melted into air, into thin air : 
And like the baseless fabric of a vision, 
The cloud-cap'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,j 
Yea, all that it inherit, are dissolved ; 
And like an unsubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a wreck behind." 

Most sublime philosophy that, surely ! And after these 
voracious intuitions have devoured all others that were be- 
fore them, together with their consequents, " themselves 
still being so ill-favored that it cannot be known that they 
have eaten anything," it would be easy to find others by 
which these, in their turn, would be devoured, and so on 



RECAPITULATION. 207 

interminably. Indeed this is the necessary procedure of the 
Intelligence, according to the system under consideration. 
For if, as their system maintains, all other objects of know- 
ledge " are not what we take them to be," we must of neces- 
sity conclude, that their system of philosophy is not what 
we or they take it to be. For the system itself is given by 
an Intelligence, which, as they maintain, does not give 
things as they are, or as this same Intelligence " takes them 
to be." 

On what then does this whole theory rest ? On baseless 
assumptions, and nothing else. Coleridge, directly acknow- 
ledges that his theory does rest upon assumptions. The 
same is true, however, he says, of the opposite theory. 
This is freely admitted, with this difference, how^ever : His 
theory rests upon assumptions which are not affirmed as 
true by the Intelligence. The theory w^hich gives us "things 
without us," rests upon assumptions affirmed as true by the 
Intelligence. There is a wide difference between a theory 
resting upon assumptions in opposition to intuitions, and 
one resting upon assumptions in harmony with such intui- 
tions. 

SECONDARY FACULTIES. 

We are now prepared for a consideration of the secondary 
faculties or functions of the Intelligence. 

Understanding. 
After intuitions, the next class of phenomena w^hich strikes 
our attention is notions, or Understanding-conceptions. Such 
notions are of two classes — those which pertain to indi- 
viduals, and those which represent classes of individuals, or 
notions, particular and general. All such phenomena are 
found, on analysis, to be composed of intuitions given by the 
primary faculties. Now the act of combining intuitions into 
notions, particular and general, reveals an entirely new func- 
tion of the Intelligence, a function not implied in the opera- 
tion of either of the intuitive faculties, nor in all combined. 
This intellecual function we denominate the Understanding. 

The Judgment. 
As soon as an Understanding-conception appears on the 
the theatre of Consciousness, an intellectual process entirely 



208 ir^TELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

new succeeds, a process by which, under the influence of 
the ideas of resemblance and difference, the particular ele- 
ments which enter into the conception are separated from one 
another, and each contemplated apart by itself Here we 
have what is called the process of abstraction. When also 
one notion present in the Intelligence, suggests another of a 
similar character, by a similar process, to the one last stated, 
the qualities common to the two are separated. These the 
Understanding then combines into a general notion, a notion 
representing a class or classes of individuals. This notion 
being given by the process under consideration, the par- 
ticular conceptions referred to, are subsumed, or classed 
under the general. Now this process differs entirely from 
the action of the notion-forming power. To combine intui- 
tions into notions, particular and general, and in view of the 
ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate the elements 
of a given conception from one another, or in view of the 
same ideas, to separate the elements common to two or more 
conceptions, and finally when the Understanding has com- 
bined the elements thus separated into a general notion, to 
subsume the particular under the general, are intellectual 
processes certainly entirel}^ distinct from each other. The 
power to abstract and classify is not implied in the power 
simply to combine intuitions into notions, either particular or 
general. This function of the Intelligence, the power which 
separates things that differ, and ranges together under some 
common designation those that are alike, we denominate the 
Judgment. This is the faculty also chiefly employed in 
processes of reasoning. Reason furnishes principles, the 
Understanding terms, and the Judgment affirms, in the light 
of the principles of Reason, the agreement, or disagreement 
of the terms. If the student will attentively reflect upon 
what is passing in his own mind, he will clearly recognize 
the distinction above made between the Understanding and 
Judgment. Who ever confounds the formation of a concep- 
tion of an object, with that action of the Intelligence which 
judges that such and such elements in the conception 
resemble, or are unlike each other ? Who ever confounded 
the formation of general notions, such as are designated by 
the terms man, horse, &c., with that action of the Intelli- 
gence which affirms of individuals, This is a man ; that is a 
horse ? Such intellectual operations difler not in degree, 
but in kind, and suppose two functions of the Intelligence 
entirely distinct from each other. 



BECAPITULATION. 209 

The Associating Frinciple. 
That principle of the Intelligence by which the presence 
of one thought in the mind recalls another which has formerly 
existed there, is so manifestly distinct from all other intel- 
lectual functions, that no philosopher has ever confounded 
it with any of them. As the object of the present re- 
capitulation is to give the grounds of the distinctions made 
in this Treatise between the different intellectual faculties, 
a simple allusion to the principle of Association is all that is 
requisite in this department of our subject. It remains only 
to speak of the 

Imagination. 

A reference to a distinction made in a preceding Chapter, 
between the ideas of Reason, as primary and secondary, will 
enable us to explain very distinctly our own conception of 
the nature of this function of the Intelhgence. With the 
former class of ideas, such as those of time, space, substance, 
and cause, objects exist in full and perfect harmony. The 
sphere of the Understanding, therefore, is actualities as they 
are. With most of the secondary ideas of Reason, however, 
such as those of the right, the just, the good, the beautiful, the 
grand, and sublime, relalities may or may not exist in cor- 
respondence. Now we find a power of the Intelligence 
which is perpetually laboring to combine, in thought, the 
endlessly diversified elements of objects given by the other 
faculties into harmony with those ideas last named, especially 
those of the beautiful, the grand, and sublime. This function 
of the Intelligence we denominate the Imagination. The 
Ideal generated by this faculty, incomparably superior as it 
is to what the Understanding conceives in the sphere of 
realities, finds an external embodiment in poetry, sculpture, 
painting, and in all the varied endowments of art. The 
peculiar sphere, as well as phenomena of the Imagination 
thus clearly distinguish it from all other intellectual faculties. 

Such is the classification of the intellectual faculties pre- 
sented in this Treatise. Of two things pertaining to it, the 
author himself is fully pursuaded — That the distinction 
here made between the intellectual faculties is real, being 
sustained by fundamental phenomena — and that the classifi- 
cation is complete, inasmuch as there is no intellectual 
operation actual or conceivable which may not be resolved 
into the appropriate action of one or more of these faculties. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF 
THE INTELLIGENCE. 



Having completed our analysis of the intellectual powers, 
other important questions pertaining to the action of the In- 
telligence next demand our attention. We are all aware, 
that objects of observation and reflection are distinctly ap- 
prehended on one condition only, to wit, that we give atten- 
tion to them. But we observe and reflect upon that, and 
that only, which has been given in the Intelligence prior to 
all acts of attention. When we give attention, it is to some 
definite thing, as this or that particular object. Now the ob- 
ject must have been given prior to the act of attention ; else the 
direction of the act would be wholly indefinite, and without 
respect to any particular object. The inquiry which will 
occupy our attention in the present Chapter is this : What is 
the state of the Intelligence^ what are the characteristics of its 
affirmations relative to objects of knowledge^ prior to observation 
and reflection! and what are the relations of such affirmations 
to the state of the Intelligence^ in observation and reflection ? 
The former we denominate the spontaneous^ and the latter 
the reflective developments of the Intelligence. 

General Characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge^ and of our 
Knowledge of the same. 
Before proceeding further, I would invite special attention 
to two or three preliminary observations : 

1. All objects of thought are finite or infinite, and each of 
these bears the respective characteristics of contingency or 
necessity. 

2. All finite substances comprehend ourselves, and that 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 211 

which is not ourselves. The infinite sustains the relation to 
each of unconditioned and absolute cause. 

3. Consequently, all our knowledge consists in appre- 
hending the nature of the finite and of the infinite, together 
with the relations of the finite to the finite, and of the finite 
to the infinite. The Intelligence can never go beyond these ; 
because these comprehend all possible existences, and all the 
modes and relations of existence. 

Distinct Apprehension conditioned on Attention. 
But these things, as I have remarked, we distinctly know 
only on one condition — that we attend to them ; in other 
words, observe and reflect upon them. Yet they must, in 
some sense, have been apprehended before observation and 
reflection, because the objects of observation and reflection 
must have been previously given in Sense, Consciousness, or 
Reason. 

Spontaneous Develojrment of the Intelligence. 
The question again returns upon us, What is the state of 
the Intelligence, as developed, previous to attention, i. e. pre- 
vious to observation and reflection ? To attend, to observe, 
and reflect, are acts of the Will, directing the action of the 
Intelligence. But, as before observed, the objects must have 
been in some sense apprehended previous to attention. For 
when we will to attend to anything, the act implies that the 
thing itself was in some sense in the mind, as an object of 
thought. How came this thought here ? Certain conditions 
are requisite to its existence. But when these conditions 
are fulfilled, how does this thought aris^ ? I answer, by a 
spontaneous action of the Intelligence, a spontaneity previous 
to all acts of the Will. " When Intelligence manifested itself 
for the first time," says Cousin, to whom I am indebted for 
almost everything I now say, " it is evident that its manifes- 
tation could not have been a voluntary act. It manifested 
itself, nevertheless, and you possess a consciousness of it, 
more or less vivid. Endeavor to take your thought una- 
wares, in the act of thinking without having wished to think ; 
and you will find yourself at that point which the Intelligence 
takes as its point of departure ; and thus you may at the 
present moment observe, with more or less accuracy, that 
which did occur, and must necessarily have occurred, in the 
first act of 3^our Intelligence, at a time which is no more, and 



212 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHr. 

which can never return." Now what is contained in this 
primitive intuition, this spontaneity of human intelligence ? 
All that will subsequently be found in observation and re- 
flection ; but, as Cousin observes, " If all is there, all is there 
on certain conditions." 

Characteristics of this Spontaneity. 

The next inquiry demanding attention is the characteris- 
tics of this spontaneity. The most important are the two 
following : 

1. It is in all instances a positive afnrmation, and not a 
negation. " To think," says Cousin, "is to affirm. The first 
affirmation into which nothing of volition has entere^d, and 
by consequence, nothing of reflection, cannot he an affirma- 
tion iningled with negation ; for our first acts are not denials. 
It must therefore have been an affirmation without negation, 
an instinctive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive de- 
velopment of thought." 

2. The other characteristic of this primitive intuition is, 
that although it contains all that is subsequently found in 
observation and reflection, it contains them obscurely. In 
observation and reflection, and there only, all things are dis- 
tinct, because that there, and there only, do we find not only 
affirmations, but negations. 

Characteristics illustrated. 
I have said, that in this primitive spontaneity there is con- 
tained all that is subsequently found in observation and re- 
flection, but somewhat obscurely. Consequently, there was 
a time when indeed mind was, and the universe also ; but to 
itself, as an object of knowledge, neither the mind, nor the 
universe, nor God existed. At the next moment, by a spon- 
taneous development of the Intelligence, the mind was re- 
vealed to itself. At the sam.e moment that which is not 
itself, and the cause of itself, and of that which it perceived 
as not itself, was also revealed. In other words, the mind 
apprehends but obscurely the finite and the infinite, with a 
mysterious consciousness of the relation of the one to the 
other. " We do not commence," says Cousin, again, "with 
seeking ourselves,for this would imply that we already know 
that we exist, but on a certain day, at a certain hour, at a 
certain moment, a moment solemn in existence — without 
having sought ourselves, we find ourselves ; thought, in its 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 213 

instinctive development, discloses to us that we are ; we 
atfirm our existence with profound assurance — with an as- 
surance unmingled with any negation whatsoever. We per- 
ceive our existence, but we do not discern, with all the dis- 
tinctness of Reflection, our proper character, which is that 
of being limited and bounded ; we do not precisely distinguish 
ourselves from the world, • nor do we precisely discern the 
character of this world; and besides these, we perceive the 
existence of something different from those, to which natu*- 
rally and instinctively we refer both ourselves and the world; 
we distinguish all this, but without very strictly discriminating 
between its component parts. Intelligence, in developing 
itself, perceives all that is ; but it is not able to perceive it in 
a reflective, distinct, and negative manner ; and although it 
perceives it with perfect assurance, it perceives it somewhat 
confusedly." Again — " Spontaneous and instinctive thought 
enters upon its functions by virtue of its own nature ; and 
first of all, it gives us ourselves, the world, and God ; the 
world and ourselves, with boundaries confusedly perceived, 
and God, without bound, — the whole in a synthesis, in which 
clear and obscure ideas are mingled together." 

But while these truths are thus revealed and affirmed, 
they are not, I repeat, clearly, but confusedly apprehended. 
The nature of the self, and of the not-self which was the 
immediate object of perception, together with that of the 
cause of each, was not distinctly given. Yet all were given, 
and given in such a manner, that observation and reflec- 
tion would separate the one from the other, and render each 
distinct and palpable to the mind. But the basis of observa- 
tion and reflection is given in this primitive spontaneity. Ob- 
servation and reflection may separate these elements, and 
determine their relative characteristics ; but they can add no 
new element to the composition, unless it be themselves as 
facts of Consciousness, which, as facts, must also be first 
given in the manner above referred to. 

ADDITIONAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS, 

Some additional remarks, designed to elucidate still fur- 
ther the subject before us, are here required. 

Categories of Spontaneous and Reflective Reason. 
I begin with noticing the distinction between the categories 
10* 



214 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of spontaneous and reflective Reason, and with such illustra- 
tions as will enable us to distinguish them. The categories 
of the reflective Reason are all abstract, universal, and ne- 
cessary. Those of spontaneous Reason, are necessary, but 
concrete, and particular. With this difference, they are 
identical. In other words, the categories of spontaneous 
Reason, are those of reflective Reason in a concrete and par- 
ticular form. For example, the principle of causality, as a 
category of the reflective Reason, is this : Every event must 
have a cause — a truth, universal, necessary, and absolute. 
Now this principle, as a category of spontaneous Reason, is 
this : This particular event, — this particular sensation, for 
example, must have a cause. The principle of space, as a 
category of reflective Reason, is. Body supposes space. As 
a category of spontaneous Reason it is. This particular body 
is somewhere, or in space. Thus by determining the cate- 
gories of reflective Reason, we can readily determine those 
of spontaneous Reason. For the former are the latter in a 
necessary, to be sure, but concrete and particular form. 

Relation of Observation and Reflection to this original Spon- 
taneity. 
The relation of observation and reflection to the original spon- 
taneity of the Intelligence, next claims attention. Their exclu- 
sive object is to determine the nature, character, and relations 
of that,the reality of which has been previously affirmed. With 
the reality itself they have nothing to do. For example, what 
has reflection to do with determining the question whether I 
really exist, or not, the very truth which must be assumed 
as the basis of all reflection ? Reflection may determine my 
nature and character, but my existence must be first affirmed, 
and then assumed, before reflection becomes possible. The 
same remarks apply equally to external existences. Obser- 
vation and reflection may determine their character, but 
never their reality. Hence the reason of the universal in- 
quiry in respect to external objects, which inquiry is, not 
whether this particular object exists ; but what are its na- 
ture, character, and relations ; the reality of the object being 
necessarily assumed as the ground of all such inquiries. Ob- 
servation and reflection, then, assume an entirely wrong di- 
rection when wa attempt by them to determine the reality 
of our own existence, or of the existence of the external 
world, or of that to which we necessarily refer ourselves, 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 215 

and the external world. The reason or ground of such 
affirmations we can know only by falling back upon the ori- 
ginal spontaneity of the human Intelligence. There no man 
is or can be a sceptic, and he that makes himself such by ob- 
servation and reflection, is, m the language of inspiration, a 
fool. Yes, he is more than a fool ; he is supremely wicked. 

Confidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason^ how weakened. 
You see how it is, that the confidence of men, in the first 
truths of human Reason, is often weakened. They expect, 
by a process of reasoning, to demonstrate the reality of those 
very truths which must be assumed, or all reasoning becomes 
impossible ; and which, as the ground of such reasoning, 
have been previously affirmed with absolute certainty, in the 
primitive spontaneity of the human Intelligence. They ex- 
pect also to have their convictions strengthened by the de- 
monstration, an expectatioti not realized, of course. The 
result is, that the conviction is weakened, instead of strength- 
ened. The man wha expects to have his confidence in the 
reality of his own existence, or in that of the external world, 
or of God, increased by any process of reasoning, is, in my 
judgment, seeking for truth in the wrong direction. When- 
ever we fall back upon the spontaneity of our own Reason, 
we find ourselves intuitively affirming each of these truths 
with equal absoluteness, and assuming them as the ground 
of all our inquiries. When we contemplate our own exist- 
ence, and that of the external world, as we necessarily do, 
as conditioned and relative, we never inquire whether there 
is an existence unconditioned and absolute, to which the 
former may be referred ; but what is the character of that 
unconditioned and absolute existence, to which, by a pre- 
vious, spontaneous, intuitive, and absolute affirmation of 
Reason, all that is conditioned and relative has been referred. 

Use of the Common Demonstrations of the Divine Existence. 
Of what use, then, it may be asked, are the common de- 
monstrations of the existence of God .'' Of none, I answer, 
in satisfying our own minds of the reality of the Divine ex- 
istence. If this is expected from them, our confidence will 
be rather weakened than strengthened, and that, for this rea- 
son : The mind begins the investigation by suspending its be- 
lief in the reality of the Divine existence, upon the validity 
of the demonstration. It also expects and demands, as 



216 INTELLECTUAL PHlLOSOTHr. 

above remarked, that the demonstration shall be such as to 
increase its previous confidence in the reality of the Divine 
existence. But such expectation will not be realized. 
Hence the demonstration will, under such circumstances^ 
rather diminish than increase our confidence in this funda- 
mental truth. The most delightful feature of our holy reli- 
gion, to my mind, is this : its great fundamental truths are 
all suspended, not upon the validity of demonstrations, but 
placed at the foundation of all demonstration, among the 
primitive, absolute, and necessary intuitions and affirmations 
of Reason ; intuitions which no one can deny without vio- 
lating the fundamental laws of his own being, and rendering 
himself a fool, not only, but infinitely impious. Foy no man 
can possibly become so impious and wicked as the sceptic. 
The man who enters a family and seduces every female 
there, but leaves a consciousness of guilt as a foundation for 
repentance, and reformation to virtue, is a saint, compared 
with the man who, without actual seduction, annihilates in 
the minds of such females, all regard to chastity as a virtue, 
and to its opposite as a sin. This the sceptic does when he 
has obtained his object. Of what use then, the question re- 
turns upon us, are such demonstrations ? Of no use but 
this, to turn the weapons of the enemy against himself. To 
substantiate his position, he appeals to science. Now 
science, when pressed into the field, must be shown to be on 
the side of his opposers. Till thus pressed she remains 
silent, because her infiuence is not needed. 

Conclusions arrived at by a process of Reasoning, wlien false. 
We see when it is, that any conclusions to which we come 
by a process of reasoning, are, and must be false. When 
they contradict any of the necessary and spontaneous intu- 
itions of the human Intelligence, as, for example, the reality 
our own existence, or that of the external world. Every 
step in a process of reasoning must be intuitively certain. 
Now to bring a conclusion to which we have arrived by a 
series of intuitions, against another primitive intuition, is to 
affirm the falsity of one intuition upon the authority of an- 
other ; and the non-reality 'of the primitive upon the authority 
of the derivative. This is precisely what Coleridge has 
done, or rather, promises to do. He first acknowledges that 
the belief in the reality of things without us is an intuition, 
primitive and necessary, and then promises, by a series of 



SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION. 217 

intuitions, to demonstrate the non-reality of such existences. 
— See Biog. Lit. p. 153. 

Reasons of the Diversity and Difference of the Opinions of Men. 
In judgments., men differ, not in the spontaneous, but re- 
flective developments of their Intelligence. In the former 
state, all put essentially the same inquiries, and all believe 
the same things. There is no doubt or disbelief here. In 
this inner sanctuary of the Intelligence, scepticism has no 
place. In respect to the results of observation and reflec- 
tion, here diversity and contradiction appear. The reason 
is, that in the former state, nothing but the pure afiirmations 
of the Intelligence are' met with. In the latter, assumptions 
mingled with such affirmations, together with the logical 
consequents of assumptions, present themselves. 

Sources of Error. 
Error has no place among the spontaneous affirmations of 
the Intelligence, for the obvious reason, that here nothing 
but pure intellectual affirmations appear. The same would 
be true in the reflective operations, but for the fact, that 
assumptions are here mingled with such affirmations. When 
men contemplate one class of facts, for example, various hy- 
potheses may present themselves as grounds of the explana- 
tion of the facts, hypotheses none of which are affirmed as 
true by the Intelligence. The Will, however, may assume 
some one as true, which is not so. This assumption, toge- 
ther with all its logical consequents, is now mingled with 
the facts, and all together present a confused mass of error 
and truth. Here is the source of error of every kind, and 
in connection with all subjects of thought. Pure thinking, 
unmingled with assumptions, is never adulterated with error. 



CHAPTER XV. 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 



In all our inquiries hitherto, one question has been left al- 
most wholly untouched, the question in respect to the origin 
OF OUR IDEAS. To this qucstion special attention is now in- 
vited. 

The two Schools in Philosophy. 
Two great schools have, for the last century or two, di- 
vided the philosophical world, in respect to the question be- 
fore us. These schools have been denominated the Sensual, 
and Ideal or Transcendental school. At the head of the for- 
mer is Locke. At the head of the latter is Kant. A few 
remarks explanatory of the principles of these schools, may 
prepare the way for a more distinct elucidation of the present 
subject. 

Principles of Locke. 

I begin with Locke. According to him, all ideas existing 
in the mind, are derived from two sources, Sensation^ and 
Reflection. To establish his principles, he first proves that 
there are no innate ideas in the mind, that is, ideas previous 
to experience. Having disposed of this question, he starts 
the following as the great problem in philosophy. 

" Let us suppose," he says, " the mind to be, as we say, 
white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how 
comes it to be furnished .'* Whence comes it by that vast 
store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has paint- 
ed on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all 
the materials of Reason and knowledge ? To this I answer," 
he adds, " in one word, from experience ; in that all our 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 219 

knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives 
itself." 

In a subsequent section, he shows that the sources of ex- 
perience are two-fold, as observed above, Sensation, and 
Reflection or Consciousness. 

" Our observation," he says, " employed either about ex- 
ternal, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of 
our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that 
which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of 
thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge from 
whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do 
spring." Experience being the watch-word of the school of 
Locke, and of his system^ the system itself has been denomi- 
nated Empiricism. 

It should be borne in mind, that Locke does not speak of 
experience, as the mere condition of ail our knowledge. In 
that case, his system would be undoubtedly correct. Nor 
would his principles be doubted by any school in philosophy. 
On the other hand, he speaks of experience, as furnishing the 
materials of all our knowledge. All knowledge is exclusive- 
ly constituted of elements furnished by experience. 

2'heory of Kant. 

In opposition to Empiricism, Kant and the Transcendental 
school maintain that experience is so far from giving us 
necessary truths, that these truths themselves lie at the foun- 
dation of all experience. 

To understand the principles of Kant correctly, it is neces- 
sary to keep in remembrance the fact, that he evidently uses 
the term experience in two senses — in respect to the Sensi- 
bility, and the Intelligence. When he says that all our 
cognition begins with experience ; he then refers to the Sen- 
sibility ; for he speaks of the '' faculty of cognition being 
awakened into exercise," by this experience. To suppose 
that by experience here, he refers to the action of the Intel- 
ligence, would make him say, that the " cognition-faculty is 
awakened into exercise " by the action of the cognition- 
faculty. He supposes, and very correctly, that the condition 
of the primary action of the Intelligence, is some effect from 
some cause upon the Sensibility. By the term experience 
here, he refers to this effect. 

On the other hand, when he affirms that a priori or neces- 
sary ideas, are the condition and ground of all experience, he 



220 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, 

here uses the term under consideration with reference to 
the Intelligence exclusively. His nneaning is, that ideas a 
priori are the condition and ground of all other mental per- 
ceptions and affirmations. In conformity with this state- 
ment, he first attempts to show that the ideas of time and 
space are the necessary condition of all affirmations of Sense 
and Consciousness pertaining; to the qualities of all substan- 
ces subjective and objective. When, for example, a certain 
effect is produced upon the Sensibility by some unknown 
cause — a cause, as his theory affirms, existing nowhere and 
in no time — the ideas of time and space are developed, 
v/hile the effect is postulated as the quality of some cause 
external to the mind, and existing in time and space. This 
mental act postulating a subjective effect as the quality of 
some external cause, is what he calls perception. But for 
these ideas, no such perception could have taken place. 

He then goes on to shov/ (and here, as we shall see, he is 
correct), that other a priori ideas are the condition of all 
Understanding-conceptions and affirmations of the Judg- 
ment. 

Such are the principles of these schools. In their funda- 
mental affirmations, both are alike wrong. This I will now 
attempt to show. 

Principles of Locke tested with reference to Necessary Ideas, 
We begin with Empiricism — the proposition that all our 
knowledge, all ideas now in the mind, come from experience, 
from sensation and reflection. Take as an example the idea 
of space. Here I lay down this proposition as self-evident, 
that that which cannot give the essential fundamental cha- 
racteristics of an idea, cannot give the idea itself. Now the 
fundamental characteristics of the idea of space, are infinity 
and necessity. The Reason apprehends space as infinite, and 
not only affirms that it is — that is, that it exists, but that it 
must be. On the other hand, everything of which we are 
conscious and which we perceive, is finite, and as we have 
seen in the former Chapters, is also contingent. Nor can 
these faculties reach beyond the finite. But the idea of the 
infinite is in the Mind, because the idea of space is there, 
which is infinite. The idea of space, then, cannot come 
from Sensation or Reflection. But suppose that Sensation 
or Reflection, or both together, could give space as infinite. 
They could merely affirm that it is, not that it must be. The 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 221 

system of Locke, and of the entire sensual school, falls to 
the ground, when tried upon the idea of space. The same 
fact might with equal distinctness be shown to be true with 
respect to all ideas which lie beyond the limits of the con- 
tingent. Thus far and no farther can Empiricism go. Ne- 
cessary, universal, absolute, and eternal truths, can never be 
derived from experience, for the obvious reason that they 
are not the objects of experience. They lie entirely beyond 
the limits of Sense, and Consciousness or Reflection, which 
constitute the sole ground and source of experience. 

Principles of Locke fail in respect to Understanding-concep- 
tions. 
But Empiricism not only fails entirely, w^hen tried upon 
all necessary truths, but also upon all the phenomena of the 
Understanding. Every notion existing in the Understanding 
is composed, as we have seen, of two classes of elements, 
the phenomenal and the rational, the contingent and the ne- 
cessary. These elements are given by faculties entirely dis- 
tinct the one from the other. The phenomenal are given by 
Sense and Consciousness. The rational by the Reason. 
The first elements only are given by experience. The last 
lie beyond the bound of experience. Example : Sense per- 
ceives the quality of some external substance. No notion 
can be formed till the idea of substance is developed, by 
conceiving of this quality as belonging to some substance. 
So of all the notions of the Understanding. As they all 
embrace elements necessary as well as contingent^ and as the 
latter only are derived from experience, all such notions in- 
clude elements which were never given by experience. 

Error of Kant. 
The fundamiCntal error of Kant, understanding the propo- 
sition, that necessary ideas are the condition and ground of 
ail experience, as he employs it— that is, in its universal 
form, as including all intellectual affirmations — has been 
made sufficiently manifest in preceding Chapters. The intu- 
itions of Sense and Consciousness, instead of being condi- 
tioned on the prior existence, in the mind, of the ideas of time 
and space, are themselves the necessary chronological ante- 
cedents of these ideas. Using then the term experience as 
pertaining to the intuitions of these faculties, the proposition 
of Kant is demonstrably false. All necessary ideas sustain 



222 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to the contingent the relation of logical, while the latter sus- 
tain to the former the relation of chronological antecedents. 
It is the height of absurdity to represent the logical antece- 
dent as the condition and ground of the existence of the 
chronological. 

Position of Kant true in respect to Understanding-conceptions 
and Affirmations of the Judgment. 
If we admit that contingent intuitions are the chronologi- 
cal antecedents of necessary ones, still it may be asked, is 
there not an important sense in which the proposition, that 
ideas a priori ^xe the condition and ground of all experience, 
is true ? It is strictly true, I remark, if the term experience 
be used with reference, not to the phenomena of Sense and 
Consciousness, but as it is sometimes used, with reference to 
the Understanding and Judgment. There is a wide differ- 
ence between merely perceiving and understanding an object. 
A a object is perceived when it is presented to the mind as an 
object of Sense. It is understood when, and only when, 
such questions as these have been resolved in respect to it, 
to wit : When and where does it exist ? what are its quali- 
ties, its nature, substance, quantity, and relations ? But the 
resolution of these questions necessarily pre-supposes the 
existence of the ideas of time, space, substance, quantity, 
quality, and relation, in the mind. Using the term experi- 
ence in the sense of understanding objects, how perfectly 
manifest is the fact, that necessary ideas are not derived from 
experience, but are themselves, together with the perceptions 
' above referred to, the condition and ground of experience. 
Some object must first be perceived — not understood, but 
perceived — before necessary ideas can be developed in the 
mind. Perception and Consciousness, then, in the sense 
now explained, are the chronological antecedents of all ne- 
cessary ideas, and these again are both the logical and chro- 
nological condition and ground of experience — that is, of 
understanding objects. But Perception and Consciousness 
do not give necessary ideas, only in this sense : when any 
object or phenomenon is perceived by Sense or Consciousness, 
the Reason, on occasion of such perceptions, enters into im- 
mediate and spontaneous exercise, and apprehends the ideas 
of space, time, substance, cause, quantity, quality, relation, 
&c. These ideas are not derived from, but merely occa- 
sioned by such perceptions. These ideas thus developed , 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 223 

then become the laws of thought, under the influence and 
guidance of which all our knowledge of objects is derived — 
that is, all our experience, using the term in the sense of 
understanding objects. 

Now if we understand the word experience as mere 
Sense and Consciousness, then, I repeat, it is the chronolo- 
gical condition or ground of all ideas in the mind. In this 
sense of the term Locke is, no doubt, right in the affirmation, 
that all our knowledge is derived from experience. But this 
is evidently not the sense in which the term was understood 
by him. But if experience be understood, as designating the 
notions (contingent and relative) formed in the mind, of ob- 
jects of Sense and Consciousness, then I affirm that such 
notions, instead of being either the logical or chronological 
antecedents of necessary ideas, are themselves both the logi- 
cal and chronological consequents of such ideas. 

TRUE EXPLANATION. 

Intuitions. 
The question in respect to the origin of our knowledge, 
together with its progress from its commencement to its de- 
velopment in its present form, now admits of a ready expla- 
nation. Knowledge, in all instance, commences (certain 
conditions being fulfilled) with the intuitions of Sense and 
Consciousness. Reason then intervenes, and affirms the 
logical antecedents of each empirical intuition, as it is given. 

Notions. 
The next class of phenomena that appears is Understand- 
ing-conceptions, in which the intuitions referred to are com- 
bined into notions of particular things. At first all such 
notions are concrete and particular. The elements of the 
abstract, the general, and the universal exist, but they exist 
only in the concrete. 

The Judgment. 
The Judgment now intervenes, and under the influence of 
the ideas of resemblance and difference, separates the ele- 
ments of the abstract, general, and universal, from the con- 
crete and particular. Then notions, abstract and general, 
and ideas of Reason in their abstract and universal form, 
appear on the theatre of Consciousness. A new action of 



224 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the Judgment now takes place — an action in which the par- 
ticular is subsumed under the abstract, the general, and the 
universal. 

Associating Principle and the Imagination. 
In the midst of all this movement, the associating princi- 
ple is perpetually active, and over all the great deep of 
thought thus set in motion, the Imagination then hovers, and 
blends the endlessly diversified elements of mental concep- 
tion, feeling, and action, into forms more perfectly harmon- 
izing with the ideas of the just, the good, the beautiful, the 
sublime. 

Scientific Movement. 
The last movement of Mind is the scientific movement — 
a movement in which the properties and relations of the 
varied objects of thought are systematically evolved in the 
light of fundamental ideas and principles of Reason. Such 
is the origin of knowledge. Such, too, is the movement of 
Mind from the beginning, as it rolls on towards its final con- 
summation in pure and universal science. In beauty, gran- 
deur, and sublimity, nothing can be compared with the 
movement of Mind. All that is external and visible but 
feebly reflects it. 

MANNER IN WHICH THE GENERAL, ABSTRACT, AND UNIVERSAL 
ARE ELIMINATED FROM THE CONCRETE AND PARTICULAR. 

But one additional topic, connected with the present sub- 
ject, requires elucidation, to wit : The manner in which no- 
tions, general and abstract, and ideas and principles, universal 
and necessary, are eliminated from notions and judgments, con- 
crete and particular. 

General Notions. 
In answering this inquiry, I begin with general notions. 
We will take for example and illustration, the notion desig- 
nated by the word mountain. It is admitted, that in the first 
development of the Intelligence, there was no such general 
notion in the mind. The Intelligence began not with the gen- 
eral notion, but with the conception of some particular moun- 
tain which had before been an object of perception. How 
then is the general eliminated from the particular } Another 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 225 

mountain becomes an object of perception. Under the in- 
fluence of the associating principle, the first notion is recalled. 
The Judgment, as these perceptions are present on the the- 
atre of Consciousness, separates the elements common to the 
two. The Understanding now combines these common ele- 
ments into a new conception, under which the Judgment sub- 
sumes the two particulars. On the perception of a third 
mountain, the general notion, in a manner like that just de- 
scribed, undergoes a new modification, by which it embraces 
those elements only common to the three particulars, while 
each particular is again classed under the general. Thus the 
process goes on, till the notion under consideration assumes 
its most general form. This is the process by which gene- 
ral notions are, in all instances formed, a process so particu- 
larly elucidated in a former Chapter, that nothing further 
need be said upon it here. 

Abstract Notions. 

We will now consider the origin and genesis of abstract 
notions such as are designated by such such terms as redness, 
sweetness. These are distinguished from general notions, 
and also from necessary and universal ideas, by this charac- 
teristic. They designate some single quality of particular 
substances without reference to those substances. 

To form general notions, miore than one object must be 
given. To form abstract notions but one is required. Ex- 
ample : This apple is red. When we have separated the 
quality designated by the term red, from the subject to 
which it belongs, we then have the abstract notion desig- 
nated by the term redness. The same holds in all other 
instances. 

Universal and Necessary Ideas. 

In explaining the origin and genesis of universal and neces- 
sary ideas, in their abstract and universal form, we will take 
as the basis of our explanation and illustration the principle 
of causality, to wit : Every event has a cause. 

It is admitted, that originally, this principle is not given in 
this form. What is given ? Some particular event, and the 
affirmation of the Reason, This particular event had a cause. 
It is also admitted and affirmed, that the universal principle 
is not here, as is true of contingent general principles, given 
by the succession of particulars. For if you suppose the 



226 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

event repeated a thousand or a million times, all that you 
have in each instance is the particular event, and the parti- 
cular affirmation, This event had a cause. How then shall 
we account for the formation of the idea or principle under 
consideration ? Let us recur to the individual fact above al- 
luded to — the fact composed of two parts ; the empirical and 
absolute parts. We will leave out of view the idea of suc- 
cession, and confine ourselves to the one fact before us. 

By immediate abstraction let us suppose the separation of 
the empirical, and the disengagement of the necessary and 
absolute. We then have the pure idea of the absolute and 
necessary. This idea thus developed we find it impossible 
not to apply to all cases, real or supposed. We have then, 
and in this manner, the universal, necessary, and absolute 
idea or principle. 

This process might perhaps be more distinctly explained 
by a reference to the ideas of body and space. These ideas 
are not originally given in their present simple abstract form. 
They are given in such proportions as this : This particular 
body is somewhere, or in space. Here you have the empiri- 
cal part, body, and the necessary and absolute part, space. 
Separate the two, and you have the contingent idea of body, 
and the necessary and absolute idea of space. Hence the 
principle, universal, necessary, and absolute : Body sup- 
poses space. 

Error of Cousin* 
I have now a word to say upon a favorite principle of 
Cousin, that most necessary ideas, such as the idea of time, 
cause, &c., have their origin in Reflection, and what he 
calls a sentiment of the Will. The first succession of which 
we are conscious, he says, is some act of the Will, for the 
reason that we perceive nothing only on the condition that 
we attend to it, and the condition of attention is the Will. To 
this I reply : It is admitted that we know nothing, i. e. have 
a distinct knowledge of nothing, only on the condition of at- 
tention, and that the condition of attention is the Will. But 
from this it does not follow, that the act of attention is the 
first thing of which we are conscious. It maybe some feel- 
ing or thought, it being impossible for us to become distinct- 
ly conscious of the act of attention, till we attend to that. 
Equally false is his conclusion that the consciousness of our 
own proper causalty precedes any conception of the principle 



ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 227 

of causality. We are not conscious of our Will as a cause, 
but of the acts of the Will as mere phenomena. Succession 
within and without is nothing but succession. The first phe- 
nomenon that is observed by the mind, whether it is within 
or without us, develops the principle of causalty, or we can 
never account for its existence in the mind. 



CHAPTER XVI. 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 



Investigation and Reasoning distinguished. 

One department of inquiry of great importance still re- 
mains. When we have done with this, our inquiries in re- 
gard to the intellectual powers will have closed, only as far 
as we may find their operations combined with that of the 
other faculties or susceptibilities of the mind. 

The department to which I refer, is the employment of 
these powers in what is called a process of Investigation and 
Reasoning. These processes, though intimately connected, 
are entirely distinct, and should be carefully distinguished 
the one from the other. In the former process our exclusive 
object is the discovery of truth. In the latter, the object 
equally exclusive is, to prove the truth already discovered. 

Your attention in the present Chapter will be directed to 
the first process. Our inquiry is, What are the laws which 
govern the mind, or ought to govern the mind, in a process 
of Investigation of truth r 

Substances^ how known. 
All substances are revealed to us by their respective phe- 
nomena. Their existence^ not%nly, but their nature, char- 
acter, and powers, are revealed to us in this manner, and this 
manner exclusively. The induction of phenomena therefore 
lies at the basis of all our investigations pertaining to sub- 
stances. 

Induction of Phenomena, for what Purposes made. 

There are four purposes entirely distinct, for which an in- 
duction of phenomena is made : 

1. For the purpose of discovering the nature, charac- 
teristics, and powers of some particular substance. 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 229 

2. For the purpose of classification, into genera and 
species. 

3. For the purpose of discovering some general fact, or 
order of sequence. 

4. For the purpose of discovering universal laws, in con- 
formity to which the action of .<^ubstances is subordinated. 

Now the principles which should guide us in the induc- 
tion of phenomena depend upon the object we have in view 
in such induction. 

Induction pertaining to particular Substances. 
In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of deter- 
mining the characteristics, and powers of some particular 
substance, the following principles are of fundamental impor- 
tance in guiding our investigations. 

1. In marking the phenomena which appear, or the char- 
acteristics of particular phenomena, omit none which do ex- 
ist, and suppose none which do not exist. 

2. In determining the particular powers of the substance 
in the light of phenomena thus classified and characterized, 
undeviatingly adhere to the following principles. Pheno- 
mena, in their fundamental characteristics alike, suppose simi- 
lar powers. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics 
unlike, suppose dissimilar powers. In strict conformity to 
those principles, an attempt has been made, in a preceding 
part of the present Treatise, to determine, among other things, 
the different functions of the human Intelligence. Whether 
the effort has been successful, time will determine. 

Induction for purposes of Classification into Genera and Spe- 
cies. 
In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of classi- 
fication into genera and species, the following principles 
should be strictly adhered to : 

1. Fix definitely and distinctly upon the principle of clas- 
sification, whatever it may be. 

2. With a rigid regard to principle, range with the given 
class every object, whatever its diversities in other respects, 
which bears the characteristic mark. 

3. Strictly exclude from the class, every individual in 
which the characteristic mark is wanting. 

The correctness and apparently easy application of the 
above principles are so obvious, that it would seem, that every 
11 



230 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

one would find it very easy to apply them in all cases. 
But their rigid application, in cases where it is often most 
demanded, requires an intellectual integrity, and sternness of 
virtue, which the mass of mankind ''very little wot of." 
Every one almost would readily apply them to shells, and 
rocks, and earths, and beasts, and fowls, and fishes, and even 
to the objects in the firmament above us. But let us sup- 
pose that an individual has before him a correct definition of 
treason, murder, theft, and of kindred crimes punishable by 
the law, and that he should discover upon an only son, a 
dark spot, which, if carefully examined, would mark him as 
a subject of one of the crimes above named ; it would re- 
quire the stern virtue of a Brutus, to be willing to have inqui- 
sition made according to the principles of immutable justice. 
Cases which thus try the virtue of mankind are of very fre- 
quent occurrence. 

Finding a General Fact , or Order of Sequence. 
A general fact, as we have seen, is a quality which attaches 
itself to each individual of a given class. vSometimes it may 
be peculiar to this one class ; sometimes it may be common 
to it and other classes. In other instances, it may be an es- 
sential quality of one class, and a mere accident in connection 
with another. When we have ascertained a fact to be gen- 
eral, then when an individual of a given class appears, we 
know, without particular investigation, that the quality is also 
present. In determining the question whether a fact is strict- 
ly general, the only difficulty which presents itself, is in distin- 
guishing between an essential and accidental quality. These 
two principles should determine our conclusions under such 
circumstances : 

1. The existence or absence of perfect uniformity of ex- 
perience. 

2, Experience in such decisive circumstances, as to ren- 
der it certain, that the fact is or is not an essential, and not 
an accidental quality of the class. Nothing but good judg- 
ment can enable one to distinguish between decisive and 
indecisive facts under such circumstances. 

One of the most fruitful sources of error is based upon uni- 
formity of experience in certain circumstances. The ab- 
sence of such uniformity is certain evidence, that a fact has 
an accidental, and not a necessary connection with a certain 
class. Its presence, however, may constitute no certain 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 231 

ground for the opposite conclusion. The king of Japan, 
for example, reasoned very inconclusively, from an experi- 
ence perfectly unvarying in his circumstances, to the conclu- 
sion, that water never, under any circumstances, exists in any 
other than the fluid state. To separate the decisive from the 
indecisive, and rest our conclusions upon the former class of 
facts only, is the distinguishing characteristic of strong per- 
ceptive powers associated with good judgment. 

The Probable and Improbable. 
Between the perfectly certain and uncertain lie the proba- 
ble and improbable. If, as has been already said, a fact has 
been ascertained to have a necessary connection with a given 
class, its presence, when any individual of the class is met 
with, becomes perfectly certain. But if its connection is 
accidental, its existence in connection with a particular indivi- 
dual of the class becomes probable or improbable in propor- 
tion to the uniformity or want of uniformity of experience 
under similar circumstances. Much of the most serious 
transactions of life rests upon a calculation of probabilities. 

Order of Sequence. 
The object of investigation here is to ascertain, in refer- 
ence to given effects, those things which sustain to such 
effects the relation of real causes. The difficulty to be over- 
come, often consists in this. The real cause of a given 
effect may exist in connection with such combinations of pow- 
ers, that it may be difficult if not impossible for the beholder 
to determine which produced it. Under such circumstances, 
careful experiments, in connection with close observation, can 
alone determine the real order of sequence. There are four 
important principles which should be strictly adhered to, as 
tests of all our conclusions in relation to such investigations : 

1. When in each experiment, the combination has been 
different, with this exception, that one element has been pre- 
sent in all, and the given effect has in each instance arisen, we 
then conclude that this element is the real cause of the effect. 

2. When, on the removal of a certain element, the given 
effect disappears, while it remains, this being present, when 
each of the others is removed, we then conclude, that this 
particular element is the particular cause. 

3. When the given effect is the invariable consequent 
of the addition of a new element to a given combination, 



232 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

while the effect does not appear, when this antecedent is not 
added, we then fix upon this particular antecedent as the real 
cause. 

4. When a number of consequents exist in connection with 
a number of antecedents, and when a particular consequent in- 
variably disappears on the removal of a given antecedent, we 
fix upon the latter as the real cause of the former. 

The Discovery of Universal Law. 
In the induction of phenomena for the discovery of univer- 
sal law, three important principles are to be strictly adher- 
ed to. 

1. The phenomena must not merely consist with this par- 
ticular hypothesis, but demand it as their logical antecedent. 

2. Consequently such phenomena must contradict, with 
equal positiveness, every other contradictory hypothesis. 

3. AH phenomena to which the given hypothesis does not 
sustain the relations of logical antecedent, must be left wholly 
out of the account, as having no bearing upon the subject. 

But this subject has been so fully treated of in the preced- 
ing Chapter, that nothing further upon it is demanded here. 

TESTIRIONY. 

It often happens, and that in reference to subjects of the 
greatest importance, that the facts which constitute the basis 
of our inquiries after truth, have never been given to us as 
objects of Sense or Consciousness. We are compelled to 
receive or reject them on the testimony of others. From this 
source, the greatest part of our knowledge, and of the most 
important of our knowledge, is derived. 

The great inquiry here presents itself: What are the 
laws of evidence under the influence of which we judge our- 
selves bound to receive and act upon phenomena revealed to 
us through the affirmations of other minds ? Testimony is 
used for the same purpose that the faculties of wSense and 
Consciousness are used, to wit : for the ascertainment of 
facts, or phenomena, which constitute the basis of judgment 
in regard to a given subject. 

Characteristics of the Statements made by a Witness. 
The statements made by a witness may be contemplated 
in three points of light. 

1. In the light of the idea of possibility or impossibility. 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 233 

If an individual should affirm that an idiot, remaining such, 
had given a scientific demonstration of some of the most 
abstruse problems in the higher mathematics, we should give 
no credit at all to his statement, on the ground of a perceived 
impossibility of the occurrence of such a fact. Jf, on the 
other hand, the witness should affirm that an individual 
remaining an idiot up to a certain period, did, from that 
period, manifest a high degree of mental energy, we should 
pronounce the statement highly improbable, though not 
absolutely impossible in itself. The statement, therefore, is 
capable of being established-by testimony. 

2. The statement may also be contemplated in reference 
to the question whether in itself, aside from the character 
of the witness, it is credible or incredible. A statement 
characterized as impossible, is absolutely incredible. No 
weight of testimony can render it worthy of belief. An 
event also may be contemplated as possible, and yet the 
statement that it has actually occurred may be almost wholly 
wanting in respect to credibility. If it should be said that a 
pure spirit before the throne had, without any form of temp- 
tation from without or within, violated his duty to his God, 
we should hesitate to pronounce the occurrence impossible 
in itself. Yet we should deem it hardly credible. A state- 
ment, to be credible, must assert what is in itself perceived 
to be possible. It must also fall within the analogij of 
experience. Thus, to the great mass of mankind, there is 
wanting entirely any experience of a direct revelation from 
God. Yet the existence of such a revelation for the good 
of the race, is analogous to what all have experienced of the 
Divine beneficence to man. There is, therefore, nothing in- 
credible in the statement, that such a revelation has been 
made. A statement, then, which affirms the occurrence 
of an event in itself possible, and which falls within the 
analogy of experience, is capable of being rendered worthy 
of all confidence by testimony. 

3. A statement is in itself probable or improbable, when it 
does or does not accord with general experience in similar 
circumstances. A thing may be possible, and, at the same 
time, very improbable. No one would say that it is abso- 
lutely impossible that a die, when thrown, should fall twenty 
times in succession with the same number uppermost. Yet 
all would pronounce such an occurrence in an extreme 
degree improbable. An improbable event may be rendered 



234 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

worthy of belief by testimony. A much higher degree, 
however, is demanded to establish such an occurrence, than 
one which accords with what we have had experience of in 
similar circumstances. 

Circumstances which go to establish the Credibility of a Wit- 
ness. 
We will now consider the circumstances which go to 
establish the credibility of a witness. Among them, I will 
specify the following, without enlarging upon any of them. 

1. The most important characteristic is a character for 
veracity. 

2. The next is a capacity to comprehend the particular 
facts to which he bears testimony. 

3. Full opportunity to have observed the facts, together 
with evidence that adequate attention was given to them at 
the time. 

4. Evidence that the occurrence was of such a nature 
that the individual was not deceived at the time, and that it 
sustains such a relation to the individual, as to preclude the 
reasonable apprehension that his memory has failed him in 
respect to it. 

5. An entire consistency between the statements of the 
witness and his conduct in respect to the events, the occur- 
rence of which he affirms. If an individual affirms his entire 
confidence in the veracity of a certain person, and his entire 
treatment of him is in full harmony with his statements, we 
are bound to admit the truth of what the witness testifies in 
relation to his own convictions. 

Corroborating Circumstances aside from the Character of the 
Witness. 
But there are circumstances often attending the testimony 
of a witness, totally disconnected with the question of his 
veracity, which demand our confidence. Among these, I 
specify the following : 

1. The entire absence of all motives to give false testi- 
mony. This principle is based upon the assumption, that 
men do not act without some motive, and that consequently 
they will not ordinarily violate the principles of truth without 
some temptation to do it. 

2. When no assignable motives exist to induce an indi- 
vidual to make a given statement, if he is not convinced of 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 235 

its truth, and when strong motives impel him to deny it, 
especially if it is false, then we recognize ourselves as obli- 
gated to believe his statements without reference to his moral 
character at all. 

3. Another circumstance which tends strongly to corrobo- 
rate the statements of a witness is this : When the facts 
afRrmed lie along the line of our own experience in similar 
circumstances. This, however, is not a safe principle to 
rely upon, in the absence of other circumstances of strong 
corroboration. Villains often throw their statements into 
harmony with experience, for the purpose of covering their 
dark designs. 

4. When, though neWj, they accord with the known powers 
of the agent to whom they are ascribed. 

5. When these facts stand connected with the develop- 
ment of laws and properties in the agent, before unknown. 

Under such circumstances, the further removed from ex- 
perience the facts are, the greater probability of their being 
true. Because the greater probability that they would, if 
not true, have been unknown to the witness. 

Concurrent Testimony. 
The confidence which we repose in the affirmations of a 
witness is greatly strengthened by the concurrent testimony 
of other individuals. Here the following circumstances 
should be especially taken into the account : 

1 . When each witness possesses all the marks of credi- 
bility above referred to. 

2. When there is an entire concurrence in their statements, 
or a concurrence in respect to all material facts. 

3. When the characters of the several witnesses are wide- 
ly different, as friends and enemies, &c., and who of course 
must be influenced by widely different motives, and even by 
those directly the opposite ; especially when their charac- 
ters, motives, and relations to the subject are so different as 
to preclude the supposition of a collusion between the wit- 
nesses. 

4. When one witness states facts omitted by others, and 
" when all the statements together make up a complete account 

of the whole transaction. 

5. When there are apparent contradictions between the 
statements of the witnesses, which a more enlarged acquaint- 
ance with the whole subject fully reconciles. Such occur- 



236 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rences in testimony preclude the supposition of collusion, 
and present each individual as an independent, honest wit- 
ness in the case. 

6. Coincidences often occur in the statements of witnesses 
which, from the nature of the case, are manifestly undesign- 
ed. When such occurrences attend the testimony of various 
individuals, all affirming the same great leading facts, they 
tend strongly to confirm the testimony given. This princi- 
ple is most beautifully illustrated by Dr. Paley, in his Horse 
Paulinse— a work deserving more attention than almost any- 
thing else the Doctor ever wrote. 

Great care and sound judgment are requisite in the appli- 
cation of the principles above stated. When they are ful- 
filled in the case of testimony pertaining to any subject, it 
would be the height of presumption and moral depravity in 
us not to act upon it as true. Infinite interests may be 
safely based upon the validity of such testimony. W"e are 
often necessitated to decide and act, however, in the absence 
of testimony thus full and complete, and often upon testi- 
mony failing in many respects of the marks of credibility- 
above laid down. To discern between the valid and the 
invalid — to determine correctly when to trust and when to 
withhold confidence, requires stern integrity of heart, and a 
Judgment, " by reason of use exercised," to distinguish the 
true from the false. 



CHAPTER XVIL 



REASONING, 

The distinction between Reasoning and Investigation was 
made plain in the last Chapter. The former process has 
nothing to do with the discovery of truth. Its exclusive ob- 
ject is the establishment of truth already discovered. It 
belongs to Intellectual Philosophy to develop the law of 
Reasoning — that is, to develop those laws which control the 
action of the Intelligence, when drawing conclusions from 
premises laid down. 

TTie Syllogism the universal Form of Reasoning. 

I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by 
the following quotation from Whately's Logic : 

" In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense 
of the word, i.e. make use of argument, either for the sake 
of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of 
satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the 
subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in 
the mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided 
it be correctly conducted." Again : " In pursuing the sup- 
posed investigation, it will be found that every conclusion is 
deduced in reality from two other propositions (thence call- 
ed premises), for though one of them may be, and commonly 
is suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted ; 
as may be made evident by supposing the denial of the sup- 
posed premise, which will at once invalidate the argument." 

Hence this author affirms, in opposition to the opinion of 
some on the subject, that the syllogistic is not a particular 
kind of reasoning, as distinguished from moral or induc- 
tive reasoning, for example ; but the sole and universal 
process. 

11» 



238 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The above Principle verified. 

That this author is correct in the principle above stated, a 
very few considerations will render evident. 

That all reasoning, purely demonstrative, is strictly con- 
formed to the law of the syllogism, none will deny. As 
an example and illustration of this kind of reasoning, we 
may take the following: Things equal to the same thing 
are equal to one another. A and B are each equal to C. 
Therefore they are equal to one another. The major pre- 
mise, in all such processes, is either an intuition of Reason, 
or some proposition previously demonstrated. 

But inductive Reasoning has by some been supposed to be 
an exception, because that, in the syllogism, we go from the 
general to the particular ; whereas, in the inductive process, 
we reason from the particular to the general. This objec- 
tion, if valid, would equally exclude almost the entire mass 
of demonstrative reasoning. Here also we do in reality go 
from the particular to the universal — that is, the minor pre- 
mise is particular. This objection assumes also what is not 
true of the syllogism — that is, that in all instances, in the 
syllogistic form, we reason from the general to the particu- 
lar. All reasoning is strictly conformed to the laws of the 
syllogism, wherein a conclusion is legitimately drawn from 
two premises, a major and a minor. In induction, as well as 
everywhere else, these two premises appear, the major being 
almost universally suppressed. In no form of reasoning 
legitimately conducted is the conclusion more extensive than 
the major premise. When we reason from the particular to 
the general, we always do it under the assumption (and this 
assumption is the suppressed major) that what is true of the 
particular, is also true of the class to which the individual 
belongs. 

Forms in which the Major Premise appears. 
There are three forms in which what is called the major 
premise, that which asserts the universal or general fact, is 
expressed ; a circumstance which has led others to suppose 
that there are three kinds of reasoning, of which the syllo- 
gism is one. These forms are the categorical, in which the 
general fact is directly affirmed or denied — the hypothetical, 
in which the general principle is hypothetically affirmed or 
denied, as in the proposition, If A is B, C is D — and the 



REASONING. Q29 

disjunctive, in which a fact is affirmed to attach to some one 
of a given number, without determining which, as in the 
proposition A is either in C or D. 

The categorical we have already considered. It remains 
to consider the last two. Now a moment's reflection will 
convince us, that a hypothetical premise is nothing but a 
universal put into the form of a particular. The proposi- 
tion, for example, If Caesar was an usurper he deserved 
death, is nothing more than the universal proposition, All 
usurpers deserve death, expressed in a concrete and parti- 
cular form. The same holds in respect to all propositions 
of a similar character. A hypothetical proposition is no- 
thing but a general or universal principle hypothesized in re- 
spect to a particular case. 

A careful analysis will show that a disjunctive proposition, 
also, is in reality nothing but a general, or universal propo- 
sition, expressed in a concrete and particular form. When, 
for example, we say, A is either in B or C ; it is not in B, 
therefore it is in C, we find, on analysis, that the first premise 
contains a universal principle, expressed in a concrete and 
particular form. The principle is this — when an element 
must exist in connection with some one of a given class, to 
prove that it does not attach to some one or more of the 
members, is to prove that it does belong to those, be 
they one or more, that remain. The syllogism, therefore, 
might be thus expressed : If C is not in one of the two, it is 
in the other. It is not in one, to wit, B. Therefore it is in 
C. The syllogism then is not a particular form of reasoning, 
but the universal and exclusive form. 

Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions from a 
Process of Reasoning. 
All conclusions in a process of reasoning are, of course, 
either affirmative, as A is B, or negative, as A is not B. 
Such conclusions rest upon two distinct and opposite princi- 
ples, on which all reasoning, legitimately conducted, rests. 

1. All terms which agree with one and the same term, 
agree with one another. 

2. All terms which agree with a particular term, differ 
from all others which disagree with the same term. 

Remarks upon these Principles. 
On the former principle all affirmative^ and on the latter 



240 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY-. 

all negative conclusions rest. All reasoning strictly conform- 
ed to these principles, must be right, and all which transgres- 
ses them, must be wrong. 

It will be perceived also, that these principles are nothing 
more than particular forms of the axioms common to all 
sciences, as the axiom in mathematics, " Things equal to the 
same thing are equal to one another," &c. 

In the celebrated dictum of Aristotle, these two principles 
are expressed in one formula, to wit : Whatever may be af- 
firmed or denied of any term distributed (i. e. taken univer' 
sally) J may be affirmed or denied of every particular compre- 
hended under thai term. 

Remarks on ^ristotle'^s Dictum. 

The two principles under consideration, thrown into this 
form, are not rendered more distinct and simple than they 
were before ; nor, in my judgment, are they rendered as dis- 
tinct as when they appear in their separate form, the form in 
which they are announced in connection with all other sciences. 
Throwing them into this form has also, I believe, induced 
two quite common mistakes connected with the science of 
logic. 

The first is the impression noticed above, that the syllogism 
is exclusively confined to one kind of reasoning, to wit : that 
in which we proceed from the universal to the particular. 
From the form of the principles, as announced in the dictum, 
we should suppose that this must be the case in respect to 
all reasoning conformed to the syllogism ; whereas, no such 
difficulty even apparently attaches to these principles, when 
announced in their distinct and separate forms. 

The second mistake is found in the somewhat harmless, 
but very useless labor, which we meet with in the common 
Treatises on Logic, of reducing all the syllogisms in the last 
three figures to the first. This is done because that in this 
last named figure only, is the dictum directly applicable to 
the syllogism. Now what is the real use of these reduc- 
tions ? Are the two terms more fully compared with one 
and the same third, or is their agreement or disagreement 
with that term, and consequently with each other, more dis- 
tinct, in the first figure than in all the legitimate moods in 
either of the others ? By no means. Take, as an illustra- 
tion, the following s341ogism in Camestres, in the second fig- 
ure. Every X is Z. No Y is Z. Therefore no Y is X. 



REASONING. 241 

This syllogism reduced to Celarent in the first figure, would 
stand thus : No Z is Y. Every X is Z. Therefore no X 
is Y ; the converse of the conclusion above obtained, and 
which, by simple conversion, may be changed into the same, 
to wit, no Y is X. Now I ask, is the proposition. No Y is 
X, rendered any more evident by all this process than it was 
before ? Are X and Y more distinctly compared with Z, or 
is the fact that one agrees, and the other disagrees with that 
term, and consequently that they disagree with each other, more 
distinct and palpable, in the last instance, than in the first ? 
If any person can see the difference between them, they can 
see what I cannot. Of what use then is all this labor at re- 
duction ? This only : the student is taxed with much labor 
in the conversion and transposition of propositions, under the 
promise of additional light upon the correctness of conclu- 
sions previously obtained upon principles undeniably legi- 
timate. The result is, that his conclusions are rendered not 
one whit more distinct or valid to his view than they were 
before. No science should be burdened with useless labor. 
Logic, like all other sciences, with these principles in their 
distinct and separate forms, is far better off without the dic- 
tum than with it. 

DIFFERENT KINDS OF REASONING. 

We are now prepared for a contemplation of the different 
kinds of reasoning resulting from the nature of the different 
subjects upon which the Intelligence is employed in such 
processes. I will introduce my remarks upon this depart- 
ment of our inquiries, with the following quotation from 
Coleridge : 

" Every man must feel, that though he may not be 
exerting different faculties, he is exerting his faculties in a 
different way, when in one instance he begins with some one 
self-evident truth (that the radii of a circle, for instance, are 
all equal), and in consequence of this being true, sees at 
once, without any actual experience, that some other thing 
must be true likewise, and that, this being true, some third 
thing must be equally true, and so on, till he comes, we will 
say, to the properties of the lever, considered as the spoke 
of a circle ; which is capable of having all its marvellous 
powers demonstrated even to a savage who had never seen a 
lever, and without supposing any other previous knowledge 



242 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in his mind, but this one, There is a conceivable figure, all 
possible lines from the middle to the circumference of which 
are of the same length : or when, in the second instance, he 
brings together the facts of experience, each of which has its 
own separate value, neither increased nor diminished by the 
truth of any other fact which may have preceded it ; and 
making these several facts bear upon some particular project, 
and finding some in favor of it, and some against the project, 
according as one or the other class of facts preponderates : as, 
for instance, whether it would be better to plant a particular 
spot of ground with larch, or with Scotch fir, or with oak in 
preference to either. Surely every man will acknowledge 
that his mind was very differently employed in the first case 
from what it was in the second, and all men have agree.1 to 
call the results of the first class the truths of science^ such as 
not only are true, but which it is impossible to conceive 
otherwise : while the results of the second class are called 
facts, or things of experience : and as to these latter we must 
often content ourselves with the grea.ter probability., that they 
are so, or so, rather than otherwise — nay, even when we 
have no doubt that they are so in the particular case, we 
never presume to assert that they must continue so always, 
and under all circumstances On the contrary, our conclu- 
sions depend altogether on contingent circumstances. Now 
when the mind is employed, as in the case first mentioned, I 
call it Reasoning, or the use of the pure Reason ; but, in the 
second case, the Understanding or Frudence.'''' 

Without reference to the propriety of the peculiar use here 
made of the terms Reasoning, Understanding, and Prudence, 
I would observe, that no one can doubt the reality of the 
distinction between the kinds of reasoning designated in this 
passage. The question arises. What is this distinction ? 
What are the peculiarities which distinguish the one kind of 
reasoning from the other .'' 

Distinctions Elucidated. 

1. One ground of distinction is found in the nature of the 
objects of ratiocination in the two instances referred to. 
In the first example the objects are pure and necessary 
conceptions of Reason. In the second, the objects are reali- 
ties contingent and particular. 

2. In the first instance no elements exist in the objects but 
what are perfectly known to the mind. No unknown 



REASONING. 243 

elements exist to vitiate our conclusions. In the second 
instance what is known exists in connection with elements of 
which we are totally ignorant, and which may operate in the 
production of results precisely opposite to the conclusions 
which we have drawn from what we do know. 

3. Consequently, in the first instance, our conclusions 
involve nothing but universal, necessary, and absolute know- 
ledge. In the second instance, the utmost that we obtain is, 
conclusions more or less probable, according to the degree 
in which the known may be affected by the unknown, to wit, 
conclusions not necessary but contingent. 

Distinction hetuoee.n Demonstrative and Probable Reasoning. 

The distinction between demonstrative and probable, or, 
as it is sometimes improperly called, moral reasoning, can 
now be readily pointed out. When the properties and rela- 
tion of objects embracing no elements which are not perfectly 
known, are systematically evolved in the light of axioms and 
postulates, which are the intuitions of Reason, the result is 
absolute demonstration. If the objects themselves are pure 
ideas of Reason, the conclusions will be universal and neces- 
sary. If the objects are contingent, such will be the conclu- 
sions. The result, however, is pure demonstration, in both 
instances alike. The syllogism, for example, every X is Y, 
every Z is X, and therefore every Z is Y, is perfect demon- 
stration, whatever the objects represented by the terms 
may be. 

On the other hand, when we attempt to determine ques- 
tions pertaining to events depending in part upon circumstan- 
ces which we know, and in part upon others which we do 
not know, and in a state of ignorance of the influence of that 
which is unknow^n in determining the result, or w^hen we 
attempt, in the light of fundamental principles, to determine 
the relations and properties of substances embracing elements 
known and unknown, and while we are ignorant of the ex- 
tent in which these relations and properties depend upon the 
unknown elements, then our conclusions are in no sense 
demonstration, but partake of probabilities greater or less, 
according to the degree in which the known or unknown ele- 
ments preponderate. Thus we have a distinct view of the 
broad distinction between the two kinds of reasoning un- 
der consideration. It does not lie in the nature of the objects 
to which such reasoning pertains, but in the relations of the 



244 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

objects to our Intelligence. Were all objects as perfectly 
known to the mind, as the objects treated of in the mathema- 
tics, then all reasoning M'ould be alike demonstrative. 

Common Impression in respect to the Extent of Demonstrative 
Reasoning. 
" If," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " the account which has 
been given of demonstrative evidence be admitted, the pro- 
vince over which it extends must be limited almost entirely 
to the objects of the pure mathematics." With this state- 
ment there is quite an extensive argreement, I believe, 
among philosophers. The reasons assigned for the above 
conclusion are the following : 

1. The fact, that the basis of all mathematical demonstra- 
tions, are axioms and postulates which are intuitively certain. 

2. That every step from these axioms and postulates to the 
remotest conclusions, is equally intuitive. 

3. That the terms employed are so few, and distinctly de- 
fined, that they cannot be misapprehended. 

The principle assumed is, that no other science is capable of 
possessing the above characteristics, and consequently that no 
other science can so properly be called demonstrative. 

Let us first inquire, whether the mathematics is the only 
science based upon axioms and postulates intuitively certain. 
Take as an illustration the following axiom in mathematics : 
The whole of a thing is greater than any of its parts, and com- 
pare it with the following affirmation of Reason : Every event 
has a cause. Which is the least certain ? Neither. Thus 
I might show by an induction of many particulars, that all the 
fundamental principles of morals and religion are as intuitive- 
ly certain as any of the primary intuitions of the mathema- 
tics. 

Permit me in the next place to ask^ whether there are no 
important truths resulting with as intuitive certainty from the 
primary truths of morals as from those of the mathematics .'' 
Take the following intuition in morals : " Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor as thyself," and consider the following proposi- 
tion based upon it : " Love worketh no ill to his neighbor." 
Consequently the man that does his neighbor a deliberate 
injury cannot be actuated by the principle of love. The 
above conclusion is of great practical importance, and yet I 
shall not hesitate to pronounce it as absolute a demonstration 
as can be found in Geometry. So of the numberless other 



REASONING. 245 

truths based upon the primary intuitions of morals and re- 
ligion. 

In regard to the last peculiarity of mathematics I have only 
to say that when the principles of morals are as definitely set- 
tled as those of the mathematics (and no reason but a false 
philosophy can be assigned why they have not been thus set- 
tled long ago), we may expect the same precision in morals 
as in any other science. 

Method of Proof . 
Having shown' that all reasoning resolves itself into two 
classes, demonstrative and probable, another topic demand- 
ing attention is the method of proofs or the general mode to 
be adopted in proving a proposition, the truth of which has 
been already ascertained. In the last Chapter I endeavored 
to develop those laws of belief which should guide the mind 
in its inquiries after truth. Now when truth has been dis- 
covered and adopted in conformity with those rules, and we 
wish to present arguments for the purpose of conveying to 
other minds the same convictions which exist in our own, 
one rule of fundamental importance presents itself. Present 
those considerations by which our own mind has been con- 
vinced. This rule might, at first thought, seem to be so ob- 
viously proper, and so manifestly of universal application, as 
to render its statement entirely unnecessary. But there is no 
rule which is more frequently transgressed, and for the ob- 
vious reason, that few persons practise self-reflection suffi- 
ciently to render themselves distinctly conscious of the real 
ground of their assent to a vast majority of the truths which 
they believe. Hence it very commonly happens, that when 
individuals are called upon to assign reasons for propositions 
which they m,ost firmly believe to be true, they for the first 
time, perhaps, begin to doubt the reality of the objects of their 
faith. This most frequently happens, perhaps, in reference 
to truths the most obvious, and with which the mind is most 
familiar. The reason of this most singular fact is obvious. 
We seldom recur to the grounds of our belief in truths so ob- 
vious and familiar, that they have been universally admitted. 
— The evidence of such truths has come into the mind un- 
sought. The reverse is the fact with respect to truths less 
obvious and familiar. 

Real Proof found in no other Method. 
On reflection, it will appear evident, that in no other me- 



246 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tbod of argumentation is real proof to be met with. We may 
show an individual that the truth of a given proposition ne- 
cessarily results from principles which he admits. But this 
(the argumentiim ad hominenh)^ is mere hypothetical, and 
not real proof. For if the principles of the individual are 
false, the argument is good for nothing, as far as the real es- 
tablishment of truth is concerned. The same may be said of 
every other kind of proof, but that of which we are speaking. 

Sources of Fallacies in Reasoning. 
Assuming the proposition which 1 have endeavored to es- 
tablish, as true, to wit : That every conclusion in a process 
of reasoning is based upon two propositions, called premises, 
the place where fallacies in reasoning are to be found, if they 
exist, may be readily pointed out. They nmst be found in 
one or both of the premises, or in the conclusion. Hence, in 
examining any particular process of reasoning, such questions 
as these are of fundamental importance. — What is the propo- 
sition which the author is aiming to establish ? What prin- 
ciples has he assumed as previously established or as self- 
evident ? Are these principles legitimately assumed ? What 
statements does he propose as matters of fact ? Are they au- 
thentic ? ' Do they belong to the principle to which they are 
applied ? Do his conclusions legitimately result from the 
premises laid down ? By such questions as these, fallacies, 
if they exist, may commonly be detected. Four great ques- 
tions, I repeat, should be asked, if we would determine cor- 
rectly whether a proposition has been proved, by a given 
process of argumentation, to wit: What is the precise nature 
of the. proposition which is the subject of the argument } 
What are the premises or arguments by which the proposi- 
tion has been sustained ? Are these premises sound ? And 
does the conclusion legitimately result from the premises .'' 
If fallacies have been introduced into the process, we shall 
thus discover their particular hiding-places, and know how to 
bring them into the light. 

CONCEPTION OF LOGIC. 

The object of the present and preceding Chapter has been 
to lay down certain great principles, in respect to the discov- 
ery of truth, and its establishment by a process of argumen- 
tation. In this department of our investigations, it remains 
to speak of but one additional topic, the Conception of Logic. 



REASONING. 247 

All Things occur according to Rules. 

" Everything in nature," says Kant, and this is one of his 
most important thoughts, "•' as well in the inanimate as in the 
animated world, happens or is done according to rules, though 
we do not always know them. Water falls according to the 
laws of gravitation, and the motion of walking is performed 
by animals according to rules. The fish in the water, the 
bird in the air, moves according to rules." 

Again : " There is nowhere any want of rule. When we 
think we find that "want, we can only say that, in this case, 
the rules are unknown to us." 

The exercise of our Intelligence is not an exception to the 
above remark. When we speak, our language is thrown 
into harmony with rules, to which we conform without, in 
most instances, a reflective consciousness of their existence. 
Grammar is nothing but a systematic development of these 
rules. So also when we judge a proposition to be true or 
false, or to be proved or disproved by a particular process of 
argumentation ; or when we attempt to present to our- 
selves, for self-satisfaction, or to others for the purpose of 
convincing them, the grounds of our own convictions — that 
is, when we reason, our Intelligence proceeds according to 
fixed rules. When we have judged or reasoned correctly., 
we find ourselves able, on reflection, to develop the rules in 
conformity to which we judged and reasoned, without a dis- 
tinct consciousness of the fact. In the light of these rules, 
•we are then able to detect the reason and grounds of falla- 
cious judgments and reasonings. 

Logic defined. 
The above remarks have prepared the w^ay for a distinct 
statem.ent of the true conception of Logic. It is a syste- 
matic development of those rules in conformity to which the 
universal Intelligence acts, in judging and reasoning. Logic, 
according to this conception, would naturally divide itself into 
two parts — a development of those rules to which the Intel- 
ligence conforms in all acts of correct judgment and reason- 
ing, and a development of those principles by which false 
judgments and reasonings may be distinguished from the 
true. A Treatise on Logic, in which the laws of judging 
and reasoning are evolved in strict conformity to the above 
conception, would realize the idea of science as far as this 



248 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

subject is concerned. Logic, to judging and reasoning, is 
what Grammar is to speaking and writing. Logic pertains 
not at all to tlie particular objects about which the Intelli- 
gence is, from time to time, employed, but to rules or 
laws in conformity to which it does act, whatever the ob- 
jects may be. 

Relations of Locjic to other Sciences. 
In the chronological order of intellectual procedure. Logic 
is preceded by judging and reasoning, just as speaking and 
writing precede Grammar. In the logical order, however, it 
is the antecedent of all other sciences. In all sciences the 
Intelligence, from given data, judges in respect to truths 
resulting from such data. We also reason from such data 
for the establishment of such truths. Logic develops the 
laws of thought which govern the action of the Intelligence 
in all such procedures. As a science, it is distinct from all 
other sciences, yet it permeates them all, giving laws to the 
Intelligence, in all its judgments and reasonings, whatever 
the objects may be about which it is employed. 



CHAPTER XVII 1. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 

There are a few topics of a miscellaneous character connect- 
ed with our previous investigation, which I have reserved for 
fi distinct and separate Chapter. The first to which I would 
direct attention is, 

The Bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Science^ mo- 
peril/ so called. 
In the philosophy of Locke, axioms have no place, except 
as objects of ridicule and contempt. He directly denies that 
any science whatever is founded upon them. Equally re- 
moved from his philosophy are all ideas of pure Reason. 
All the objects of knowledge are qualities external and inter- 
nal. Now in what sense and in what form is science per- 
taining to any subject possible, according to the fundamental 
principles of this philosophy ? The answer which I give to 
this question is this : In no form whatever is science of any 
kind possible, according to the fundamental principles of this 
philosophy. We will take in illustration the science of 
external and material substances. All that we know of 
these substances, according to this philosophy, is by sensa- 
tion — that is, qualities, and nothing else. Now the first step 
in a scientific process pertaining to these qualities, is that of 
making abstraction of them, in thought, separating those which 
differ, and uniting those which agree. On what condition 
can this process take place ? On one condition only, to wit : 
that we have in our minds the ideas of resemblance and 
difference. But these ideas are pure conceptions of Reason, 
and are not given by sensation at all. Sensation may give 
the colors red and yellow, for example ; but it can never 
give the fact, that the one color differs from the other. This 



250 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

judgment is conditioned on the prior existence in the mind 
of a pure conception of Reason, the ideas above named. 
But the reality of such ideas this philosophy denies. It 
thereby, in its fundamental principles, renders the first step 
in a scientific process impossible. 

But let us suppose that this philosophy did admit of ab- 
straction. Simple classification and generalization would be 
possible — that is, these qualities, as they exist in combina- 
tion, might be classed into genera and species, and then 
qualities, common to all individuals of given classes, might 
be found. This would be the utmost limit of scientific pro- 
cedure, according to this philosophy, and this comprehends 
the limits of the sphere of the Intelligence as presented in 
the school of Locke. But this is the starting point of real 
science, properly defined. When substances have been 
classified and generalized, the Intelligence is then broughj 
into circumstances to evolve their properties and relations in 
the light of fundamental ideas. This is science — a thing im- 
possible according to the philosophy of Locke. 

In the denial of the axioms, also, as the foundation of 
science, Locke renders science of all kinds impossible. Sup- 
pose we did not know the axiom. Things equal to the same 
thing are equal to one another, how could we affirm that be- 
cause A and B are equal to C, therefore they are equal to 
one another ? It would be impossible to make such an aflBr- 
mation. The same holds in respect to every step in all the 
sciences, pure and mixed. Take away the axioms, and 
"darkness all, and ever-during night" enshrouds the sun of 
science. Whenever we meet with scientific Treatises in the 
school of Locke (and we meet with many), thej' exist in 
spite of his philosophy, and not as a consequent of it. 

KANt's distinction between ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL 
JUDGMENTS. 

I have reserved for this place, the consideration of the dis- 
tinction above named, a distinction w hich constitutes one of 
the fundamental peculiarities of the philosophy of Kant, and 
which laid the foundation for the various systems which have 
risen out of the principles and fragments of his philosophy. 

Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined and distin- 
guished. 
The first thing to be done is to define these judgments, 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS- 251 

and to distinguish the one from the other. All judgments 
pertain to the relation between a subject and predicate. 
This relation is possible only in two ways. Either the pre- 
dicate is really contained in the subject, and the judgment 
evolves, or designates it as a quality necessarily embraced in 
our conception of the subject ; or the predicate lies complete- 
ly out of the subject, although it sustains a certain relation 
to it. Thus when we affirm that all bodies are extended, 
the predicate is really embraced in our conception of the sub- 
ject ; since it is impossible to conceive of a body which is 
not extended. The judgment in this case simply designates 
the quality named as thus embraced in the conception. All 
such judgments proceed on the principle of contradiction. 
No individual for example can deny the proposition, All bo- 
dies are extended, without contradicting the essential concep- 
tion which every one has of body. All such judgments, Kant 
denominates analytical. To find them, we have only to 
analyze our conceptions and find the elements essentially 
embraced in them 

On the other hand, when we say all bodies are heavy, the 
predicate does not, as in the former case, lie within the sub- 
ject, as an essential element of our conception of the subject. 
We cannot conceive of body w^hich is not extended. But 
w^e can conceive of body as extended, without including in the 
conception the idea of weight. That all bodies have w^eight, 
we learn from experience alone. Through experience this 
element is added to our notions of body. All judgments of 
this character, Kant denominates synthetical. 

All pure experience-judgments are synthetical, that is, 
when, by investigation, we have discovered, as connected 
with an object, or an essential element of it, some quality un- 
known before, we then, in thought, add that quality to our 
former conception of the object. 

But we find, on analysis of our judgments, that we have 
not only empirical, but a priori judgments, which are syn- 
thetical. Of this character are all the primary principles of 
Reason-judgments, such as, Body supposes space : succession 
time ; events causes, &c. In all such judgments the predicate 
is not contained in the subject, as an essential element of any 
conception of that subject, but lies wholly without it, and 
the Judgment affirms the relation betv/een them. 

Thus far the anal3-sis of Kant is deeply profound and cor- 
rect. Much light is thrown thereby upon the procedure of 



252 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the Intelligence. Further, -when this philosopher affirms 
that all the sciences ^' contain synthetical judgments, a 
'priori^ as principles," he has asserted a true and very impor- 
tant fact. When philosophers have discovered new and im- 
portant principles, however, they are very much exposed to 
become intoxicated by their own discoveries, and, as a con- 
sequence, employ such principles in destroying the temple of 
philosophy, instead of adding them as polished stones to that 
temple. Whether this philosopher has done this in the in- 
stance under consideration, remains to be seen. 

Errors of Kant in the Application of the above Principles. 
At first thought, it would appear that the principles above 
elucidated would be very harmless, at least, in their results 
(and so they will be foiind to be when legitimately applied), 
and that they would lead to no disastrous conclusions per- 
taining to the validity of our knowledge relative to realities 
within and around us. Yet upon these principles, this philoso- 
pher has founded most of his conclusions, in which the vaHdity 
of our faculties, in reference to all affirmations pertaining to 
realities, material and mental, finite and infinite, is denied. 
The conclusions to which he pushes these principles, may be 
thus stated : 

1. Not only are all experience-judgments synthetical, but 
also all judgments of pure science, such, for example, as 
mathematical judgments. 

2. As in all such judgments the predicate lies wholly out 
of the subject, such judgments have no claim whatever to 
objective validity. They are entirely foundationless. In 
themselves they are without foundation, of course, and as 
the predicate lies wholly out of the subject, it can have no 
foundation in that. 

3. As such judgments are themselves without foundation, 
so also must be all sciences founded on them as principles. 

4. As all pure sciences rest exclusively upon such judg- 
ments, and as all judgments pertaining to such sciences, 
such for example, as mathematics, are purely synthetical, 
such sciences, with all judgments pertaining to them, are 
wholly without any objective validity. 

5. As synthetical judgments, a priori^ precede as laws of 
thought, and determine the character of all experience- 
judgments, and all conclusions based upon them, these last 
judgments, like the former, are wholly destitute of all claims 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 253 

to objective validity. The entire fabric of human know- 
ledge, consequently, falls. Our intelligence is exclusively a 
faculty of cognizing as real, what has no existence out of the 
cognition-faculty itself The universe, material and mental, 
God, liberty, and immortality, are the unreal objects of 
foundationless conceptions. Yet they are objects which 
we are bound to treat as real, because our cognition-faculty 
presents them as such, and practical Reason, that function of 
Reason which teaches what we ought to do, affirms our ob- 
ligation thus to treat them. 

6. On no other supposition than that such is the nature 
and procedure of the cognition-faculty, can we account for 
the possibility of synthetical judgments, a piiori, of sciences 
all of whose judgments are synthetical, together with 
the relations above stated of synthetical judgments to expe- 
rience. The existence of synthetical judgments reveals the 
nature of the cognition-faculty, and determines the character 
of its whole procedure. The basis of the whole system of 
knowledge is synthetical judgments, having no claim to ob- 
jective validity. The entire superstructure receives its 
form and dimensions from such judgments. The building, 
therefore, cannot be more substantial or real than the founda- 
tion on which it rests. 

Such is the system of this philosopher, a system moulded 
from the airy materials, and built upon the airy foundation, 
under consideration. It now remains to point out the errors, 
not in the distinctions made by Kant between analytical 
and synthetical judgments, but in the use he has made of 
these principles thus distinguished. 

1. Kant has failed to mark the real relations existing be- 
tween the subject and predicate, in synthetical judgments. 
Had he distinctly marked this relation (the failure to do 
which being a capital error in philosophy), he would have 
perceived at once, that no such conclusions can be drawn 
from those judgments as he supposed. But what is this re- 
lation ? In a synthetical judgm.ent, the predicate lies out of 
the subject, to be sure, and is not included in it, as is true in 
analytical judgments. In the former, however, the predicate 
sustains to the subject the relation of logical antecedent. 
Now such a judgment is self-evidently as valid, for things 
in themselves, as a judgment which affirms of a subject, an 
element embraced in our conceptions of that subject. The 
connection between the subject and predicate is no less-real, 
12 



254 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and no less necessary, in one case than in the other. We 
find, then, no more reason to question the vahdity of syn- 
thetical judgments for things in themselves, than to question 
those which are purely analyticaL 

2. The second and great error of Kant in the use which 
he has made of the judgments under consideration, is the 
affirmation, that in all pure sciences, in mathematics for 
example, all judgments are synthetical, whereas, all such 
judgments, with the exception of the primitive, are exclu- 
sively analytical. This is evident from the fact, that all 
such judgments proceed on the principle of contradiction. 
In the mathematics, for example, the relations and properties 
of quantities and numbers given by definition are evolved 
in the light of postulates and axioms, in such a manner, that 
every conclusion must be admitted or the axioms denied. 
In other words, they all proceed on the principle of contra- 
diction, the very element which Kant himself has fixed on 
as the characteristic which distinguishes analytical from syn- 
thetical judgments. He himself admits, that all derivative 
judgments in the mathematics do proceed on the principle 
of contradiction ; yet maintains still, that such judgments 
are synthetical, and not analytical. " Although," he says, 
" a synthetical proposition may at all times be discerned by 
means of the principle of contradiction, yet only in this way, 
inasmuch as another synthetic proposition is presupposed 
from which it can be deduced — but never of itself." The 
argument of Kant appears at least very much like a contra- 
diction. The distinguishing characteristic of analytical pro- 
positions, as he himself affirms, is that they may be discerned 
by means of the principle of contradiction, and while all de- 
rivative mathematical judgments (these being the kind of 
which he is speaking) may, as he acknowledges, be thus 
discerned, still he says, they are not analytical, but syntheti- 
cal. It makes no difference whether a proposition is dis- 
cerned by means of some other or not. If it is discerned by 
means of the principle of contradiction it is analytical and 
not synthetical. 

3. The great error of Kant, then, consists in this, in not in 
the first place marking distinctly the relation of the subject 
and predicate in a synthetical judgment ; and then in the 
second place, in extending the sphere of such judgments 
altogether too far. A careful analysis clearly shows, that none 
but the primitive, or first truths of Reason, are synthetical. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 255 

All beyond is analytical, proceeding according to the principle 
of contradiction. 

4. Kant therefore gives an entirely false account of the 
procedure of the Intelligence in the sciences. According to 
this philosopher, in all the sciences, the Intelligence begins 
with synthetical judgments, judgments in which the pre- 
dicate lies wholly out of the subject. From this predicate 
as subject, the next step is to another predicate lying in a 
similar manner without that, and so on, each step being like 
the first, purely synthetical. If this were the case, we 
should have, in no science whatever,* anything like demon- 
stration, for this, in all instances, rests upon the principle of 
contradiction exclusively. In other words, all demonstrative 
sciences are analytical, and not synthetical, except, as shown 
above, in their first a priori principles. The scientific proce- 
dure, then, is exactly the reverse of what Kant represents it. 
Instead of going from judgment to judgment synthetically, 
the Intelligence, after the first principles have been obtained 
synthetically, falls back upon the principles thus obtained, 
and in their light evolves, by a process exclusively analytical, 
the properties and relations of the subjects of investigation. 

PROGRESS OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE THE TIME 
OF KANT. 

Since the era of Kant philosophers of the Transcendental 
school have taken for granted the fundamental principles of 
his philosophy, to wit, that all ideas and principles of Reason 
are wholly invalid, in respect to things in themselves, that is 
in respect to realities material or mental. They are of great 
use, as prior principles by which the procedure of the Intel- 
ligence may be explained. If, on the other hand, we apply 
them beyond this, and suppose them to have any validity 
whatever from things in themselves, we fundamentally err. 

Now the efforts of philosophers of the Transcendental 
school have been strenuously directed to the formation of a 
system of mental science, in strict conformity to this assump- 
tion. The difficulty perpetually encountered has been the 
apparent impossibility of constructing a system which should 
not fundamentally involve the very principles, the validity of 
which the philosophy itself denies. Keeping this fact in 
view, we shall be able to explain distinctly the progress of 
this philosophy from Kant to the wild forms which it has 
recently assumed in Europe and this country. 



266 IKTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

System of Kant. 
The system of Kant admitted and affirmed the existence 
of two unknown and unknowable realities, realities existing 
neither in time nor space, and which are neither substance 
nor attribute ; realities, denominated no^imena^ to wit, the 
subject which thinks, and the object which, in some unde- 
fined and inconceivable manner, affects the subject and sets 
the machinery of thought in motion. The Intelligence thus 
brought into action, then, by virtue of its own laws, forms to 
itself a universe, as described in preceding chapters ; the uni- 
verse thus formed having no correspondence whatever to 
the realities, material and mental, which the Intelligence pos- 
tulates as constituting it. Such is the system of Kant. 

System of Fichte. 
Fichte followed Kant as one of the great lights in philo- 
sophy. Adopting the fundamental principle of his master, the 
principle above stated, pertaining to the invalidity of all ideas 
of Reason, and consequently of all affirmations of the Intel- 
ligence in reference to reahties, with a profound analysis he 
examined the principles of Kant, and found that one side at 
least of his system ran upon a line the reality of which his 
philosophy denied, and that that philosophy could not be true, 
if that principle was granted as real. Kant maintained that 
the machinery of thought could not be set in motion without 
the action of some external cause upon the thinking power 
to "awaken the faculty of cognition into exercise." But 
this, as Fichte saw, admitted the validity of one principle of 
Reason for things in themselves, to wit, the idea of cause 
and effect. If the validity of this idea was to be admitted, 
that of all others, to wit, those of body and space, succession 
and time, phenomena and substance, must be admitted also; 
these last having precisely the same claims to validity, for 
things in themselves, that the former has. Thus we should 
have a system of realism, instead of idealism. Fichte, to 
escape this difficulty, denied the existence of the object alto- 
gether. All knowledge, according to him, is reduced to one 
proposition, and consists of the different forms in which this 
idea or proposition is evolved. The proposition is this : I 
AM I. Consciousness has two spheres, the exterior and the 
interior. A certain phenomenon appears. The interior Con- 
sciousness postulates it as the phenomenon of the subject I. 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 257 

Here is the first development of the proposition, I am I. 
Another phenomenon appears. The exterior Consciousness 
postulates that as the phenomenon of something exterior to 
the I. The same I which was before assumed as the subject 
of the interior phenomenon, is now projected as the subject 
of the exterior. Thus we have another development of 'the 
proposition, I am I. In such a procedure we gain the con- 
ception of the Me and the Not-me. Thus the varied universe 
is generated. All is ideal. All the repetition of one propo- 
sition, I am I. The following amusing caricature of this sys- 
tem, a system which for a long period held almost absolute 
sway over the philosophic mind of Germany, Coleridge ac- 
knowledges correctly states its principles: 

Eu! Die vices gerens, ipse Divus, 

(Speak English, Friend!) the God Imperativus, 

Here on this market-cross aloud I cry: 

I, I, I ! I, itself, I ! 

The form and the substance, the what and the why, 

The when and the where, and the low and the high. 

The inside and outside, the earth and the sky, 

I, you, her and he, you and I, 

All souls and all bodies are I, itself, I! 

All I, itself, I ! 

(Fools, a truce with this startling!) 

All my I! all my I! 
He's a heretic dog who but adds, Betty Martin ! 
Thus cried the God with high imperial tone ; 
In robe of stiiFest state, that scoffed at beauty, 
A pronoun-verb imperative he shone — 
The substantive and plural-singular grown, 
He thus spake on ! Behold in I alone 
(For ethics boast a syntax of their own) 
Or if in ye, yet as I doth depute ye. 
In O ! T, you, the vocative of duty ! 
I, of the world's whole Lexicon the root 
Of the whole universe of touch, sound, sight, 
The genitive and ablative to boot ; 
The accusative of wrong, the nominative of right, 
And in all cases the case absolute ! 
Self-construed, .1 all other moods decline: 
Imperative, from nothing we derive us ; 
Yet as a super-postulate of mine, 
Unconstrued antecedence I assign 
To X, Y, Z, the God intinitivus ! 

Yes, according to this sublime philosophy, all things visi- 
ble and invisible, finite and infinite, subjective and objective, 
material and spiritual, the earth, the air, moon and stars, 
time, place, substance, cause, God, liberty, and immortality, 



258 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are nothing but the T am I subjectized and objectized, unified 
and reduplicated, consolidated and sublimated, materialized 
and spiritualized, limited into the finite, and expanded into 
the infinite ; first a subject, then an object ; now cause, and 
then effect ; now a creature trembling in the presence of the 
Eternal One ; then that very Eternal One transformed into the 
moral order of the universe. Yet Fichte was a great phi- 
losopher, else he could never have systematized such ab- 
surdities ; and Germany must have been fruitful of great 
philosophers, else the nation never could have digested 
such absurdities. 

System of Schelling. 
The system of Fichte had its day, and was then super- 
seded by one in more complete harmony with the principle 
above named, the system of Schelling. The philosopher 
last named was at first a warm disciple of the former, and 
defended his opinions against the objections of the followers 
of Kant. At length he began to discover insuperable diffi- 
culties in the system of his master, as the latter had done in 
that of Kant. Fichte denied the reality of the infinite, except 
as the moral order of the universe, that is, of the develop- 
ments of the I am 1. His system also admitted the reality 
of a multitude of Ps. Schelling was struck with difficulties 
like the following, fundamentally involved in this system : 

1. In admitting the reality of a multitude of distinct exist- 
ences, it would be difficult to deny the validity of the idea 
of time, at least as applicable to things in themselves. 
For there must be a real coetaneousness or succession in the 
existence of things thus existing, whatever they may be. 
This would establish time as a reality in itself As a conse- 
quence, the same must be admitted of space, substance, 
cause, &c. But the validity of all these ideas for things in 
themselves, is denied by the philosophy assumed on all 
hands as true. Therefore, no such separate existences are 
to be admitted as real. 

2. Fichte deduces the object from the subject. It would 
be just as philosophical to deduce the subject from the 
object. 

3. He also deduced the infinite from the finite, a most 
unphilosophical procedure ; it being just as philosophical, and 
more so, to deduce the finite from the infinite. 

While, therefore, Schelling rejected the system of his 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 259 

master, he retained the fundamental elements of his system, 
to wit, that all knowledge is but the repetition, in different 
forms, of one and the same intuition, the I am, as he chooses 
to denominate it, an assumption which Coleridge appears to 
have adopted from Schelling, or at least, he held it in com- 
mon with that philosopher. Now as Fichte, to escape ditfi- 
culties which he met in the system of Kant, threw away 
the object^ leaving the subject mind as the only reality, so 
Schelling, to escape similar difficulties inherent in the system 
of his master, rejected all subjects but one, the Infinite and 
Absolute. The Infinite and Absolute is the only reality. 
All individualities are merely apparent, and only different 
forms in which the Infinite and Absolute manifests itself. 
Being and knowing are identical. The subject which knows, 
and the object known, are not diverse the one from the other, 
but one and the same. Assuming the Infinite and Absolute 
as the only reality, the system of knowledge, according to 
Schelling, proceeds in perfect conformity to the principles of 
his predecessor. In the Infinite and Absolute two opposite 
forces, each infinite and indestructible, exist, one tending to 
expand infinitely, and the other seeking to know itself in 
this infinity. The result of these two forces interpenetrating 
each other, each being infinite and indestructible, is a finite 
generation. Hence individualities finite, and limited, arise. 
These individualities are not separate existences, but only 
forms in which the Infinite and Absolute develops itself In 
the finite the same contradiction, the same conflict of op- 
posing forces, is repeated — the finite seeking to expand itself, 
and to know itself in this expansion. In this act of self- 
consciousness, the finite is present to itself as subject and 
object. The object is the external creation. The subject is 
the being who knows this creation. Yet the subject and 
object are not two, but one and the same. Neither is dis- 
tinct from the Infinite and x^bsolute, but only a form in which 
the postulate / am in the Infinite is repeated. The I in the 
Finite and Infinite, in order to know itself, must see itself in 
the act of perceiving an object. For how can we know 
what perception is, that is, know ourselves as percipients, 
only by knowing ourselves in the act of perceiving some- 
thing, that is, some object ? But the object known cannot 
be different from the subject which knows, since being and 
knowing are correlative, and must meet in the same subject. 
The subject, then, knows itself by seeing itself as its own 



360 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

object, an object postulated as external to the self, in order 
that the I may know itself in the act of perceiving something 
which to itself, that is, to the philosopher (since, as Cole- 
ridge remarks, none but philosophers who have a peadiar 
philosophical talent can descend to such depths), is both 
itself and not itself. In thus seeing ourselves in all things, 
and finding all things in ourselves, we at length, as streams 
in the ocean from whence they came, lose ourselves and all 
things in the Infinite and Absolute. The Infinite projects 
itself into the finite in order to know itself in producing and 
perceiving the finite. The finite loses itself again in the In- 
finite, as bubbles in the ocean from which, for a moment, 
they appear as separate, without being in reality distinct 
existences. God is the sole reality, creation the mirror in 
which he sees himself, by an act of self-projection in the 
finite. This is the Pantheistic System, which resulted as the 
" natural daughter" from the philosophy of Kant. I do not say, 
that I have made myself understood, in the hints above 
given, of this strange philosophy. How can that be rendered 
intelligible which its great expounder afiEirms can never be 
symbolized by words, which must be thought in order to be 
understood, which can be thought only by the peculiarly 
gifted, and to these has no other claims to truth, than that 
it is thought ? Enough, however, will be understood to lay 
the foundation for an appreciation of the remarks which will 
follow an expose of the 

System of Hegel. 
All things in the world of mind are progressive. This is 
especially true in philosophy. The founder of a new system 
seldom perceives the results of his own fundamental princi- 
ples. It remains with his disciples to consummate, in succes- 
sive generations, what he has begun. With Hegel remains 
the honor of consummating the philosophy of Kant, by 
systematizing the logical consequents of the principles of 
"the venerable sage of Konigsburg." Each great light in 
philosophy, who succeeded Kant, saw, in the system of his 
predecessor, assumptions in direct opposition to the funda- 
mental principles which all acknowledged as true ; to wit, the 
total invalidity of all ideas and principles of Reason, for things 
in themselves, and each endeavored to form a system in 
harmony with that principle ; but each had, in some form or 
other, introduced into his system j as a fimdamental element j 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 261 

the opposite principle. Hegel found, in the system of 
Schelling, the very element on account of which the latter 
had rejected the system of Fichte, and Fichte had rejected 
that of Kant. In the system of Schelling, the reaUty of 
the Infinite and Absolute, as a substantial existence, entered 
as a fundamental element. But this was an admission of the 
validity of one class of the ideas of Reason, that of substance 
and attribute, not only for experience, but for things in 
themselves. But if the validity of these ideas be admitted 
in this form, then that of those of cause and effect, succession 
and time, body and space, must also be admitted in the same 
form. For all these ideas, as we have before remarked, 
have the same identical claim to validity for things in them- 
selves, that any one of them has. If the validity of one be 
admitted, that of all the rest must be. This Hegel saw. He 
saw, too, in the systems of all his predecessors, some one idea 
of Reason at least, assumed as valid for things in themselves, 
and not, as required by the assumption which all held in 
common, as the mere law of thought. As, therefore, 
Fichte, to escape this difficulty, had taken away an object^ 
admitted as real in the system of Kant ; and Schelling, 
to escape similar difficulties, had taken away all sub- 
jects but one, admitted in the system of his predecessor, 
and had resolved all realities into one substance, the 
Infinite and Absolute ; so Hegel, to escape the difficulties 
common to the systems of all his predecessors, took away 
subjects of every kind, even the Infinite and Absolute, and 
resolved all realities into pure thought, without a subject. 
Thought without cause, object, or subject, is the system of 
Hegel. Hegel is to Kant what Condillac is to Locke. Each 
is the true exponent of the logical consequences of the 
fundamental principles of his master. The natural progress 
of the school of Locke is, through materialism into Atheism. 
The natural progress of the system of Kant is, first to univer- 
sal Spiritualism, then to Pantheism, and then to absolute 
nihilism, as consummated in the school of Hegel. This 
result follows as a logical consequent of the assumption, that 
ideas of Reason are invalid for things in themselves. For 
no system but that of Hegel can be found which does not, in 
some form or other, assume the validity of some one or more 
of these ideas, that of substance and attribute especially. Of 
the philosophy now under consideration, one of its author's 
own countrymen has well observed, that " Hegel's philoso- 
12* 



262 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

phy is nothing in itself and by itself, nor was its author in 
himself hut beside himself^ One thing is quite certain, that 
neither himself, nor his followers, ever, in reality, believed his 
own system. Whatever else they held, there was one thing 
which none of them ever doubted, to wit, that Hegel was a 
most prof ound thinker. He was no thinker at all, if his own 
system be true. As the profoundest thinker of the sons of 
earth, his disciples now worship him ; and they worship him 
not as a great thought, but as a real, substantial existence, 
often comparing him with the Son of God, and giving the 
superiority to the former. 

REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEMS ABOVE PRESENTED. 

Each of the systems above described has difficulties pecu- 
liar to itself, and all have others in common with each ; 
difficulties perfectly subversive of the systems which involve 
them. 

Difficulties in the System of Kant. 

The system of Kant could account for the commencement 
of knowledge, or for the beginning of the action of the faculty 
of cognition. It admitted of two realities, the subject, the 
knowing faculty, and the unknown cause of the action of that 
faculty. Without the admission of two such realities, Kant 
maintained that we cannot account for the faculty of cognition 
being called into exercise. In this way he could account for 
the faculty of cognition being called into exercise. He 
accounted for it, however, on an assumption of the validity 
of ideas of Reason, for things in themselves, to wit, that of 
cause and effect. This assumption, as we have seen, is in 
direct opposition to the fundamental principles of his philo- 
sophy. 

Further, the entire system of Kant is built upon the 
assumption, that knowledge has a real beginning, and real 
progress. But this admits and affirms the reality of time, as 
something in itself, a principle fundamentally denied in the 
philosophy of Kant. Thus the entire analysis of the human 
Intelligence given by him, is based upon the assumption 
which his philosophy denies, and which he, in his Critick of 
Pure Reason, page 41, denies, as really true, that human 
cognitions have real beginning and progress. 

The entire system of Kant also presents us with the 
strangest paralogism ever met with in the history of philoso- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 263 

phy. His system rests on the formal assumption, that the 
In'elligence gives us nothing whatever as it is in itself. He 
then persuades himself, and endeavors to persuade the world, 
that by this very Intelligence, he has discovered and pro- 
claimed the real form of the procedure of the Intelligence in 
all cognitions. Now, if the Intelligence, as this philosophy 
affirms, gives us nothing as it is in itself, then all philosophy 
becomes the perfection of absurdity. No wonder, then, that 
the disciples of Kant soon saw, that his whole system pre- 
sented a rude mass of palpable contradictions ; and while 
they themselves retained the fundamental assumption on 
which the whole building rested, they fled from the crumbling 
fabric, to build up others equall}^ foundationless, and, like 
their predecessors, doomed to fall by their own weight. 

Difficulties inherent in the Systems of Fichte and Schelling. 

By taking away all external existences, Fichte and Schel- 
ling escaped one difficulty involved in the system of Kant ; 
at least, they escaped it in the particular form in which it 
there presented itself. It remains to be seen whether they 
have perfected a system free from difficulties similar to those 
met with in that of their great master and predecessor, or 
free from difficulties less self-destructive. We have seen 
above, that each of their systems involved a contradiction 
of the fundamental principle common to them all. There 
are other difficulties, of a character peculiar to these systems, 
to which special attention is now invited. 

One of the difficulties, to which I refer, relates to the 
commencement of the action of the Intelligence according to 
the fundamental principles of these systems. In taking away 
the external cause, it becomes evident, at once, that know- 
ledge could not, in the first instance, begin with an affirma- 
tion of the Intelligence. This would be inconceivable. It 
would be to suppose the Intelligence to begin to act without 
a cause for its action. The first movement of the mind, 
therefore, must be found somewhere else. Where should 
this movement occur ? It must be an act of the Will, postu- 
lating the assumption, I am I, according to Fichte, and, I am, 
according to Schelling. Now such an act, without a prior 
act of the Intelligence, is absolutely inconceivable and 
inexplicable, by any of the known laws of mind. Acts of 
Will, in any direction, without an antecedent affirmation of 
the Intelligence presenting an object towards which the 
Will may act, are inexplicable and inconceivable. Thus, in 



264 INTELLECTUAL i'HILObOPHx. 

the failure of the fundamental assumption, the entire systems 
built upon that assumption fall, of course. 

I will now notice a fundamental assumption, peculiar to 
the system of Schelling, and adopted from him, probably, by 
Coleridge. I will give the assumption in the language of 
the latter philosopher : " Des Cartes, speaking as a natural- 
ist, and in imitation of Archimedes, said, Give me matter and 
motion, and I will construct you the universe. We must of 
course understand him to have meant : I will render the 
construction of the universe intelligible. In the sa,me sense 
the transcendental philosopher says, Grant me a nature hav- 
ing two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand 
infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend ov find itself 
in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences, 
with the whole system of their representations, to rise up 
before you. Every other science pre-supposes Intelligence 
as already existing and complete. The philosopher contem- 
plates it in its growth, and, as it were, represents its history 
to the mind, from its birth to its maturity." Again, " It is 
equally clear, that two equal forces acting in opposite direc- 
tions, both being finite, and each distinguished from the other 
by its direction only, must neutralize or reduce each other to 
inaction. Now the transcendental philosophy demands, first, 
that two forces should be conceived which counteract each 
other by their essential nature ; not only in consequence of 
the accidental direction of each, but as prior to all direction, 
nay, as the primary forces from which the conditions of all 
possible directions are derivative and deducible : secondly, 
that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite, 
both alike indestructible. The problem will then be to dis- 
cover the result or product of two such forces, as distinguish- 
ed from the result of those forces which are finite, and derive 
their difference solely from the circumstance of these direc- 
tions. When we have formed a scheme or outline of these 
two different kinds of force, and of their different results by 
the process of discursive reasoning, it will then remain for us 
to elevate the Thesis from notional to actual, by contemplat- 
ing intuitively this one power, with its two inherent, inde- 
structible, yef counteracting forces, and the results or genera- 
tions to which their interpenetration gives existence, in the 
living principle, and in the process of our own self-conscious- 
ness." 

Now in the name of the universal Intelligence, we may ask ; 
and we may ask it at the risk of being told that the " philosophic 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 265 

talent is not yet inborn in us," Can any Intelligence like ours, 
either by intuition, or by any process of discursive reason, cal- 
culate the results of the action of two such forces as these ? 
Can he show the results, let him conceive these infinite and 
indestructible forces to meet in what direction he will ? 
Above all, can he show, or conceive, that the result of the 
action of such forces, beg;un in the Infinite and repeated in 
the finite, shall and must be the system of which we are 
conscious, and nothing else ? This he must do or his con- 
clusions are not scientific. Must not a philosopher be, " not 
in himself y but beside himself j^'' who can suppose that the sys- 
tem of mental operations of which we are actually conscious, 
is the real result of the action of two forces, one of which 
tends to expand infinitely, and the other to know itself 
in that expansion, and especially that he can logical- 
ly deduce from the action of such forces, as the necessary 
result, this system just as it is ? Even Hegel could not di- 
gest such absurdities ; and hence, he rejected the system 
which rested on them as a system of monstrosities. 

Difficulties in the System of Hegel. 
The system of Hegel is replete with difficulties, if possi- 
ble of a still graver character. It overlooks entirely two 
departments of our nature, the Sensibility and Will, de- 
partments just as real as thought. We might just as 
philosophically resolve all realities into volition, or feeling, 
as into thought. And what is thought without a thinker } 
We can no more conceive of it than we can conceive of an 
event without a cause. The system is also fundamentally 
destructive of morals and religion. In the language of ano- 
ther, as translated from the German by Dr. Murdock, " He- 
gel has a God without holiness, a Christ without free love, 
a Holy Ghost without illumination, a Gospel without faith, 
an Apostasy without sin, Wickedness without conscious guilt, 
an Atonement without remission of sin, a Death without an 
offering, a religious Assembly without divine worship, a Re- 
lease without imputation. Justice without a judge, Grace 
without redemption. Dogmatical Theology without a revela- 
tion, a This Side without a that side^ an Immortality without 
an existence, a Christian Religion without Christianity, and 
in general, a Religion without religion." 

Difficulties common to all the Systems. 
In one thing there is a perfect agreement in all these sys- 



266 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

terns, to wit : that ideas of Reason are not valid for things 
in themselves, especially as applied by the Intelligence to 
the external universe. Yet all these systems rest upon the 
assumption, that these ideas are valid for things in them- 
selves ; that is, for the explanation of human cognitions. 
Why is their validity assumed in respect to the latter, and 
denied in respect to the former ? No philosopher can give 
a satisfactory answer to this question. If we assume that 
what the Intelligence gives as external is not, in reality, ex- 
ternal, why should we not assume that whatever this same 
Intelligence cognizes, " is not what we take it to be .^" If 
the Intelligence falsifies the objects of its own perceptions 
and affirmations, why should we not conclude, that it does, 
and must falsify its own mode of conceiving of these things } 
If the principles common to all these systems, are correct, it 
is the height of absurdity to attempt to philosophize on any 
subject. None of these systems, also, explain the facts of 
the human mind, just as they lie under the eye of Conscious- 
ness. They all rest upon assumptions which give and ex- 
plain a system of facts pertaining to an indefinable, incon- 
ceivable something called Mind, but the system given and ex- 
plained is not the system which we seek and desire to have 
explained ; nor is the Mind given by these systems the Mind 
necessarily supposed by this system. What we want is a 
philosophy which shall explain ourselves to ourselves ; and 
shall leave us, when explained, what we are, and not trans- 
formed into some other thing, and that thing sublimated into 
nothing, and that nothing etherialized into an unsubstantial 
all-comprehending insubstantiality, w^hich is itself really in- 
comprehensible, and comprehends nothing. 

While all these systems fail to explain ourselves to our- 
selves, without making ourselves something not ourselves, 
we are able to give a sj^stem of knowledge which shall satis- 
fy all the demands made by the mind upon philosophy ; that 
is, asj^stem which shall ex/;/«i7i things without transforming, 
or annihilating them. Instead of a nature having the two 
contrary forces supposed by Coleridge, let us assume as real 
three things — a mind finite and limited, and existing in a tri- 
unity, as Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will — an external 
universe so correlated to this mind, that when certain condi- 
tions are fulfilled, the former becomes to the latter an object 
of knowledge — and another mind infinite and perfect, sus- 
taining to the finite, matter and spirit, the relation of an un- 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 267 

conditioned and absolute cause, and that the infinite Intelli- 
gence has so constituted the finite, that in knowing the world, 
it shall also know itself and God. With these assumptions, 
we can explain ourselves, the world, and God, to ourselves, 
and leave all facts when explained (what sound philosophy 
always does) just " what they were from the beginning." 
We can explain the origin and progress of thought from its 
source to its present state^ We can deduce from these 
assumptions, all the sciences, pure and mixed. We can 
explain the sources of error, even the wild dreams of philoso- 
phy itself. 

These assumptions have this advantage over those on 
which the theories under consideration rest : The former are 
the logical antecedents of the facts of universal Consciousness. 
The latter are mere assumptions, without any foundation 
whatever. The evidence that the former assumptions are 
the logical antecedents of the facts referred to is, that the ac- 
tual procedure of the universal Intelligence is in harmony 
with these assumptions and with none other. The entire 
analysis given in the present Treatise presents a full demon- 
stration of the truth of this declaration. 

MODERN TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

The procedure of the systems of philosophy, which we 
have been considering, has been very much like the " end- 
less wars of Chaos and old Night," described by Milton. 
Each new sect in philosophy demolished the system of their 
predecessors, and then erected another, to be demolished by 
a third, more foundationless, if possible, than any that preced- 
ed ; and the last that appears is the most baseless of all, and 
leaves the great questions in philosophy more in the dark 
than they were before. As a consequence, the public mind 
has been fast becoming somewhat sceptical in respect to the 
possibility of philosophy itself. This circumstance apparent- 
ly has given rise in Europe and this country to a new sect, 
it would hardly be proper to say of philosophers, since they 
systematically reject all philosophy. They assume as true, 
the general principles of Cousin, Hegel, Schelling, &c., and 
then reject and denounce all philosophy, everything like con- 
secutive reasoning, or logical deduction. Action purely in- 
stinctive, they hold, is by far the most perfect form of activ- 
ity. The same holds of the Intelligence. Philosophical 



268 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

reflection, logical deduction, and systematic treatises, es- 
pecially in respect to Mental Philosophy, Theology, or 
Morals, only trammel thought and darken the spiritual 
vision. Thought, purely spontaneous and instinctive, is the 
most true, and the most perfect. 

When Reason is permitted to develop itself freely, un- 
trammelled by logic ; when men, in short, think, speak, and 
act from pure instinct, without system, there is the most 
perfect system. The most perfect demonstration is the 
simple enunciation of spontaneous mental conceptions, with- 
out argument. Hence, they never reason, never explain, 
never discuss, but, as oracles of Reason, simply announce her 
dicta. If you call in question any of their enunciations, 
they have one reply, and that is always at hand, to wit. 
You are not spiritual. The truly spiritual is not developed 
in you. How can a man that never saw, discriminate be- 
tween colors } You ask of them a particular explanation 
of their principles. This only occasions the retort, You are 
not spiritual — the truly spiritual is not yet inborn in you. 
They talk much of religion, and complain that all the world 
lacks it ; and yet religion is, with them, " without form and 
void," for almost all of them deny of God everything but an 
ideal existence. They speak of Christ as the incarnation of 
divinity ; and then, in the language of one of their great 
leaders, represent his character as essentially defective, on 
account of the lack of " fun" in its composition. They talk 
much of sin, regeneration, atonement, redemption, repent- 
ance, faith, holiness, purity, and love, &c. All the vocabu- 
lary of evangelical religion is introduced as familiar terms 
into their discourses : yet all such terms find themselves 
there in such strange company, and in the midst of such 
new and bewildering associations, that they cannot even 
know themselves. The following passage will give, per- 
haps, as correct a view of the meaning which they attach to 
terms like the above, as any that is often met with in their 
writings. It is from one of their leading writers, in an 
article found in the Dial, the organ of the sect: 

" Holding as they do but one essence of all things, which 
essence is God, Pantheism must deny the existence of 
essential evil. All evil is negative — it is imperfection, non- 
growth. It is not essential, but modal. Of course, there 
can be no such thing as hereditary sin — a tendency posi- 
tively sinful in the soul. Sin is not a wilful transgression of 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 269 

a righteous la\Y, but the difficulty and obstruction which the 
Infinite meets with in entering into the finite. Regeneration 
is nothing but an ingress of God into the soul, before which 
sin disappears, as darkness before the rising sun. Pantheists 
hold also to the Atonement^ or at-one-ment, between the soul 
and God. This is strictly a unity, or oneness of essence^ to 
be brought about by the incarnation of the Spirit of God 
(in us), which is going on in us as we grow in holiness. As 
we grow wise, just, and pure — in a word, holy — we grow 
to be one with him in mode, as we always were in essence. 
This atonement is effected by Christy only in as far as he 
taught the manner in which it was to be accomplished more 
fully than any other, and gave us a better illustration of the 
method and result in his own person, than any one else that 
has ever lived." 

Now, if any one should ask this writer to explain the 
meaning he really attaches to such terms and phrases as 
" non-growth," the " Infinite entering into the finite," and 
" the incarnation of the Spirit of God in us," and especially 
if we should ask of him a reason of his belief in Pantheism, 
his only reply, no doubt, would be : You are not spiritual ; 
the spiritual is yet to be inborn m you. And then he would 
go on with most pitiful lamentations over the want of re- 
ligion, of spirituality, in all the world ; of the melancholy 
decay of the god-like spirit of faith, and spiritual vision, and 
inspiration, that existed in Moses, and Christ, and Paul, and 
Mahomet, and among the heroic spirits of the Reformation. 
I^ow, the philosophic observer is not at a loss to perceive, 
that all this complaining of the non-growth, and absence of 
spiritual vision in all the world but themselves, is nothing 
but a feint, to keep from view a mass of foundationless 
assumptions, the validity of which they themselves dare not 
seriously examine, nor have distinctly exposed to public view, 
lest their baselessness should become so manifest, that even 
their abettors would be ashamed to avow them any more. 
Mysticism is the consummation, the last development, of 
false philosophy. Men who are on the track of error, will 
reason and philosophize, as long as they can hope to con- 
vince the world of their principles by reasoning based upon 
the result of philosophic investigation. When this hope 
fails, the last resort is assumptions, attended with the usur- 
pation of direct spiritual vision, and superior divine insight 
and illumination, 



270 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



ECLECTICISM OF COUSIN. 



System stated. 

From the chair of philosophy in Paris, Cousin has pro- 
nounced Eclecticism as constituting the distinguishing cha- 
racteristic, the perfection of the philosophic movement of 
the nineteenth century. Before admitting this enunciation 
as true, it becomes us to inquire diligently into the meaning 
of such an imposing term. The attentive reader of the 
works of this great philosopher will not be at a loss to de- 
termine the meaning which he attaches to the term, nor the 
doctrine represented by it. This philosopher professes to 
have obtained a point of observation, from which he has 
brought all previous systems of philosophy into complete 
harmony with each other. All possible questions in philo- 
sophy have been solved in these different systems. Each 
system has moved in the direction of some one great ques- 
tion, and has attained its object in the solution of that ques- 
tion. It now remains to take from all these systems the 
principle on which each rests, and which each has devel- 
oped, and resolve the whole into one harmonious unity. 
The following passages will show that I have not miscon- 
ceived nor misstated the principles of this philosopher : 

" You may perceive the tendency of my discourse. After 
the subjective idealism of the school of Kant, and the em- 
piricism and sensualism of that of Locke, have been devel- 
oped, and their last possible results exhausted, no new com- 
bination is, in my opinion, possible ; but the union of these 
two systems, by centering them both in a vast and powerful 
eclecticism." Again : " Our philosophy, gentlemen, is not 
a melancholy and fanatical philosophy, which, being pre- 
possessed with a few exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform 
all others on the same model ; it is a philosophy essentially 
optimistical, whose only end is to comprehend all, and 
which therefore accepts and reconciles all. It seeks to ob- 
tain power only by extension ; its unity consists only in the 
harmony of all contrarieties." 

Remarks upon this System. 
For myself, I would say, that I wholl}^ dissent from the 
system of Eclecticism as above announced. I do it for the 
following reasons : 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 271 

1. It is, as a system, totally unlike the procedure of the 
Intelligence in reference to every other science. No science 
whatever that has stood the test of time has been evolved in 
conformity to this principle. What if some astronomer, for 
example, should arise, and profess to have found some point 
of observation from which he could show that all the systems 
of astronomy were essentially correct, and should proclaim, 
that the true system is found in all, as the general in the 
particular, and should be so evolved as to include all other 
systems ? He might say, in the language of this great philoso- 
pher, " Our astronomy, gentlemen, is not a melancholy and 
fanatical astronomy, which, being prepossessed with a few 
exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform all others upon the 
same model ; it is as an astronomy essentially optimistical, 
whose only end is to comprehend all, and which, therefore, 
accepts and reconciles all. It seeks to obtain power only by 
extension ; its unity consists only in the harmony of all con- 
trarieties." All this is well said, and looks well on paper. 
But who would expect to find, in a system constructed in 
conformity to such an hypothesis, the true " Mecanique 
Celeste .^" In every other science, each school has found 
its point of observation, from which it has attempted a solu- 
tion of the great questions pertaining to that particular 
science, and which it was its object to solve. One school has 
succeeded another, till some one has evolved a system which 
has stood the test of time. So, I venture to predict, it will be 
in respect to the Philosophy of Mind. If the true system has 
not yet been developed, the time is coming when it will be. 
And that philosopher will have the happiness of attaining 
this great end, who .shall find, not some point of observation 
from which he can reconcile all the jarring antagonistic 
systems which have claimed the credence of man, but some 
great central position, in the depths of our inner being, from 
which he can solve the diversified questions of philosophy 
pertaining to the facts of universal Consciousness. 

2. The assumption on which Eclecticism, as above defined, 
rests, is totally false in point of fact : the position that the 
essential element in each system is true. Take, as an illus- 
tration, the system of Pantheism. Now that system is either 
totally right or wholly wrong. It either correctly explains 
every fact pertaining to the universe, or it totall}^ falsifies 
every fact professedly explained by it. It either rightly 
explains, or totally misrepresents all things. Further, if this 



272 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

system is right, every other system is totally wrong, and 
misrepresents everything which it professedly explains. 
There is no blending of this system with any other which 
does not assert its fundamental principle ; and then it is not 
another, but one and the same system. 

The same holds true of the systems of Hegel, Kant, and 
Locke. Either thought is the only reality, and then Hegel 
is totally right, and all other systems wholly false, or thought 
is not the only reality, and then in nothing is Hegel right. 
This system either correctly explains or totally misrepresents 
every fact in the universe. 

Either ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, 
and then Kant is wholly wrong, or they are not thus valid, 
and Kant is wholly right. His fundamental principle either 
rightly explains or totally misrepresents every idea of 
Reason. There is no position midway between these ex- 
tremes. 

Either all ideas do come from experience, and then Locke 
is wholly right and all systems denying this are so far wholly 
wrong, or all ideas do not come from experience, and then 
Locke is wholly wrong. It does not help the matter to say, 
that some ideas come from experience, and therefore Locke 
is partly right. Locke and all the world knew, long before 
his celebrated Essay was thought of, that some ideas came 
from experience. It was only as an universal proposition 
that Locke affirmed his position. If that proposition is not 
strictly universal, Locke is wholly wrong, and so he himself 
regarded the subject. 

Nor, in my judgment, was it becoming in a great philoso- 
pher to attempt to show, as Cousin has done, in conformity 
to the spirit of Eclecticism, that the great principle of 
Locke's philosophy is right, by attributing to him a principle 
that he never held, or conceived of; to wit, that ideas of 
experience are the chronological antecedents of all other 
ideas. The individual who has ever read Cousin's Psycho- 
logy, translated by Prof. Henr}', a work presenting one of the 
finest specimens of philosophic reasoning to be met with in 
any language, will recollect the frequency with which the 
remark is made in that work, that there is an important sense 
in which the propositions of Locke, that all ideas come from 
experience, is true. Locke's whole system rests upon this 
one proposition. Cousin, after proving the proposition 
false, must show that after all it is true, or the fundamental 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 273 

position of his own Eclecticism would fail entirely. How does 
he accomplish his object ? By the affirmation that there is 
a sense in which the proposition, that all ideas are derived from 
experience, is true ; that is, such ideas are the chronological 
antecedents of all other ideas. But this, I repeat, is a sense 
in which Locke never presented the proposition under 
consideration, and never thought of doing it. Did it become 
a great philosopher to attempt to save his own hypothesis, 
by attributing to another a principle which all the world 
know he never held, or, at least, never avowed ? 

In the remarks made above, I would by no means be un- 
derstood as advancing the sentiment, that if Pantheism or any 
other system is wrong, that therefore nothing which the 
abettors of such systems may say is true. Nothing is far- 
ther from my intention than this. This whole Treatise pre- 
sents proof sufficient of the fact, that no such thing is intend- 
ed. What I do mean is this, That whatever truths exist in 
connection with false systems, and many such often are therein 
found, exist in them not in consequence of the systems, but 
in spite of them, and are totally misrepresented by them. 
The true Eclecticism, as I understand it, is this, To search for 
truth in connection with every system, without assuming be- 
forehand, that it does or does not exist there. ^' Prove all 
things ; hold fast that which is good." This is an Eclecticism, 
which is infinitely preferable to that which " consists only 
in the harmony of all contrarieties." 

3. In his position as an Eclectic, Cousin has fallen into the 
very error which he has charged upon Locke, as so greatly 
vitiating his method as a philosopher. The error is this : 
Beginning with an hypothesis, before carefully analyzing and 
classifying the facts of Psychology as the basis of an hypo- 
thesis. Locke, as Cousin has shown, by assuming at the out- 
set a particular hypothesis respecting the origin of Ideas, 
was led to misrepresent (an error perfectly natural under the 
circumstances) the most important facts of human Conscious- 
ness. So Cousin, by assuming, that the fundamental ele- 
ments of all systems are right, must, to be consistent, be a 
sensualist with Locke, a spiritualist with Fichte, a pantheist 
with Schelling, and a nihilist with Hegel. These considera- 
tions are abundantly sufficient to show the claims of Eclecti- 
cism to the regard of philosophers. 



274 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



COMMON SENSE. 

There are few words in more common use than the above. 
Common Sense is everywhere appealed to as a standard 
and test of truth and error. Yet it would be somewhat diffi- 
cult, without the most careful reflection, to define correctly 
the words under consideration. Dr. Reid regards Common 
Sense as a distinct faculty of the mind. Philosophers gene- 
rally have rejected this assumption. This they have done, 
however, without themselves attempting to tell us what this 
something is, the reality of which they all acknowledge. 
My object will be, to state distinctly the real meaning of the 
words under consideration. 

Common Sense defined. 

Every one is aware, that, in the presence of certain facts, 
the universal Intelligence invariably makes particular affirma- 
tions. With such affirmations, numberless assumptions, to- 
gether with their consequents, may be mingled. Hence, in 
reference to almost all subjects of thought, diversity of opi- 
nion appears. Yet, in the midst of all this diversity, there 
are judgments common to all minds who have apprehended 
the same facts. 

JVow these affirmations^ common to all minds in the presence 
of the same/acts^ affirmations in their concrete and particular 
form, is what is meant by the words Common Sense. The 
words designate the real affirmations of the universal Intelli- 
gence, in view of given facts, as distinguished from assump- 
tions, and the logical consequents of the same, pertaining to 
the same facts. Common Sense, then, is not, as Dr. Reid 
supposes, a special faculty of the Intelligence. It designates, 
I repeat, the real affirmations of the general Intelligence, in 
distinction from assumptions and their logical consequents. 

Common Sense a Standard of Truth. 
Common Sense, then, may be properly appealed to, as a 
decisive standard of truth. Its responses must be true, else 
the universal Intelligence is a lie. No conclusions in philo- 
sophy and rehgion, no results of processes of investigation 
and reasoning which are in contradiction to its decisions, 
will stand the test of time. I will here confess, that the prin- 
ciple under consideration has been a leading idea which has 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 275 

guided my Judgment in respect to the great facts and prin- 
ciples announced in the present Treatise. That philosophy, 
which, disregarding all assumptions and their consequents, 
shall announce the real convictions of the universal Intelli- 
gence, is the true philosophy. Philosophy and Common 
Sense the author of our existence has joined together. Phi- 
losophy runs mad with the wildest conceivable delusions, 
when divorced from Common Sense, as a light, and authorita- 
tive guide. 

Philosophic Principles — why rejected by the Mass of Mankind, 
Philosophy (falsely so called) has at various periods de- 
nied the reality of mind, of matter, or the external world, 
and of God, the author of the two former. Yet the mass of 
mankind have continued to believe their own substantial exist- 
ence, together with that of the external world, and of God. 
The reason is, that philosophers have rested their investiga- 
tions upon baseless assumptions ; while the mass of mankind, 
more fully influenced by the philosophic spirit in respect to 
such subjects, have followed the dictates of Common Sense. 
Universal materialism, on the one hand, or spiritualism on the 
other, together with kindred systems, such as Pantheism and 
Idealism, can never become the sentiments of the race. The 
Common Sense of mankind is at war with all such princi- 
ples. Suppose, for example, an individual announces as a 
truth of philosophy, what Pantheism affirms, that all individ- 
ualities in the universe are not real, but only apparent, that 
they are all the phenomena of one conamon substance. Such 
a dogma can never become the belief of the race ; for the ob- 
vious reason that it contradicts the fundamental affirmations 
of the universal Intelligence pertaining to phenomena and 
substance. The reason is that separateness, and not abso- 
lute unity, is the fundamental phenomenon which all individ- 
ualities present in respect to each other. When things 
appear as separate, we must admit that they are separate ; in 
other words, that Pantheism is false, or deny the fundamental 
convictions or Common Sense of the race, pertaining to 
their ideas of substance. 

Dictates of Common Sense — how known and distinguished. 
One important question arises here, to wit : How can we 
determine, whether a given fact or principle is or is not a 
dictate of Common Sense ? This question we can answer, 



276 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

not by an appeal to tradition, to books, or to the responses 
which the race at large might formally give, if required to re- 
spond to the inquiry. For with all such responses, number- 
less assumptions would no doubt be mingled. On the other 
hand, everyone who would understand the dictates of Com- 
mon Sense must enter into the depth of his own mind, and 
there notice the real affirmations of his own Intelligence, in 
view of given facts. Such affirmations he may trust in and 
announce, as the real dictates of the Common Sense of the 
race. He that will most correctly interpret the real dictates 
of his own Intelligence, is the most perfect oracle of the uni- 
versal Intelligence. In retiring, then, from the outward world 
into the depths of our own minds, and there receiving the 
real dictates of our own Intelligence, we find the true facts 
and principles of Common Sense. 

Characteristics of Men distinguished for Common Sense. 

We often hear individuals spoken of as wanting in, or 
possessed of, a great degree of Common Sense. The cha- 
racteristic which distinguishes the latter from the former 
class, is a well balanced Judgment, particularly in respect to 
the common transactions of life — a Judgment by which they 
detect and announce at once the real affirmations of the In- 
telligence in the presence of given facts. The mass of men 
— a fact to which philosophers as a body are by no means 
exceptions — are so blinded by assumptions, and theories 
founded thereon, that, in respect to the most important sub- 
jects, they do not recognize the real affirmations of their own 
Intelligence. In the presence of given facts, they see in 
them what all the world sees. Yet under the influence of 
false assumptions and theories, they disregard what their own 
Intelligence really affirms. Men, on the other hand, dis- 
tinguished for Common Sense, in the presence of the same 
facts and convictions, announce and rely upon, not in their 
abstract and universal, but in their concrete and particular 
form, their own judgments, just as they lie in their own In- 
telligence — judgments which all the world really pass in the 
presence of the same facts ; but which, for reasons above 
stated, philosophic minds especially, in many instances, totally 
disregard. Of the latter class we say, they are destitute of, 
or rather do not ttse, their Common Sense. 

After writing the above, I was much interested to find that 
the sentiments expressed so fully correspond with those of 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 2*77 

Jouffroy, in respect to the same subject. I will present, as 
a farther elucidation of this important subject, two extracts 
from the writings of the philosopher above named : 

" The history of philosophy presents a singular spectacle ; 
a certain number of problems are reproduced at every 
epoch ; each of these problems suggests a certain number of 
solutions, always the same ; philosophers are divided j dis- 
cussion is set on foot ; every opinion is attacked and defend- 
ed, with equal appearance of truth. Humanity listens in 
silence, adopts the opinion of no one, but preserves its own, 
which is what is called Common Sense. 

" Thus, to refer to examples, all philosophical epochs 
have produced upon the stage the opposite theories of Mate- 
rialism and Spiritualism in metaphysics, and those of Stoi- 
cism and Epicureanism in morals. None of these doctrines 
has permanently prevailed : none has perished ; all have 
found sincere and illustrious partisans ; ail have exerted 
nearly the same influence ; but, in the end, the human race, 
which has witnessed their debates, has become neither Mate- 
rialist nor Spiritualist, neither Stoic nor Epicurean ; it has 
remained what it was prior to philosophy, believing at once 
both in matter and spirit, respecting duty and pursuing hap- 
piness at the same time." 

Again : " Everybody understands by Common Sense a 
certain number of principles or notions evident of them- 
selves, from which all men derive the grounds of their judg- 
ment and the rules of their conduct ; and nothing is more 
correct than this idea. But it is not sufficiently known that 
these principles are merely positive solutions of all the great 
problems which philosophy agitates. How could we regu- 
late our conduct, what judgments could we form, if we 
could not distinguish between good and evil, truth and false- 
hood, beauty and deformity, one being and another, and 
reality and nullity ; if we did not know what we should hold 
to, concerning that which we see with our eyes, perceive 
with our Consciousness, and apprehend with our Reason ; if 
we had no idea of the purpose and the consequences of this 
life, of the author of all things and of his nature ? What 
would be the light of Intelligence, how would society pro- 
ceed, if there were even the shadow of doubt on the notions 
which we possess in regard to most of these points ? Now 
what are these notions, so firmly and so necessarily estab- 
lished in the Intelligence of all men, but a series of respon- 
13 



278 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ses to these questions : What is the true ? What is the 
good ? What is the beautiful ? W^hat is the nature of 
things ? What is being ? What is the origin and certainty 
of human knowledge ? What is the destiny of man in this 
world ? Is his entire destiny accomplished in this life ? Is 
this world the production of chance, or of an intelligent 
cause ? And, we ask, are not these the questions with 
which philosophy is occupied ? Do they not contain, in their 
germs at least, all the questions of logic, metaphysics, morals, 
politics, and religion ? 

" Common Sense, therefore, is nothing but a collection of 
solutions to those questions which philosophers agitate. It 
is another philosophy prior to philosophy properly so called ; 
since it is found spontaneously at the bottom of every Con- 
sciousness, independently of all scientific research. There 
are accordingly two votes on the questions which interest 
humanity, namely, that of the mass and that of the philoso- 
phers, the spontaneous vote and the scientific vote, Common 
Sense and systems." 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRODUCTIONS OF THE GERMAN MIND. 

Characteristics stated. 
Every one who has become familiar with the literary, phi- 
losophic, and scientific productions of the great thinkers of 
Germany, cannot fail to have noticed especially the two fol- 
lowing peculiarities, which distinguish such productions from 
the generality of those of a similar character among other 
nations, to wit, profound thought and scientific development. 
The most of such productions, whether they evolve truth or 
error, indicate great depth of thought, and are also evolved 
in the light of profound scientific principles. The author 
finds in the depths of his subject some great central posi- 
tion as his point of perspective, around which all the parts 
and elements of the subject are made to revolve in harmony 
with fundamental ideas. 

Ground of these Peculiarities. 

1 will here present two great facts, as among the principal 
causes of these peculiarities. 

The first is, that the philosophic movement in Germany is 
peculiarly an independent movement. In no part of the 
world does the public mind appear to be so completely 



MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS. 279 

emancipated from blind adherence to authority, to creeds, 
the decrees of councils, &c. A German thinker, whether 
his mind is in pursuit of truth or error, is an independent 
thinker. His object is to develop his subject, whatever it 
may be, in the light of fundamental ideas and principles. 
Such minds may become intoxicated with their own indepen- 
dence, yet they will think profoundly; and profound thinking 
will ultimately find the path of truth. 

Another, and the principal, ground of these characteristics 
is the fact, that in the German mind the philosophic idea 
seems to be more distinctly developed than in that of almost 
any other nation. Hence, the treatises of the thinkers of 
that nation, whatever the subjects may be, are developed in 
the light of fundamental ideas. It is a melancholy fact, that 
with a movement so grand and sublime, the elements of a 
philosophic scepticism should be so mingled, as to mar the 
most important results of the movement itself. Such is the 
nature of the movement, however, that the discordant 
elements will ultimately be thrown off. Then we shall have 
a movement the most grand, and sublime, and perfect, ever 
witnessed in the march of mind. 

The great desideratum in the philosophic movement in 
this and other nations is the introduction into it of the spirit 
of independence in connection with the controlling influence 
of the philosophic idea, which characterizes the action of 
the German mind, together with a total rejection of the scep- 
tical elements w4iich, as remarked above, have so deeply 
marred the results of such action. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INTELLIGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM 
THAT OF THE BRUTE. 



It has been very common with philosophers to represent 
all created existences, from the highest Intelligences in 
heaven to the crude forms of matter, as successive links in 
one great chain, each link in the chain, commencing with the 
lowest, differing mainly in degree from that which immedi- 
ately succeeds it. The highest forms of brute, and the low- 
est of rational Intelligence, for example, differ, it is asserted, 
not in kind^ but only in degree. Of late, the reality of orders 
of existences, as successive links of a great chain, has come 
to be seriously doubted. The intelligence of man and the 
brute, it is said, differs not in degree, but in kind. If we 
conceive of the highest forms of brute intelligence increased 
to any degree whatever, as far as degree is concerned, still 
it makes no approach at all to real rationality. The differ- 
ent orders of brute instincts do constitute, it is thought, 
different links of one chain. Those of rational Intelligences 
constitute another and totally different chain, a chain none 
of the links of which are connected, in any form, with any 
of those of the other. This last is the opinion entertained 
by the author of this Treatise. I will now proceed to state 
the grounds of this opinion. I will introduce what I have 
to say upon this subject by two extracts, somewhat lengthy, 
from Coleridge. In the first, we have a classification of the 
different forms of brute Instinct ; in the second, we are pre- 
sented with two instances of Instinctive Intelligence, in their 
highest manifestations. 

Brute Instincts classified. 
" It is evident that the definition of a genus or class is an 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 281 

adequate definition only of the lowest species of that genus : 
for each higher species is distinguished from the lower by- 
some additional character, while the general definition in- 
cludes only the characters common to all the species. Con- 
sequently it describes the lowest only. Now I distinguish a 
genus or kind of powers under the name of adaptive power, 
and give, as its generic definition, the power of selecting and 
adapting means to proximate ends ; and as an instance of 
the lowest species of this genus, I take the stomach of a 
caterpillar. I ask mj^self, under what words I can generalize 
the action of this organ ; and I see that it selects and adapts 
the appropriate means ( i. e. the assimilable part of the vege- 
table congesia) to the proximate end, i.e. the growth or re- 
production of the insect's body. This we call vital power, 
or vita propria of the stomach ; and this being the lowest 
species, its definition is the same with the definition of the 
kind. 

" Well, from the power of the stomach I pass to the power 
exerted by the whole animal. I trace it wandering from 
spot to spot, and plant to plant, till it finds the appropriate 
vegetable ; and again on this chosen vegetable, I mark it 
seeking out and fixing on the part of the plant, bark, leaf, 
or petal, suited to its nourishment ; or (should the animal 
have assumed the butterfly form), to the deposition of its 
eggs, and the sustentation of the future larva. Here I see a 
power of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends 
according to circumstances. And this higher species of 
adaptive power we call instinct. 

'' Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in the 
succeedinor extracts from Huber, and see a power of select- 
ing the proper means to the proximate ends, according to 
varying circumstances. And what shall we call this yet 
higher species } We name the former, Instinct ; we must 
call this Instinctive Intelligence. 

^' Here then we have three powers of the same kind, Life, 
Instinct, and Instinctive Intelligence ; the essential charac- 
ters that define the genus existing in all three. But in 
addition to these, I find one other character common to the 
highest and lowest, viz. : that the purposes are all manifestly 
pre-determined by the peculiar organization of the animals ; 
and though it may not be possible to discover any such imme- 
diate dependency in all the actions, yet the actions being 
determined by the purposes, the result is equivalent : and 



282 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

both the actions and purposes are all in a necessitated refer- 
ence to the preservation and continuance of that particular 
animal or of the progeny. There is a selection, but not 
choice — volition rather than Will. The possible knowledge 
of a thing, or the desire to have the thing representable by 
a distinct correspondent thought^ does not, in the animal, 
suffice to render the thing an object^ or the ground of a pur- 
pose. I select and adapt the proper means to the separation 
of a stone from a rock, which I neither can, nor desire to make 
use of for food, shelter or ornament : because, perhaps, I wish 
to measure the angles of its primary crystals, or, perhaps, 
for no better reason than the apparent difficulty of loosening 
the stone — stat pro ratione voluntas — and thus make a mo- 
tive out of the absence of all motive, and a reason out of the 
arbitrary will to act without any reason." 

Manifestations of Instinctive Intelligence. 

" Huber put a dozen humble-bees under a bell-glass 
along with a comb of about ten cocoons, so unequal in height 
as not to be capable of standing steadily. To remedy this, 
two or three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretch- 
ed themselves over its edge, and with their heads down- 
wards fixed their fore feet on the table on which the comb 
stood, and so with their hind feet kept the comb from falling. 
When these were weary others took their places. In this 
constrained and painful posture, fresh bees relieving their 
comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these 
affectionate little insects support the comb for nearly three 
days, at the end of which they had prepared sufficient wax 
to build pillars with. But these pillars having accidentally 
got displaced, the bees had recourse again to the same ma- 
noeuvre (or rather pe^oeuvre), till Huber pitying their hard 
case, &c. 

" ' I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant 
that I observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity. 

" ' One rainy day, I observed a laborer digging the ground 
near the aperture which gave entrance to the ant-hill. It 
placed in a heap the several fragments it had scraped up, and 
formed them into small pellets, which it deposited here and 
there upon the nest. It returned constantly to the same 
place, and appeared to have a marked design, for it labored 
with ardor and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, 
excavated in the ground in a straight line, representing the 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 283 

plan of a path or gallery. The laborer, the whole of whose 
movements fell under my immediate observation, gave it 
greater depth and breadth, and cleared out its borders : and 
I saw at length, in which I could not be deceived, that it had 
the intention of establishing an avenue which was to lead 
from one of the stories to the under-ground chambers. This 
path, which was about two or three inches in length, and 
formed by a single ant, was opened above and bordered on 
each side by a buttress of earth ; its concavity en forme de 
gouttiere was of the most perfect regularity, for the architect 
had not left an atom too much. The work of this ant was so 
well followed and understood, that I could almost to a cer- 
tainty guess its next proceeding, and the very fragment it 
was about to remove. At the side of the opening where 
this path terminated, was a second opening to which it was 
necessary to arrive by some road. The same ant engaged in 
and executed alone this undertaking. It furrowed out and 
opened another path, parallel to the first, leaving between 
each a little wall of three or four lines in height. Those 
ants who lay the foundation of a wall, a chamber or gallery, 
from working separately, occasion now and then a want of 
coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. 
Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by 
no means embarrass them. What follows proves that the 
workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. 
A wall had been erected with the view of sustaining a vault- 
ed ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the 
wall of the opposite chamber. The workman who began 
constructing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the 
opposite partition upon which it was to rest. Had it been 
continued on the original plan, it must infallibly have met 
the wall at about one half of its height, and this it was ne- 
cessary to avoid. This state of things very forcibly claimed 
my attention, when one of the ants arriving at the place, and 
visiting the works, appeared to be struck by the difficulty 
which presented itself; but this it as soon obviated, by taking 
down the ceiling and raising the wall upon which it reposed. 
It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with the 
fragments of the former one.'" — Huher'^s Nnt. Hist, of Ants. 
The facts above cited, every one will acknowledge, may 
be assumed as representing Instinctive Intelligence, m its 
highest form. The question to be settled is, In what respects 



284 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is this like rationality, as it exists in man ? In what respects 
do these forms of Intelligence agree, and disagree ? 

Princijyle on ivhich the Argument is based. 
In conducting our inquiries on this subject, the first thing 
to be settled is, the principle on which our conclusions shall 
be based. On all hands it is agreed, that there are points of 
resemblance between the manifestations of Intelligence in 
the brute and among mankind. At the same time, there are 
points of dissimilarity equally manifest and important. 
Now let A represent the mental phenomena which appear 
in man, and never appear in the brute. If we can find the 
power or powers in man from which the phenomena repre- 
sented by A result, we have then determined fully the facul- 
ties which man possesses and the brute wants. The facul- 
ties thus asserted of man, are to be wholly denied of the 
brute, and all the manifestations of brute intelligence are to 
be accounted for by a reference to what remains, after the 
former have been subtracted. All must admit, that this is 
the true and the only true principle to be applied in the case. 
It now remains to apply the principle to the solution of the 
question before us. 

Points of Resemblance between the Man and the Brute. 

That brutes, such as are supposed in the present argu- 
ment, possess the faculty of external perception, such as 
sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, that such perceptions 
are followed by feelings of a given character, and that these 
feelings are followed by external actions which are correlated 
to the perceptions referred to, and that all these manifesta- 
tions are common to man and the brute both, will be denied 
by none who have, however carelessly, observed the facts 
which have presented themselves to his notice. Such are 
the phenomena common to man and the brute. 

Hypotheses on which these common Facts may be explained. 

There are two distinct and opposite hypotheses on which 
these common facts may be explained. When man has an 
external perception. Reason at once suggests certain funda- 
mental ideas in the light of which he explains to himself the 
phenomena perceived, and passes certain judgments upon 
them. Action with him has special reference, not to the 
phenomena, but to the judgments thus passed. All these 



HUMAN AND ERUTE INTELLIGENCE. 285 

things we know from Consciousness, to be true, in reference 
to man. 

As far as the facts under consideration are concerned, it 
may be that the same is true of the brute. All the phe- 
nomena of brute action, however, are equally explicable, on 
an entirely different hypothesis. When a brute has a percep- 
tion of some object, without the presence of any fundamental 
ideas in the light of which he can explain to himself what 
he sees, and consequently form notions and judgments of 
the object perceived, and acts in view of judgments thus 
formed, it may be, that such perceptions are followed by 
certain feelings, and that from these, as necessary conse- 
quents, external acts, such as the brute puts forth, arise. 
All that would be intellectual with the brute, on this hypo- 
thesis, would be the simple power to perceive the object, 
without the capacity to recognize himself as the subject or 
the thing perceived, as the object of the perception, so as to 
form any conceptions or judgments pertaining either to the 
subject or object. The feelings which attend such percep- 
tions, together with. such as arise from the internal organism 
of the brute, such as hunger and thirst, are followed neces- 
sarily by external actions in harmony with the sphere for 
which the creature was designed. The action of the brute 
would be in fixed harmony with law — law, however, which 
has no subjective existence in the Intelligence of the crea- 
ture, but which exists as an idea in that of the Creator. 
Action, in such a case, would be purely mechanical, the pro- 
pelling force being the feelings generated as above supposed, 
while the law of action would be an idea which the subject 
of the action never apprehended, but in conformity to which 
the organism of the brute is formed, 

A case stated in the public prints, a case, whether true or 
false, at least conceivable, and therefore proper to be used in 
illustration, will fully illustrate the hypothesis under consid- 
eration. A lady, some time before the birth of a child, was 
struck at by a rattlesnake, and barely escaped with her life. 
As a consequence of the fright of the mother, the child, 
when born, had upon parts of its body the marks of the ser- 
pent. His eyes had the fiery and vengeful appearance 
peculiar to the reptile. One arm, also, lay coiled upon its 
side in a manner perfectly serpentine. As the child grew 
up, and came into the presence of certain objects, despite of 
all efforts of his Will to the contrary, his eyes would roll in 
13* 



286 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

their sockets, with the fiery vengeful appearance peculiar to 
the serpent when attacked by an enemy. At the same 
time, the arm referred to would strike at the object per- 
ceived, in exact conformity to the motions of the reptile in 
similar circumstances. In connection with the physical or- 
ganization of this individual, two classes of actions, each 
equally conformed to ideas, appeared ; the one class, how- 
ever, the consequents of volition in harmony with concep- 
tions and judgments, and the other caused by feelings gene- 
rated by external perceptions. Now, in conformity with the 
fact last named, we can explain all the phenomena of brute 
action, however intelligent in appearance. All such phe- 
nomena may be the exclusive result of the peculiar feelings 
and organism of the animal, in the total absence of the Intel- 
ligence peculiar to man. The question is. Are there any 
facts peculiar to brute and human action, verifying this hypo- 
thesis ? This question I will now endeavor to answer, in the 
light of the principle I have laid down as the basis of our 
conclusions on this subject. 

Points of Dissimilarity between Man and the Brute. 
In order to test the validity of the hypothesis under con- 
sideration, we will now attend to the fundamental phe- 
nomena which distinguish man from the brute. Among 
these, I will specify only the following : 

1. Man, from the laws of his Intelligence, is a scientific 
being. The main direction of the human Intelligence is not 
merely towards phenomena, but towards the scientific expla- 
nation of phenomena. This is one of the great wants of 
human nature, the scientific explanation of phenomena. AH 
mankind agree in the assumption, that in the brute there is 
a total absence of this principle. Brute intelligence pertains 
exclusively to mere phenomena. The creature never seeks 
an explanation of what he sees. He acts from feelings 
generated by perceptions, without ever seeking an explana- 
tion of what he sees or feels. 

2. Man, as a race, is progressive. The brute is perfectly 
stationary. For six thousand years, each race has been spec- 
tators of precisely the same phenomena. The commence- 
ment of observation with man, was the commencement of 
intellectual progress, which has been onward from genera- 
tion to generation. With all bis observations, the brute has 
never advanced a single step. He is now just where he was 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 287 

six thousand years ago. The beaver builds his dam, Hves 
and dies, just as did the first that ever appeared on earth. 
The same is true of the action of every bruie race. 

3. Man is the subject of moral obhgation, and consequent- 
ly of moral government. In other words, man is a moral 
agent. All this is universally denied of the brute. He is 
never, except when man acts towards him, as all acknow- 
ledge, irrationally, regarded or treated as the subject of moral 
obligation or of moral government. I might cite other 
points of dissimilarity, equally manifest, and equally funda- 
mental. But these are sufficient for the present argument. 

Facts applied. 

It now remains to apply the facts above stated to the so- 
lution of the question under consideration. When we have 
determined the faculties necessarily supposed, as the condi- 
tion of science, progress, and moral agency in man, we have 
determined the faculties which we are totally to deny of the 
brute. For it should be borne in mind, that the facts above 
named do not exist in one degree in man, and in a smaller 
degree in the brute. The difference is not that of degree, 
but of total dissimilarity. What various individuals of our 
race, in the respects under consideration, possess in different 
degrees, the brute totally wants. The faculties, therefore, 
w^hich are to be affirmed of men as the condition and ground 
of these facts, are to be totally denied of the brute. 

1. I ask, then, in the first place. What faculties constitute 
man a scientific being ^ those in the absence of which he can- 
not possess science, and in the possession of which he is of 
course scientific .'' Sense, the faculty of external perception, 
man, as we have seen, has in common with the brute. But 
this a creature may possess in any degree, and make no ap- 
proach whatever to science. Other faculties in addition are 
supposed as the condition and ground of such developments. 
What, then, are these faculties } I answer, they are, of the 
primary faculties. Reason, and Self-consciousness ; and of 
the secondary. Understanding and Judgment, In the absence 
of Reason, fundamental ideas, in the light of which pheno- 
mena maybe explained, are totally wanting, and consequently 
science becomes impossible. Without Reason also Self-con- 
sciousness would, properly speaking, be impossible, or if 
possible, absolutely useless, and therefore not supposable, as 
originating from perfect Intelligence. Without Reason too, 



288 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

conceptions, notions, and judgments would be absolutely im- 
possible. Notions cannot be formed without ideas of Rea- 
son, such as substance, cause, tinne, space, &c. Judgments 
also, and consequently classification and generalization, can- 
not take place without the ideas of resemblance and differ- 
ence. In other words, without Reason, the exercise of the 
Understanding and Judgment is impossible. The existence 
of these faculties is therefore not* to be supposed. If, then, 
as we are logically bound to do, we take from the brute, 
Reason, Self-consciousness, Understanding, and Judgment, 
what remains to him ? Just what we have attributed to 
him, to wit, the power of external perception, together with 
corresponding feelings, and susceptibilities, and an external 
organism, the action of which is in necessary conformity to the 
feelings thus generated. 

It should be borne in mind, that science in man does not 
depend upon the degree in which the faculties above named 
are possessed by him. The degree of the scientific move- 
ment will be, other things being equal, as the degree in 
which these powers are possessed. When they exist in any 
degree, there will be real science. The total absence of 
science in the brute, indicates most clearly a total absence of 
the scientific faculties ; faculties which are so connected with 
each other, that if one be conceived of as wanting, the others 
also must be. 

The question, I repeat, is not whether the action of the 
brute is not in harmony with fundamental ideas ; but whether 
these ideas have a subjective existence in his Intelligence. 
The bee, for example, builds its cell in conformity to pure 
ideas of Reason. But does it not thus build, not because it 
knows such ideas, but because of the peculiarity of its per- 
ceptions, sensations, and physical structure, all of which ren- 
der its thus building mechanically necessary } The facts 
before us show clearly that it does. 

2. In the next place, we will raise the inquiry. What 
faculties in man render him a progressive being ? They are 
evidently the same as those which render him scientific, with 
the addition of the Imagination. It is because that where 
phenomena appear, mankind are able, in the light of ideas of 
Reason, to explain to themselves these facts, and thus find 
the fundamental principle involved in them, that, as a race, 
we are progressive. For this reason also mankind gain im- 
portant knowledge from accidental experience, a fact which 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 289 

never appears in the brute. A man and a brute are swimming 
together across a river. They become exhausted, and when 
about to sink, meet with something hke a plank floating by. 
They both get on to it and are saved. The brute passes on 
without being a whit wiser from his experience. The oc- 
currence constitutes an era in the history of the human race. 
Man reflects upon the occurrence, and hence arises all the 
wonders of ship-building and navigation. All these had their 
origin in accidental occurrences like that above supposed. 
In the knowledge obtained from occurrences similar in their 
nature, the art of printing, and all the results of steam-power, 
&c., originated. Man and the brute, also hear melodious 
sounds. Each alike copies what he hears. On the part of 
man, these sounds are re-combined into strains still miore 
melodious. Hence the science of music. The brute copies 
what he hears, but never, in a solitary instance, re-combines, 
in the least, what he hears. The mocking-bird presents a 
striking illustration of the truth of this statement. It will 
copy almost every melodious sound it ever hears. Yet it 
was never known to produce a single new combination of 
sounds. Such facts most indubitably indicate in the brute 
the total absence of all the faculties w^hich lay the foundation 
for progress in man, the faculties of Reason, Self-Conscious- 
ness, Understanding, Judgment, and the Imagination. With 
these in any degree, creatures are in a corresponding degree 
progressive. Without them, whatever else they may pos- 
sess, they are perfectly stationary. Nothing is more unphi- 
losophical and illogical, than the conclusion often drawn, in 
the presence of progress on the one hand, and its total 
absence on the other, that brute Instinct and human Intel- 
ligence differ only in degree. How demonstrably evident is 
the conclusion, that they differ not in degree, but in kind. 

3. In respect to the inquirj^. What faculties in man exist 
as the condition and ground of moral agency in him.' the an- 
swer is ready. They are the faculties above named, together 
with that of Free Will. The absence of those first named, in 
the case of the brute, has already been established. Shall 
we still attribute to him that of Free Will ? The following 
considerations perfectly satisfy my own mind on this point. 

(1.) The action of Free Will, in the absence of concep- 
tions and judgments, is impossible. Till I have conceptions 
of A and B, and judge that one differs from the other, or at 
least, that one is not the other, I cannot choose between them. 



290 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

There may be selection, but not choice ; nor can there be 
selection such as implies the action of Free Will. 

(2. ) None of the phenomena of brute action necessarily 
suppose the presence of Free Will in the subject. All such 
phenomena are just as explicable on the opposite hypothesis 
as on this. Now a power is never to be supposed, when its • 
presence is not affirmed by positive facts, or necessarily sup- 
posed by the known sphere of the subject. No such con- 
siderations demand the assumption of Free Will in the brute. 
Such an assumption therefore is wholly illogical. 

(3.) All the phenomena of brute action clearly indicate 
the absence of the power under consideration. Place the 
brute in any circumstances whatever, and there let particular 
sensations be generated in him, and his action will be just as 
fixed and uniform, as that of any mechanical process what- 
ever. As often as the experiment is repeated, it will invari- 
ably be attended with the same results. With such facts 
before us, how illogical the assumption of Free Will in the 
brute. 

(4.) Such a power as that under consideration would be 
a totally useless appendage to the brute, contemplating him 
in reference to the sphere for which he is designed. When 
the intellectual faculties above named are denied him, what 
a useless appendage to the brute, and how worse than useless 
to man, in respect to the use to be made of the animal, would 
such an appendage as Free Will be. The creation of such 
a power, under such circumstances, would be a wide depar- 
ture from all the manifestations of wisdom visible in all the 
divine works beside. 

(5.) Finally, the power under consideration constitutes 
one of the most essential elements of the Divine image in 
which man was created. Why should we suppose an ele- 
ment so fundamental in that image to exist in a creature, in 
whom all the other elements are totally wanting, and that 
without any solid basis for that conclusion ? 

Thus, by the most logical deductions, we have determined 
the powers of the brute, as distinguished from those of man. 
Taking from the former, what fundamental phenomena re- 
quire us to do, to wit, the powers of Reason, Self-Conscious- 
ness, Understanding, Judgment, Imagination, and Free Will, 
we leave him with the powers of external perception, with 
a sensibility, and physical organization, of such a nature, 
that under the varied circumstances of his being, his action 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 291 

is in necessary harmony with the ends for which the all-wise 
Creator designed him. All the phenomena of brute action 
can be accounted for on this hypothesis, and its truth is also 
-affirmed by fundamental phenomena. In this lower creation 
man stands alone. There is nothing like him "in the heavens 
above, nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the 
earth." There he stands, "the image and glory of God." 
Fallen though he is, 

" his form has yet not lost 
All its original brightness, nor appears 

Less than the excess 

Of glory obscured." 

General Remarks. 

1. We are now prepared to explain the ground of the 
misjudgment so common in respect to the action of the 
brute. Men judge of brute action in the light of their own 
consciousness, pertaining to similar actions in themselves. 
When men and brutes are placed in similar circumstances, 
and the external actions of both are similar, men often con- 
clude that the brute acts in view of the same conceptions 
and judgments, in view of which they are conscious of act- 
ing themselves. Now such conclusions are wholly unauthor- 
ized. The external manifestations of instinctive and rational 
Intelligence may be, in many important respects, similar, yet 
there may be a total dissimilarity in the nature of these dif- 
ferent kinds of Intelligence. 

2. We are also prepared to state the conclusion which 
the facts connected with brute Intelligence force upon us. 
It is one of these two : Either the Intelligence of the brute 
is incomparably more perfect than that of man, or, aside from 
the power of external perception, he has no Intelligence at 
all, such as man possesses. The first manifestations of Intel- 
ligence in man, how imperfect and feeble ! How rude and 
ill-shaped, for example, the first habitations built by man ! 
How slow the progress of human architecture from such rude 
beginnings to its present perfection ! On the other hand, the 
first production of the brute bears the stamp of perfection. 
The first dam built by the beaver, the first nest built by the 
bird, have never been surpassed. The first cell built by the 
bee can hardly be improved, even in thought. Now suppose 
that such actions of the brute are, as is the case with man, 
the result of the carrying out of an idea, a plan, previously 



292 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

developed in his Intelligence, what must we conclude ? Why, 
that the first race of brutes that ever appeared on earth, had 
a degree of Intelligence which man, after six thousand years 
of laborious progress, has hardly reached. This or the op- 
posite one forces itself upon us. 

3. Another consideration to which I would direct attention 
is this — the facts on which the conclusions of individuals have 
been based, in respect to the existence of the higher powers 
of Intelligence in the brute, as contrasted with others in the 
same connection, which have been totally overlooked. A 
distinguished naturalist, for example, states that the wild 
ass, when he begins to flee from a man, will first turn one 
ear, and then the (^her, backwards towards the object of his 
terror. From this fact, he concludes that the animal is 
deliberating what course he shall take ; and, as a consequence, 
attributes to it the possession of the powers of deliberation 
and Free Will. A grave conclusion, surely, to infer from 
the leering of an ass, the existence of such powers. How 
often have the actions of the elephant been proclaimed, as 
proof of the existence of the higher powers of Intelligence in 
that animal ? Now let us contemplate another class of facts 
in connection with the same animal. Those who have 
visited menageries are familiar with the dancing of the ani- 
mal at the " sound of the lyre," actions as indicative of 
superior Intelligence as any he ever puts forth. How was 
the creature taught such an act f Did he take lessons, as 
men do, and thus acquire it .' It was by a process very dif- 
ferent from this. When the keepers wish to have the animal 
acquire the art under consideration, they place him upon a 
floor covered with plates of iron. These plates are gradually 
heated till the creature, beginning to feel pain in his feet from 
the heat, lifts first one foot and then the other. As soon as 
such motions begin, the music commences, which is made 
to become more and more lively as the animal steps with 
greater and greater rapidity. When this process has been 
continued for a sufficient length of time, the music ceases, 
and the animal is instantly taken from his painful condition. 
These experiments being repeated a few times, such an 
association is established between the sound of the lyre, and 
the Sensibility of the animal, that as soon as he hears the 
music he begins to dance, and continues the pace till the 
music ceases. Thus we have the elephant dancing in his 
wisdom, as many suppose. Now had the animal the real 



HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE. 



293 



Intelligence possessed by any individual of our race, wbo is 
in any degree removed above absolute idiocy, sucb an im- 
position could not be practised upon him for a single hour. 

The actions of the creature, in this case, in conformity to 
Intelligence, are not, as all perceive, a manifestation of Intelli- 
gence in him, but in the keeper. So whatever Intelligence 
the animal manifests in any instance, is not an indication of 
Intelligence in him, but in the Creator. The same is true of 
all other animals. 

4. The form in which memory exists in brutes, may now be 
readily pointed out. Memory, in man, is the recalling of the 
fact that v^e were, in particular circumstances, the subjects of 
such and such thoughts, feelings, &c. In the brute no such 
recollections can occur. When the brute has been affected 
in a given manner, in given circumstances, the same sensa- 
tions are reproduced in him when he comes into similar cir- 
cumstances again, and hence the sarne actions are repeated. 

5. Finally, we notice the error of some who attempt to 
account for the diversities of intellectual manifestations be- 
tween men and brutes, on the ground of diversities of phreno- 
logical development. To suppose that the soul of a dog, 
if placed in connection with the brain of a Newton, would 
manifest the Intelligence of that great philosopher, is as 
illogical as to suppose that gold and water will exhibit the 
same phenom.ena, when subject to the same influences. The 
manifestations of substances diverse in their nature will, 
under the same circumstances, be as diverse as their nature. 
The brute, in any circumstances, is still a brute, and not a 
man, nor an angel. Diversities of phrenological develop- 
ment may account for the diverse intellectual manifestations 
among men ; but not for those between man and the brute. 
The brute must become another being, before he can mani- 
fest the intelligence of man. 



CHAPTER XX. 

MATTER AND SPIRIT^ 
Principle on which the Argument is based. 

All reasoning which is legitimate, in respect to the nature 
of any substances, is based upon the intuition that substances 
really are, as their phenomena ; that substances, all of whose 
phenomena are totally different, are totally diverse in their 
nature ; and that, as far as the fundamental phenomena of any 
two substances differ, so far is there a corresponding differ- 
ence in the nature of the substances themselves. Two sub- 
stances are presented to our Intelligence, as the objects of 
our present inquiries, matter and spirit. The question is, 
Are these substances, in their nature, fundamentally diverse, 
or are they identical ? 

7'he Soul, how revealed to itself. 

The principle which reveals the soul to itself, is the 
principle of substance ; the principle of our nature, or law 
of Reason, b}'^ which we affirm that every quality supposes 
a subject, a substance, a real being, or existence. 

The unity and identity of the soul is revealed to us by 
that law of our Intelligence, by which all the phenomena of 
Memory and Consciousness are necessarily referred to one 
and the same subject, the I of Consciousness. 

All the phenomena of the mind, both past and present, are 
given in Consciousness, not as mere facts, but as affirmations, 
as propositions, I think, I feel, I purpose or will, or I did 
think, feel, or will. This I, the subject of these phenomena, 
the mind necessarily conceives of as a unity, as remaining 
one and the same amid the ever changing phenomena which 
it exhibits. 



MATTER AND SPIRIT. 295 

Matter, how revealed. 
Now while the soulis revealed to itself as the subject of 
the phenomena given in Consciousness, matter is revealed to 
us as the cause of certain phenomena of which we are con- 
scious. As the subject is considered a real substance, or 
being, one and identical, while the phenomena are perpetu- 
ally changing, so the cause of these phenomena is, by the 
same law of our Intelligence, considered as a substance, a 
real being, remaining one and identical, while the phenomena 
are perpetually varying. In short, matter is given as the 
object or cause of certain perceptions in us, the qualities 
perceived being the phenomena of the subject of these quali- 
ties, and to our minds the only possible index of the nature 
of this subject. On the other hand, mind is given as the 
subject of this perception, the perception itself being a phe- 
nomena or quality of this subject, and to us, together with 
other operations or qualities given in Consciousness, the 
only possible index of the nature of the subject, ourselves or 
the soul. 

Our Knowledge of the existence of Matter and Spirit equally 
certain. 
Here I would repeat a remark made in a former Chapter, 
that the mind knows with the same certainty the reality of 
the object of the perception under consideration, that it does 
that of its subject. Both are revealed to us by the same 
principle, that of substance. The qualities of these subjects 
are revealed by different faculties of the Intelligence ; but 
each faculty has equal authority, and affirms the reality of 
its objects with equal directness, and equal positiveness. 
Sense affirms directly and positively the reality of the qual- 
ities of external substances. Consciousness affirms with the 
same directness and positiveness the reality of the phenomena 
or qualities of the internal subject or substance. 

Principle on which the Argument rests re-stated. 
Now the determination of one fact, or rather inquiry, will 
determine with absolute certaint}^, the question whether the 
nature of these two substances, matter and mind, is identi- 
cal. The inquiry is. Do these substances exhibit any phe- 
nomena or qualities which are identical ? If they do, then 
the conclusion forces itself upon us, that, so far at least, their 



296 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

nature is the same. If, on the other hand, the quaUties of 
each are found to be totally unlike those of the other, then 
we infer with equal positiveness, a corresponding difference 
in their nature. 

Qualities of these two Substances. 

The qualities or phenomena of mind are, thought, feeling, 
willing, and nothing else. These phenomena are to us the 
only possible index of the nature of their subject, the soul, 
which thinks, feels, and wills. 

The qualities, or phenomena of matter, on the other hand, 
are solidity, extension, form, figure, color, &c. These phe- 
nomena also are to us the only possible index of the nature 
of their subject. 

The Argument. 

Now I affirm, and who will deny the affirmation ^ that the 
phenomena of these respective subjects differ, not in degree, 
but in kind ; that they are not only not alike, but wholly 
unlike. What is there in thought, feeling and willing, that 
in the least possible respect resembles solidity, extension, 
figure, form, color, &c. ? Now as we know absolutely that 
the phenomena of the two substances are wholly unlike, we 
know with the same absoluteness, that there is and must be 
a corresponding dissimilarity in their nature. Before we can 
admit or even suppose, that mind is material, or matter is 
spiritual, in its essence, we must prove that sensation, thought, 
and volition, are reducible in the last analysis, to solidity, 
extension, &c., or that these are, by a similar analysis, re- 
ducible to thought, feeling, or willing. When the one or 
the other of these schemes has been accomplished, then 
we will acknowledge with the materialist, that mind is mat- 
ter, or with the spiritualist, that matter is mind. Till then, 
we shall rest in the absolute affirmation of Reason, that the 
nature of these two substances is totally dissimilar. 

No solid objections can be presented to the above argument, 
which do not involve the assumption, that the objects under 
consideration are not as they present themselves to our Intel- 
ligence. This being assumed, it becomes folly to reason at 
all on the subject. The same assumption, also, may be 
made in respect to any other subject, and then all reasoning 
and all investigation become perfect folly. 



MATTER AND SPIRIT. 297 

Common Objections. 
A few of the common, and most important objections to 
the above argument demand a passing notice : 

1. It may be said, that for aught we know, there may be 
phenomena yet unknown to us, common to both these sub- 
stances. To this I reply, that when such phenomena are 
discovered, we w*ill acknowledge that so far, and so far only, 
their natures are alike. Such a discovery, however, would 
not affect the above demonstration : for it would still remain 
true, that as far as the phenomena under consideration are 
concerned, they are wholly unlike. 

2. It may also be objected, that these two substances 
have always, as far as our knowledge extends, existed to- 
gether. This objection supposes us ignorant of the eternal 
mind, an admission which we shall by no means grant. But 
suppose we yield even this. Does co-existence, and even 
necessary co-existence, suppose a common nature ? Body 
and space always co-exist, as far as body is concerned, and 
as far as our experience goes ; but to suppose them, for 
this reason, identical in their nature, is absurd, 

3. The mutual influence of these two substances, the one 
upon the other, is often adduced as proof of the identity of 
their ultimate essence. But this fact equally consists with 
both hypotheses, and of course can prove neither. Before it 
can be shown to possess any force, it must be shown that no 
two substances can mutually affect each other, only on the 
single condition of a common nature. But this can never 
be done. 

These are the principal and only objections, as far as my 
knowledge extends, to the above demonstration. Their 
weakness shows the weakness of the hypothesis they are 
designed to sustain. 



CHAPTER XXI, 

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 



Intimately connected is the doctrine discussed in the last 
Chapter with that to be discussed in the present, to wit, the 
doctrine of Immortality. The relations of spirit to the eter- 
nal future before us, present questions of greater moment to 
us, as intelligent beings, capable of investigating the question 
of our own destiny, than any other of which we can con- 
ceive. Indeed, all real interests with such beings are in- 
volved in such a question. In the volume of Inspiration, 
this doctrine is, as we should expect, set with the greatest 
possible distinctness before our minds. The individual who 
confides in the truth of that sacred record, needs no other 
foundation on which to rest the question of his own Immor- 
tality. The examination of the truth of this doctrine, how- 
ever, pertains not merely to those who are privileged with 
the knowledge of Inspiration. This conviction may properly 
be presented as the great phenomenon of the race, of the 
universal human Intelligence. It belongs to philosophy to 
investigate the grounds of this universal conviction. 

Preliminary Considerations. 

Before proceeding to a direct consideration of the grounds 
of this conviction, a few prehminary considerations demand 
our special attention : 

1. The first that I notice, is the fact above stated, that the 
conviction of the truth of this doctrine is co-extensive with 
the race of man. It belongs to no age, to no form of religion, 
to no nation, to no race of men, as a peculiarity. It is the 
common element of all religions, the common conviction of 
the race, in all ages and conditions. To the wild son of the 
forest, to the ferocious cannibal of the isles of the Pacific, 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 299 

to the wanderer among Afric's " sunny mountains," and the 
inhabitants of " India's coral strand," as well as to that 
portion of the race to whom Christianity has imparted the 
blessings of civilisation, the conviction of an endless exist- 
ence after the closing up of the concerns of this mortal 
sphere is an omnipresent reality. " Simple nature " has 
imparted this expedfation to the race, as the common boon 
of heaven, irrespective of rank or condition. 

2. This conviction does not exist in the universal Intelli- 
gence as the result of investigation, of logical deductions from 
processes of reasoning. This is evident from the fact, that 
it exists among races of men totally unaccustomed to reason 
on any such subject. Here also it exists with as much 
strength as among those who are most disciplined in logical 
deductions. It lies in the mind, as one of the great primary 
intuitions of the universal Intelligence. It has precisely the 
same claim to a place among such intuitions that the belief 
of our own existence has. 

3. This conviction lies in the Intelligence in such a form, 
as to be, in reality, incapable of increased confirmation by 
any process of reasoning. When we fall back upon the 
primary intuitions of our minds, we find it there, as one of 
the great starting points of the Intelligence. We find it, not 
as a point to be reached after we have left the sphere of 
primary intuitions, but as one of the seven pillars on which 
the temple of truth, reared by investigation and reasoning, 
must rest. Like all other primary intuitions, this conviction 
is incapable of essential confirmation by any power of logical 
deductions. 

4. While this conviction, as a primary intuition of the 
universal Intelligence, is incapable of essential confirmation 
from logical deductions, it remains equally proof against all 
apparent demonstrations to the contrary. An individual 
may pile what he may deem demonstration upon demon- 
stration upon this conviction, in order to crush and annihi- 
late it, till he triumphs in the terrible assumption, that its 
light is for ever extinct in his mind. Still, in a moment, it 
will rise before him again, in all the strength and vigor of 
immortal youth. He again knows the truth of that convic- 
tion, with an assurance with which he hardly recognizes his 
own existence. This apparent resurrection is not the result 
of logical deductions. In that moment the Intelligence 
looks down into the depths of its inner being, and there 



300 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

again finds this intuition unmoved from its eternal foundations, 
as the moveless rock beneath the billows of the ocean. The 
individual who thinks that he has demonstrated to himself 
the fact, that as a brute he shall live and die, should remem- 
ber, that however secure he may think himself from the 
conviction of, to him, the unwelcome truth of his own im- 
mortality, the terrible reality will her^fter leap up again, 
as an armed man. He will never escape from it. It will 
and must be to him as a guardian angel, or a spectre of 
darkness. 

5. In the facts above stated, we have the highest possible 
evidence of the truth of the doctrine under consideration. 
What the universal Intelligence affirms, in view of certain 
facts, must have its foundation in these facts ; or we must 
assume that the Intelligence itself is a lie ; and then to reason 
on any subject becomes the perfection of folly. 

6. As a primary conviction of the universal Intelligence, 
the exclusive province of philosophy pertaining to it is, to 
investigate the grounds of this conviction, and not to attempt 
to establish the truth of it by any process of loojical deduc- 
tion. Here, I think, lies the error in the common demon- 
strations, or attempted demonstrations, of the doctrine of 
Immortality. The assumption in all such demonstrations is, 
that the truth of this doctrine is to be found as some distant 
point in a process of logical deduction, instead of recog- 
nizing the conviction of the truth of the doctrine as one of 
the primary intuitions of universal Reason, and then falling 
back upon the intuition itself, to discover its foundation, or 
chronological antecedent. One fact should be kept in mind 
here. In falling back upon any primary conviction of the 
Intelligence, for the purpose of finding the foundation of the 
same, the validity of that conviction does not depend upon 
the success of our endeavors. Reflection may fail of its 
object, " yet the foundation of truth standeth sure." 

Principles on which the 'present Argument rests. 

There are two foundation principles on which the entire 
argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immortality rests : 

1. The first is this, that every sentient being is formed for 
a particular destiny. To fill the sphere of existence for 
which each creature was formed, that constitutes his destiny. 
That each creature is thus formed and adapted to a particu- 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 301 

lar sphere, the fiUing up of which constitutes his destiii}^, is 
a fundamental conviction of the race. 

2. There is in the constitution of each being, and order of 
beings, a fixed adaptation to his or their particular destiny. 
To suppose the opposite, would be to suppose that the Crea- 
tor lacks wisdom, or goodness, or both. 

3. Hence, if we would determine the destiny of any 
being, or order of beings, we must investigate their powers 
and susceptibilities, and from these learn what their real des- 
tiny is. The great French naturalist, from a single bone be- 
longing to an animal of an extinct species, could determine 
at once, in view of that single part, the genus or species of 
the animal, and the main features of its physical structure. 
So true is Nature in the adaptation of one part of her works 
to another. Equally real and perfect is the adaptation of 
the constitution of each creature to his particular destiny. 
Of this all men are convinced. All men believe that the 
destiny of the bee differs from that of the horse, and that 
that of man differs from that of either of the former. The 
ground of this conviction is the fundamental difference of 
their nature and constitution. 

We must admit the validity of the above principles, as the 
ground of the argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immor- 
tality, or deny w^holly the validity of conclusions based upon 
the laws and constitution of nature. If we deny the pro- 
priety of reasoning from the fundamental laws and constitu- 
tion of a being to his destiny, it becomes perfect folly for us 
to reason from or about creation at all. If the voice of Na- 
ture is false in this instance, he is guilty of infinite folly and 
absurdity who will trust her anywhere. 

Direct Argument. 

We are now prepared for distinct statement of the ground 
of the universal conviction of the truth of the doctrine of 
Immortality. It is the conscious adaptation of the powers 
and susceptibilities of the soul to that great idea, or to its real- 
ization^ as the appropriate destiny of man. Our godlike 
powers and susceptibilities are in conscious adaptation to the 
realization of that idea as our appropriate destiny, and to 
none other. 

1. The universal conception of the idea, as one of the 
primitive ideas of Reason, indicates in man powers adapted 
to its realization. For who should realize an idea but the 
14 



303 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOrHY. 

being who has conceived of it ? The conception of the idea 
of Paradise Lost indicated, in Milton, powers adapted to the 
production of that immortal poem. So the universal con- 
ception of Immortality, as one of the fundamental phenomena 
of the human Intelligence, indicates, in man, powers adapted 
to the realization of that conception. 

2. But when this conception arises in the human mind, 
we find our powers and susceptibilities in conscious adaptation 
to it. The realization of the idea becomes the great object 
of desire, and our whole being shrinks back with horror at 
the thought of annihilation. How true to nature, as the 
truth lies revealed in the depths of universal mind, is the 
sentiment which Milton has put into the mouth of a fallen 
spirit : 

" For who would lose 
Though full of pain, this intellectual being, 
These thoughts that wander through eternity, 
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost 
In the wide womb of uncreated night, 
Devoid of sense and motion ?" 

Unless the fixed direction of universal nature is towards 
the unreal. Immortality is the destiny of man. Now it is 
the conscious adaptation of his powers to that idea, together 
with the principle, that the destiny of each being and race of 
beings is as their powers and adaptations, that constitutes, as 
it appears to me, the chief ground of the universal convic- 
tion of the truth of the doctrine of Immortality. What 
other conviction should arise in the conscious presence of 
such facts ? 

3. But there is another fundamental fact which lies at the 
basis of the universal conviction of which Ave are speaking — 
a fact of which every one becomes sufliciently conscious, as 
soon as he knows himself, to lay the foundation of the con- 
viction under consideration, although the fact may not, in 
most minds, possess all the distinctness of reflection. It is 
the fact, so undeniably and universally manifest, that all the 
powers of the soul are capable and adapted to a state of end- 
less progression. The poM^ers of thought involve the ele- 
ments of endless progress in knowledge. So all our capaci- 
ties are in their nature adapted to a state of limitless 
expansion. What is the conviction which forces itself upon 
the mind in the presence of such powers r The answer is, 
that the doctrine of Immortality reveals the destiny of man, 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 303 

or the fundamental tendencies of nature are towards the 
unreal and untrue. Which conclusion is most reasonable, 
that powers and susceptibilities adapted to endless expansion 
are just to begin to open to the light and influence of truth, 
and then descend into the abyss of non-'existence, or that 
*' the eternal years of God are theirs .^" What excuse can 
a rational being have, in the presence of such faculties, for 
not assuming his own Immortality as the great goal towards 
which all his plans and purposes shall be directed r 

4. There is another important fact bearing upon this topic — 
a fact of whidi every one is conscious as soon as he comes 
to recognize himself as a moral agent. It is a fact, that we 
do violence to our moral nature, and render ourselves really 
incapable of the virtues to which our nature is adapted, when 
we reject the doctrine of Immortality. When we contem- 
plate ourselves as the creatures of a day, our nature shrinks 
to the dimensions of its own withering, contracted concep- 
tions, and thus becomes incapable of great thoughts and 
noble aspirations. " The grander my conceptions of being, 
the nobler my future. There can be no sublimity in life 
without faith in the souPs eternity." It is only in the pre- 
sence of such conceptions and anticipations, that great vir- 
tues, such as render us pure and blessed even here, become 
possible to us. The individual who does not " dial on time 
his own eternity," cannot become truly great, nor greatly 
good. His aspirations and his virtues, if he could have any, 
would, of necessity, be as contracted and grovelling as his 
conceptions of his own destiny, and that of the race with 
which he is connected. Now this feeling of violence and 
self-suicide done to the higher departments of our nature, in 
the denial of this doctrine, is one of the chief sources, as I sup- 
pose, of the universal conviction of the truth of the soul's 
eternity. 

5. I mention another fact as the ground of this conviction. 
It is the fact, that every one becomes aware of as soon as 
the fact presents itself to his mind, that no real reasons 
whatever exist against the doctrine of which we are speak- 
ing. On the one hand, the truth of the doctrine stands 
forth as a primarj'-, fundamental intuition of universal Reason. 
On the other, no reasons at all present themselves against 
this intuition. What reason, for example, does the dissolu- 
tion of the physical organization, with which the soul is now 
connected, and the consequent disappearance of any mani- 



304 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

festations of the soul's existence to us, afford against this 
doctrine ? This fact is just as consistent with the soul's 
Immortality, as with the opposite supposition. It may be 
but one of the necessary steps in the progress of its future 
development. 

The same holds true of the loss of mental vigor which 
often attends the approach of dissolution under consideration. 
When from weariness and exhaustion, we approach a state 
of sleep, we find the same want of vigor ; yet we know that 
the real powers of the soul are not the less, under such cir- 
cumstances. The same may hold true in the case above 
referred to. It may be, and no doubt is, one circumstance 
which attends our mortal state, while it has no bearing what- 
ever against the soul's Immortality. With such evidences 
as that above stated, and in the total absence of all evidence 
to the contrary, every one feels that it would imply infinite 
guilt in him not to assume the doctrine under consideration 
as true. 

6. There is one fact which science has developed, as con- 
firmatory of the universal conviction under consideration, 
though from its being a fact of science, it cannot constitute a 
ground of that conviction. At death, not a particle of the 
physical organization, with which the soul is here connected, 
perishes. How unreasonable and absurd the supposition, 
that the soul, for which all else was made, is the only 
reality that then ceases to be ? As the particles of the body 
immediately enter into new combinations, how reasonable 
the conclusion (and how unreasonable and absurd the oppo- 
site conclusion), that the soul also passes away from the 
present scene to the sphere of its future existence ! 

Future Reirihutions. 

There is one element of the doctrine of Immortality, which 
should not be passed over without special attention. I refer 
to the question, w^hether the soul, in the eternal future, is 
to exist in a state of moral retribution. The following con- 
siderations may be presented as having a decisive bearing 
upon this question : 

1. Wherever, throughout the wide world, the idea of 
Immortality is met with, w^e find it connected with the belief 
and anticipation of a state of moral retributions. There is not 
an age or nation where an exception to this belief can be met 



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 305 

with. Such a fact marks the doctrine of future retributions, 
as one of the primary intuitions of universal Reason. 

2. All our ideas of moral fitness are met in this doctrine, 
and are perfectly reversed by every other hypothesis. No 
individual can contemplate a life of self-sacrificing virtue, 
and of flagrant vv^ickedness and crime unattended wath re- 
pentance, as terminating in the same condition hereafter, and 
retain his sentiments of moral esteem for the " Judge of all 
the earth." Every individual does as fatal violence to his 
moral nature, who entertains the sentiment, that God does 
not, in eternity, hold deserved retributions in readiness for 
the virtuous and vicious, as the man does who denies the 
soul's Immortality. I feel perfectly safe in venturing the 
affirmation, that there is not an individual on earth, who holds 
that God has prepared the same rewards hereafter for the 
virtuous or the vicious here, that does, or can, in the depths 
of his own mind, entertain feelings of esteem and reverence, 
and is inspired with feelings of delight and praise, for the 
Eternal One. 

3. I mention one other very decisive fact bearing upon 
this question. Every observer of the facts that lie all around 
him in the universe, cannot have failed to notice an invariable 
tendency, common to the practice of both virtue and vice; 
it is a tendency to changeless fixedness of character in the 
one specific direction in which an individual accustoms him- 
self to act. Now, what does such an unvarying and uni- 
versal fact indicate, in respect to the character of the future 
destiny of moral agents ? Certainly this, and this only, that 
the moral universe is advancing, not only in the line of 
immortal existence, but to a state of fixed and changeless 
moral retributions. What other convictions do such con- 
siderations tend to impress upon the mind of all who seri- 
ously throw their thoughts upon the eternal future before 
them.? How thoughtfully, then, does it become us to walk 
along the borders of that " undiscovered country," across 
whose bourne we are so soon to pass. 



CHAPTER XXII. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



We come now to a consideration of the last and most im- 
portant subject to be investigated in the present Treatise — 
the idea of God. In the remarks which I shall make upon 
this subject, I shall take for granted two important facts : 

1. That there are, in the universe around us, two orders 
of existences — matter and spirit. 

2. That there is in our minds the idea of a Being of infi- 
nite perfections, who sustains to all conditional existences 
the relation of an unconditioned and absolute cause. We 
not only conceive of such a being as possible, but really ex- 
isting. This maybe assumed as the conviction of the race ; 
at least, wherever the Intelligence exists in any considerable 
degree of development. M}^ object in the present chapter is 
to elucidate the ground of this conviction. 

Preliminary Considerations. 
In the commencement of my remarks upon this subject, 
special attention is invited to the following preliminary con- 
siderations : 

1. The idea of God, like that of Immortality, is in all minds 
in whom Reason is in any considerable degree developed. 
This will be admitted by all who are at all acquainted with 
the history of the race. The idea of God is a common phe- 
nomenon of the universal Intelligence. 

2. Like the doctrine above named, it is not in the mind as 
the result of logical deduction : yet it is there with such 
weight of conviction, that every one feels that he involves 
himself in infinite guilt, in denying, or entertaining a doubt 
of its objective validity. This is evident from the fact, that 
every sceptic, in the depths of his own mind, believes that, 



IDEA OF GOD. 307 

if there is a God, he has forfeited His eternal favor in the 
denial of His existence, a fact most clearly indicating the 
consciousness, that in doubting, instead of adoring and wor- 
shipping, he has done fatal violence to the laws of his own 
being. 

3. This idea is in the mind W'ith such weight of conviction, 
as to be apparently incapable of increase or diminution from 
any process of logical deduction. It may be doubted whether 
all the proposed demonstrations of the past and present 
century, have added any considerable weight to the conviction 
already existing upon the mind, of the reality of the Divine 
existence. Nor have all professed arguments to the con- 
trary, erased this conviction from the mind of the sceptic 
himself; a fact fully evident from the force with which the 
consciousness of the fearful reality often leaps upon such 
minds, in moments of solemn thought, or of sudden calami- 
ties, or unexpected exposure to death. 

4. As this conviction is not in the mind, as the result of 
logical deduction, it must be ranked among the primary in- 
tentions or principles of Reason ; primary, as opposed to con- 
victions resulting from processes of reasoning. 

5. As a first truth of Reason, the Divine existence is sus- 
ceptible, in the first instance, of the kind of proof common to 
all first truths, and in the second, of that which is peculiar to 
all necessary intuitions. In the light of the above observa- 
tions, we will now proceed to a consideration of the ground 
of the universal conviction of the reality of the Divine exist- 
tence. 

There are two fundamental forms in which the idea of God 
is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit God the un- 
conditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally ex- 
ists, and God the Infinite and Perfect. I design to consi- 
der this subject in each of these forms. 

GOD THE UNCONDITIONED AND ABSOLUTE CAUSE OF ALL THAT 
CONDITIONALLY EXISTS. 

The ground of the belief of the existence of God, consi- 
dered as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that 
conditionally exists, that is, of all things whose existence can 
be conceived of only on the conlition of admittin'T; the reali- 
ty of something elsrf as the condition and cause of their ex- 
istence, the ground, I say, of the convictions of the reality of 



308 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the existence of God, contemplated in this light, is simply 
the apprehension of the reality of the conditioned. The re- 
ality of a cause unconditioned and absolute of all that exists 
conditionally follows, as the logical antecedent, of the con- 
ception of the conditioned. This is evident from the fact, 
that we can no more conceive of the opposite as true, that is, 
that something conditioned may exist, without a cause uncon- 
ditioned and absolute, than we can conceive^of an'^event with- 
out a cause. Indeed the principle that the conditioned sup- 
poses the unconditioned as its logical antecedent, is only one 
form of announcing the principle of causality. These two 
principles, which in reality are not two but one, must stand 
or fall together. The reality of the Divine existence there- 
fore, contemplating God as the cause, unconditioned and ab- 
solute of all that conditionally exists, is just as evident as the 
principle of causality, to wit, the proposition that no event 
exists without a cause. The conditioned, as a matter of fact, 
does exist. This we know absolutely from Consciousness. 
Our mental states, as well as our own existence and that 
of the reality and condition of the external world, we neces- 
sarily conceive of, as conditioned. God, the unconditioned 
and absolute cause, therefore, must be. It is impossible even 
to conceive of the opposite, any more than we can conceive 
of body without space, succession without time, an event with- 
out a cause, or phenomena without substance. IVo individ- 
ual does or can, in thought, deny the reality of something 
conditioned, that is, of something caused by something else. 
It is impossible therefore even to conceive the non-reality of 
a cause, unconditioned and absolute, of that which we neces- 
sarily conceive of as conditioned. 

This Frinciple holds, ichether the conditioned he conceived of 
as finite or infinite. 
The principle under consideration holds, in- whatever light 
the conditioned may be contemplated, whether as finite, or 
infinite. Let X represent the conditioned. Now if every 
element in X be conceived of as conditioned, that is, depend- 
ing upon something out of itself, as its cause, the whole of 
X must depend upon something unconditioned and absolute, 
out of itself. Even to conceive of the opposite is an absolute 
impossibility. The idea of God, therefore, contemplating 
him as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that ex- 
ists conditionally, is an idea absolutely universal and neces* 
sary. 



IDEA OF GOD. 309 



LOGICAL CONSEQUENTS OF THE PRINCIPLE ABOVE ELUCIDATED. 

Now all that will follow as the logical consequents of the 
form of the idea of God above elucidated, must be true of him. 
One inquiry of fundamental importance with the philosopher 
and theologian is, What are these consequents ? To a con- 
sideration of some of them, special attention is now invited. 
What, then, are the attributes which we necessarily ascribe to 
God, contemplated as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, 
of all that conditionally exists, and in view of the character 
of his works, contemplating him as such a cause f Among 
these, I specify the following : 

Eternity. 
As such a cause, God must be eternal in his existence. 
K his existence is not from eternity, then it is an effect of 
some other cause, and God would not be the cause uncondi- 
tioned and absolute of all that conditionally exists. 

Freedom as opposed to Necessity. 
God, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, is a/ree, and 
not a necessary cause. This is absolutely evident from the 
fact, that the effects of the Divine agency are in time.) and not in 
eternity. A cause that acts of necessity must act, and act to 
the full extent of its power, as soon as it does exist. If we 
suppose a necessary cause to exist from eternity, the effects of 
its action must also be eternal. To suppose the opposite, 
would be to suppose that a cause did exist from eternity, 
which must act as soon as it exists, and yet that through the 
eternity of the past, it did not act at all. The commence- 
ment of its action in time, therefore, would not only be 
unaccountable, but inconceivable. If the human race, the 
world of mind around us, had their origin in a necessary and 
not a free cause, their existence would be from eternity, and 
not have commenced in time. It did commence in time. 
God, then, the unconditioned and absolute cause of their exist- 
ence, is a free, and not a necessary cause. This conclusion 
follows of necessity. Further, to suppose God to be a 
cause unconditioned and absolute, and yet that he is a neces- 
sary and not a free agent, is a palpable contradiction. What 
is a necessary cause } It is a cause which can act, onl}"^ as 
it is acted upon by something out of itself, a something which 
14* 



310 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

necessitates its action. A necessary cause, therefore, in its 
action, must be conditioned, and not unconditioned and abso- 
lute. If God, then, is not a free, he is not the unconditioned 
cause of all conditional existences. Besides the supposition 
that the unconditioned and absolute is under the law of 
necessity, implies that the necessitating power acted antece- 
dently to the unconditioned. This is equivalent to denying 
that God as the jirsty as well as the unconditioned and abso- 
lute cause. 

Intelligence.^ 
As an unconditioned and absolute cause, God must be pos- 
sessed of Intelligence. This follows as a necessary conse- 
quence of the fact, that he is a//-ee, and not a necessary agent. 
Free ao;ency, in the absence of Intelligence, is an absolute 
impossibility. We cannot possibly conceive of such an 
agent. Further, the universe to which God has given exist- 
ence is one. Every object and element in the universe 
exists as a part of the great whole. The whole is in perfect 
adaptation to each and every part, and every part is in adap- 
tation equally perfect to the whole ; and the great whole, with 
all its parts, exists in perfect harmony with fundamental 
ideas of the Intelligence. Now to suppose that a free cause 
has created and constituted a universe, all the parts and 
departments of which, as parts of one great whole, exist in 
perfect harmony with fundamental ideas of the universal 
InteUigence, is an absolute impossibility. It is, in reality, the 
gross absurdity of affirming an event without a cause. 

Spirituality. 
As the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that condi- 
tionally exists, God is a spiritual., and not a material existence. 
This follows, as the logical consequent of the fact, that he is 
a free and intelligent, and not a necessary and unintelligent 
agent. 

Moral Agency. 
God also must be a moral agent. This likewise is a logi- 
cal consequent of the fact that he is an intelligent and free 
agent. Intelligence and free agency cannot be postulated of 
any being without, as the logical consequent of that suppo- 
sition, attributing to him moral agency. 



IDEA OF GOD. 311 

The Exercise of Moral Government, in Harmony luith the Law 
of Justice and Goodness. 
Every individual, from a consciousness of what is passing 
in the interior of his own mind, knows perfectly, that in the 
constitution of his mental being, a moral government, in har- 
mony with the law of justice and goodness, is actually esta- 
blished. He is conscious, that he cannot act in opposition 
to ihe law of justice and goodness, without doing violence to 
the fandamental laws of his moral being. Here is moral 
government established. What does its existence indicate, 
in respect to the character of God, the author and establisher 
of that government ? We must affirm that truth is not 
revealed at all in nature, or that the fact under consideration 
reveals God as the moral legislator and governor of the uni- 
verse, administering his government in harmony with the 
law^ of justice and goodness. In the depths of his ow^n Con- 
sciousness, every one finds the basis of his convictions in 
respect to God, as the righteous moral legislator and governor 
of the universe, 

GODj THE INFINITE ATS'D PERFECT. 

We come now to consider the second form in which the 
idea of God is revealed in the human Intelligence, to wit, 
God, the Infinite and Perfect. 

This a First Truth of Reason. 
That this form of the idea of God is a first truth of 
Reason, is evident from this one consideration. Should any 
one attribute to God an acknowleds^ed imperfection of any 
kind, he would know in himself, that he had thereby in- 
volved himself in infinite guilt. Men may, without con- 
scious guilt, impute to the Most High real imperfections, but 
not as such. Whatever individuals regard as necessarily 
implied in the idea of the Infinite and Perfect, they univer- 
sally conceive themselves as under the highest obligation 
to attribute the same to God. Further, there never was a 
time, since the idea of God first arose in our minds, when we 
did not thus regard him. There never w^as a time since the 
period under consideration, wdien we would not regard our- 
selves as infinitely guilty in attributing to God any acknow 



312 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ledged imperfection, or in not affirming of him whatever we 
regarded as involved in the idea of the Infinite and Perfect. 
God, then, the Infinite and Perfect, is a first truth of uni- 
versal Reason. It now remains to designate the grounds of 
our conviction of the objective validity of this form of the 
idea of God. 

Does Creation indicate the Character of God as Infinite and 
Perfect ? 
At the outset of our inquiries here, an important question 
arises, to wit : Does creation reveal its author as Infinite 
and Perfect ? Can an effect acknowledged to be finite 
reveal its cause as infinite ? If so, this revelation cannot be 
found in the mere extent of the Divine works. Suppose that 
the creation of one world only would have revealed its author 
as finite. How many such worlds would it take, to reveat 
him as infinite ? Nothing short of a number absolutely in- 
finite, which is an absurdity. It is the height of absurdity, 
therefore, to reason, as is commonly done, from the mere 
extent of creation, which is still acknowledged to be finite, 
to the absolute infinity and perfection of its author. Yet we 
cannot say, a priori, that God may not stand revealed in his 
works, as the Infinite and Perfect.' That he is thus revealed 
therein, has been shown above. The fact we are bound to 
admit, although we may not be able to designate ihe grounds 
of our convictions in respect to it. It not unfrequently hap- 
pens, that in the presence of certain facts, our Intelligence 
affirms absolutely particular conclusions, as the logical 
antecedents of the facts, while we may be at a loss to deter- 
mine the particular elements in view of which those conclu- 
sions are affirmed. For such a reason, the conclusions 
ought to be to us none the less valid. I once read of a 
painting which presented with great perfection of execution, 
a human countenance. Every one that contemplated the 
countenance, felt, as his eyes were fixed upon it, a sort of 
horror creeping over him. Let us suppose, that no one 
could designate the elements in the picture which sustained 
to those feelings the relation of cause. No one would, for 
that reason, doubt the existence of such elements in the 
object. So, in the presence of the universe, God stands 
revealed to our minds as the Infinite and the Perfect. 
Though we may not be able to find those elements in his 
works, which thus reveal him, shall we, for that reason, 



IDEA OF GOD. 313 

doubt the reality of the revelation ? In the case of the 
painting referred to, it was found that the author had pro- 
duced it, after perpetrating the crime of murder. Hence he 
had pencilled in the countenance, the internal feelings of his 
own mind. So God, for aught we can know, a priori, may 
have somewhere in his creation, pencilled out the indications 
of his own Infinity and Perfection, pencillings which the uni- 
versal Intelligence discovers and correctly interprets, with- 
out, in most instances, being able to distinguish. This I 
believe to be the real state of the case. God, in his works, 
stands revealed as the Infinite and Perfect. The elements 
in his works, by which he is thus revealed, may not yet have 
been designated. Yet they will be. It becomes us, as phi- 
losophers and Christians, to continue our observations till the 
elements under consideration are recognized and presented to 
the world. 

Reasons why these Elements have not yet been designated. 

Permit me here to suggest the inquiry, whether, mainly 
for the three following reasons, almost, if not quite all efforts 
to find the ground of the conviction under consideration, per- 
tainino; to the Divine Infinity and Perfection, have proved 
unsuccessful : 

1. The two forms above designated, in which the idea of 
God is developed in the Intelligence, have not been recog- 
nized and separated from each other. Hence, considerations 
adapted only to reveal God as the unconditioned and abso- 
lute cause, have been adduced to prove his Infinity and Per- 
fection. Failing to establish this last point, they have been 
rejected, as having no bearing whatever upon the question of 
the Divine existence. 

2. An attempt is always made to demonstrate the reality 
of the Divine existence and perfections by a formal process 
of logical deduction, instead of recognizing the belief of these 
truths as among the primary and necessary intuitions of 
Reason, and then falling back upon those intuitions to find 
their chronological antecedents, in other words, the grounds 
of such affirmations of Reason pertaining to God. 

3. The argument for the Divine Infinity and Perfection 
has almost invariably taken a wrong direction, to wit, the 
element of immensity in the external creation. This im- 
mensity is limited, finite. The infinite is not found here. 
Hence, many have concluded, that no evidence at all exists 



314 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

in creation, of the Infinity and Perfection of God. So Kant 
reasons ; and because this one element of creation does not 
reveal God as the Infinite and Perfect, he argues, that crea- 
tion presents no evidence at all, even of the Divine existence, 
— a most strange and illogical conclusion. Where, then, shall 
we expect, a priori^ to find those pencillings in view of which 
the Intelligence affirms the Divine Infinity and Perfection ? 
Not surely in the external material universe, but in that 
" which is made in the image of God," the universe of mind. 
Among the laws of its inner being, mind will find the indica- . 
tions of the Infinity and Perfection of its author, if it finds 
them at all. 

Foundation of the Conviction that God is both Infinite and 
Perfect. 
We are now prepared for a direct consideration of the 
grounds of the affirmation of the Intelligence, that God is both 
Infinite and Perfect. 

1. The first that I notice is a fundamental element in the 
idea of God, as the unconditioned and absolute cause of all 
that exists conditionally. Whatever the Intelligence neces- 
sarily apprehends as finite, it as necessarily regards as con- 
ditioned. In tracing back every chain of causes and efi^ects 
to the first, or unconditioned and absolute cause, we naturally 
and necessarily ask, in respect to everything given as finite, 
What caused that ? We put this question with no more 
doubt that it had a cause, than we have that no event exists 
without a cause. The Intelligence does not, and cannot re- 
cognize itself, as in the presence of the unconditioned and 
absolute, till it finds itself in the presence of the Infinite and 
Perfect. This I believe to be one of the chief sources of the 
conviction in our minds in respect to God as the Infinite and 
Perfect. 

2. In the presence of this idea of God, the Intelligence 
intuitively and absolutely affirms the total absence of all 
evidence of the idea, that God is finite and imperfect. 
Hence the Intelligence cannot affirm either of God. Fur- 
ther, from the depth of our inner being there proceeds a 
solemn prohibition against imputing to God any imperfection, 
natural or moral, without positive evidence. Everj'^ one 
feels the presence and force of that prohibition, why attends 
properly to the admonitions of his own nature. 

3. To the idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, our 



IDEA OF GOD. 315 

entire mental constitution is in conscious harmony. It is 
only in the presence of this idea that the Mind is capable of 
the degree of virtue and happiness which its nature con- 
sciously demands. We cannot exist without a consciousness 
of such facts pertaining to the fixed correlation between the 
changeless demands of our own nature and the reality of 
God, as the Infinite and Perfect. Our nature shudders and 
shrinks back with horror at any other conception of God 
than this. The idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, is 
the great want of universal Mind. To every other want, in 
the universe within and around us, a corresponding reality 
exists. To know the demands of the nature of anything, 
is to know with perfect certainty the reality of corresponding 
objects in creation aiound. Shall we suppose that the great 
overshadowing want of universal Mind is the only neces- 
sity to which no corresponding reality exists ? Now, I 
believe that the conscious correlation of our immortal powers 
to the idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, and to that 
idea alone, is one of the chief grounds of the atfirmations 
of our Intelligence, under consideration, pertaining to God. 

4. In all minds, also, there exists a conscious conviction 
that God should be nothing else than the Infinite and Per- 
fect. Morally perfect we know he ought to be. So the 
Intelligence affirms, that having voluntarily given existence 
to beings whose nature demands nothing else than Infinity 
and Perfection in him, he ought to be to those beings what 
their nature, as he has constituted it, demands. Hence, also, 
from the depths of our being, there not only comes up a 
solemn prohibition against attributing finiteness and imper- 
fection to God, but a solemn admonition to esteem, adore, 
and worship him as nothing else than the Infinite and Per- 
fect. Every one who properly listens to what is passing in 
the inner sanctuary of his own mind, w^ill recognize what I 
mean in these declarations. 

5. Worship is recognized by universal Consciousness, as a 
changeless demand of our nature. Yet every one feels that 
he does that nature infinite violence, when he worships any- 
thing but divinity, and divinity in harmony with any idea 
opposed to that of God as the Infinite and Perfect. What 
does such a law of universal Mind indicate ? Certainly, 
that God, the only object of worship, is nothing else than 
the Infinite and Perfect. In the consciousness of such de- 
mands in our nature, the Intelligence perceives at once, 



316 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

as their logical antecedent, the reality of Infinity and Per- 
fection in the author of that nature. 

6. One other ground of conviction under consideration 
yet remains to be designated, a ground more fundamental, if 
possible, than any yet pointed out. Mind is everywhere 
revealed to itself, not only as destined to an immortal exist- 
ence, but as possessed of powers involving in their own 
nature the elements of endless progression. Every power 
and susceptibility of our nature possesses this one character- 
istic, a fixed adaptation to a state of endless growth and 
expansion. Of this characteristic of his own immortal powers 
every one is really, though he may not be reflectively, con- 
scious. What do such powers indicate in respect to their 
author ? Nothing else than Infinity and Perfection. As 
Mind descends to a contemplation of its own powers and 
susceptibilities, and perceives in them all the elements not 
only of Immortality, but of endless growth and expansion 
in thought, feeling, and action, here it finds those pencillings 
in which it reads, with the most profound and solemn con- 
victions of its being in the presence of eternal realities, the 
Infinity and Perfection of the author of its existence. 
Mind knows, that in the endless growth and expansion of 
its immortal powers, nothing but Infinity and Perfection in 
God can meet the eternally enlarging demands of those 
powers. In view of its own powers and destiny. Mind reads, 
with the most undoubted conviction, the Infinity and Per- 
fection of the eternal guardian and disposer of the immortal 
interests involved in the possession of such powers. 

Such, as I conceive, are the grounds of the affirmations 
of the universal Intelligence in reference to God, as the 
unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally 
exists, and as the Infinite and the Perfect. 

Nature of the Argument above adduced. 
A question may arise in some minds, in respect to the 
nature of the above argument pertaining to the idea of God, 
w^hether it is an a priori or a posteriori demonstration of the 
Divine existence and character. It w ould hardly belong to 
either, according to the common definitions of the words, 
and yet it, in an important sense, partakes of the nature of 
both. The argument, unlike those commonly presented, 
does not attempt a direct and logical proof of the validity of 
the idea of God. It assumes, in the first instance, the va- 



IDEA OF GOD. 317 

lidlty of the idea, as a first and absolute truth of Reason ; it 
then, in the next instance, falls back upon the idea itself, 
for the purpose of finding its chronological antecedent, or 
the phenomena and truths in view of which the validity of 
the idea is affirmed by the Intelligence. 

This I suppose to be the only proper method of conduct- 
ing the argument. What, as in the present case, my Intelli- 
gence gives me as truth, I am not at liberty to doubt, even 
while searching for the grounds of my convictions of its 
truth. Let it be understood, then, that the design of the 
above argument is to present the grounds of the universal 
conviction in respect to the existence and perfections of 
God. If I have been successful, I have, in reality, given 
the highest demonstration of the objective validity of the 
idea of God. 

Relation of the Idea of God^ above elucidated^ to all other 
Ideas of Him. 
The two forms of the Divine idea above elucidated, to 
wit : God, the absolute and unconditioned cause of all that 
exists conditionally, and God the Infinite and Perfect, are the 
great foundation principles in the science of Theology. 
Whatever is correctly affirmed or denied of God, must be 
done in the light of these two principles. In their light 
every other truth of God, and all his works, all the princi- 
ples of his eternal government, stand revealed to our minds. 
Do we, for example, affirm omnipotence, omnipresence, om- 
niscience, justice, goodness, truth of God, it is because these 
perfections are involved, as essential elements, in our idea of 
him as the Infinite and Perfect. Do we legitimately deny 
anything of God, it is because that, in attributing it to him, 
we should affirm finiteness and imperfection of him. The 
same holds true of everj' form in which any particular cha- 
racteristic is to be attributed to God. That conception of 
any particular characteristic which most fully harmonizes 
with the fundamental elements involved in the idea of abso- 
lute Infinity and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God ; while 
every other, and especially every opposite form, is to be de- 
nied of him, 



318 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



THE IDEA OF A SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY. 

Theology defined. 
Theology is the science of God, systematically evolved in 
the light of the fandaniental ideas of Reason pertaining to 
him, above elucidated. This will be admitted by all in whose 
minds the idea of science is developed at all, as a correct, 
and the only correct definition of the subject. 

Postulate, Axioms, 6^^c., in Theology. 

The great postulate, the foundation principle, in the sci- 
ence, as shown above, is the idea of God as the uncondi- 
tioned and absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Perfect. 

The axioms in the science are the two following : 

1. Whatever is involved as an essential element of our 
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, and of Infinity 
and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God. 

2. Whatever, if attributed to him, would contradict the 
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, or affirm finite- 
ness or imperfection of God, is to be denied of him. 

All particular attributes, the definitions in the science, are 
then to be elucidated in the light of the postulate and princi- 
ples, or axioms, above presented. 

Kind of Proof pertaining to each particular Attrihute. 
The proof, and the only proof, to be presented, that any 
particular characteristic is to be affirmed of God, is a demon- 
stration of the fact, that such characteristic is essentially in- 
volved in our conception of him as the unconditioned and 
absolute cause, or as the Infinite and Perfect. This is the 
kind of proof peculiar to all sciences — proof resting upon 
the principle of contradiction. While it is shown that such 
or such an attribute, or any particular form of a given at- 
tribute, must be affirmed of God, else we deny of him the 
prerogative of unconditioned and absolute cause, or the cha- 
racteristics of Infinity and Perfection, we have presented 
absolute demonstration of the fact, that such attribute be- 
longs to God. 

This Science to he evolved in the light of the Works of God, 
material and mental, and of the Teachings of Inspiration. 
This science also should be evolved in continued reference 



IDEA OF GOD. 319 

to the works and Word of God. In developing the attributes 
involved in the principles under consideration, we should not 
go to the Bible to prove that such a characteristic is to be 
affirmed of God, but the teachings of Inspiration should be 
adduced, to show the correspondence between the affirma- 
tions of science and the Word of God. Thus the science 
under consideration would be, as far as it extends, a conti- 
nued commentary upon the sacred volume. The perceived 
harmony of the two would give additional force to the 
influence of each upon the mind. Facts in the external ma- 
terial creation will not be adduced in proof of the reahty of 
particular attributes in God, but creation itself will be thrown 
before the mind, as the work of God, in the light of all the 
attributes involved in the ideas of him as the unconditioned 
and absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Perfect. The 
great truth to be developed is, What may be accomplished 
through matter, under the guidance and control of a being 
possessed of all the perfections invoh^ed in the principles 
under consideration } Of course, no attempt will be made 
to determine particular developments. But this great 
thought will be thrown into distinct visibility before the 
mind, to wit : that all that is possible, through matter, the 
attributes involved in the ideas of Infinity and Perfection, 
enable the Most High to discern and accomplish. 

In respect to Mind, this science should bs evolved in cor- 
relation to all the powers and susceptibilities of our nature. 
The fundamental object of the science relating to Mind 
being mental development, in harmony with the idea of God 
as the unconditioned and absolute cause, and as the Infinite 
and Perfect, under the influence of these ideas, it should be 
so evolved that the natural result upon the Mind, of a know- 
ledge and contemplation of the system, would be endless pro- 
gression and expansion of the powers of thought, feeling, 
and action. The demands of the logical department of our 
nature will be fully met, when each attribute, and each cha- 
racteristic of every attribute, are seen to follow, as logical 
antecedents of the id^as of God under consideration. The 
demands of the Sensibility will be met, when the Divine per- 
fections rise before the contemplation in such a manner, as is 
best adapted to excite all those feelings and sentiments which 
the finite is bound to cherish towards the Infinite. The de- 
mands of the voluntary powers are met when the Divinity 
stands in distinct contemplation before the Mind, as the pro- 



320 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

per, and only proper object of the Mind's supreme choice, 
obedience, love, worship, and delight. 

In the development of this science, another great thought 
would be thrown into distinct visibihty before the Mind, to 
Mat : What will be the destiny of Mind, what its future de- 
velopments, under the teachings, guidance, and control of 
such a being ? Here, also, no attempt would be made to 
determine particulars. The contemplation, on the other 
hand, would be turned upon the destiny and developments 
of Mind, viewed in the general point of light, in the con- 
templation of the facts under consideration. 

Theology^ JVatural and Revealed. 

Theology, with truth and propriety, has been separated 
into two departments, natural and revealed. 

Natural Theology.^ as a science, is a systematic development 
of those truths pertaining to the attributes, character, and gov- 
ernment of God, involved in the ideas of God, considered as 
the unconditioned and absolute cause, and as the Infinite and 
Perfect, 

The idea of a Divine revelation, as far as it pertains to God, 
is, God the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God the 
Infinite and Perfect, revealed in fixed and perfect correlation to 
the necessities of the beings to whom that revelation is made. 
Nothing in such revelation would contradict either of the 
principles under consideration, nor any of the logical conse- 
quences of the same. As far as natural Theology and reve- 
lation pertain to the same things, there will be a perfect 
harmony between them. Each will elucidate and confirm 
the teachings of the other. Revelation will extend the 
sphere of mental vision in relation to divinity and humanity 
both, far beyond the reach of natural theology. But the natu- 
ral and revealed will harmoniously blend into one beautiful, 
all-comprehending unity. Such will be the character of any 
real revelation from God. Such a revelation the sacred vol- 
ume claims to be. Its friends have no fear, in meeting the 
question of its divine origin, in the light of these principles. 
When the science of theology shall be developed in a form 
truly scientific, then the harmony between the natural 
and revealed, and of the teachings of both with the dictates 
of universal Reason, will become distinctly visible to the 
world. The accomplishment of this object is a want yet, as 
it appears to me, to be met, in the science of theology. 



IDEA OF GOD. 321 

Difference between Mystery and Absurdity in Theology. 

The terms mystery and absurdity are in very common use 
in theology. Doctrines presented as affirmed by the 
direct teachings of Inspiration, are often objected to, on the 
ground of intrinsic absurdities imputed to them. When the 
element of absurdity is imputed to a given doctrine, the doc- 
trine is often defended, on the ground, that mystery is a com- 
mon element of all religious truth, and that consequently the 
fact that any doctrine is very mysterious, is no valid objection 
against it. It belongs to the province of Intellectual Philo- 
sophy to discriminate between a real mystery and absurdity. 

Absurdity defined. 
When all the elements contained in the subject and predi- 
cate of a given proposition are fully and distinctly known to 
the mind, and when those terms are said to agree, while the 
Intelligence clearly perceives, from the nature of the elements 
which they represent, that they cannot agree, or when they 
are affirmed to disagree, while the Intelligence perceives and 
affirms absolutely that they do and must agree, here w^e have 
a contradiction, or absurdity. If God himself should directly 
require us to affirm as true, what our Intelligence thus affirms 
to be false, we could not comply with the requisition. A 
professed revelation containing any such proposition as the 
above, we cannot admit to be a real revelation from the Infi- 
nite and Perfect. The Intelligence, on no authority what- 
ever, can affirm any such proposition of God, while it still 
affirms his Infinity and Perfection. 

Mystery defined. 
On the other hand, let us suppose that the subject and 
predicate of a proposition, each embraces some elements 
w^hich we know, and some which we do not know, and that 
in the proposition the subject and predicate, in view of the 
elements which we know, are affirmed to disagree, and on 
the ground of the unknown it is affirmed that they agree, 
the admission of the truth of such a proposition involves no 
contradiction. The grounds of the agreement under con- 
sideration would be a mystery. As such we might reasona- 
bly admit the truth of the proposition, on sufficient testi- 
mony. 



322 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Mystery and Absurdity defined in another Form. 
Further facts are sometimes presented to us in such a light, 
that their logical antecedents, or the condition and ground of 
their existence and explanation, are also given at the same 
time. On the other hand, facts of the highest moment to us 
may be revealed as facts merely, while the condition and 
ground of their existence are wholly unrevealed and unknown 
to us. In the former instance, if a proposition is presented 
to us, affirming, as the logical antecedent of the facts referred 
to, what our Intelligence affirms can never be such antece- 
dent ; in other words, when any proposition contradicts . 
the necessary intuitions of our Reason, the Intelligence, on 
no authority whatever, can admit its truth. The proposition 
is absurd. On the other hand, when facts are affirmed, as 
in the second instance above specified, we can admit their 
reality as facts, while the ground of their existence is un- 
known, that is, mysterious to us. There is a mystery., but no 
absurdity in such a case. The proper application of these 
principles will be found to be of fundamental importance in 
the science of theology. 

Fundamental Characteristics of real Revelation from God. 
We have in our hands a book which claims to be a reve- 
lation to man from the Infinite and Perfect. The question 
arises. In what light shall we regard the book ? By what 
principles shall we test its claims } The following may be 
laid down as decisive principles to be rigidly applied under 
such circumstances. 

1. As far as the revelation pertains to the same subjects 
which fall within the legitimate domain of natural theology, 
as above defined, there will be a perfect harmony between 
the natural and revealed. 

2. In this revelation, the Infinite and Perfect will stand 
revealed in full and fixed correlation to the condition and 
fundamental wants of man, circumstanced as he now is, as 
affirmed by the testimony of human consciousness. The 
consciousness which every man, that truly knows himself 
and God, has that the truth of what is affirmed is a change- 
less demand of l>is nature, in his present and prospective con- 
dition, will be to him the highest evidence that the record 
is and must be true. 

3. Such a revelation will present a resolution of the great 



IDEA OF GOD. 323 

questions of human duty and destiny, the solution of which 
is one of the great wants of man. 

4. The claims of the record, as a revelation from God, 
will be urged upon us, by all the external evidence which, 
in all other cases, distinguish truth from error. 

Such a record the sacred volume professes to be. Its 
friends, as before remarked, have no fear, in submitting the 
claims of Christianity to the most rigid test of the principles 
above elucidated. 

Revealed Theology defined. 
We are now prepared for a distinct definition of revealed 
theology. As revealed theology includes the teachings of 
natural, it may be defined as the systematic development^ in 
the light of some one great central idea or principle^ of the 
truths of Inspiration pertaining to the character and govern- 
ment of God. In its most comprehensive signification, it 
would include the entire system of divine truth, pertaining 
not only to God exclusively, but to human duty and destiny, 
in both of which God stands revealed to our minds. Every- 
thing pertaining not only to the character and government of 
God, but to the subjects of that government, so far forth as 
their revealed duty and destiny would illustrate the principles 
of the Divine administration, would be comprehended in a 
system of revealed theology, using the words in their most 
extensive application. Such, as I supjDOse, is theology. 
Its systematic development upon principles purely scientific, 
still remains as one of the great wants of humanity. This 
want will remain unmet, till the true conception of such a 
system shall be distinctly developed in the minds of philoso- 
phers and theologians both. If the hints above given shall 
tend to this result, I shall feel that no small service has been 
done to the cause of truth. 

Defects of Method in the common Systems of Theology. 
There is no department of human thought where .system, 
scientifically developed, is not a great want of the human 
mind. In no other department is this want more deeply felt, 
than in theology. There is no subject of thought which, 
when developed upon scientific principles, does not become 
an object of interest. Theology, in itself the most interesting 
and important of all subjects, will, when as a system it shall 
be developed upon profoundly scientific principles, possess 



324 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

an interest which shall, as it ought to do, overshadow all 
other subjects. Every system of truth has some one great 
central truth or principle about which all the others revolve, 
and in the light of which they appear as harmonious parts of 
one great whole. No subject of thought is scientifically 
developed, until it is evolved in conformity to the conception 
above given ; in other words, till it is systematically evolved 
in the light of fundamental ideas. To no subject are the 
above remarks more fully applicable than to that of theology. 
Theology, like every other department of human research, 
has its great central truths and principles about which all 
other truths and principles pertaining to the same subject 
revolve, and in the light of which they all appear as parts of 
one great whole. Unless this is true, to speak of the sci- 
ence, or system of theology, is to use words without meaning, 
or to " speak of things that are not, as though they were." 
In the definition given of revealed theology, I have not desig- 
nated the particular truth or truths, about which, as I sup- 
pose, the entire system of revelation revolves, and into which 
all its diversified parts blend into one sublime and harmoni- 
ous unity. I leave it to theologians who may condescend to 
receive a hint from a source so humble, to find, in the light 
of it, this great central position, and from it to give to the 
system of theology a truly scientific development. The man 
is yet to rise, who, by a " wisdom which cometh from above," 
shall do this great work for humanity. That man, when his 
work shall come to be appreciated, will be ranked among the 
greatest benefactors of his species. 

But 1 have wandered much farther than I expected, when 
I commenced this seeming digression from my subject, which 
is, the defects of method in the common systems of theology. 
On this subject, as a friend of truth as well as philosophy 
(for philosophy as well as theology is deeply concerned in the 
subject upon which I am speaking), I may be permitted to 
speak my thoughts with all freedom. 

What then are the errors, particularly of method, in the 
common systems of theology } Among these I notice the 
following : 

1. An error frequently noticed in the preceding part of this 
Chapter, and which I need but hint at here, is the method of 
proving the Divine existence. If in the first step an error 
of method is committed, the whole subsequent procedure is 
marred, and the system of theology is developed in a manner 



IDEA OF GOD. 325 

not fully satisfactory to the mind. If the question in respect 
to the Divine existence is not settled to the full satisfaction of 
the mind, the proof pertaining to each particular attribute 
will be in a corresponding degree unsatisfactory, and a feel- 
ing of uncertainty, in respect to that which the mind really 
knows with more certainty than almost anything else, a feel- 
ing somewhat at least bordering on scepticism, will creep 
over the mind, in relation to the whole system. Now there 
are, as it appears to me, three prominent errors of method in 
the prevailing treatises on theology, in respect to the subject 
before us= 

The first is the fact, as stated above, that the Divine exist- 
ence is not recognized as a truth already known and affirmed 
by the human Intelligence, and that the only proper method 
of demonstration of that truth, is by a method purely psycho- 
logical, that is, by falling back upon the conviction itself, and 
finding the real facts on which it truly rests, in the depths of 
the Intelligence. When the Intelligence has affirmed any 
truth with profound conviction on any subject, the only 
real demonstration of that truth which can be presented to 
the mind, is to throw into distinct visibility, the real facts in 
view of which the reality of the truth was affirmed. Now 
theologians, instead of recognizing this fact in respect to the- 
ology, have gone beyond the circle of the mind's convictions, 
to find some facts in the external world from which, as a logi- 
cal consequent, the truth of the Divine existence would fol- 
low. The mind of course returns from its researches more 
unsatisfied than when, from the centre of real illumination, it 
wandered abroad in search of light. 

Another error which I repeat here, is not recognizing the 
two distinct and prominent forms in which the idea of God 
is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit : God the un- 
conditioned and absolute cause, and God the Infinite and 
Perfect. Hence considerations perfectly demonstrative of 
the validity of the idea in one form, but which are without 
force in reference to the other, are adduced without discrimi- 
nation of their real bearing. The Mind perceiving that the 
argument has no real weight to prove the existence of God in 
the form in which it expects it to prove it, assumes that it 
has no real bearing upon the subject, and thus becomes dis- 
satisfied with the whole argument on the subject. This is a 
natural consequence. Hence many a student in theology 
has had occasion to confess that he never doubted the reality 
15 



326 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the Divine existence, till he turned to the arguments ad- 
duced in books and the theological recitation room to 
prove it. 

The other error is in attempting to deduce the evidence of 
the infinity and perfection of God from the extent and laws 
of the world of Matter, instead of that of Mind. On this 
point I have already said so much that I shall not enlarge 
here. 

2. The second, and the great error of method, in the 
common (so called) systems of theology, is an almost, if 
not quite, total want of scientific development. I know of no 
professed system of theology, the mode of presentation and 
development of which accords with any proper conception 
of a system of truth, much less with a true definition of real 
science. There is and can be no real system where there are 
not one or more great central truths or principles which im- 
part unity and harmony to the whole. There is and can be 
no such thing as a system evolved in such a manner as to 
realize the idea of science, in which the relations and pro- 
perties of a given subject are not systematically evolved in 
the light of fundamental ideas. 

Now where is the system of theology that is developed 
in any degree of conformity to the idea of system or science 
as above announced, or to any other proper definition of the 
idea of a system scientifically expressed ? I know of no 
such system. What is the mode of procedure in such sys- 
tems } The first thing proposed is to prove the existence of 
God. The next step is to take up each particular attribute, 
and by a separate course of argument, prove that such 
attribute is to be aflarmed of him. Now this can be shown 
in a moment to be a most unphilosophical procedure. 

In the first place, if the proposition first proved, to wit, 
God exists, does not in itself involve a real demonstration of 
the reality of his particular attributes, the proposition abso- 
lutely amounts to nothing ; for it is a demonstration of the 
existence of a God without attributes — that is, the existence 
of no God at all. For a God without attributes is, in fact, no 
God. 

If, on the other hand, the demonstration of the proposition, 
God exists, does involve in itself a corresponding proof of 
his particular attributes, then the only proper subsequent 
scientific procedure is, to evolve analytically each particular 
attribute as involved in the proposition already demonstrated. 



IDEA OF GOD. 327 

To attempt in any other form, by a separate course of argu- 
mentation, a subsequent demonstration of each particular 
attribute, is a most unphilosophical and unscientihc proce- 
dure — a procedure which really, as shown above, nullifies 
all that went before. 

Further, when the proposition, God exists, is proposed as 
a subject of demonstration, the first thing to be done is to 
define the terms used, especially the term God. Now if 
this term is not so defined as to involve his particular attri- 
butes, the term means nothing, and the demonstration is null 
and void. If the term is so defined as to evolve the particu- 
lar attributes, then, when the proposition, God exists, has 
been demonstrated, the reality of each attribute is involved 
in the demonstration, and the only subsequent procedure 
really philosophic, scientific, and reasonable, is to evolve 
each particular attribute as thus involved in what has already 
been proven. To attempt, by a separate course of argumen- 
tation, to demonstrate the reality of any particular attribute, 
is to confess the futility of the previous demonstration. In 
fact, if the common procedure is the correct one, we have 
not proved that God, according to any proper definition of 
the term, exists, till we have presented a formal demonstra- 
tion of the reality of each particular attribute. For a God 
destitute of any essential attribute is not God. 

In proving the proposition, God exists, according to the 
two forms above stated, to wit, God the unconditioned and 
absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect, we have 
done what every demonstration should do — that is, demon- 
strated a proposition which involves every particular attri- 
bute, and which has given us a great central position, from 
which the entire system of theology may receive a purely 
scientific development. The whole sphere of vision be- 
comes as luminous as heavenly light. 

3. The third general defect that I notice in the common 
systems of theology, is the total unsatisfactoriness of the 
arguments adduced to prove the reality of particular attri- 
butes. Suppose we have fully satisfied our minds of the 
validity of the two forms of the idea of God presented in 
this Chapter. Our attention is turned to a particular attri- 
bute. We see at once that we must afl^rm this attribute of 
God, or deny of him the prerogative of unconditioned and 
absolute cause, or impute to him finiteness and imperfection. 
The reality of the attribute as a characteristic of God, thus 



32S INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

becomes demonstrably evident. In affirming the attribute of 
him, every department of our nature is satisfied. The de- 
mands of the logical department are fully met. The scien- 
tific and philQsophical ideas also receive a most full and 
delightful realization. 

On the other hand, let us suppose, that having proved the 
proposition, God exists, we attempt, by a new and separate 
course of argumentation, to prove the reality of some parti- 
cular attribute — the Divine omnipotence, for example. What 
should we naturally expect from such a procedure ? Just 
what, in fact, we shall find — arguments perfectly unsatisfac- 
tory and inconclusive. The nature of the argument, as pre- 
sented in a system of natural theology, may be thus stated, 
and these present the strongest arguments that can be met 
with : 

1 . The fact and the extent of creation. 

2. The fact that God now sustains and governs the uni- 
verse, particularly the physical. 

Now, here are effects undeniably finite. From them it is 
argued, that their cause must be infinite, a palpable violation 
of a fundamental principle of logic, a principle universally 
admitted, to wit, that no legitimate conclusion ' is more 
extensive than the premises from which it is deduced. 
Hence it is, that the Mind does not and cannot perceive any 
force in the argument ; and as this is the best that can be 
adduced in the same direction, a feeling of dissatisfaction 
and doubt arises in respect to all arguments to prove the 
divine Infinity and Perfection. 

When the testimony of Inspiration is adduced in confir- 
mation of such arguments, the feeling of dissatisfaction ex- 
perienced in the presence of the first attaches to that of the 
second, and the result very probably is, that feelings more 
allied to scepticism than joyful confidence and faith, creep 
over the mind, and it may be, mar its peace and purity. 

4. I mention one other difficulty. According to the 
common method of developing truth in theology, we have 
no proper tests which we can apply to determine the ques- 
tion, whether any particular attribute shall be affirmed of 
God, or the particular forin in which it shall be affirmed. 
If we assume the idea of God as the unconditioned and 
absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect, as the 
great central idea about which the entire system of truth 
pertaining to God, his character and government, is to re- 



IDEA OF GOD. 329 

volve, and in the light of which each particular truth is to 
be explained, we have a plain and sure test, a standard to 
M^hich we can apply in all cases in determining what attri- 
butes and characteristics we shall affirm or deny of God, and 
the light in which we shall affirm or deny them. The great 
question to be asked in each instance is, Must we affirm this 
particular attribute, and must we affirm it in this or that 
particular form, or either deny of God his prerogative, as the 
cause unconditioned and absolute, or assert of him finiteness 
or imperfection ? 

But according to the common methods of theologizing, 
when we take up any particular attribute, we have nothing 
in what has gone before, or in what is to follow, to which 
we can appeal as a standard or test, to determine what attri- 
butes, or what forms of particular attributes, we are to affirm 
or deny of God. The entire system of theology is thus 
rendered vague and indefinite, and the truth makes no deep 
and palpable impression upon the mind. No other result 
can follow from such a method of evolving the truths of 
theology. 

Use of the common Treatises on Natural Theology. 
The question is often asked. Of what real utility are the 
common treatises on natural theology — such, for example, 
as that one so celebrated of Dr. Paley } To me such 
treatises appear really worse than useless, if presented as 
grounds of proof of the existence of God, particularly as 
the Infinite and Perfect. How many persons have said, 
" I never doubted the reality of the Divine existence, till I 
sought for a proof of it in Paley's Natural Theology." If, 
on the other hand, such works are referred to, as sources of 
beautiful and striking illustrations of the " handiwork of 
God," thus awaking in us a sense of the Divine w^isdom and 
glory, they may be read with great interest and profit. This, 
as I conceive, is their appropriate, and only appropriate use. 

CONCLUSION. 

I must here take my leave, for the present, of the inquirer 
after truth in this field of vast and solemn thought and con- 
templation. If we were never to return to it again, to renew 
our researches, I should part with him with the deepest 
regret. If, however, the inquirer has become imbued with 



330 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 

a love of the science which we have investigated, and has 
understood and appreciated the bearing of its principles, it 
may be that the time is not far distant when I shall behold 
him upon elevations, and traversing fields of thought which 
my own powers never enabled me to reach. 

One thing has cheered me on in these interesting and mo- 
mentous investigations — the thought that they were all 
legitimately tending in one fixed direction, to God as the 
Infinite and Perfect. 

Here I leave the inquirer, with the fervent hope, that at 
last, in the unveiled presence of that infinite, all-perfect, and 
Eternal One, we may again meet ; that Eternal One, '' in 
whose presence there is fulness of joy, and at whose right 
hand there are pleasures for evermore." 



THE END. 



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